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Résumé 
En concevant que toute société a deux clivages dominants, l’un social et l’autre 
partisan, cette thèse développe une théorie sur le changement institutionnel. L’hypothèse 
initiale, selon laquelle les groupes sociaux créés par le premier clivage agiront pour 
restreindre le changement institutionnel et que le changement aura lieu lors de l’émergence 
d’un groupe partisan capable de croiser le clivage social, fut testée par les processus traçant 
les changements qui furent proposés et qui ont eu lieu au sein des conseils nominés en 
Amérique du Nord britannique. Ces conseils furent modifiés un bon nombre de fois, 
devenant les chambres secondaires de législatures provinciales avant d’être éventuellement 
abolies. La preuve supporte l’hypothèse, bien qu’il ne soit pas suffisant d’avoir un groupe 
partisan qui puisse croiser le clivage qui mène le changement : un débat partisan sur le 
changement est nécessaire. Ceci remet aussi en cause la théorie prédominante selon 
laquelle les clivages sociaux mènent à la formation de partis politiques, suggérant qu’il est 
plus bénéfique d’utiliser ces deux clivages pour l’étude des institutions.  
Mots-clés : clivage sociétal, clivage social, clivage partisan, gouvernement responsable, 
gouvernement représentatif, gouvernement responsable de parti, conseil du roi, conseil 
souverain, conseil du gouverneur, conseil des nominés, conseil législatif, chambre haute, 
deuxième chambre, conseil exécutif, assemblée, législature, parlement, groupe social, parti 
politique, mouvement politique, constitution.   
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Abstract 
By conceiving of any society as having two dominant cleavages, one ‘social’ and 
one ‘partisan’, this dissertation develops a theory on institutional change.  The initial 
hypothesis that social groups created by the former will act to restrain institutional change 
and that change will occur when a partisan group emerges that can cross the social cleavage 
was tested by process tracing the changes which were proposed and which occurred to the 
appointed councils established in British North America.  These councils were modified a 
number of times, becoming second chambers in the provincial legislatures, and were 
eventually each abolished.  The evidence found supports the hypothesis, though it is not 
sufficient to have a partisan group that can cross the cleavage drive change, a partisan 
debate over the change was necessary.  This also challenges the prevailing theory that 
social cleavages lead to political party formation, suggesting the benefit of using these two 
cleavages for the study of institutions.   
Keywords : societal cleavage, social cleavage, partisan cleavage, responsible government, 
representative government, responsible party government, king’s council, sovereign 
council, governor’s council, nominee council, legislative council, upper chamber, senate, 
upper house, second chamber, executive council, assembly, legislature, parliament, social 
group, political party, political movement, constitution. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Legislative institutions in a democracy are invariably designed around principles of 
representation.  Once chosen, these principles often remain static in spite of frequent 
demands for change, usually advanced under the populist label of ‘reform’.  What factors 
restrain institutional change and, by extension in the instances where change has proven to 
be possible, how are these restraints overcome and what then drives successful institutional 
change?  Nowhere is this question more relevant than for ‘upper chambers’, as these bodies 
were often created in the distant past, when ideas surrounding representation may have 
been markedly different.1 
Change has long been advocated for the upper chamber in Canada’s federal 
legislature, the appointed or ‘nominee’ Senate.  Just seven years after the first four of the 
British provinces in North America agreed to form a federation2, the new federal lower 
chamber, the house of commons, gave unanimous consent to hold a debate on whether or 
not to entirely restructure the senate, including a different method of selection based on 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘senate’, ‘upper chamber’ or ‘upper house’ and ‘second chamber’ will be used interchangeably 
throughout this dissertation.  In most legislatures which have two deliberative bodies, the one whose 
representational structure comes closest to representing the population on a proportionate basis is always 
given the label ‘first’ or ‘lower’ chamber (or house), though it can have any number of formal appellations 
(e.g. House of Representatives in the U.S., National Assembly in France).  The label ‘first’ for this chamber is 
because this chamber is seen as closest to the people (Patterson et Mughan 1999a, 2), though one can make a 
case that the label second  is what drives the terminology and is indicative of the fact that often these second 
chambers are seen as junior or secondary (Massicotte 2001, 151).  ‘Senate’ is the most common formal 
appellation which countries have used to designate the chamber least oriented to representation by population 
and ‘second chamber’ is the most common term used for it in the political science literature.  The hierarchical 
designation ‘upper house’ arose in countries where that chamber was used to represent aristocratic birth.  The 
one exception to the afore stated rule is the Netherlands, where the name of the popularly elected chamber is 
Tweede Kamer, translated as ‘second chamber’, and the formerly aristocratic chamber or ‘upper house’ is 
Eerste Kamer or ‘first chamber’ since it came into existence first and is feudally closest to the King. 
2 ‘Federal’ systems have two formal levels of government to which the constitution has assigned different or 
shared legislative and administrative responsibilities, though Riker  suggests that three conditions must be met 
for a country to be considered federal namely that “(1) two levels of government rule the same land and 
people; (2) each level has at least one area of jurisdiction in which it is autonomous; and (3) there is some 
guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own 
sphere”.  Federalism, not unlike bicameralism, was designed to be a divided government and in the process 
create a series of checks on authority, ensure a diversity of representation and protect minority and sectional 
interests. Unitary systems of government have only one constitutional level of government; though there are 
invariably local governments (such as city governments) established and assigned delegated authority to 
deliver certain services by the central government. 
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proportional representation, the allotment of six senators for each province, and the fixing 
of terms of eight years, staggered to ensure the election of only half the Senate at a time.  
Over the next 132 years, there have been repeated attempts to alter this second chamber in 
Canada’s bicameral3 parliament, with many proposals repeating elements from this attempt 
at institutional change – a ‘reform’ bandwagon that reached a fevered pitch by the end of 
the 20th Century with 28 serious initiatives to reform the Senate including a country-wide 
referendum on a constitutional amendment endorsed by Conservative Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney and all the provincial premiers (see Stilborn 2003).  Yet, the Canadian Senate 
remains virtually unchanged from the design agreed to by the Fathers of Confederation at 
Quebec City in 1864 (Hicks 2007; Seidle 1991; Ajzenstat 2003). 
The most common explanation among Canadian scholars for the lack of change is 
the restraint imposed by the Canadian Constitution (Smith 2003a, 2003b; Forsey 1984; 
Mallory 1984; Franks 1987).  To get around this constraint, the Conservative government 
of Prime Minister Stephen Harper proposed legislation aimed at incremental changes 
within what the government claims is the purview of the federal parliament.  The two 
pieces of legislation were first introduced in 2006 as the ‘Senate Appointment 
Consultations Bill’ and the ‘Senate Tenure Bill’, which were to have the combined intended 
effect of transitioning the Canadian Senate to an elected chamber using single transferable 
voting with eight year terms (see Hicks et Blais 2008).4  Neither of these made it through 
parliament, even though the government bills were reintroduced the following session with 
several changes that had been proposed in the Senate.  At the end of the next parliament, in 
2010, the government again introduced two reform bills, and this time the new ‘Senatorial 
Selection Bill’ only proposed giving the provinces the option to hold elections for senators 
to be appointed from their province.  Again these bills did not make it through parliament.  
                                                 
3 ‘Bicameral’ legislatures are simply those which have two distinct assemblies within a single legislature – 
though Trivelli (1975) offers a more extensive definition which includes separate sessions for each assembly, 
separate vote outcomes, and different membership.   
4 One of the Prime Minister’s advisors, Senator Hugh Segal, also introduced a motion in the second chamber 
(Senate Motion No. 6, 2007) which would have in the alternative held a country-wide referendum on 
abolition.  It did not proceed. 
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They have since been combined into a single ‘Senate Reform Bill’ that is currently before 
parliament.  It would allow provinces to hold elections and change senators’ terms to nine 
years.  The government of Quebec, Canada’s only predominantly francophone province, 
has stated repeatedly that it will challenge any legislation that alters the Senate in court if it 
does make it through parliament. 
Constitutional rules for changing institutions of governance do generally require 
higher levels of concurrence than what is required for ordinary pieces of legislation, but this 
is not unique to Canada and they are rarely prohibitive.  Additionally, it was only in 1980 
that the federal government was told by the supreme court of Canada in a reference related 
to that government’s attempt to change the Senate (Re: Upper House) that there were 
constraints on the federal parliament’s capacity to alter the Canadian senate.  That Liberal 
government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was under the impression that the federal 
parliament had the capacity to change this body on its own; and previous governments had 
done so unimpeded when they added additional senators for new provinces in the 
federation or when it imposed mandatory age 75 retirement on senators.  Clearly, the 
Canadian Constitution cannot be the primary explanation for why institutional change has 
not occurred in Canada. 
The other explanation in the older Canadian literature for why its Senate had not 
been changed was that the upper chamber itself is able to block change (Ross 1914; 
MacKay 1963; Kunz 1965; Campbell 1978).  But in 1982, an amending formula was put in 
place which set the formal constitutional rules for altering the “powers of the Senate and 
the method of selecting Senators”, “the number of members by which a province is entitled 
to be represented in the Senate and the residence qualifications of Senators” (Constitution 
Act, 1982, s.42) under the less onerous formula of requiring only the agreement of seven of 
Canada’s ten provincial legislatures plus the federal house of commons.5  The Senate’s veto 
                                                 
5 Other institutional arrangements, such as abolition of the Senate or ending the monarchy, require all 10 
provincial legislatures to concur. 
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on any such change would only be a temporary or ‘suspensive’ 180 day delay (ibid., s.47), 
a clause specifically placed in the Constitution to allow for ‘reform’ of this institution.6 
While the Canadian Senate may appear at first glance to have been impervious to 
change, when looked at from its institutional origin, this and other upper chambers in 
Canada have undergone significant changes over time.  The first colonial or ‘provincial’ 
settlements, under both the French and the British in North America, had an appointed 
nominee council of officials and landed gentry to advise and assist the governor.  Later an 
elected lower chamber was added to this and, then, in each of the British provinces of North 
America, the upper chamber was subsequently divided into two, thereby separating the 
executive and legislative function, leaving the appointed legislative council as the upper 
chamber in the bicameral legislature.  Responsible government was later obtained in each 
province, which saw the executive council transformed from being a body of appointed 
elites who enjoyed the confidence of the governor to a body of leading elected members of 
the lower chamber who enjoyed the confidence of that chamber.  In the provinces of 
Canada and Prince Edward Island, the upper chamber was successfully transitioned to 
election.  The province of Ontario was the first to eliminate its upper chamber while 
Quebec’s chamber reverted to an appointed body at Confederation, which itself was a 
major institutional redesign in the creation of a federal country. In the provinces of Nova 
Scotia and Quebec, the upper chamber’s veto was reduced to a suspensive one; and 
abolition of the upper chambers was accomplished successively in Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Quebec.  So, institutional change has 
occurred in Canada. 
While these were the changes that have been made to the nominee councils in 
Canada, numerous other changes were unsuccessfully proposed.  These events offer an 
                                                 
6 After the 180 days, the house of commons need only adopted the resolution or ‘address’ calling for the 
change again.  Other items require the agreement of all ten provincial legislatures (see chapter 3). 
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opportunity to examine institutional change in terms of constraints and in terms of what 
factors may lead to change.7   
The initial hypothesis for this dissertation is that societal cleavages directly impact 
on institutions and thus affect change.  We are interested in two types of societal cleavages, 
both of which can become embodied in legislative chambers through their representational 
function, and these we define as being either ‘partisan’ or ‘social’.  Partisan cleavages 
emerge due to differences over ideology or policy or simply through coordinated political 
action aimed at public office.  In the modern era this cleavage is reflected in a legislature by 
organized political parties, but the time period we are interested in includes the rule by a 
governor and elites, and the so-called era of ‘loose fish’ when political parties were 
emerging but as yet unstructured so membership was seen to be fluid.  In each of these eras, 
it is believed there will be an identifiable partisan cleavage that will emerge surrounding 
governance at the elite level.  Social cleavages, on the other hand, arise from group identity 
markers and form around race-ethnicity, class, religion and/or linguistic differences, 
whether ascriptive or constructed.  Both of these cleavages, it is posited, influence elite 
political behaviour and will either align or be cross-cutting.    Figure 1.1 models how this 
interaction is expected to work. 
Normative theory will be advanced in support of a change to the institution of 
governance being advocated by any group.  It is expected that inertia and path dependency 
will neutralize normative arguments, no matter how compelling or temporally popular they 
might be.  What will determine the success or failure of the proposed change, it is posited, 
is the interaction of elite representatives on the two sides of the competing societal 
cleavages. 
  
                                                 
7 This dissertation is concerned with formal state ‘institutions’, specifically the deliberative bodies which have 
been constitutionally constructed as bodies ‘corporate and politic’ and assigned legislative or administrative 
responsibilities for governance.  In French civil law, bodies that are able to take a collective decision and act 
as a single unit are referred to as a ‘personne morale’. 
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Figure 1.1: Societal Cleavages and Institutional Change 
 
More specifically it is hypothesized that: 
1) In instances where change occurs, the partisan cleavage will have created one 
group that can overcome resistance to change from the other group. 
2) The social cleavage is a stronger determinant of the success or failure to achieve 
change than the partisan cleavage. The more socially divided a society is, the 
harder it is to achieve institutional change. 
3) When the social cleavage and the partisan cleavage are aligned, change does not 
occur because the ‘out’ and ‘in’ groups each have a different preference for change 
and each  distrusts the change proposed by the other social group. 
4) When the social and the partisan cleavages are cross-cleavages: 
a. If change is seen to come from a social group it will be resisted as outlined 
in 3. 
b. When proposals for change come from only one side of the partisan 
cleavage, it is successful only if the group has elite representatives from 
both sides of the social cleavage among its leadership. 
c. Change that is supported by both sides of the partisan cleavage will be the 
easiest to achieve. 
5) The changes to institutions that will encounter the least resistance will be those that 
do not significantly alter the balance between social group representation in either 
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6) A change to the balance in social group representation in an institution or in the 
overall structure of governance will only be possible if a shift in the social cleavage 
has occurred that either (i) reduces or eliminates the social group’s perceived need 
for representation or (ii) replaces the cleavage with another as the dominant social 
cleavage in that polity. 
As noted, partisan cleavages are the result of the fluid and overlapping fault-lines of 
ideology, policy preferences and political participation, and each can be expected to drive 
demands for institutional change. 
  The period covered by this research, from the time of the royalist French and 
British regimes up until the abolition of upper chambers in each of Canada’s provinces in 
the 20th century, allows for an examination of institutional change in both non-democratic 
and democratic environments.  The methodological approach is to process trace each 
change: changes that were successful and seriously considered proposals that were 
unsuccessful.  It is by placing these changes in their temporal and societal context that the 
interaction of social and partisan forces can be examined.  The research is then reported in 
this dissertation as an historical narrative which is used to test the propositions advanced in 
the original hypotheses. 
I. Institutional Change 
With the dominance by behaviouralism of political science beginning in the 1960s, 
the study of institutions fell out of favour.  It has begun to see a rebirth, beginning in 
economics (North 1990).  This ‘new institutionalism’ emerged in opposition to the focus on 
individual action and choice (March et Olsen 2006). 
New institutionalism has not been focused on institutional change, but rather on 
how much institutions resemble each other, something surprising given their differing 
histories and contexts around the world and across time (DiMaggio et Powell 1983; Meyer 
et Rowan 1977; Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson et Boli-Bennett 1977).  
There is a “superstability to institutions because they are woven into an historical 
and normative fabric” (Rhodes, Binder et Rockman 2006, xvi).  They generate social rules 
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and norms (North 1990).  And proposals for institutional change will provoke resistance, 
even in the face of a rational level of objective knowledge, because they are seen to violate 
these strongly held norms.  As Halal puts it: 
“Institutional concepts are so deeply engrained in the prevailing social 
culture that they seem inviolate, accepted as matters of faith, the only 
reasonable way the world is presumed able to function effectively.  
Institutional rules are the sacred cows of society” (Halal 2009). 
The natural resistance of institutions to change has resulted in such metaphors as 
‘immortal’ (Kaufman 1976), ‘frozen’ (Lipset et Rokkan 1967) and the permanent and 
imperceptibly changing ‘coral reef’ (Sait 1938).  Institutions endure because they become 
taken for granted through repeated use (Berger et Luckmann 1967; DiMaggio et Powell 
1991) or are seen as ‘legitimate’ through the endorsement of authoritative individuals and 
organizations (Meyer et Rowan 1977).  Path dependency (Thelen 1999; Pierson et Skocpol 
2002) and inertia (Williamson 1985, 1975; North 1990, 1994) further restrain change. 
This focus on stability and constraint make the insights offered by this literature 
poorly suited to explain institutional change (North 1981; Orren et Skowronek 1994; 
Powell 1991).  For the political sociologist, change is understood to be the result of an 
exogenous shock that disrupts the constraining all-powerful state (Krasner 1984; Thelen et 
Steinmo 1992).  From the rational choice perspective, institutional change is expected to be 
driven by actors who want to maximize their own benefits in that institution or in a larger 
game (Tsebelis 1990) or a governing party which see its future success threatened (Boix 
1999; Rokkan 1970).  Normative ideas can also be expected to have resonance across 
borders leading to transnational movements for change (Hall 1993; Blais, Dobrzynska et 
Indridason 2004). 
Even in the management literature, where institutional studies have experienced the 
greatest growth, it is generally acknowledged that “neo-institutional theory is weak in 
analyzing the internal dynamics of organizational change that links organizational context 
and intraorganizational dynamics” (Greenwood et Hinings 1996, 1023).  The neo-
institutional theory across disciplines is helpful in pointing to the distinction between 
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convergent and radical change, and by signalling the contextual dynamics that precede the 
need for change (Dougherty 1994, 108; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay et King 1991; Oliver 
1992).  Convergent change is the fine tuning of an existing orientation and will happen 
slowly and gradually (Pettigrew 1985, 1987 #683).  Radical change happens swiftly and 
impacts on virtually all aspects of an organization (Tushman, Newman et Romanelli 1986). 
The management literature offers some support for this particular study is in its 
growing interest in how cultures restrain institutional variation.  There is an emerging belief 
that the reason institutions are so similar by country is because of cultural habits.  The 
population ecologists tend to discount the possibility of radical change due to 
environmental determinism (e.g. Hannan et Freeman 1989).  They do not consider the 
impact of a socially divided society on institutional design, but it is a logical extension of 
this reasoning that change should be easier (and not harder) in a society with a social 
cleavage. 
Strategic choice theorists originally focussed on the role senior actors in an 
institution played in bringing about change (e.g. Child 1972; Tichy 1983; Tichy et Devanna 
1986).  This has been replaced by a focus on choice and context (Hrebiniak et Joyce 1985; 
Ven et Poole 1988).  Yet, in spite of pleas for a theoretical understanding of how contextual 
pressures are interpreted and responded to by organizational actors (Ven et Poole 1988; 
Hrebiniak et Joyce 1985; Pettigrew 1985), they have “not been successful” (Ven et Poole 
1988, 327) and are of “limited help” (Ledford, Mohrman et Lawler 1989, 4). 
While institutional change at the level of formal institutions of governance is a still 
largely under-theorized field, the Marxist perspective on institutional change had long 
suggested a connection between social cleavages and institutional change.  Capitalism’s 
need for workers to produce wealth for the bourgeoisie, which benefits from these workers 
due to the protection afforded by the state, would lead to the workers altering the state 
institutions through revolution.  Similarly, identity classifications imposed by empires in 
colonial settings, but equally by the creation of administrative units in federations, construct 
‘minorities’ and ‘nations’ that challenge the institutional structures of the empire or state 
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(Anderson 1983; Brubaker 1996).  From the Marxist perspective, the social cleavage 
created by state control will create an ‘out’ group that will drive change, though it is 
significant that change is expected to be achieved through revolution given resistance to 
change by the ‘in’ group. 
II. Societal Cleavages 
The word cleavage has its origins in mineralogy, where a crystallized substance can 
be split along definite planes, and in geology, where fissures in rocks develop perpendicular 
to stress in the earth’s surface.  While the term is often used loosely in politics to describe 
any political division in society, whether it be between groups or within groups, the use of 
the word in this dissertation is specific to the dominant division in a polity that forms 
around partisan identity and social identity. 
Groups are constructs and, as individuals, people form identities in conjunction with 
other citizens from any number of group boundaries, which are imposed upon them by 
others or adopted by themselves, and reflect anything from shared physical characteristics 
to similar beliefs (Anderson 1983).  As a result, individuals are often members of a number 
of groups.  Cleavages result when individuals form political divisions large enough to 
create in-groups and out-groups. 
Lipset and Rokkan, in their seminal work on the emergence of political parties, 
begin with the following observation about a sociological approach to political behavior: 
“It has often been suggested that systems will come under much heavier 
strain if the main lines of cleavage are over morals and the nature of human 
destiny than if they concern such mundane and negotiable matters as the 
prices of commodities, the rights of debtors and creditors, wages and profits, 
and the ownership of property.  However, this does not take us very far; 
what we want to know is when the one type of cleavage will prove more 
salient than the other, what kind of alliances they have produced and what 
consequences these constellations of forces have had for consensus-building 
within the nation-state.”  (Lipset et Rokkan 1967) 
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By searching out that single dominant social cleavage, they concluded that there were four 
cleavages that could explain the emergence of political parties in the post-reformation and 
post-industrial revolution period in Western Europe: owner/worker, church/state, 
urban/rural and centre/periphery. 
Cleavages are not only based on sociological attributes, they can also form around 
long-standing issues in a political system (Dahl 1966).  Thus the very nature of governance 
will form cleavages.  These partisan cleavages will shift over time as the issues change and 
political parties realign (Butler et Stokes 1974; Sundquist 1973; Burnham 1970). 
In the voting behaviour literature, the idea that social identity can influence 
individual support for political parties has a long tradition (Lazarsfeld, Berelson et Gaudet 
1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld et McPhee 1954; Alford 1967; Butler et Stokes 1974; Hout, 
Manza et Brooks 1999).  Class, gender, age, race and religion all have been found to affect 
voting.  Social connections lead to different concerns and these concerns, in turn, are 
mediated by both social and political attitudes (Vanneman 1980; Schwartz et Huismans 
1995; Brint 1984; Kelley et Evans 1995; Weakliem 1991, 1993 #625).  Shifting values can 
render social cleavages less relevant (Inglehart 1987, 1990, 1997). 
Using both a psychological and sociological approach to voting behaviour, 
behaviouralist scholars argue that social identity is at one end of a ‘tunnel of causality’ with 
party identification at the other end (Campbell, Converse, Miller et Stokes 1960).  Though 
they acknowledge that depending on the question a researcher is exploring and the 
circumstance that the voter finds herself in, either sociological or psychological factors can 
be used to explain vote choice.  This funnel idea has been developed by Miller and Shanks 
(1982, 1996; 1990, 1991) into what Sniderman et al. (1990, 121) call a “consensual 
approach” to the study of voting.  A causal chain of variables are organized in temporal 
order with personal characteristics at the beginning, partisan factors along the chain and 
vote choice at the end.8 
                                                 
8 This approach has been criticized on the grounds that voters have different cognitive abilities and access to 
political information, so where items appear on the causal chain can have significant theoretical and 
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At the elite level, social groups will come to be represented variously by some 
formal mechanism or because a person in public office comes to be identified by a group as 
representing them, either because they share the characteristics of the group or because they 
advance the group’s interests within the institution (Pitkin 1967; Pennock et Chapman 
1968; Schwartz 1988; Rehfeld 2006).  Thus members of governing bodies, even appointed 
ones, can come to reflect the social cleavages in a society, even if there is no formal 
mechanism for group representation. 
That more than one cleavage can impact on politics at the same time and in 
competition was first noted by Rokkan (1967), in the same book where he and Lipset 
identified the dominant cleavage which impacted on national political party formation in 
Western Europe.  More recently, the idea of ‘cross-cutting cleavages’ has been used to 
analyse shifts in party politics (Burnham 1970; McKay 1983).  That cleavages are in 
competition can also be found in Marx (1970), who famously argued that religion needed to 
be abolished because it competed with ideology, dismissing the former as illusory.9 
III. Conceptualizing Institutional Change 
This dissertation is interested in changes to formal institutions of governance.  The 
latter have rules that must be followed in order to alter their structure.  The rules, which 
govern the structure, are almost always referred to as ‘constitutional’, though it will vary by 
society whether there is a written constitution that formally sets an amending formula or 
unwritten conventions.10  These constitutional constraints often set the bar for decision 
making for institutional change higher than that used for ordinary legislation and are likely 
unique in some way to each country based on its history and its social contract.  While 
                                                                                                                                                    
methodological consequences (Sniderman, Griffin et Glaser 1990; Sniderman, Brody et Tetlock 1991; Rivers 
1991; Achen 1992). 
9 Organized religion has equally vilified ideology and has frequently been in direct competition with secular 
ideas and policies (Dawkins 2006). 
10 A written constitution, which may include a formal constitutional document, and judicial interpretation of 
that document form part of the constitution.  As for conventions, these are usually not subject to any judicial 
interpretation, though in Canada the courts have been asked to identify their existence through the somewhat 
unique mechanism of a `reference` (see Chapter 3). 
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these rules may include the population through a mechanism such as a referendum, the 
exercise will be driven by elites.11 
The elites, who most directly control the process, are members of the various 
legislative and executive bodies; in a federation there will be actors at both the federal and 
the provincial level often involved, and in an empire there is a similar multilevel process 
that will be involved in making changes.  Given the period being examined, the bodies 
which control the change and the rules will vary by time.  Our unit of analysis is therefore 
our cases. 
The theory to be examined in this dissertation is that societal cleavages create 
groups that drive and restrain institutional change.  While it is accepted that inertia and the 
formal decision rules established for changing that institution, including but not limited to a 
constitution, will naturally constrain change, these are posited to be passive forces.  Societal 
cleavages are conceived of as active forces. 
Constitutional and institutional arrangements bound second chambers and operate 
on two levels, as they in the first instance set specific rules for chamber design and 
alteration, and in the second they are themselves the objects of change.  Altering a second 
chamber will mean altering the constitution and the institutional arrangements.  Institutional 
arrangements include, but are not limited to, bicameral and federal relationships and 
structures. 
It is assumed that there will always be agitation for change emerging from 
transnational ideas for system design and from home-grown ‘reform’ initiatives aimed at 
                                                 
11 There are instances where referendum can be initiated by the public itself and the legislature is entirely 
removed from the decision making process by the constitution, but even in these instances it will be an elite-
driven exercise as administrative hurdles, such as the collection of signatures and the financing and 
management of a campaign, require direction and structure.  These instances are by definition driven by 
partisan cleavages.  Additionally, in all cases, elites, who are members of an institution, are likely to offer 
opinion on the merits of change that impact on their institution, which for voters, and some members of other 
institutions involved in the approval process, will be seen as informed advice or heuristics.  The rules for 
constitutional change are different in each instance, so the use of referenda or an institution only having  a 
suspensive veto over its own alteration are simply variations on the rules and thus fall under the rubric of the 
constitutional and institutional arrangements, which bound the institution and its change. 
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the institution in question, but as these require a critical mass of support for adoption they 
are naturally offset by inertia.  What will be operating within a second chamber are any 
number of possible partisan and social relationships and the exact ones will be the result of 
this chamber’s representational structure as determined by the constitutional and 
institutional arrangements.  If a social cleavage is reflected in the representational role for 
this chamber it is expected that this will be an institution which produces the greatest 
resistance to its own change. 
This approach to cleavages is distinct from the approach used by other scholars to 
study cleavages (e.g. Jenkins 1983; Alber 1995; Hout, Manza et Brooks 1999).  Our 
interest is not in how cleavages emerge and operate at the societal level (membership, 
boundaries, etc.), but in how these cleavages are reflected in the institution in question and 
how they may be restraining or driving actors. 
The third difference with other scholarship is that we do not require either a 
connection between political organization and the group or an awareness of group identity 
at the societal level. What matters is that there be an acceptance of the existence and 
relevance of a social cleavage by the elites, and while it is expected that elites will have 
some sensitivity to actual cleavages in their society, this need not be accurate or informed 
by particular events.  It is the salience of the social cleavage and thus the need for the 
institution to represent the out-group(s) which is significant as it will dictate an actor’s 
individual and collective agency on behalf or in opposition to that group. 
It is not important that a second chamber has performed its function as a chamber in 
which sectional interests are protected – a point of discussion with respect to senate reform 
in a number of countries – but simply that the sectional interests that were identified as 
worthy of formal representation continue to be relevant to the elites who control the 
mechanisms for institutional change. 
The relevance of cleavages is expected to vary by time and by polity.  For example, 
class may be seen to have less significance now as a social group identifier in many 
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industrialized societies, but in a developing society it may just be now emerging as a 
relevant cleavage.  Shifts may also happen to diminish one cleavage, such as race and 
religion, only to see it replaced with a parallel cleavage, such as language and culture, using 
almost identical group identity boundaries, as was the case in Quebec. 
The existence of a social cleavage will result in representational demands within a 
legislature and are often the reason federalism, bicameralism and constitutionalism12, 
jointly or severally, are adopted by some polities.  It is also evident that second chambers, 
as the bodies least likely to be predicated on population proportionality are the legislative 
chambers in which these cleavages are most likely to obtain formal or informal 
representation.  Therefore, once a cleavage is accommodated and certain groups are 
identified as worthy of representation in an upper chamber is likely more difficult to alter 
that chamber unless either there is a shift in the relative significance of the groups or 
alternately, the cleavage persists but the changes proposed do not substantively alter the 
representational balance. No group, even an in-group, will ever be entirely satisfied with an 
institution.13  Nevertheless, ‘out-groups’ are expected to be the most desirous of change.  
So change will be proposed by ‘out’ social groups.  But it is expected that this will be 
opposed by ‘in’ social groups out of a lack of willingness to share power and the spoils that 
go with political influence.  It is also expected that each social group will mistrust the 
motives of the other when changes are proposed. 
In the absence of social groups opposing change, change will happen along the 
direction of the partisan cleavages in society, namely ideology, policy preferences or 
                                                 
12 ‘Constitutionalism’ in the modern sense refers to the institutional restraints on power, which usually require 
a written constitution (though McIlwain 1947 illustrates a number of other historic and less formal dimensions 
of restraint of which the more modern model can be seen to include separation of powers, electoral 
accountability and a system of checks and balances).  It was the Philadelphia Conference of 1787 which 
resulted in the combination of bicameralism, constitutionalism and federalism for the purposes of governance 
for the uniting provinces, re-labelled states, of America. 
13 In-groups, and even some out-groups, might prefer the status quo because change poses a large number of 
unknowns and the current configuration has provided them with some success, but even in this 
conceptualization the argument is that these groups would prefer change but are opting for a less desirable 
outcome based on the available win-set (Tsebelis 2002). 
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political participation. Ideology will pressure for institutional change which can facilitate a 
set of outcomes which reflect that group’s advocates’ conceptualization of how society 
should function. Policy preferences will encourage actors to favour configurations which 
permit the implementation and protection of specific policies.  Membership in a loose 
political organization or a more formal political party will orient the actors towards an 
institutional design which favours their organization’s or party’s control of that institution 
and of governmental power more generally.  The three dimensions of partisan cleavages are 
not always clearly delineated, given the fact that many actors are influenced by more than 
one partisan interest and the fact that these preferences will often work in tandem.  
Nevertheless, they do offer various dimensions upon which to examine institutional change. 
IV. Cases 
The cases studied in this dissertation are the nominee councils of the royalist French 
and British regimes.  By process tracing changes made to them up until the abolition of the 
legislative councils in each of Canada’s provinces, we have eight separate appointed 
chambers which underwent a half dozen changes each.  The French province of Canada 
became the province of Quebec under the British.  It was then divided into Upper Canada 
and Lower Canada, which was subsequently reunited as the province of Canada in 1840.  
At Confederation in 1867, a federal legislature was created and Upper Canada or Canada 
West became Ontario and Lower Canada or Canada East became Quebec.  Newfoundland, 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Manitoba provide the additional 
provincial nominee councils. 
The first goal in theory formation through process tracing is to “identify apparent 
causal mechanisms and heuristic rendering of these mechanisms as potential hypothesis for 
future testing” (Bennett et George 1997, 5).  Bennett and George argue that a single case 
study, especially one studied across time, offers a great deal of internal data for the testing 
of independent variables (see also George et Bennett 2005).  King, Keohane and Verba’s 
(1994) admonition that researchers should always try to increase their ‘N’, even in 
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qualitative research, commends the examination of more than one province in this fashion.  
Studying eight councils from inception to abolition over a period of 300 years, in both 
undemocratic and democratic eras, has a symmetry that ensures events are not artefacts of a 
single era or polity, which is important for this specific research inquiry given that societal 
cleavages are the independent variable.  
There are three schools of thought concerning institutional development in the 
colonies of the British empire, all of which conceive of change being imposed on a colony 
rather than obtained locally.  The first is legalistic and argues that the local institutions were 
the product of British constitutional law with only small variations allowed for by law 
(Payne 1904; Speyer 1906; Fiddes 1926; Keith 1928, 1929, 1930, 1936; Simmons 1949; 
Young 1961; Lee 1967; Evatt 1967; Bell 1968; Madden et Fieldhouse 1985, 1987).  This 
would suggest a common design for every ‘settler’ colony and a common design for every 
‘ceded’ colony, and we know neither to be the case. 
The second explanation is that the institutions given to a colony were the product of 
the prevailing model of the day at the colonial office in London (Jeffries 1938, 1972 #672; 
Stahl 1950; Heussler 1963; Swinfen 1970; Lloyd 1996).  While this allows for variations in 
design, as officials adopted new models, it does not explain why changes occurred at 
different times in different provinces.  Neither does the third explanation, political 
economy, which prescribes specific institutions for the colonies based on British economic 
interests and the need to create economically viable colonies (Wakefield 1914; Wright 
1962; Winch 1965; Armitage 2000). 
V. Overview of Dissertation 
The chapters in this dissertation that follow, reflect specific stages in the 
dissertation, as each period was examined chronologically and each province examined 
separately.  Each chapter was initially written following that stage of research.  The 
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findings of each chapter thus reflect the evolution of the original hypothesis due to the 
evidence observed in that set of process traces. 
Following this chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature.  As there is 
little consideration of how social cleavages may interact with institutions, the literature 
concerning variously social cleavages, institutionalism, colonial studies and bicameralism 
is reviewed.  This review points to a number of voids, both in Canada’s historic 
institutional record and in the political science discipline’s approach to and understanding 
of institutions, particularly upper chambers. 
An examination of the constitutional rules that governed Canada through the eras in 
question is reviewed in chapter 3.  This includes a review of recent failed attempts to 
amend the constitution.  In light of this review, the third proposition above was revised. 
In Chapter 4, the institutional changes for the French province of Canada, which 
became the British province of Quebec is reviewed, from the 1600s to the 1791.   During 
this period there was no partisan cleavage based on ideology or political participation, and 
while there were elite interests with respect to policy outcomes, these could not be seen to 
form a partisan cleavage.  The French under British rule resisted change.  From 1791 to 
1840, a partisan cleavage is seen to emerge in each half of the province.  In both the 
provinces of Lower Canada, later Quebec, and Upper Canada, later Ontario, where 
institutional change is seen to come from the ‘out’ social group, it is resisted. 
In Chapter 5, the union and, thus, the united province of Canada is examined.  Not 
surprisingly, this union resulted in shifts in the partisan cleavage and altered the social 
cleavage.  These shifts are examined closely and their implication for institutional change 
from 1840 until 1867 is explored.  This was a period of significant change, where 
responsible government emerged and the upper chamber was changed from an appointed 
chamber to an elected.  The changes occurred when a partisan group emerged on one side 
of the partisan cleavage that could cross the social cleavage. 
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In Chapter 6, the evolution of institutions in the British provinces of Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland are examined.  Each of these 
provinces obtained bicameralism, division of the nominee council into executive and 
legislative and responsible government at different times.  In the case of Prince Edward 
Island, it transitioned to an elected upper chamber.  In all provinces the group that achieved 
these changes was able to claim to have support from both sides of the social cleavage.  In 
New Brunswick, however, which was divided socially between Acadians and English, there 
was no evidence that the ‘out’ group advocated either institutional change or for the status 
quo. 
Chapter 7 deals with Confederation and reviews the shifts in the social and partisan 
cleavages that Confederation wrought.  This provides the context for the two subsequent 
post-Confederation chapters.  The chapter also briefly examines the creation of the 
Canadian Senate, which, as a continuation of developments in Chapter 5, provides further 
evidence in support of our claim that institutional change occurs only when a partisan group 
emerges to drive that change which can cross the social cleavage. 
Chapter 8 examines the Canadian province of Manitoba.  A principle argument in 
the colonial studies literature is that colonial institutions of governance were the result of 
British law and colonial office design, and as Manitoba was created by the Canadian 
government and followed the same provincial developmental trajectory from governor’s 
council to representative government to responsible government, this allows for an 
examination of these developments removed from direct British influence.  Manitoba also 
is the first province to abolish the upper chamber.  Again, change was possible when a 
partisan group emerged that could cross the social cleavage. 
Chapter 9 examines the four provinces that joined Canada with upper chambers and 
abolished them: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Quebec.  A 
movement in favour of abolition began at roughly the same time in each province (and each 
province shared ideas in support of abolition).  We find that for change to occur it is not 
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sufficient to have a partisan group that could cross the cleavage.  It was also necessary to 
have a partisan debate over change.  In Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Quebec, it 
was only when the two political parties differed that change occurred.  In New Brunswick, 
the parties agreed over change but it was only when it became an election issue that 
abolition occurred.  What is key is that change has to become a public issue over which the 
government has a stake.  
It should be noted that this ninth chapter fills a significant void in the historical and 
constitutional literature, being the first systematic examination and reporting on the 
abolition of upper chambers at the provincial-level in Canada. 
In Chapter 10, which is the conclusion, the model hypothesized at the outset is 
revised based on what was found during the dissertation. 
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 Chapter 2: Situating this Research 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate this study in the broader literature.  As there 
has been little consideration of the relationship between social cleavages and institutional 
change, it is necessary to draw on the literature concerning variously social cleavages, 
institutionalism, colonial studies and bicameralism.  The chapter is thus organized along 
those four groupings. 
I. Social Cleavages 
Social cleavages were first posited as explanatory factors for political party 
development by Lipset and Rokkan (1967).  They set three criteria for a cleavage to be seen 
to exist.  First, there must be a division in the society based on demographics or 
socioeconomics that separates one group of people from other members of the society.  
Second, members of one side of the cleavage must be aware of the characteristics that bind 
them and they must be willing to work together in the interests of the group.  Third, there 
must be some sort of institution available to provide organizational support to the 
advantage of one side of the social divide. 
They grouped cleavages as either territorial or functional.  The territorial cleavage 
defined the nation and was formed in the revolutions that swept Europe beginning in 
France.  The functional cleavage emerged through the industrial revolution and was 
interest-based. 
In response to the advantages each state provided to one side of the country’s 
cleavage, political parties emerged to further the interests of the other side.  Thus, in 
addition to the then popular Marxist identification of a class cleavage, they found three 
other principle cleavages that could explain the emergence of the opposition party: centre 
versus periphery, which stems from the conflict between the central nation building 
authorities and the resistance found in ethnically, linguistically and religiously distinct 
populations in the regions; urban versus rural, which stems from conflict between the 
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industrial class arising in cities and the traditional propertied class of the rural areas; and 
church versus government, which stems from conflict between the centralizing nation-state 
and the historically privileged church (Lipset et Rokkan 1967, 14). 
Kriesi et al. (1995) went on to argue that these ‘traditional’ cleavages had been since 
joined by ‘new’ cleavages of gender, generation, peace and war, and ecology.  Eckstein 
(1966) suggested that cleavages could be grouped into ‘segmental cleavages’, which align 
with sociological characteristics, ‘cultural divergence’, which in general reflects a group’s 
shared-world view, and ‘specific disagreements’, which align with policy.  Rae and Taylor 
(1970) also grouped cleavages within three categories, namely: ascriptive, which includes 
race and ethnicity; attitudinal, which includes ideology; and behavioural, which includes 
membership in an organization and political participation; and argued that these in turn 
should be evaluated on five dimensions based on the strength of connection felt by the 
community and how the membership divides its relationships between the three.  The three 
level categorization of cleavages, without the more complicated five dimensional 
interactions, was used effectively by Sisk (1995) in his examination of the democratic 
movement in South Africa.  Recent interest in cleavages has been in how cleavages lead to 
social movement formation (Klandermans 2001). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) found that once the parties initially formed, they became 
frozen, because these parties proved to have the capacity to absorb new issues within them; 
and Mair (1997) found that this continued through the 1980s and 1990s.  The implication 
was that the political and the social dimensions of a society might operate independently 
from one another, something that did not encourage an examination by scholars of how 
cleavages might impact on formal institutional structures. 
When Tocqueville (2000) observed the growing and irrepressible ‘tendency’ 
towards democracy, he noted that this will be tempered by a polity’s sociological 
circumstance.  Hanna Pitkin (1967) illustrated how societal groups can be represented in 
legislatures along four distinct dimensions – formal, descriptive, substantive and symbolic 
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representation – something that has become central to the examination of both demands for 
representation and the role legislators fulfill as political actors.  Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1977) 
has observed the existence of consociational democracies where ideological and ethnic 
conflicts have been resolved through elite accommodation.14 
None of these scholars suggest that there is a direct connection between social 
cleavages and the formal institutions of governance.  Lipset and Rokkan were interested in 
political party formation within those institutions.  Lijphart is only interested in the sharing 
of executive authority, and even recommends that the powers of second chambers be 
limited since “two legislative chambers with equal, or substantially equal, powers and 
different compositions is not a workable arrangement” in parliamentary systems and 
“smaller-unit overrepresentation in the federal chamber violates the democratic principle of 
‘one person, one vote’” (Lijphart 2004, 105).  Interestingly, Lijphart (1977) defined Canada 
as a non-consociational country which had consociational elements. 
There is evidence of cleavage accommodation in legislative institutions beyond 
political parties and cabinet power-sharing arrangements.  Htun (2004), in a survey of 50 
countries that officially accommodate representation based on gender, ethnicity or both, 
found that while it is through the political parties that gender representation is often 
facilitated, it is through the institutions themselves (e.g. set-aside seats or specific 
constitutional or electoral rules) that ethnicity most often finds participation. So it would 
seem logical, given the function of an upper chamber to provide an alternative 
representational role than the representation by population of the lower chamber, to 
examine the link between social cleavages and the emergence of bicameralism and the later 
abolition of upper chambers. 
                                                 
14 Lijphart’s (1977) countries of study, which he identified as consociational democracies, were the European 
plural societies of the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria. 
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II. Institutionalism 
The study of institutions was made less central to political science scholarship 
when, beginning in the 1960s, behaviouralism came to dominate the discipline.  At that 
time, it was widely concluded that “formal laws, rules, and administrative structures did not 
explain actual political behavior or policy outcomes” (Thelen et Steinmo 1992, 3).  The 
study of government institutions, constitutional issues and public law was deemed 
“unpalatably formalistic and old-fashioned” (Drewry 1996, 191), and it was argued that 
research that involved comparing and contrasting institutional configurations in different 
countries did not lend itself to the development of new explanatory theory (Eckstein 1963). 
The pendulum has swung back and it is now virtually unanimously accepted across 
the social sciences that institutions matter (Thelen et Steinmo 1992), with some going so far 
as to declare that “we are all institutionalists now” (Pierson et Skocpol 2002, 706).  Yet, 
while institutionalism has found a rebirth within political science, it does so often in 
competition with the rational actor perspective and the cultural community perspective 
(March et Olsen 2006).  Appointed bodies of governance, which evolved in response to the 
addition of democratic elements, offer a unique opportunity to examine these various 
threads.  As government institutions created by a constitution, they embody formalistic 
laws, rules and structures (see Drewry 1996).  As ‘structured institutions’, they are subject 
to both exogenous constraints and endogenous behaviour, two of the threads in rational 
choice (see Shepsle 2006).  When the history and norms of a polity become embedded into 
institutions, they cease being the creations of self-interested political actors and instead 
become independent entities that over time shape a polity by influencing actors’ 
preferences and identities (Rhodes, Binder et Rockman 2006, xxcv-xvi).  If these appointed 
bodies can be used to accommodate societal cleavages, separated from the public 
mechanism of periodic elections, then they should be uniquely situated to examine how the 
three dimensions – institution, actor and cultural community – combine and interrelate. 
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Institutionalism from a public choice, historical and sociological perspective each 
offer explanations, albeit limited, as to what drives institutional change.15  Change may be 
brought about by the rational actor who wants to maximize benefits in that institution or in 
a larger game (Tsebelis 1990), governing parties which see future success threatened (Boix 
1999; Rokkan 1970) or paradigm shifts stemming from normative transnational ideas 
(Tocqueville 2000)16.  These would each point to explanations for why governments might 
favour abolition of an upper chamber or specific selection mechanisms.  Additionally, it has 
been noted that ‘upper chambers’, even when elected, are conservative bodies (Campbell 
1978; Mastias 1999) that resist social change and possibly favour parties of the ‘right’, 
which would suggest that abolition might be ideologically driven.17 
III. Colonial Institutions 
Eckstein’s (1963) suggestion that comparing institutional configurations does not 
lead to the development of explanatory theory was an indictment of what is now sometimes 
referred to as ‘old institutionalism’, and is an appropriate criticism of the colonial studies 
literature.  But the period in time which so interested these scholars was a period of 
institutional change.  A re-examination of this period would seem to be warranted precisely 
because the scholarly approach was so limited. 
                                                 
15 There are other approaches to institutionalism, such as constructivist institutionalism and network 
institutionalism, but the public choice, historical and sociological approaches offer three alternative 
conceptions of what might be driving and constraining change (see Rhodes, Binder et Rockman 2006). 
16 See, also, Hall (1993) on how transnational ideas influence public policy and Blais (2004) on how they 
influence electoral system choice. 
17 Campbell (1978) has attributed the conservative nature of the Canadian Senate to elite accommodation that 
is facilitated by the prime minister appointing business and political elites.  This is disputed by Ross (1914) 
and more recently by Smith (2003a).  The French Senate is not appointed but rather indirectly elected by 
electoral colleges based on local election results, and the clerks of the French Senate suggest that the 
explanation for their senate’s dominance by parties of the right is due to the seat distribution favouring rural 
regions (interviews, December, 2007). 
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Colonial ‘Studies’ 
Colonial studies, which had its heyday in the 19th and early 20th Century, was 
preoccupied with institutional development and variation and its approach was decidedly 
historic and legalistic.18  This literature suggests a largely consistent developmental 
pathway for institutions of governance after the establishment of administrative authority, 
and this began with the addition of elected representatives, followed by institutional control 
over legislation and finally the emergence of responsible government (Keith 1928, 1930).  
Bicameralism was the norm, and was prescribed for any colony which had self-
government, though it could be abolished in “small communities, and in provinces where 
the business of legislation is mainly of a municipal description” as two chambers can be 
“cumbrous and needlessly expensive” (Todd 1880, 472), and this explanation is advanced 
for why smaller colonies began to use mixed councils beginning in the 20th Century 
(Wight 1946).  While technically those variations are unicameral, they are designed to 
maintain the function of bicameralism, namely review and restraint by appointed 
councillors in counterbalance to public interest being advanced by elected assemblymen. 
The composition of the colony in terms of race and ethnicity emerges in this 
literature as directly tied to representation in legislative councils, with federal and 
seemingly homogeneous societies turning to territorial representation and pluralistic 
societies turning to communal and corporate representation, though no explanation is given 
as to why this occurred.19 
Given the historical and legalistic approach to the examination of institutions, the 
simple assumption of these scholars is that institutions of governance were designed by the 
                                                 
18 As colonial studies is based largely on legal interpretation, there is a continuous evolution in terminology as 
the British and local courts came to define ‘colony’, ‘province’, ‘dominion’, ‘territory’ and ‘possession’ .  
Debates over the meaning of ‘dominion’ and ‘provincial’ still drives Canadian legal and political discourse.  
The most interesting treatment of this topic is Snow (1902), who traces the etymology of these terms and 
argues that these terms were historical synonyms. 
19 It is in this literature that the concept of pluralism first emerges, with Furnivall identifying in India: “A 
plural society; a society, that is, comprising two or more elements or social orders which live, side by side, yet 
without mingling, in one political unit”, making it different from confederate arrangements since “the 
constituent elements are not segregated each within its territorial limits” (Furnivall 1939, 449).  
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imperial government, and while they may have made alterations in design to suit local 
exigencies, the more important factor in the institutions assigned to a colony was the model 
of the day preferred by the colonial office. 
There are two exceptions in the colonial studies literature that do not suggest 
institutional design was the whim and wish of the imperial government.  Todd (1880), a 
Canadian parliamentary librarian, argues that colonial second chambers are entirely the 
product of local direction.  This absolutist view would simply on the face of it seem absurd, 
given the reality that institutional change had to be accomplished through an imperial 
mechanism.  It does not explain why nominated chambers evolved into upper chambers in a 
bicameral legislature in every single colony in British North America, though it might 
explain why they did so at such different times. 
Ward (1976) argues that elite demands in the colonies, elite direction in London and 
social agitation interacted to result in changes to colonial governance.  While this unique 
incorporation of the society alongside elite interaction is a definite improvement over the 
usual colonial studies fare, using agitation as a sole mechanism to measure societal interest 
is limiting.  It would also on the face of it appear flawed since if it was social agitation that 
resulted in institutional change, then the communities which had the greatest and earliest 
agitation should have had their institutions altered first and they did not. 
Given the era of this scholarship, it is riddled with racial judgments, but even in its 
commitment to variously European-, Anglo- and White-superiority, and its clear belief in 
racial determinism, there is one interesting claim advanced concerning institutional change.  
Wight (1946) has the only book exclusively devoted to legislative councils in the colonies.  
He too uses the commissions of appointment and instructions issued to governors as his 
research material so, like his contemporaries, he leaves the reader with the impression that 
the representational structure for the second chamber was imposed on a colony.  But he 
suggests that second chambers which include ethno-racial representation are harder to 
change than those where membership is based on a territorial franchise, and that while 
sectional and commercial interests are sometimes accommodated in second chambers, these 
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“divisions of which it is the constitutional expression go less deep” than race and ethnicity 
(ibid., 86).  Why this might be the case he does not posit, nor does he cite specific 
examples. 
Armitage (2000) offers a good overview of the historic, religious, geo-political and 
economic factors that drove the British to empire build during the various stages of 
expansion.  For a more detailed review of the literature surrounding the British colonial 
theories from 1570 to 1850, see the classic work by Knorr (1944).  Of particular note is the 
forward to Knorr’s review, written by Canada’s Harold Innis, whose own ‘staples theory’ is 
the classic political economy explanation for early social and political developments in the 
Canadian provinces (first explored in Innis 1923, 1930, 1940). 
At the heart of colonialism was the ‘mercantile’ system, a term made most famous 
by Adam Smith (1906), which is a system of political economy that uses restraint on 
imports and targeted exports to enrich the host country.  This policy became government 
policy during the Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell, which enacted the Navigation Act, 
1651 to prohibit foreign vessels from engaging in coastal trade.  The Act required that all 
goods imported from the continent of Europe be carried on either an English vessel or a 
vessel registered in the country of origin of the goods and was aimed primarily at curtailing 
the activities of Dutch seafaring traders, though it made no distinction by country (Gardiner 
1894).20  While most legislation adopted during the Commonwealth was repealed upon 
restoration of the monarchy, this law was retained and extended by the Staple Act, 1663, 
which required that all colonial exports to Europe be landed through an English port before 
being re-exported to Europe.  The Plantation Duty Act, 1673 placed the first duties on 
colonial exports, established the first tax collectors in North America and required that 
colonial exports be sent only to England.21 
                                                 
20 This led to the first Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-4. 
21 The Plantation Duty Act placed a penny tax on each pound of tobacco and a five-shilling tax for every 
hundred weight of sugar, and while the requirement that goods only be sent to England and thus not traded 
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To the British, settlements overseas were in the first instance the establishment of 
plantations to produce material needed or desired in England, with tobacco, sugar, cotton 
and fish being the primary staples.  This economic policy would drive British imperial 
policy until (i) Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations led to a growing belief among business 
interests in the merits of a laissez-faire free market and (ii) dissatisfaction among British 
citizens with long and expensive wars increased.  This two pronged challenge undermined 
mercantilism as the cornerstone of British colonial policy. 
In terms of institutional design for the colonies, the most significant contribution is 
J.S. Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government (1865).  For Mill there are two 
purposes of government: it must improve the virtue and intelligence of the citizens and it 
must promote the common good.  Governments can be judged on the impact they have on 
the individual.  Little attention is usually paid to Mill’s first point: improving the citizen.  
As Wilff (1996, 194) explains: “One major theme of modern liberalism is that the moral 
welfare of the citizens is none of the government’s business”, so the relevance of Mill’s 
writing to modern political philosophy centres on his normative arguments on the 
government’s obligations to its citizens, the benefits of democracy over good despotism in 
terms of both government services and quality of life for the citizens, and why people 
flourish in conditions of independence.  These, and the idea that each branch of government 
– civil, penal, judicial, financial or economic – has its own standards of success and failure, 
have commended his writing to students of modern institutional design. 
But it is Mill’s thinking on colonial institutional design that is most significant for 
our purposes.  It reflects the normative ideas that came to dominate the Imperial 
government in the United Kingdom and it reflects the thinking behind the colonial studies 
scholarship of the 19th and 20th century.  In terms of colonial development, Mill argues that 
representative government, where the local population chooses representatives that can 
advise the government, is the best mechanism for developing a polity.  He provides 
                                                                                                                                                    
between colonies was rarely enforced, objection to the principle behind the law led to the first tax rebellion in 
North America, known as the Culpeper Rebellion (Lovejoy 1987).  
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guidelines for how governors can effectively spread representative government through 
imperial tutelage.  The premise that is behind Mill’s colonial model of representative 
government is the notion that peoples are situated along an index of civilization evolution.  
This was a widely held belief among enlightenment scholars, in spite of their beliefs in 
liberty and individualism. 
Mill believed that institutions and practices can reshape local societies; that they 
first needed to develop the tools to participate in representative government and join 
modern civilization.  The model of government that Mill recommends for a colony is a 
‘government of leading strings’.  This refers to the apparatus that was used at the time to 
teach children to walk, which involved support straps to prevent the child from falling 
while it learned to walk on its own.  Thus representative government in a colony should 
have an appointed governor to manage the colony’s affairs and oversee the work of 
officials, but also an elected assembly so that people from that society could participate in 
their own governance.  From Mill’s perspective, participation was essential because: “a 
person has nothing to do for his country and he will not care for it” (1865, 204).  
Institutions could be tools to help ‘civilize’ a society. 
Wakefield’s A View on the Art of Colonization (1914) equally argued for the need 
for representative government in a colony, though he did so from a political economy 
perspective.22  Wakefield concluded that cheap available labour was key to a colony’s 
success and that cheap land was the reason New South Wales in Australia had been an 
economic failure.  People would not work for wages if they could obtain land cheaply and 
then work for themselves.  When land was cheap there would be a shortage of labour and 
capitalists could not employ their money profitably. 
In looking at the United States, Wakefield concluded that Americans were not 
progressing in the ‘art of living’ because they had so much land.  While their numbers were 
steadily increasing, the population merely dispersed across North America.  Key to an 
                                                 
22 Wakefield’s ideas were first advanced in A letter from Sydney, published anonymously in 1829, following 
the failure of the Swan River settlement in New South Wales, Australia. 
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improved quality of life, which is again tied into the enlightenment belief that civilization is 
evolutionary, was concentrated settlement.   
To attract this settlement, land needed to be priced, not based on supply and demand 
but artificially, so as to make it affordable for financially solvent immigrants intent on 
improving their station in life for whom land was unavailable or unobtainable in the British 
Isles, yet not so cheap that it would be available to all who immigrated to the colony.  The 
first immigrant landed population would form the colonial elite and would be entitled to 
elect their own representative assembly, which in turn could levy local taxes so as to 
finance public works projects for the colony.  Representative government was an incentive 
to attract settlers and the working poor, who lacked such in Britain.   
There needed to be a pool of poor immigrants who would work the land owned by 
capitalists and the propertied class for wages.  They, in turn, would do so with the belief 
that their life would be better in the new territory and in the hope of acquiring enough 
money to purchase land themselves in the future and be socially mobile. The pool of 
working poor was necessary to attract sufficient capital to make the local economy 
sustainable.23 
Marx in Das Capital (1967, 839) rightly noted that Wakefield’s political economy 
model for colonial development was not new, nor uniquely colonial, but simply recognition 
of “the truth as to the condition of capitalist production in the mother-country”.  Marx’s 
belief was that all capitalist societies structure themselves similarly so as to enforce 
capitalism, maintain the bourgeoisie and reproduce themselves.  Reproducing themselves is 
why colonial governments and societies mimic their imperial parent. 
Another possibility is that there is an evolutionary nature for British institutional 
design.  This becomes apparent to any Canadian student of responsible government who 
reads Roberts’ The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England (1966).  The 
                                                 
23 Wakefield’s pricing structure informed the marketing perspectives offered by the Canada Company for land 
in Upper Canada beginning in 1825, by the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Company and the British 
American Land Company for the Eastern Townships of Lower Canada beginning in 1834, and by the 
Hudson’s Bay Company for Vancouver Island in 1849. 
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executive council of Queen Elizabeth was akin to the governments under the British 
governors in the era of representative government.  Lord Burghley, who as the leading 
member of Elizabeth’s council sitting in the British parliament, could have been prime 
minister and was frequently questioned about his actions, but was clearly not since he 
would use the queen’s commands to justify those actions.  This is in contrast to Sir Robert 
Walpole under George I who could not hide behind the king’s commands.  Walpole had to 
answer for his conduct to parliament and was subject to criticism, censure and 
impeachment.  According to Roberts, this was the birth of responsible government in 
England, as to gain office and stay in office, Walpole needed the confidence of parliament, 
and not just the king.  In England, anyway, responsible government arose because of a 
change in the attitude of parliament more than a change in the attitude of the governor or 
the king. 
Councils and Responsible Government 
The term ‘responsible government’ is now widely used to refer to a political system 
in which the government is responsible to the electorate, but for Canada and other British 
parliamentary systems it has a more specific meaning.  It refers to the system of 
government modelled on the parliament at Westminster wherein members of the executive 
council or cabinet are chosen from and collectively responsible to the elected members of 
the legislature.  They are entitled to govern only so long as they enjoy the confidence of the 
lower chamber.  The term in Canada first emerged in 1828 in the debates over altering the 
colonial representative government system, and was first advocated by Robert Baldwin and 
William Baldwin.  In these debates, and throughout the ones to follow in Canada, two 
major competing concepts of representation were being advanced, that espoused by 
Edmund Burke and that espoused by James Madison. 
Burke in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1968), originally published in 
1790, argues that a legislature should not be a collection of representatives or, as he put it, 
“is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interest each 
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must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates”.  Rather, 
legislators should be trustees and parliament should be a deliberative assembly of “one 
nation, with one interest, that of the whole” (Burke 1968).  This concept of a trustee 
requires representatives to follow their own judgment about the proper course of action. 
James Madison in The Federalist Papers (Madison 1999), published originally 
between 1787 and 1788, argued for a delegate conception of representation.  Delegates are 
expected to consult with and then to follow their constituent's preferences.  The Federalist 
Papers, which is a collection of newspaper articles written under the pen- name Publius by 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson were a defence of the institutions 
chosen for the proposed United States of America, including an appointed upper chamber.  
Collectively they set forth the political theory behind the republic and federalism. 
The first substantive written treatise on the merits of responsible government for 
Canada is found in Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of British North America (1912b), 
prepared for the British government following the rebellions in the two Canada’s and 
published in 1839.  Durham uses the term ‘responsible government’ in its broader meaning, 
applying it equally to the United States’ republican system, which he points out Canadians 
could look to with envy, as well to the British parliamentary system.  He recommends the 
two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada be united and given the British model of 
responsible government wherein the local executive council, chosen from the leadership of 
the legislature, would be accountable to that legislature and would have complete control of 
the executive branch of government when it comes to ‘local’ matters.  
From the perspective of British constitutional law (Keith 1930, 1928), the crown 
had the right to establish government in a territory, but the inhabitants could be legislated 
for and taxed only by a legislature in which they were represented or by the British 
parliament itself.  In conquered colonies, the crown might legislate as it pleased, though 
once colonies were granted an assembly, only the British parliament could take that 
institution away.  Also under British constitutional law, a colony could never be given 
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responsible government since the supremacy of the British parliament and the requirement 
that all government officials be responsible to that parliament prevented such a change. 
That change that did happen was so significant that this development is featured 
prominently in every book on Canadian history, the constitution and Canadian political 
institutions of governance.  But because colonial institutions are conceived of as having 
been granted by the British and because of the centrality of British constitutional law, the 
constitutional studies literature credits the change with an alteration in legal interpretation 
(Oliver 2005) or the triumph of pragmatism over law (Kennedy 1922).  The historical 
literature focuses on the events of the moment and the role played by leading historical 
figures on both sides of the Atlantic in obtaining the ‘grant’ of responsible government 
(Creighton 1965). 
A colony in the parlance of sovereignty was a province of the crown.  In the first 
instance the provincial government took the form of a provincial governor who would be 
assisted by a nominee council.  An elected assembly would be added at some point, and the 
council and assembly would act as a bicameral legislature for the purposes of enacting local 
laws and ordinances.  From this point on the colony is said to have representative 
government.  At some point the nominee council would be split into two, an executive 
council and a legislative council, with the later having the legislative function in the 
bicameral legislature.  Responsible government would at some point be ‘granted’ and the 
governor would appoint as members of the executive council those persons who had the 
confidence of the assembly and these individuals would be accountable to the legislature 
for the government of the province.  Eventually, each legislative council would come to be 
abolished. 
While the ‘standard developmental trajectory’ for institutions in territories under 
British control might be explained by the historical events in the moment or by the shift in 
the British constitution and imperial policy, similar changes occurred elsewhere.  Not only 
had responsible government occurred in England a century and a half before, but the 
growing dominance of the lower house and the widening of the franchise was 
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simultaneously occurring there (Ward 1976), and in some respects these developments in 
England lagged behind the colonies (Moore 1997).  Second chamber configuration varied 
by colony, and counter to Keith and the theory of bicameralism discussed below, Todd 
(1880, 473) argues that the use of either election or appointment was “not based upon any 
definite or abstract principle, but is simply owing to the prevailing tone of popular opinion 
in the particular colony, to which upon this question the imperial government has invariably 
deferred”. 
Formally, these changes are the result of commissions and instructions given to 
governors, the originals of which are in the National Archives in the United Kingdom.  The 
Canadian parliament has at various points in its history ordered the production of some of 
these documents and despatches between the governors and the colonial secretary and when 
it has, they are printed as parliamentary sessional papers.  Several of these sessional papers 
were subsequently published by Arthur G. Doughty, who as dominion archivist had been 
tasked by the Canadian parliament to assemble them; and he carried on this practice of 
compiling and publishing them for subsequent years on his own.   Significant constitutional 
papers relating to Canada for the years 1759 to 1791 are found in Shortt and Doughty 
(1907), for 1791 to 1818 in Doughty and McArthur (1914), and for 1819 to 1826 in 
Doughty and Storey (1935).  Kennedy (1930) followed this tradition and published a 
consolidated set of documents relating to the Canadian constitution for 1713 to 1929. 
The first specific study of the development of responsible government in the 
province of Canada is Stephen Leacock’s Baldwin, Lafontaine, Hincks: Responsible 
Government (1907), part of the ‘Makers of Canada’ series of biographies.  It systematically 
chronicles the electoral and legislative politics within which these three men worked to 
wrestle decision making away from the governors.  It is rich with the detail of provincial 
politics, though offers no insight beyond the activism of the local politicians in the face of 
activist governors who ultimately concluded, along with the parent government in London, 
that representative government was unmanageable and so accepted the change. 
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As he was compiling the instructions and despatches he found most relevant to 
Canada’s constitutional evolution, Kennedy (1922) wrote The Constitution of Canada: An 
Introduction to its Development and Law.  This is the first book that process traces 
institutional change for all the provinces of Canada.  As it is the result of compiling 
correspondence between governors and British colonial officials when changes were made, 
the story is one of normative argument and benevolent concession.  While it has some 
societal context, with discussion of the political issues upon which each legislature 
grappled and campaigned on, the picture that emerges is one of legal developments as local 
elites navigate British parliamentary sovereignty and imperial interest in making a case for 
why specific institutional changes should be granted by the imperial government.  
Livingston’s Responsible Government in Nova Scotia (1930) is a more developed 
examination of the acquisition of responsible government in that province.  Livingston 
argues that Nova Scotia was the laboratory in which the principles and practices that would 
later be applied to other colonies, and then to the empire, arose and were tested.  The 
normative ideas of Joseph Howe are at the heart of this contention and Livingston shows 
how the political parties, if one can call them such in this era, in both the colony and in 
Great Britain, interacted in making this change at both ends.  While responsible 
government is the product of elite interaction in this analysis, the societal context that is 
noteworthy is a rural-urban cleavage that pits the upper chamber against the lower over this 
change.24 
From these initial examinations, responsible government would remain central in all 
Canadian histories.  But they equally fail to consider why responsible government 
developed in the same way in each province and yet did so at different times.  It is simply 
taken for granted that this was the obvious system for each of Britain’s provinces, given 
their existence under British rule, and the variations in times are simply reported as local 
historical artefacts.  The general conclusion of the literature is summed up by Massicotte 
                                                 
24 He would follow this thesis of Nova Scotia having set the normative theory and practical example for 
responsible government in an examination of Prince Edward Island (Livingston 1931).  
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and Seidle (1998) who write: “Responsible government was born of a combination of 
democratic aspirations tempered by loyalty to the Crown and the new attitude of an Empire 
resigned to losing its absolute powers”. 
While responsible government might be the most studied and recounted aspect of 
this dissertation, and is the one area where institutional change has been examined by many 
others, it is absent of insight as to how and why change might occur beyond this localized 
setting and time.  The fact that it emerged at different times and in England a century and a 
half earlier is also ignored, which would suggest that it merits re-examination. 
IV. Bicameralism 
As Uhr (2006, 474) notes “bicameralism is surprisingly under-researched and is 
quite under-theorized”.  Currently “two-thirds of democratic national legislatures are 
bicameral” (Uhr 2006, 477) and while federal countries only account for one-third of 
bicameral systems in the world (Patterson et Mughan 1999b, 10), the “model of bicameral 
federalism spread so widely that today all federal countries have bicameral legislatures” 
(Tsebelis et Money 1997, 6).25 
As second chambers find their genesis in the writings on mixed government by 
Plato and Aristotle of ancient Greece and Cicero of Rome (Tsebelis et Money 1997; 
Patterson et Mughan 1999b), and found their way into the modern era through the 
emergence of ‘estates’ within feudal Europe (Marriott 1910; Temperley 1910), with the 
progenitors of the 18th century bicameral model being the colonially minded British (Wight 
1946; Wood 1993), some countries have expended great energy considering or responding 
                                                 
25 There are four small countries which are exceptions to this rule; though the number and the countries vary 
based on when and how the list of federations is generated.  Tsebelis and Money (Tsebelis et Money 1997, fn 
8) used the Europa Yearbook (Europa Yearbook: A World Survey  1994) which has two minor exceptions to 
bicameral federations, namely the Federated States of Micronesia and the United Arab Emirates; Watts (Watts 
1996, 84) identifies the exceptions as the U.A.E. and Ethiopia; Massicotte (2001) identifies St Kitts and 
Nevis, Micronesia and Venezuela; and Hicks and Blais report four (2008), with Comoros added to the ones 
just mentioned.  All are small countries and can be seen as exceptions to the rule.  At the lower administrative 
units  level in federal countries unicameralism is the norm, with the exceptions of the United States and 
Australia where all but one state legislature in each of these countries is bicameral. 
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to agitation for ‘reform’ due to the chamber’s strong and continued association with ideas 
such as aristocracy, protection of property and restraint on popular opinion.  In the process, 
a great deal of well-considered material has been generated on such important matters as 
institutional design and purpose.  There has not, however, been a commensurate amount of 
academic research. 
What little scholarly interest has emerged on second chambers can be linked to 
popular debate over ‘reform’.  For example, the handful of British scholars who took an 
interest in bicameralism in the first half of the 20th century were motivated by their 
country’s own discussions surrounding reform of the house of lords.26  Their comparative 
approach and their attempt to divine an identifiable theory to govern second chambers 
continue to inform examination of bicameralism today, including the work of Tsebelis and 
Money (1997), Patterson and Mughan (1999b) and Shell (2001). 
Comparative Literature 
It was in 1910 that the first comparative looks at second chambers emerged, one 
each from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge.  Marriot’s Second Chambers: An 
Inductive Study in Political Science (1910) provides a detailed history of the British, 
American, German, Canadian, South African and French senates, along with a less detailed 
analysis of the other European experiences.  While its prescriptions are limited, its 
summary of the challenge facing British second chamber reformers is similar to what 
Canadian scholars repeatedly claim is the current challenge for Canada’s Senate, and that is 
“to discover for it a basis which shall be at once intelligible and differentiating; to give it 
powers of revision without powers of control; to make it amendable to permanent sentiment 
                                                 
26 Lord Rosebery had proposed changes to the house of lords in 1884 and 1888, Lord Salisbury in 1888, Lord 
Newton in 1907, a Select Committee of Reform of the House of Lords made proposals in 1908, the Bryce 
Conference of 1918 and the British Government introduced resolutions in 1922.  None of these resulted in 
changes, though The Parliament Act of 1911 changed the powers of the house of lords from an absolute to 
suspensive veto. 
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and yet independent of transient public opinion; to erect a bulwark against revolution 
without interposing a barrier to reform” (Marriott 1910, 298). 
Temperley’s Senates and Upper Chambers: Their Use and Function in the Modern 
State, with a Chapter on the Reform of the House of Lords (1910) employs a similar 
detailed survey of British, American, Colonial and European experiences and 
developments, and offers one of the earliest observations that upper chambers are more 
powerful when elected, and recommends that the British house of lords transition to 
election as it is “the best, and probably the only way, of rendering it strong and efficient” 
(Temperley 1910, 177).  In contrast, Lees-Smith’s Second Chambers in Theory and 
Practice (1923), which examines Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, United States, 
South Africa, Norway and Ireland, as well as providing useful detail on the workings and 
findings of the Bryce Conference of 1918 which, as a cabinet committee studying house of 
lords reform, conducted much of its work in private, concludes that “direct election leads to 
confusion, labour and expense” (Lees-Smith 1923).  In the United States, Johnson’s The 
Unicameral Legislature (1938) offered insights into bicameralism and unicameralism by 
drawing on the experience of colonial North American bicameral legislatures and of 
unicameral legislatures abroad, with the ultimate objective of taking a position in his 
country’s domestic debate over institutional change, in this instance in favour of second 
chamber abolition.27 
There is a large gap in the comparative study of second chambers from these 
meagre beginnings until the turn of the century, and the recently renewed interest appears 
to be no less attuned to the political debates of their time and place.  Smith’s book The 
Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective (2003a) is clearly tied to the ongoing debate in 
Canada over reform of the country’s second chamber and contains a number of modest 
prescriptive suggestions on how the senate should and could be altered, tempered by what 
                                                 
27 Johnson (1938) notes that in the year 1937 alone, 21 states had debated 40 state-constitutional amendments 
aimed at changing their legislatures from bicameral to unicameral.  While he offers this data as evidence of a 
growing trend, no state moved to unicameralism after Nebraska, which had made the transition in 1934. 
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is seen as the climate of constitutional fatigue in Canada.  His comparative lessons are 
drawn from Australia, Great Britain, United States and Germany, though his interest is 
singularly the Canadian Senate.  He concludes that senate reform is not possible in Canada 
because Canada is a double federation – two nations and ten units – where interests overlap 
and institutions play more than one role, though he suggests that it is the amending formula 
in the Constitution of Canada that prevents change.  He also notes that there has been no 
agreement on what the Canadian Senate is supposed to do and, until this happens, he 
suggests “there will be no agreement on its modification” (Smith 2003a, 157).   
Russell’s Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas (2000) was 
directly tied to her country’s commissioned research for the Wakeham Commission28, so it 
is more optimistic about institutional change, and offers comparative lessons for possible 
institutional redesign from a number of parliamentary systems, including Australia, 
Canada, Germany and Spain.  The conclusions which emerge are that second chambers 
should have a distinct design from the lower house in terms of composition, party balance 
and method of selection, for which elections based on territorial regions are the most likely 
to give the chamber legitimacy, and a second chamber need not have equal, but must have 
sufficient, power to review the decisions of the lower house.  
The fact that all this scholarship is tied to a domestic reform agenda does not make 
the contribution to comparative analysis of second chambers any less valid.  It simply 
explains the filter through which this scholarship is being undertaken and makes the more 
restricted lessons that the experiences of other countries are seen to offer, more 
understandable. 
                                                 
28 The Wakeham Commission is more formally known as the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House 
of Lords and was established by the government to “consider and make recommendations on the role and 
functions of the second chamber” and to “make recommendations on the method or combination of methods 
of composition required to constitute a second chamber fit for that role and those functions”.  The 12-person 
commission was chaired by the Rt. Hon. Lord Wakeham and produced 130 recommendations of which the 
most dramatic change would have been to introduce some elected seats from the regions and some appointed 
seats based on gender and ethnicity (Wakeham 2000). 
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The one notable exception is the work by Tsebelis and Money on second chambers, 
which is entirely an examination of second chambers in pursuit of a political science model.  
Bicameralism (1997) applies game theory to a comparative look at bicameralism in an 
attempt to determine how the existence of a second chamber in a legislature may constrain 
or influence decision-making.  What makes this contribution so important is its focus on 
both chambers of a legislature, simultaneously, which is in and of itself a radical departure 
from most institutional analysis. 
Tsebelis effectively builds upon this approach in Veto Players (2002), where he 
argues that all political systems can be seen in terms of the particular person or institution 
whose agreement is necessary in order to change the status quo.  Therefore, if one knows 
the preferences of a veto player, it is possible to identify the set of policies that will not 
elicit a veto – the “winset of the status quo”: the more veto players, the fewer acceptable 
policies, the smaller the winset, and thus the existence of institutionalized “policy stability” 
(Tsebelis 2002, 2).  This carries some important lessons for the issue of institutional 
change, and for bicameralism and federalism, as it illustrates how more veto players result 
in resistance to change, which suggests there are different degrees of inertia.29 
In addition to these comparative works, there have also been two compilation works 
published recently to fill the void in scholarship on bicameralism.  Patterson and Mughan 
have assembled the book Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Patterson et 
Mughan 1999b), which offers papers from well-known domestic scholars on their 
respective country’s second chamber, including the United States, Germany, Australia, 
Canada, France, Britain, Spain and Poland.  In their own contribution to the topic they 
conclude that, with the exception of the United States, second chambers are always less 
powerful and prestigious than the lower house, though second chambers are generally 
becoming more assertive due to their mistreatment by the lower house, increased partisan 
                                                 
29 The increase in veto players not only increases policy stability but can lead to the independence of 
bureaucracies and the judiciary, and government instability in parliamentary systems (regime instability in 
presidential systems). 
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competition and changes in popular understanding about majoritarian politics and the 
nature of democracy. 
Baldwin and Shell’s Second Chambers (2001) also brings together papers from 
scholars of different countries delineated not by country but by field of research interest, 
including papers on the history of bicameralism and the functions and powers of second 
chambers.  Among its more interesting ‘new’ observations are: second chambers do not 
vary significantly in terms of pay, resources, composition and occupation from lower 
chambers, though they have a higher average age and a slightly greater, though still under-
representative, number of women (Rush 2001); and that even weak second chambers have 
significant authority over constitutional change and increasingly have been obtaining 
powers related to human rights protection (Russell 2001).  Each book makes a worthwhile 
contribution to advancing our understanding of bicameralism, though both of these last 
works are constrained by the lack of cohesiveness that is inherent in compilation volumes. 
The handful of comparative works examined above have each in some way 
attempted to advance a ‘theory of bicameralism’; though, as yet, bicameralism is little more 
than “a concept in search of a theory” (Shell 2001; Smith 2003a).  The early comparative 
works took an approach which today we would consider historical institutionalism, as they 
derived a theory by combining the historical record with the contemporary comparative 
experience (Marriott 1910; Temperley 1910; Lees-Smith 1923; Johnson 1938).  The 
modern approach is similar, though decidedly more long term, in that it combines deductive 
analysis, beginning with an examination of the earliest Greek political philosophers who 
advocated ‘mixed government’ and proceeding through the 17th and 18th Century theorists 
who gave the world the theory of federalism, with inductive analysis, by examining the 
bicameral legislatures that operate in both federal and unitary states (Tsebelis et Money 
1997; Patterson et Mughan 1999b; Shell 2001).  The result has been a theory which is 
surprisingly similar across periods of scholarship, yet, is still little more than a recognition 
that a second chamber provides both a review and representational function which is 
distinct from the lower house (Hicks 2007, 22), and even here there is dispute as to which is 
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the more significant role, since the comparative evidence is that regional and administrative 
unit representation is not always provided by second chambers, meaning that review might 
be its primary, if not singular, function (Brennan et Lomasky 1993, 214).30  This poses an 
inherent challenge for any who wish to extrapolate from the ‘theory of bicameralism’ in 
order to identify normative arguments that may emerge in a polity in opposition to 
institutional change. 
On the representation axis, the requirement as currently suggested by the theory of 
bicameralism is that a second chamber must have a different representational purpose than 
the lower house, yet any number of configurations can meet this criterion.  The British 
house of lords embodying a historic claim by the aristocracy to the right to participate in 
governance decision making (Roberts 1926), the German ‘Bundesrat’ or Federal Council 
being used to represent both the state governments and “the power constellations among the 
political parties in the states” (Patzelt 1999, 68) and the U.S. Senate which, through the 
transition to popular election, has come to be similarly constructed as the House of 
Representatives and yet sufficiently distinct so as to represent “different passions” among 
the polity (Sinclair 1999, 56), each can lay claim to this broad normative definition; as can 
virtually every proposal for reform of the Canadian Senate advanced in the last 140 years, 
including the current appointed body (Hicks 2007). 
Clearly representation must be central to any theory of bicameralism.  Legislatures 
are the bodies designed for representation and, even if they were not, all institutions of 
governance have a dimension of representation.  Identifying the nature of that 
representation should be central to any institutional analysis.  If the upper chamber is 
providing a definable representational role – particularly a representational role that is seen 
as essential to society and an alternative to the representation being provided by the lower 
chamber – then it should be more difficult to alter or abolish the upper chamber.  If, on the 
                                                 
30 Patterson and Mughan argue that this is particularly true in parliamentary systems, where the 
representational role is largely displaced by the review function (Patterson et Mughan 1999b, 240-2). 
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other hand, that representational role is lacking then the relevance of the upper chamber to 
the polity would be less. 
A number of countries have adopted federalism and bicameralism specifically 
because they are mechanisms for accommodating cleavages – particularly cleavages which 
are geographically bounded and involve race, ethnicity, language or culture.  In these 
instances, it would seem likely that upper chamber transformation would be more difficult 
since the groups so accommodated would not want to forgo their influence, even if the 
institution was ‘weak’ in terms of legitimacy or power.  
The ‘other’ role of an upper chamber identified by the rudimentary theory of 
bicameralism is the idea of review.  Tsebelis and Money (1997) suggest that the goal of all 
institutional design, whether unicameral or bicameral, is to manage the interaction between 
efficient and political.  Central to this claim, and the discussion of upper chambers almost a 
century earlier by Temperley (1910) and Lees-Smith (1923), is the idea of restraint, which 
can be found in The Federalist Papers (1999), Tocqueville (2000) and Mill (1865). 
Hamilton argued in The Federalist Papers in 1787 that the selection of national 
senators through appointment by the state legislatures would result in men of “peculiar care 
and judgment” being in the upper chamber, men who “will be less apt to be tainted by the 
spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill humors, or temporary 
prejudices and propensities” (Hamilton 1999, No. 27:143).  A senate, noted Madison in the 
same year, stops the passage of legislation without proper review and reflection, preventing 
“a variety of important errors in the exercise of legislative trust” (Madison 1999, No. 
62:347). 
Whether it be called ‘redundancy’ (Patterson et Mughan 1999b, 13), ‘sober second 
thought’ (John A. Macdonald, 1865; Supreme Court of Canada, 1980), ‘reflection’ (Mastias 
1999, 175), ‘review’ (Hicks 2007, 22), protection against ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
(Hamilton 1999), ‘quality control’ (Tsebelis et Money 1997, 40) or ‘a second opinion’ 
(Wheare 1967, 140); or framed in a democratic sense as the “interposition of so much 
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delay” so the opinion of the nation can be adequately expressed [Bryce Conference Report, 
1918 in Lees-Smith (1923, 33)] and that legislation can be “submitted to the deliberate 
judgment of the electorate” (Marriott 1910, 86); every student of upper chambers has 
identified a function relative to the lower house as central to a ‘theory of bicameralism’ that 
is to provide a restraint on the lower house and sometimes the executive branch. 
Uhr points out that John Stuart Mill is still frequently cited as an authority for the 
Australian senate and, along with Tocqueville and The Federalists Papers, is essential for a 
proper consideration of not only bicameralism but the Australian senate’s use of 
proportional representation (Uhr 1999, 106; 1995, 136).  Moore illustrates how Edmund 
Burke’s contribution intersects with these writings and how this scholarship was actively 
drawn upon by the founders of Canada in their theorizing over institutional design (1997, 
Ch.3).   Ostrom has identified the works associated with institutional formation in the U.S., 
particularly Tocqueville and The Federalist Papers, as a “revolution in political theory” 
when it comes to federalism (Ostrom 1991, 14), and Whitaker (1983) has illustrated how in 
addition to federalism these works reconceptualised democratic theory and intertwined the 
two in the process.  All this seems to support the legitimacy of using these works to identify 
a theory of bicameralism, though the inability of scholars to produce a coordinated or 
particularly instructive theory suggests that something is lacking either in terms of 
conceptualization or approach. 
Wirls and Wirls, in The Invention of the United States Senate (2004), suggest that 
the shortcoming of earlier theorizing lies in its narrow focus on functional consequences.  
As an alternative, they offer their own detailed examination of what they see as the 
theoretical origins of the U.S. Senate, and the intent of that unique breed of philosopher-
politicians who attended the Continental Congress and helped fashion that country’s 
institutions.  Their particular contribution to the theoretical debate lies in the identification 
of differences in underlying concepts employed by the founders and by contemporary and 
antecedent institutional philosophers.  However, in their attempt to avoid a functional 
explanation they place too much importance on ideas which may be little more than a 
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justification for a favoured institutional design and for elite restrictions on political 
participation.  What emerges is no more useful as a theory of bicameralism, even if it is a 
more nuanced explanation of contemporary thought at the time of the American 
Revolution. 
They also, as is common in much of the literature on bicameralism, get sidelined by 
the debate over how direct the connection between ancient Greek and Roman theory on 
mixed government is to modern bicameralism, and the debate over how innovative was the 
U.S. Senate.  For example, Shell (2001) argues that the connection between mixed 
government and bicameralism is itself nothing more than justification after the fact for 
institutions in Britain, and that the house of lords was the product of historical development 
and practical necessity during the middle ages rather than philosophical musings.  Of 
course, the adoption of normative arguments advanced by Plato and Aristotle, even if only 
used to justify an emerging or evolving institution like the bicameral parliament and the 
house of lords, is prima facie evidence of these classical scholars’ influence on, and 
relevance to, the society in question (e.g., Fritz 1954).31 
For its part, the debate over the originality of the U.S. Senate can be found as far 
back as Temperley and Marriott, with the former arguing that, in spite of the “strange 
ingenuities of political architecture in the United States”, bicameralism was adopted 
                                                 
31 While a direct connection may not be evident between the house of lords and the Roman senate, 
Wickham’s (2009) recent examination of how Rome’s legal and political influence survived and shaped the 
Middle Ages does give new credence to this claim.  While initially the British Isles lost its Roman influences 
due to how isolated this part of the Roman empire had always been, the Roman traditions continued to 
dominate medieval Europe and re-emerged in England during the Port-Carolingian period as the legal and 
institutional influences of Charlemagne (crowned Imperator Augustus by Pope Leo III) made it from western 
Europe to the British Isles even as his influence had begun to wane in Frankish territory.  Armitage (2000) 
shows how by the end of the 15th Century, the British king had fully adopted the language and symbols of the 
Roman Imperium for the express purpose of asserting independence from the Roman Catholic papacy and the 
Holy Roman Empire, and this legal basis for governance encouraged territorial expansion and conquest.  In 
addition to this western Roman empire legacy, several of the British high offices of state are direct 
importations from the eastern Roman court at Byzantium, including the most senior post in British heraldic 
law, the Earl Marshall, whose court determines a noble’s right to sit in the house of lords (Bruce 1999)).  
While no direct connection is made in these more works between the house of lords and the Roman senate, 
their much wider claim of an ongoing Roman legal and institutional legacy would seem to support such a 
claim.   
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because of “fidelity of Englishmen to their political traditions” (Temperley 1910, 27), and 
the latter suggesting that the U.S. “Constitution as a whole was and is native” (Marriott 
1910, 91).  Given the existence of bicameralism in Britain and in each of the North 
American colonies prior to the War of Independence, and the writings on bicameralism 
which were emerging outside of America32, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that the 
British were responsible for introducing the modern world to the principle, if not the form, 
of bicameralism33, though there may be valid disagreement as to whether this was due to an 
active promulgation of institutional format beginning with its imposition on British 
colonies (Wood 1993) or due to the spread of ideas via the increasing dominance of the 
English language as the lingua franca (Tsebelis et Money 1997). 
Country Specific Studies 
The limited comparative work on upper chambers has been focussed, as a starting 
point, on classification as a way of structuring analysis.  Lijphart (1984) did this first by 
offering a classification system for upper chambers based on the ‘degree of congruence’ – 
that is to say the similarity in representation between chambers (independent of selection 
method) contrasted with formal power asymmetry.  Looked at in this way, ‘strong’ 
bicameral legislatures are those which have differences in composition and relatively 
symmetrical power, whereas ‘weak’ bicameral legislatures are those which have either 
asymmetrical power or similarity of representation.  Mastias and Grangé (1987) argue that 
instead ‘legitimacy’ should be the central defining feature of second chambers and that the 
more direct the role the citizenry has in choosing senators the greater will be its legitimacy, 
and thus the more extensive its legislative power.  Others have waded into the debate with 
                                                 
32 Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws (1977) was directed at the British Parliament, though  informed in American 
institutional design and the separation of powers doctrine, and Mill’s Considerations on Representative 
Government (1865) is an early defence of bicameralism in Britain, though was referenced in early North 
American and Australian scholarship for their own institutional design. 
33 Madison even acknowledged that it was: “The experiences of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so 
many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in 
the course of these inquiries” which informed his ideas on representation (1999, 317). 
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Russell (2000) also arguing that Lijphart placed too little emphasis on legitimacy, Watts 
(1996) arguing that in a federation legitimacy would not be tied to directness of election but 
rather to the relationship to lower administrative units, and Tsebelis and Money (1997) 
arguing that congruence does not by itself result in agreement between chambers. 
While the debate over second chamber classification does little to advance a 
coordinated theory of bicameralism or provide insight into what might drive or constrain 
institutional change, it does help explain a divergence in the recent domestic academic 
literature on second chambers.  Within each country, scholars have increasingly been 
stepping up to fill their particular void in institutional analysis and examine their country’s 
second chamber.  In countries where upper chambers would be considered ‘weak’, the 
scholarly writing tends to focus on the deficiencies of that upper chamber or on that 
chamber’s usefulness along the review axis, an approach that is in contrast to countries 
which have ‘strong’ upper chambers, where scholarship focuses on conflict and power 
distribution between the two chambers (Tsebelis et Money 1997, 33-5).34 
In France, for example, scholarship on their Senate is either critical of the upper 
chamber as being ineffective (e.g., Grangé 1981; Tardan 1988) or tries to make a case for 
the important role the chamber can and has played due to its independence, expertise and 
longer terms of office (e.g., Mastias 1980; Grangé 1984), which can be improved upon with 
relatively minor improvements (e.g., Mastias 1980).  Similarly, the literature in Britain is 
either reform-oriented (e.g., Russell 2000) or straddles the divide between pointing out the 
limitations of a largely ineffectual upper chamber while acknowledging its previous and 
continued contribution to thoughtful analysis and legislative improvements (e.g., Adonis 
1988).   
                                                 
34 Tsebelis and Money suggest that this dichotomy in the academic literature is between federal and unitary 
systems, but this would not explain the literature in Canada which is clearly on the review axis.  Domestic 
scholarship is likely driven by the particular scholars’ ‘sense’ of strength or weakness in their country’s 
senate, and this subjective evaluation could, in turn, equally be driven by questions of legitimacy - public 
confidence, congruence in composition, symmetry in powers or some combination thereof. 
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To complicate matters, domestic scholarship in parliamentary democracies is 
sometimes subject to normative claims about how responsible parliamentary government 
should operate, and nowhere is this truer than in countries which have inherited the 
Westminster model (see Sproule-Jones 1992; Atkinson et Thomas 1993; Malloy 2002).  
This is found in countries with weak upper chambers as well as in countries with strong 
senates, the only difference being that in countries with weak senates the scholarship is in 
response to proposals for reform (e.g., Smith 2003a; Joyal 2003) and in the latter it is over 
perceived political gridlock, bargaining and trade-offs (e.g., Jackson 1995; see also Uhr 
1999).  
For its part, the widely acknowledged strong United States Senate has not only 
concurrent legislative authority with the lower chamber but unique authority with the 
executive branch to ratify treaties and appointments to the executive, making it “unusual 
among upper chambers” (Sinclair 1999, 32).  This ‘unique’ situation has clearly contributed 
to the recent volume of literature on its activities.  Much of this literature, however, still fits 
into the aforementioned categorization of that which occurs in countries with strong second 
chambers, namely conflict and power distribution between the two chambers (e.g., Cox et 
Kernell 1991; Mayhew 1991; Weaver et Rockman 1993; Thurber 1996). 
The literature on the U.S. Senate is extensive and growing, even if in a predictable 
manner, but the investigations into the 17th Amendment which transitioned the United 
States from having a Senate appointed by the state legislature to one elected directly by the 
people is still rather sparse.35  The most comprehensive resource is Haynes’ The Election of 
Senators (1906), who, like some of his overseas contemporaries, was not only interested in 
studying this institution but was actively participating in a domestic debate over the issue of 
senate reform.  In his subsequent book, The Senate of the United States (Haynes 1936), he 
                                                 
35 The 17th Amendment of the Constitution restates the first paragraph of Article I, Section 3, of the U.S. 
Constitution with the phrase “elected by the people thereof” replacing “chosen by the Legislature thereof”.  It 
also allows the executive authority of each state (i.e. the governor), if authorized by the state’s legislature, to 
fill a vacancy until a general election is held. 
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offers detailed information, though not systematically organized, on the road which led to 
election, including the suggestion that the earliest support for election came from the 
‘progressives’, that there were significant regional differences in how elections were 
handled and that by the time of passage of the 17th Amendment the majority of states had 
taken their own steps towards change and, thus, that the majority of senators in that year’s 
Congress had been chosen through some popular mechanism. 
In addition, Riker’s (1955) paper on the role of the Senate in federalism, Rothman’s 
(1966) examination of Post-Reconstruction senate elections (which relies on Haynes 
commentary), and Wirls and Wirls (2004) examination of the formation of the U.S. Senate 
and congressional party politics in the early period of U.S. history, offer a useful 
framework from which to examine this period.  And the consequences of the transition 
from state selection to direct election have already garnered some research attention 
(Stewart 1992; Stewart et Weingast 1992; King et Ellis 1996; Brandes-Crook et Hibbling 
1997; Wirls 1998).  Additionally, it seems that Schiller and Stewart have been working for 
several years to assemble a data base which they can use to fill the void in “direct analysis 
of U.S. Senate elections before direct election” (2007, 1) and also provide insight into 
factionalism within state assemblies. 
In a domestic literature which varies dramatically by country and a comparative 
literature which includes only a handful of significant forays into bicameralism, it is 
perhaps not surprising that factors which may lead to or constrain upper chamber reform or 
abolition have not been central points of research.  Yet second chambers provide examples 
of institutions which have been resistant to change and examples of institutions which have 
undergone some of the most dramatic institutional changes imaginable, transitioning from 
appointment to election to even abolition. 
Canadian Upper Chambers 
In Canada, where there have been dozens of Royal commissions, parliamentary 
hearings and governmental and non-governmental proposals for reform of the Senate since 
  
 
61
Confederation, the lack of academic research has led Franks to refer to the Senate as “both 
the most written about and the least studied of Canadian political institutions” (Franks 
1999, 121).  In spite of this interest in reform and abolition, and the fact that each of 
Canada’s provinces had abolished their upper chambers, there surprisingly has been no 
study of the abolition of provincial upper chambers, though there is some consideration of 
provincial upper chambers in books on provincial governments and politics. 
Senate 
Canada is a country which has a weak senate within the Westminster-model of 
responsible parliamentary government, and the domestic literature reflects this situation.  
There have been, to date, four book-length studies of the Canadian Senate, in addition to 
Smith’s comparative contribution discussed above.  The first was Ross’ The Senate of 
Canada: Its Constitution, Powers and Duties, Historically Considered (1914), which in 
spite of its lofty title is light on historical considerations, instead offering up arguments 
from elite discourse as to why a senate is not in natural tension with the house of commons 
and why the Canadian senate, in spite of its method of selection and appointments for life, 
is not any less connected to and representative of ‘the people’ than the house of commons 
or the monarch.  Of particular note is his acknowledgement that agitation for senate reform 
in Canada has been tied, even a century ago, to a political party winning the majority in the 
house of commons and forming a government after long periods in opposition and having 
to face a second chamber where they remain in a minority for several years, though he 
draws on the Australian experience to argue that election would not remedy the problem of 
parity in equilibrium between chambers (Ross 1914, 98).36 
It is in the next book, MacKay’s The Unreformed Senate of Canada (1963), where a 
detailed history chronicling the colonial experience and the original intentions of the 
                                                 
36 Ross reports that senate abolition was debated in the house of commons in 1909, 1910 and 1911, and a 
motion to make it elective was considered in 1909.  When Mackenzie took office in 1873 there was a 
Conservative majority in the senate of 15.  The Conservatives returned to power in 1878 and when the 
Liberals again took office in 1896 there were only 13 Liberals in the senate.  It was only in 1903 when the 
Liberals gained a majority in the second chamber, before the Conservatives took office in 1911. 
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Fathers of Confederation is discussed,37 including the decision to allocate seats in the senate 
so as to protect sectional interests, specifically relating to language, race and religion.  
MacKay reviews many of the key pieces of legislation over which the senate and house of 
commons have differed in order to illustrate the work of the senate and, specifically, to 
address the accusation that the body is naturally conservative and has been an obstacle to 
social reform, an approach picked up on both generally and specifically by Kunz. 
In The Modern Senate of Canada, 1925-1963, Kunz (1965) begins his study in the 
year MacKay ends his38, though his review is more systematic in its consideration of the 
legislative review function and more categorical in its claim that the senate has never been 
“the main and principle institutional protector of the federal units”, suggesting that it was 
simply offered by the Fathers of Confederation as “a constitutional tranquillizer to palliate 
the sectional fears of the weaker partners to federalism from the numerical majorities of the 
House of Commons” (Kunz 1965, 317).  Kunz is the only Canadian to attempt to identify a 
theory of bicameralism, though, given his singular interest in Canada and his writing prior 
to Canada’s adopting a constitutional amending formula in 1982, his contribution is more 
limited and is aimed at making a case that changes to the senate should be undertaken 
lightly and that bicameralism should not be undermined through the “sheer force of 
administrative habit or bureaucratic usage” (Kunz 1965, 23). 
Campbell’s The Senate: A Lobby from Within (1978) uses the same historical record 
to show how the senate was designed to be a conservative institution and was expressly 
intended to defend particular minority interests from which its members would be drawn, 
though he agrees that the senate has failed to do the latter, something he lays at the feet of 
its oligarchic nature and propertied interests.  His research interest is in the Senate’s 
                                                 
37 Mackay (1963) places great stock in the fact that six out of 14 days were spent on discussing the senate, 
something repeated by Seidle (1991), though Moore (1997) makes an interesting case that the length of time 
does not reflect active involvement in designing this institution but rather a testing of the resolve of the 
delegation from Canada by the Maritime delegation as this was the first item on the agenda SEE ALSO 
(Ajzenstat 2003). 
38 MacKay’s book was based on a doctoral dissertation which was submitted to Princeton in 1924.  Kunz’s 
book also started as a doctoral dissertation submitted to McGill in 1963, and covers the work of the senate 
between the end of MacKay’s book and the year of his submission.   
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composition of elites from business and politics, something he chronicles in detail, and 
argues for the existence of elite accommodation in defence of corporate interests to which 
senators are linked.39 
Campbell’s work is influenced by Presthus’ Elite Accommodation in Canadian 
Politics (1973), which found, after interviewing legislators, senior civil servants and 
interest group leaders, that there was a pre-existing and informal network of relationships 
among decision-makers based on common schooling, club memberships and other largely 
semi-class based social mechanisms,40 and that this was reinforced by a common 
commitment to the maintenance of political institutions among the leadership of societal 
groups and the social benefits that these individuals got through mutual cooperation. 
In addition to these books, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism received, though did not publish, a study by Bonenfant entitled Le sénat dans 
le fédéralisme canadien (1966).  This study argues that there was a particular role offered 
by the senate to accommodate the smaller provinces, “les sénateurs représentent une 
circonscription alors qu’ils ne devaient pas en représenter dans les autres provinces pour 
que la minorité anglo-protestante soit protégée” (Bonenfant 1966, 15) and advances the 
unique premise that Quebec’s 24 senate seats from specific ridings within the province was 
intended to ensure the independence of Quebec senators from the federal government.  For 
the MacDonald Commission, and published in Intrastate Federalism in Canada (Smiley 
1985b),41 Smiley and Watts produced a study on the senate which contains a useful caution 
for scholars who focus on constitutions and the historical record, namely that the 
                                                 
39 Campbell’s book was also based on a dissertation which he submitted to Duke in 1974.  This thesis is 
repeated in a more sensational book by journalist Claire Hoy (1999), who illustrates the corporate connections 
of the more recent Canadian senators and combines these with anecdotal evidence of sporadic performance, 
attendance and the perquisites of office. 
40 This, in turn, draws upon the consociational and power-sharing concepts of Lijphart (1968, 1969). 
41 The MacDonald Commission’s formal title is the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada.  It was a 13-person commission under the chair of the Hon. Donald 
MacDonald.  Among its recommendations is that the senate be directly elected using proportional 
representation, though with reduced powers out of concern for responsible parliamentary government 
(MacDonald, 1985). 
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institutional intentions of a country’s founders may not be relevant to modern societies.  In 
addition, Smiley (1985a) published his own paper that year on lessons Canada can learn 
from the Australian elected senate experience, which also has a useful cautionary note 
about whether in a federal context it is sufficient to simply focus on federal institutions and 
ignore state/provincial differences.  Most recently, the Centre for Management 
Development has assembled a collection of scholarly and political papers on the senate 
entitled Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew (Joyal 2003), which 
as the title implies, offers a defence of the institution – as do the frequently cited papers and 
book chapters by Forsey (1982, 1984), Mallory (1984) and Franks (1987, 2003). 
With the exception of Campbell, what unites all this scholarship and was expected, 
given a weak senate in a parliamentary system, is its primary focus on the review function 
of the second chamber and its advocacy of only modest improvements, so as not to harm 
either this review function or the supremacy of the house of commons within a 
Westminster-model of representative government.  However, with the exception of 
concerns about constitutional fatigue and the challenges imposed by the amending formula 
of the Canadian Constitution, which is surprisingly treated as sui generis, there is little 
discussion of what might drive or restrain change.  
Provincial Legislative Councils 
The only work that systematically looks at the abolition of a provincial upper 
chamber or ‘legislative council’ can be found as part of a chapter in Beck’s The 
Government of Nova Scotia (1957, 231).  Like other scholars on weak chambers, the focus 
of the chapter is on the work of the chamber in reviewing legislation.  He then proceeds to 
systematically research and recount most of the numerous attempts to abolish or alter the 
upper chamber in this province.  Unfortunately, by beginning with an examination of the 
work of the council and then by grouping the attempts at abolition by government in order 
to differentiate them, he is led to the inference that the attempts of some governments were 
more sincere or less sincere based on the chamber’s effectiveness with respect to that 
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government’s legislation.  After illustrating the elaborate steps the government took in the 
end to change the chamber, he then concludes that the council had hurt itself by failing to 
catch poorly drafted legislation. 
There are only two full books on legislative councils in Canada, and they are not 
surprisingly on the Quebec legislative council which lasted until 1968, of which the years 
1963 to its abolition drew great interest as Quebec re-examined its institutional and 
constitutional arrangements.  Turcotte’s (1933) book entitled Le Conseil legislatif de 
Québec traces the development of the legislative council from time of British conquest.  
Turcotte was the assistant clerk to the council, so not surprisingly, in addition to tracing the 
development of the institution through the lens of constitutional change from the Quebec 
Act, 1774 forward, it lays out the normative case for a nominee council as the upper 
chamber in a bicameral legislature. 
Orban’s (1967) book by the same name, published in the midst of the debate over 
abolition of the upper chamber, looks at the work and composition of the chamber.  It is 
also reflective of the thinking of the day with particular focus on the inter-relationships with 
the corporate community the councillors had through the boards of directors they served on, 
and how these relationships had transformed the chamber from being a protector of 
regional and minority interests into a protector of corporate interests.  Oban, who clearly 
supports abolition due to its corporatist focus, suggests that the chamber had outlived its 
usefulness as it was increasingly deferring to the lower chamber in terms of legislation and 
had abrogated its role as a chamber for legislative review.  
There is one U.S. book that purports to have examined the question of upper 
chambers in Canada; it was cited above, and was published in support of what the author 
hoped was an abolition movement in the U.S. following the abolition of the upper chamber 
in Nebraska in 1837.  The scholarship of this book with respect to Canada is suspect, given 
that Johnson (1938) concludes that the abolition of upper chambers occurred in Canada’s 
provinces after a sufficient number of representatives were appointed to the upper chamber 
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who would vote for abolition.  While in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia members were 
appointed who had committed to vote for abolition, in Manitoba and Quebec the council 
the government inherited was the one it needed to work with to achieve abolition as there 
were constitutionally fixed numbers for both councils and appointments were for life (or 
age 75 in the case of Quebec).  Prince Edward Island had the authority to add additional 
councillors in 1879 when it first tried to abolish its council, but was forced to make it 
elected with a property qualification instead due to public outcry, and once elected it could 
not appoint councillors in favour of abolition. 
There is a little consideration of provincial upper chambers within a more generalist 
work on institutions and constitutions, but this does not use original research and its 
generalizations are flawed.  For example, Keith (1928) writes that the political parties 
which initiated the legislation for abolition in the provinces were parties that came to power 
after being in opposition and felt frustrated in their administrative and legislative agenda by 
the second chamber.  While this was true in a number of cases, parties equally came to 
power and initiated abolition and parties that were in power for long periods of time 
initiated abolition, so it provides no insight as to why abolition occurred in some instances 
and not in others using this single variable. 
There are some details with respect to legislative councils of the provinces in the 
literature on provincial governments, legislatures and politics.  Martin’s (1914) political 
history of Manitoba, Donnelly’s (1963) book on the government of Manitoba and 
MacFarlane’s (1940) book on Manitoba’s political parties and politics, each include 
discussion of the legislative council; Morse’s (1914) book on the governments of the 
Maritime Provinces includes reference to the legislative councils in all three provinces; 
with MacKinnon’s (1951) book on the government of PEI, Raymond’s  book on the 
political history and Thorburn’s (1961) book on the politics of New Brunswick, each 
including references to the province’s upper chamber. Schindeler’s (1969, 82-3) book on 
responsible government in Ontario contains a discussion of why a legislative council was 
not created for Ontario.  These books are interested in the broader narrative of 
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governmental design and provincial politics and, where institutional evolution is 
considered, it is focused on the emergence of the elected lower chamber as the dominant 
chamber and its relationship to the government and upper chamber. 
This focus on the lower chamber, like the literature on responsible government, 
leaves examination of upper chambers subject to political party discourse.  The challenge 
posed by using this generalist literature on provincial governments for a proper 
understanding of the alteration and abolition of legislative councils is apparent in a paper by 
Kitchin (1973), who tries to draw on this scholarship to weave together a paper examining 
the abolition of provincial upper chambers.  One is left with the impression that: 
• Nova Scotia had the most disagreement between chambers (ibid., 71), when, in fact, it 
was New Brunswick that had the earliest and most, and this began well before 
Confederation; 
• Manitoba was the province that bought off most legislators in order to achieve abolition 
(ibid., 68), but in Manitoba there were only five councillors and abolition passed by one 
vote with the two cabinet ministers in the upper chamber receiving new appointments, 
which is no clear evidence that councillors’ voters were bought.  Further, in Nova 
Scotia an offer was made to councillors of remuneration if they resigned and the council 
declined and in Quebec a lifetime pension was given to all 24 retiring councillors, equal 
to their salary; 
• “‘The abolition of the legislative council, which might have been regarded by the 
French as additional security for their rights, was even supported by some of the French 
members..  And so it was that the Legislative Council of Manitoba voted itself out of 
existence after only six years of provincial experience” (ibid., 68, quoting MacFarlane 
1940, 50), which leaves the impression that French councillors agreed to abolition and 
it went quickly and easily, when, in fact, the opposite is the case on both points. 
• Quebec had a long campaign to abolish its upper chamber that occurred every time the 
opposition came to power, including during the government of Maurice Duplessis 
(ibid., 78, drawing on the work of Bonenfant 1968, 264), and yet there were only two 
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attempts to abolish the upper chamber prior to 1965, and both were from the Liberals 
and tied to a single bitterly partisan event.  The Union National government of Maurice 
Duplessis did not try to abolish the upper chamber; 
• Quebec’s upper chamber was the least representative (Kitchin 1973, 76).  Quebec’s 
upper chamber had a specific representational role and had the largest upper chamber so 
on the face of it this fails even in the context of the theory of bicameralism Kitchin 
identifies as ideal in his paper.  All provinces except Manitoba had upper chambers at 
the time of abolition where party politics had been a determinant in appointment or 
election. 
• After going into detail on how the upper and lower chamber resisted either side’s 
initiatives for change and noting that the compromise was to merge the two bodies, 
Kitchin concludes that Prince Edward Island became the third provincial legislative 
council to have been abolished (ibid., 71).  While it may be true that the council was 
eliminated, the councillors were preserved and just began to meet in the room next door 
in a single chamber with the assemblymen.42 
In Kitchin’s defence, his goal was not to undertake a comparative analysis, but rather to 
offer some lessons that Canadians and Canada’s public officials might draw with respect to 
the merits of upper chambers and how they appear to have been abolished at the provincial 
level.  He is also, like much of the scholarship on upper chambers, guided by the normative 
theory of bicameralism, which creates its own restrictions on probing institutional change. 
In addition to the paucity of book-length studies on councils, there are only three 
articles specifically on a legislative council in Canada.  Each is published 
contemporaneously to the chamber-in-question’s abolition.  The first is a paper which 
examines the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision of 1927 concerning whether 
or not the government of Nova Scotia had the authority to summon additional councillors 
                                                 
42 This conclusion as to when the chamber was abolished is the province’s official date as well.  But given 
that in the later part of the British Empire smaller colonies had an institutional configuration where the upper 
and lower chambers sat together to save money, this conclusion is misleading, especially if the purpose of the 
literature review is to, in part, allow a comparison of mechanisms and dates of abolition. 
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to the chamber in support of abolition.  In this article Mackenzie (1929) includes a brief 
review of the history of the chamber, wherein he claims that the Nova Scotia government 
approached the provinces of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in 1879 and 
convinced them to get rid of their upper chambers.  But the Liberal Party in New 
Brunswick in 1878 had won the election with a platform that included abolition of the 
upper chamber.  At most, the inter-provincial dialogue reinforced the three provinces’ 
interest in the file.  But even if it did, no province’s initiative for abolition that year was 
successful and it is misleading to suggest as he does that it started a campaign for abolition 
that would leave Nova Scotia the last to make the change.  Prince Edward Island was able 
to switch to election that year, but was forced to establish a property qualification for the 
council to preserve its function as a body representing the propertied class, a change that 
would take them until 1963 to finally eliminate. 
The other two articles are on the Quebec legislative council.  In the first, Bonenfant 
(1968) argues that the Quebec delegates to the Confederation conferences wanted an upper 
chamber because of its prestige, in addition to its capacity to represent the English 
minority.43  While the issue of prestige is reflective of Bonenfant’s wider scholarship which 
sees the institutional arrangements of Confederation through the lens of Quebec’s modern 
desire for autonomy, this is not an accurate reflection of why the upper chamber was 
adopted for Quebec.  It was adopted with the 24 electoral divisions that existed at the time 
of Confederation as a mechanism to protect the English minority in Quebec on local 
matters that might impact on their social identity.  That being said, French Canada’s leading 
Father of Confederation, George-Étienne Cartier, did frame the agreement on this 
institutional arrangement for the Canadiens as being one of preserving Quebec’s historic 
institutions and their gravitas, something that was strategic and quickly became entwined 
with ethno-religious nationalism in the province.  
                                                 
43 Bonenfant also published an article in L’Action entitled Peut-on abolir le Conseil legislative contre sa 
volonté? shortly after the Lesage government had the legislative assembly strike a committee to look into the 
constitutional arrangements for the province (14 mars 1963). 
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As a follow-up to his book, after the abolition of the legislative council in Quebec, 
Orban (1969) acknowledges that the intended role for the chamber was to protect the 
minority in Quebec.  He suggests that the dual role of representing economic interests and 
representing minority interests often made the English members side with their French 
counterparts, thus limiting their capacity to represent the English minority.  This is 
particularly interesting because it suggests that legislators must reconcile competing 
societal interests, something posited in this dissertation’s hypothesis.  He goes on to repeat 
the assertion he had made in his book in support of abolition, concluding that abolition 
became inevitable in the mid-20th century because it had become deferential to the elected 
lower house and it ceased having utility, simply rubber stamping the legislation of the 
lower chamber. 
V. Summary 
The study of institutions fell out of favour in political science during the 1960s, as 
behaviouralism came to dominant the discipline.  While it has recently seen a renewed 
interest in political science, something that first occurred in economics and management, 
study of institutional change has not yet become the focus of this new field in any 
discipline in a significant way. 
There are no systematic studies of the evolution of nominee councils in Canada 
from origin to reform to abolition.  These are bodies that underwent dramatic reforms at 
times and resisted reform at others.  They began as unicameral institutions of governance, 
dubbed the governor’s council, containing judicial, legislative and executive functions.  
When an elected chamber was created for the colonial government, they became upper 
chambers in a bicameral legislature.  Their executive function was later separated, 
renaming the upper chambers legislative councils, a label they continued with until 
abolition.  While the existing literature in law, history and political science reports these 
changes and the constitutional mechanisms that caused them, it is absent an analysis of why 
such changes occurred, when they did, with the exception of responsible government, 
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which it attributes to democratic aspirations combined with loyalty to the crown at the local 
level followed by a reluctant acceptance by the British government, which could not and 
did not want to rule the empire directly as it moved from mercantilism to free trade and 
from strict legal interpretation to political, both colonial and domestic, pragmatism.  
This lack of a systematic study of the evolution of nominee councils since the 
rejection of ‘old institutionalism’ as an appropriate scientific approach suggests the merits 
of revisiting this period of institutional evolution.  The numerous changes proposed, failed 
and adopted in each province, offer multiple points of access by which to examine 
institutional change within each of these temporal and provincial case studies. 
Conspicuously absent from the political science literature in a country where 
abolition and reform of the upper chamber in a legislature has been a political issue for a 
number of years, arguably since Confederation (though only seriously since the late 1960s), 
is a study of the abolition of legislative councils, though there is some consideration of 
these events in the studies of governments and politics in each of Canada’s provinces. 
In addition to hopefully providing insights into what drives and restrains 
institutional change, this dissertation will fill several voids in the historical record. 
 
  
Chapter 3: The Legal and Theoretical Framework for the 
Constitution of Canada 
As has been noted in the previous two chapters, political scientists who have written 
about post-Confederation Senate reform in Canada invariably identify the ‘Constitution’ as 
the principle impediment to change.  On the other hand, most scholars who research and 
write on constitutional law argue that the strength of the British and later Canadian 
constitutional model is that it can accommodate change, as unwritten ‘conventions’ “permit 
the adaptation of constitutional rules to changes in the general political principles and 
values of the day, without the need for formal amendment of existing positive law” (Heard 
1991, 5).  However, Justice Evatt (1967, vii) warns that “constant research into, and 
analysis of, all the present-day implications and tendencies of such method or system are 
essential; otherwise it may change, or be changed, without popular approval given with full 
knowledge into something very different”.  The Westminster model is thus simultaneously 
and contradictorily intransigent, adaptable and susceptible to unilateral and unintentional 
alteration. 
The reason for the apparent contradiction in seeing a constitution as an immortal set 
of rules that resist change and yet are permanently changing, I would argue, lies in the fact 
that, while rarely looked at as such, constitutions are in fact institutions, in the broadest 
sense.  Thus, they are, to use Sait’s analogy, coral islands that constantly change and evolve 
while appearing permanent and intransigent (1938, vi); evidencing two of Howlett and 
Rayner’s institutional characteristics of being simultaneously path dependent impediments 
to policy change and the process sequencing mechanism by which change occurs (2006). 
While this dissertation’s hypothesis suggests that, since the constitution and the 
political institutions through which change must be achieved are nothing more than variable 
rules of the game and the field upon which the game must be played, it is rather partisan 
and social forces operating through these mechanisms that drive and constrain change, and 
thus should be the focus of our examination.  Nevertheless, it would be a shortcoming of 
any thorough analysis of the historic evolution of Canadian upper chambers if we did not 
explore the British and Canadian constitutions and how they may have over time 
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determined and constrained the institutions within which these forces are believed to work.  
It would also be disrespectful to the large number of distinguished Canadian scholars who 
continue to cite the Constitution as the impediment to Senate reform if we did not consider 
the relative merits of this claim. 
The earliest constitutions in Canada were in fact mandates and instructions to 
governors to establish institutions.  Thus to change these institution is to change that 
constitution.  Social contract theory suggests that constitutions are contractual agreements 
among, variously, a monarch and her subjects, the citizens within a country and between 
societal groups, whether they be formal political entities like provinces or less 
geographically bounded ethnic, religious and linguistic groups.  If constitutional rules are a 
form of institution, they can act as a proxy for the more formal political institutions they are 
designed to mediate and offer another window for our examination on the constraints and 
sources of change.  And unlike the relatively new field of inquiry on institutional change 
that is the focus of this dissertation, the subject of constitutional change has long been of 
great interest and scholarly debate and investigation in Canada.  A clearer understanding of 
the dynamics of constitutional change may inform the inquiry that is central to our 
examination, namely what impediments and forces control institutional change. 
We begin this chapter by considering the legal philosophical concepts which have 
governed the political institutions of Canada and its provinces from the colonial period to 
the present.  In part one we will look at the idea of sovereignty and the nature of the social 
contract as this informs both the legitimacy of the constitution and the mechanism for its 
alteration.  In part two, we turn our attention to the formal structure of the constitutions that 
were created by the British for Canada’s provinces and dominions.  In the third and final 
section of this chapter we will examine the post-Confederation written constitution with 
specific attention to the issue of the amending formula because this is the mechanism for 
achieving institutional change in the future.  The general purpose of this chapter is to ensure 
that constitutionalism as a constraint to change is assigned no more and no less attention 
than its deserved place, while in the process gleaning any insights that the Constitution may 
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offer on the broader research question of how societal cleavages impact on institutional 
change. 
I. Sovereignty 
A philosophical debate that has informed the British constitution and guided its 
institutions of governance has been the concept of sovereignty.  Changing ideas of 
sovereignty have informed all constitutional changes, first in England, and then by 
transposition to the colony and later independent country of Canada, including the very 
question of the legality of Canadian independence.  It is therefore no coincidence that the 
modern political movement for independence in the predominantly Francophone province 
of Quebec refers to itself as ‘souverainiste’. 
From the outset, the king of England was the physical embodiment of sovereignty 
and thus the fount of all public authority, a concept that is behind the appellation 
‘Sovereign’.44  This claim emerged in a time when sovereignty was seen as ownership and 
was vested singularly in the monarch who it was claimed God had made ruler over a 
particular territory, a construct actively supported by the Roman Catholic Church and to 
this day reflected in the motto on the queen’s coat of arms in right of England – “Dieu et 
mon droit” – and in the reference to territorial boundaries via quasi-religious possessive 
synonyms such as kingdom, dominion and province.45 
                                                 
44 England has had both kings and queens as ‘Sovereigns’.  If there is no heredity first generational male heir, 
as occurred with the death of Henry VIII’s only male son Edward VI, a hereditary queen is allowed to assume 
the throne, which in the first instance brought Mary I and then Elizabeth I to power.  This ability for women 
to take the throne was not standard in Europe.  When Victoria came to the British throne, she had to 
relinquish the Kingdom of Hanover since, under Salic law, no woman could become ruler of that state, which 
was an electoral seat for the office of Holy Roman Emperor.  Beginning with the Act of Succession 1534 
under Henry VIII, and more recently in the Succession to the Crown Act 1707 under Queen Anne, the heir to 
the British throne also had to be protestant.  The various rules adopted in countries for women and protestants, 
so as to exclude them from the ultimate seats of governance is an interesting parallel to this examination of 
institutional change since it points to, even in the pre-democratic era, social cleavages beginning to restrict 
institutional change, if only to exclude ‘out groups’ from power. 
45 Snow has the most interesting examination of these and other terms, beginning with their etymology and 
their use as synonyms, leading to an examination of their nuanced differences in British common law with 
respect to colonial countries and self-governing autonomy (1902). 
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In the case of Canada, while there was an indigenous population already present at 
the time of ‘discovery’, European explorers claimed the land in their respective benefactor 
kings’ names upon their arrival.  For example, the letters patent issued on March 5, 1496 to 
John Cabot empowered him and his sons to acquire the “dominion, title and jurisdiction of 
the… islands and mainlands so discovered” for Henry VII of England, which he did when 
he landed on the North American continent, probably in Newfoundland, in 1497 (Biggar 
1911, 7-8).  Jacques Cartier did the same for the King of France when he landed in Gaspé 
Harbour on July 24, 1534 (Biggar 1924, 64-9).  Simon François Daumont, sieur de Lusson, 
took possession “in his Majesty’s name, of the territories lying between the East and the 
West, from Montreal as far as the South sea, covering the utmost extent and range possible” 
(Thwaites 1959, 104-15).46  Through these claims of exploration, and subsequent treaties 
and conquests, royal dominion and sovereignty over all of Canada was extended, and over 
what is now the United States of America was lost. 
But the idea of sovereignty as ownership and the monarch as singular owner is not 
that simple.  From the earliest days in England, more so than in other European states, the 
British king was never absolute ruler and the king’s authority has always been challenged 
by other nobles and the church (Maitland 2001).  By the ‘age of enlightenment’, the 
concept of royal sovereignty was being rejected in favour of more nuanced claims that the 
king’s right to govern had emerged from the incapacity of the people to govern themselves 
(Hobbes 1998) or, alternatively, was the result of the people’s decision to delegate authority 
to the king (Locke 1798).  Thus the idea of popular sovereignty arose to replace the idea of 
an individual ‘sovereign’, an idea that fuelled the French and American revolutions, where 
sovereign people were seen to form a social contract that variously constrained and 
empowered the king and other wielders of state power (Rousseau 1988).  This should be the 
theoretical underpinning for a constitution – and the limits it places on institutions of 
                                                 
46 Slattery has an interesting examination of whether claiming territory in the Crown’s name, as the French 
explorers did, established dominion over a territory (1986).  He argues that continuous possession is required 
for sovereignty, though this legal distinction in no way impacted on the French monarch’s decision to 
dispatch troops to defend or French colonists to settle lands claimed in their name, and the same was equally 
true for the English. 
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governance, including the crown.  Yet within the legal realm, the ‘doctrine of sovereignty’ 
continued to dominate in law, where it was asserted that sovereignty had to be singularly 
vested in some person or body that was the source of law yet separate from law, with 
unlimited power to make law to the exclusion of all others, first asserted by Austin in 1832 
(1995).47  
This doctrine of sovereignty is why all power continued to rest in the hands of the 
monarch as the sovereign even as decision making devolved to political actors.  To this 
day, all laws passed by the legislative branch in England, and with some variation in 
Canada, are still “enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same”.  All orders-in-council issued by the cabinet 
begin: “Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and 
it is hereby ordered, as follows:”. 
In spite of this construction, over time there has been a shift in the loci of power 
away from the British monarch as person.  This has been, in part, a response to the grafting 
of democratic theory onto institutions which emerged over a millennium earlier and, in 
part, the result of open conflict between the British parliament and the crown over political 
supremacy.  The English civil war, the glorious revolution and the Bill of Rights 1688, the 
Act of Settlement 1700 and the Succession to the Crown Act 1707 firmly established 
parliamentary supremacy over the crown (Hicks 2010a).  It was A.V. Dicey who translated 
this political supremacy into a revised conceptualization of where sovereignty actually 
resided (1959).  Rather than leaving it in the sole hands of the king or placing it in the 
collective hands of the people, he built on the Austinian doctrine and asserted that 
sovereignty resided in the British parliament which both represents the people and contains 
the monarch as one of its constituent elements.  Dicey was a forceful scholar and his 
domination of British and colonial law school texts firmly established ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty’ within constitutional law, something that had implications for the constitutions 
                                                 
47 see also Dewey (1894). 
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of the colonies and, later, for their independence (Oliver 2005).48  After all, if sovereignty 
rested with the British parliament for not just the United Kingdom but the entire empire, 
how could any subordinate legislature within the British Commonwealth of nations be 
given full autonomy to alter their constitutions as these were nothing more than statutes of 
that supreme parliament?  After all, if the parliament in Westminster granted authority to 
make changes locally they could equally rescind such a gift. 
From a colonial perspective, with the shift in sovereignty occurring in the United 
Kingdom, colonial governors became agents for the British government more so than for 
the British crown, taking instructions from the British cabinet and the responsible minister, 
such as her majesty’s secretaries of state for the colonies, who would be accountable to the 
British parliament for these policies and actions.  Then, with demands for independence 
from Britain, this evolution reversed itself in the early 20th century and the role of the 
British government in directing these governors all but disappeared.  They returned to being 
representatives of the person of the monarch and became vice-regents, or de facto heads of 
states, operating in former colonies like Canada, and much later in its provinces, as the 
queen did in England, with the British government simply conveying messages between 
them and the queen as a matter of convenience (Hughes 1929).49  It was at the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, with the ‘Balfour declaration’, that the independence of the various 
dominions was recognized and, at that conference, a committee was struck to explore 
further the complex legal issues surrounding the surrender of sovereignty.50  This ultimately 
                                                 
48 It has been an interest of Canadian political science for sometime whether the loci of power has shifted 
even further within the same institutional arrangements, specifically away from parliament and the cabinet 
and into the hands of ‘old boy’ networks of senior mandarins (e.g., Presthus 1973), mid-level bureaucrats 
(e.g., Pross 1992), central agencies (e.g., Savoie 1999) or even judges (e.g., Morton et Knopff 2000) and 
government lawyers (e.g., Kelly 1999). 
49 It was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Liquidators of Maritime Bank v. Receiver General 
(1892) that transformed lieutenant governors from representatives of the federal government in Ottawa to 
representatives of the monarch with all the prerogatives of the Crown. 
50 Long before this point, governors had lost the practical authority to act on executive matters without local 
ministerial approval for the exact same reason that the British monarch had lost her independence from her 
British ministers.  Once legislatures began levying taxes and voting supply, even if a governor took a decision 
that was legally his prerogative, such as dismissing ministers and filling the cabinet with his own nominees, 
he would be powerless to get supply from the legislature for the day-to-day operations of that government 
(Keith 1929, 33).  Representation, which was demanded as a right in return for taxation, invariably led to 
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led to the British parliament extinguishing its legal control over the dominion legislatures 
via the Statute of Westminster 1931. 
The passage of the Canada Act, 1982 by the British parliament enacted the 
Constitution Act, 1982 which in turn created amending formulae for this act and for the 
previous British North America Acts which were renamed Constitution Acts.  What made 
this ‘patriation’ of the Constitution possible is the emergence of what I would suggest is 
‘constitutional sovereignty’.  In many countries, sovereignty has come to rest not in the 
legislature or in the monarch, but in the constitution.  In response to the Austinian doctrine 
of sovereignty, which argued that some person or body had to be the source of law yet 
separate from law, Dicean assertions were for a parliamentary sovereignty located at 
Westminster.  But the same logic would identify the source of law in an independent 
country like Canada as, particularly given its federal structure and constitutionalized 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, residing in the Constitution.  From this perspective, the 
legislative documents for Canada that Westminster enacted at one time are no longer 
British statutes, but were patriated to Canada in law as an autonomous Constitution.  This 
perspective reconciles with popular sovereignty via the Rousseaun idea of a constitution as 
a social contract, and still leaves the Queen of Canada as a symbol of ‘constitutional’ 
sovereignty and the legislatures and federal parliament as sovereign within their areas of 
constitutional jurisdiction.51 
                                                                                                                                                    
political control transferring to the hands of the people who could obtain supply and whose representational 
role gave them the legitimacy to wield the power of the state. 
51 Constitutional change is not always recognized for what it is at the time it is occurring.  The King of 
Canada, while the same person as the King of England, became a distinct monarch in 1931 with the Statute of 
Westminster.  Yet it was only with Elizabeth II of England that the title Queen of Canada was adopted, which 
is only a partial improvement since this is the first Elizabeth who has sat on the throne of Canada (she should, 
by all rights, be Elizabeth I of Canada).  Similarly, the coat of arms created in 1921 as the deputed Arms of 
the King of the United Kingdom for particular purposes in Canada, what is commonly called to as the 
Canadian Coat of Arms, was elevated to be the Royal Arms of the King of Canada for general purposes with 
the Statute of Westminster (see Hicks 2010c).   While the Great Seal of Canada issued for George VI in 1940 
appropriately had the Canadian Coat of Arms instead of the British Arms at the feet of the monarch, there are 
many federal government buildings built after 1931 that continued to feature the British Coat of Arms in 
places of honour in a mistaken belief that this represented the Crown.  In fact, several provincial supreme 
courts continue to use the British Coat of Arms on their documents to this day, apparently oblivious to the fact 
that they are representing themselves as dispensing the justice on behalf of a foreign head of state. 
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Nature of the Social Contract 
Where sovereignty provides the philosophical legitimacy and legal authority for 
law, the political systems it codifies are institutional arrangements that are designed to 
reflect the social contract.  Understanding who were and are the parties to that contract then 
becomes a key conceptual point of departure when considering institutional change.  They 
become foundational principles for the institutions that were created, which in turn can 
influence the way “the first questions of Canadian constitutionalism are studied and 
debated” (Vipond 1985, 267). 
While sovereignty provides the authority for law and thus is the only authority that 
can authorize change, the parties to the social contract can assert a moral obligation on this 
sovereign power in order to restrain change.   In Canada, this debate over who were the 
original parties to the contract, or at least the contract that established the current set of 
political arrangements in 1867, has been a point of much examination and debate. 
One of the claims that has been advanced to explain the Constitution Act, 1867 is 
the ‘compact theory’ of Confederation, which suggests that the country which emerged in 
1867 was a ‘compact’ or contract between four ‘provinces’: Ontario, Quebec, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia.  To these foundational provinces, additional provinces joined 
the compact, including several that were carved out of territorial possessions already in 
British hands as Canada spread itself east and west until it came to encompass all former 
British colonies and territories in North America that had not joined in the American 
Revolution or been claimed by the emergent country of the United States of America. 
The idea of a compact of provinces was first articulated in opposition to the 
expansionist role Canada’s first prime minister, John A. Macdonald, was leading the 
federal government into, and was intended to support a broader interpretation of provincial 
powers and a provincial veto over any changes to the Constitution (Cook 1969).  The 
compact theory suggests that two large provinces, supported by two smaller provinces, only 
agreed to union based on the necessity of common defence and other rational arguments of 
self-interest and in no way desired to surrender their autonomy to a new political construct.  
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These arguments were laid out explicitly for the first time by Quebec Jurist T.J.J. Loranger 
in his Lettres sur l'interprétation de la constitution fédérale (1884), though the arguments 
were quickly adopted by all the provinces in their struggle for autonomy (Behiels 2007).  
Loranger was most concerned with threats to Quebec’s autonomy, but his claim was 
universal and unequivocal, that: “The confederation of the British Provinces was the result 
of a compact entered into by the Provinces and the imperial parliament which, in enacting 
the British North America Act, simply ratified it” (McRoberts 1997, 16).  Following this 
logic, the federal government could not enhance its powers without the Quebec 
government’s consent, and presumably the consent of each of the other provinces. 
Sir John A. Macdonald was consistent in rejecting not only the compact theory, but 
any proposal put before parliament that might be interpreted as an endorsement or 
validation of this theory (Dawson 1933).  Macdonald was intent on building a country, and 
while the intrusiveness of the federal state would not be genuinely felt until the era of the 
welfare state, an increasing number of irritants were beginning to emerge as the federal 
government launched its ‘national policy’ following Confederation. 
Building on the compact theory was what Cook (1969) calls the ‘national compact’ 
and McRoberts (1997) refers to as the ‘dual compact’ theory.  The idea of a dual compact 
arose, in part, out of concern for the treatment of Francophones outside of the province of 
Quebec.  The compact theory did nothing to protect their interests and even appeared to 
validate their mistreatment since provincial autonomy was assured in a compact of equal 
partners (McRoberts 1997, 19).  In calling for the defence of Francophones across Canada, 
Henri Bourassa claimed that the BNA Act was a ‘double’ contract: “One between the 
French and English of the old province of Canada, while the aim of the other was to bring 
together the scattered colonies of British North America” (Cook 1969, 57).  This argument 
of a partnership between the French and English would come to be adopted by the federal 
government as its preferred characterization of the nature of the union, under the Liberal 
administrations of prime ministers Lester Pierson and Pierre Trudeau, though the federal 
government has consistently denied the existence of a parallel compact between the 
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provinces or that this bilingual compact endowed the Quebec legislature with specific 
jurisdiction beyond that delineated in the BNA Act.  
A century before Confederation, the idea of a compact between states had informed 
the actions and debates of both independence from Britain and the subsequent formation of 
the United States of America (McLaughlin 1900).  Later, the idea of a compact of states 
was used in support of the southern states breaking away, forming a Confederacy in 1861 
and starting a ‘War between the States’ (Hughes 1935).52  While many Canadian scholars 
have argued that the Civil War likely had soured the Fathers of Confederation on the 
American model of union (see, for e.g. Hodgins 1978, 43; Creighton 1970, 10; MacNaught 
1969, 134; Waite 1962, 33; Wheare 1963, 4-5), Vipond illustrates how the same intellectual 
arguments were used by the Fathers of Confederation in conceptualizing the Canadian 
experiment as had been already identified by the framers of the American constitution, 
specifically by James Madison and James Wilson (1989).  The Confederation deal was 
defended “in terms that were strongly reminiscent of the Federalists’ classic exposition of 
constitutional federalism” (ibid., 5). 
The tension between the act of union and the retention of sovereignty in the U.S. 
federal system, combined with the dual characterization of compact of states and social 
compact of citizens, were summed up by Pelatiah Webster in a pamphlet printed in 1783 in 
support of the American union: 
“A number of sovereign States uniting into one Commonwealth, 
and appointing a supreme power to manage the affairs of the union, do 
necessarily and unavoidably part with and transfer over to such supreme 
power, so much of their sovereignty, as is necessary to render the ends of 
the union effectual, otherwise their confederation will be an union without 
bands, like a cask without hoops, that may and probably will fall to pieces 
as soon as it is put to any exercise which requires strength. 
“In a like manner, every member of civil society parts with many 
of his natural rights, that he may enjoy the rest in greater security under 
the protection of society.” (McLaughlin 1900, 472) 
                                                 
52 Hughes argues that the label ‘civil war’ obscures the nature of this conflict which was over the terms of the 
original compact. 
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Vapond argues that the effect of the U.S. Civil War was to stifle discourse, as 
Canadian politicians were reluctant to identify the federal principles as being American in 
origin even though many of them, particularly the ‘Reformers’ of Ontario and the ‘Bleus’ 
of Quebec, were avid fans of the U.S. model (1989).  The conclusion of Canadian 
historians, on the other hand, is that the model adopted by Canada was not an American 
federation but rather the British empire model “in which Ottawa replaced London and the 
provinces assumed the role of colonies” (Cook 1969, 8; see also Creighton 1965, 176-77; 
Morton 1980, 211; Saywell 1986, 4; Mallory 1965, 3-5; Bothwell 1986, 81). 
The lack of clear discourse at Confederation and the subsequent divergence in 
opinion on what the nature of the social contract was for Canada might commend a healthy 
ongoing research agenda for various departments within the Canadian academy.  But 
criticism from Norman Rogers in a paper to the Canadian Political Science Association in 
1931 so effectively undermined the compact theory among English-speaking political 
scientists that its “credibility vanished overnight” (Romney 1999, 23).  There has been little 
interest in the question since, though in recent years, there has been a revival in interest 
over the early moral foundations and how they may have been influencing identity politics 
in Canada (Vipond 1991; LeSelva 2002; Bouchard 2000). 
Interest in the social contract with respect to its constitutional implications has gone 
unstudied in large measure due to the fact that the supreme court of Canada has already 
ruled that a compact reached at Confederation cannot formally constrain future 
constitutional amendment (Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution 1981), and that even if 
many Canadian politicians subscribe to a particular notion of what the compact might be 
today, such as a partnership between the English and French, this is not sufficient to form a 
constitutional convention (Re: Objection by Quebec to a resolution to amend the 
Constitution 1982). 
Of course, what is being suggested in this chapter is not that the social compact 
provides a legal constraint on constitutional change.  Quite the opposite, it is argued that 
only the concept of sovereignty can inform constitutional change, but that the 
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understandings of social groups about the nature of the social contract that is a constitution 
may fuel opposition to change and can create a moral constraint on actors that is a counter 
pull to the formal constitutional amendment processes permitted by sovereignty. 
 The dual compact theory continues to be embraced by the Government of Quebec 
in one form or another and can be found in the work of the Tremblay Commission of the 
1950s and the arguments made against patriation in the 1970s and 1980s (McRoberts 
1997).  A partnership between the English and French has been espoused by Quebec 
premiers Jean Lesage, Daniel Johnson Sr., Robert Bourassa, René Lesvesque, Jacques 
Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard and Jean Charest, and the leader of the ‘no’ forces in the first 
Quebec referendum on independence Claude Ryan, and the separatists in Quebec have 
invoked its non-realization as justification for secession (Paquin 1999). 
Elsewhere I have provided evidence that the symbols of sovereignty and authority 
issued to Canada following Confederation suggest that there was no acknowledgement of 
the existence of a dual compact at the time of Confederation or in the first half century 
following, and that a compact of provinces was the dominant perspective of the Fathers of 
Confederation (Hicks 2010c), though I have also shown how from an institutional 
perspective, the house of commons and the senate of today show an implicit 
accommodation of all three constructions of social union: a compact of people, a compact 
of provinces and a compact of the French and English (Hicks 2007).  From an institutional 
perspective, which will become increasingly apparent in the following chapters, the 
structures of government that form the building blocks upon which Canada’s current 
federal institutions rest, pre-date 1867, and support the idea of a French-English compact.  
For our purposes here it is not necessary to resolve the debate over the nature of the social 
contract.  That a debate exists is sufficient, as it provides evidence of a coordinated attempt 
by social groups to restrain institutional change and of how societal cleavages are reflected 
within the Constitution.  
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Summary 
The authority for constitutional change rests with the queen as ‘sovereign’ and with 
her personal representatives, advisors and legislatures. For much of Canada’s history, as 
will be discussed in more detail below, this has either meant the British crown or the British 
parliament at Westminster as the legal location of sovereignty for all of the British empire.  
In terms of the social contract that is the constitution, there is disagreement over who were 
the original parties to the compact.  This has been the subject of much debate even in the 
colonies that existed before 1867 and, as has been noted here, has repeatedly emerged in 
discourse over constitutional and institutional change since confederation.  It pits those who 
believe in the popular sovereignty of the people against those who get their identity from 
particular social groups that emerge on either side of a cleavage. 
The current Canada is not unitary, given that it was decided to adopt a federal 
system in 1867, but those who identify with a popular sovereignty vested in the Canadian 
people freely entering into the social contract that is a constitution, invariably argue in 
favour of some form of majoritarian decision making in support of constitutional and 
institutional change.  The compact theory, on the other hand, particularly that of a dual 
compact which involves both provincial partnership and a partnership between the French 
and English, has always been advanced in opposition to constitutional and institutional 
change.  Put in the language of this dissertation, sovereignty can be seen as the political 
construction that allows for and drives constitutional change, whereas parties to a 
constitutional contract are often seen to be reflective of the society’s social cleavages, 
especially in a federation, and will be opponents of constitutional change in so far as it 
deviates from the original contract agreed to by the partners.53  While one can imagine 
changes to the compact they would favour, being minority parties to the contract, the status 
quo becomes the preferred position. 
                                                 
53 Federal systems are frequently adopted to accommodate minority social – cultural, linguistic or religious – 
groups that, while a minority in the country, form a majority in a particular geographic area within the state. 
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II. Constitutions 
Turning now from the philosophical underpinnings of a constitution, to the 
constitutions themselves, it is important that we put the law into the perspective it deserves.  
All constitutions can be changed.  All political systems can be changed. 
Revolution is the extreme mechanism whereby citizens force change through 
collective agitation, violence and a general departure from the rule of law.  Most states have 
allowed for more peaceful change through structured evolution.  What we are interested in 
is change to institutions through the formal processes of state sanctioned power.  This 
means we are talking about constitutional change. 
The word ‘constitution’ is used here in two different senses.  Used abstractly, it 
encapsulates the “system of laws, customs and conventions which define the composition 
and powers of organs of the state, and regulate the relations of the various state organs to 
one another and to the private citizen” (Jackson et Leopold 2001, 4).  But in most countries, 
with the notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and Israel, there are also specific 
documents referred to as the ‘constitution’ and it is in these documents that the most 
important laws of the constitution are identified and then protected by an amending 
mechanism that is more challenging than the mechanism used to adopt and amend normal 
legislation.54  As no one document can define all the rules for the operation of the state, 
these ‘written constitutions’ are invariably supplemented by customs, conventions, laws 
passed in the normal way, and judicial decisions interpreting the various clauses within the 
document. 
The legal literature often differentiates between the degrees of freedom that 
constitutional actors have in making changes to institutions, a practice that has undoubtedly 
influenced political science discourse concerning the challenge surrounding institutional 
change in Canada.  Constitutions are variously described as ‘moving or stationary’, ‘fluid 
                                                 
54 For the operation of Israel’s parliament there are ‘basic laws’ but no constitution has yet been adopted 
(Likhovski 1971). 
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or solid’ and ‘flexible or rigid’ (Bryce 1901, 131-2).  Flexible constitutions are defined as 
when every law of every description can legally be changed in the same manner by one and 
the same body, whereas rigid constitutions are those where certain laws, generally known 
as constitutional, cannot be changed in the same manner as ordinary laws (Dicey 1959, 
126-50).  This legal definition is not particularly useful as we noted above virtually every 
country in the modern era now has a written constitution, so the only thing that might be of 
interest with respect to institutional change is the degree of rigidity and thus the thresholds 
created for institutional change through constitutional amendment formulae. 
The move towards written constitutions was first necessitated with the emergence of 
federal states.  A ‘state’, as it relates to constitutions, is an independent political society 
occupying a defined territory, whose members are united at the very minimum to resist 
external force and preserve internal order (Jackson et Leopold 2001, 4).  Beginning with the 
United States, where the original colonies decided that it would be preferable not to 
surrender all public authority to a single level of government, there have emerged an 
increasing number of federations in the world, including Canada.  These are countries 
which combine shared rule through common institutions and regional rule via alternate 
institutions at the regional or local level.  In a federation, neither the federal nor the 
constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other.  Each has 
‘sovereign’ powers derived from the constitution, each is empowered to deal directly with 
its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing powers and each is directly 
elected by its citizens (Watts 1996, 7).  This necessitates a written constitution that can 
balance union with decentralization.  And, as has been argued above, this constitution 
becomes the source of their sovereignty. 
More recently, written constitutions have become the norm because, as famed 
French historian François Furet noted in a speech in Britain at the bicentennial of the 
French Revolution, “in a real democracy liberties and minorities have legal protection in 
the form of a written constitution that even Parliament cannot change to suit its whim or 
policy” (cited in Dworkin 1990).  In the case of rights, which are group entitlements 
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considered so fundamental to human dignity that they must receive special protection under 
the law, it is only through a written constitution that the government can be forced to take 
an active role; and in the case of freedoms, which involve the liberty to do or believe 
certain things, it is similarly through a written constitution that government can most 
effectively be restrained.  As with the model of federalism, it is the constitution of the 
United States with an entrenched bill of rights that served as a template for other states to 
adopt in the modern era. 
Like most political rules, there are almost as many variations in amending formulae 
as there are states, as system architects apply normative and theoretical models popular at 
the time to their own political and social context and come up with what are thought to be 
workable arrangements for that state.  For example, in Australia, referenda have been 
adopted as the preferential mechanism to change the constitution and this requires 
ratification by both a majority of electors nationwide and in a majority of states; in the 
United States a two-thirds vote in each federal legislative chamber and ratification by three-
fourths of the individual states is required; Belgium requires a federal election be called 
between the introduction of an amendment and its adoption which requires a two-thirds 
majority in each legislative chamber; France uses either a referendum or a special joint 
meeting of its legislature wherein a three-fifths majority is required; and Canada currently 
has different thresholds for different sections of its multiple constitutional documents as 
will be discussed in detail in part three of this chapter. 
Colonial Constitutions 
Where the U.K. has been resistant to written constitutions, its colonial possessions 
have always had de facto written constitutions.  These are centred on orders-in-council and 
letters patent, which are issued under royal prerogative, or on an act of the parliament at 
Westminster.  These seminal documents provide for governance of a colony and usually 
specify the composition and powers of the legislative and executive councils and 
assemblies and the superior courts. 
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Under the royal prerogative, in the first instance, letters patent will create the office 
of governor and define his duties and powers, after which governors are appointed by royal 
commission and serve at pleasure (i.e. until another governor is appointed in his stead) 
though regular terms of appointment may emerge in practice.  Royal instructions are issued 
to the governor from time to time by the secretary of state for the colonies, who is a 
member of the British privy council (i.e. cabinet), and these establish for the governor how 
he is to exercise his duties and powers.  These are all statutory instruments and form part of 
the constitution of a colony. 
In British law, there was a distinction between a colony that was ‘settled’ and a 
colony that was ‘conquered or ceded’.  The constitutions in settled colonies are based on 
the legislated authority granted the crown under British Settlements Acts, 1843 and 1887, 
and in ceded colonies on nothing more than royal prerogative constrained only by the moral 
obligation set forth in a treaty of peace or terms of capitulation.  As such, in settled 
colonies, settlers took with them all the rights of British subjects.  Specifically settlers took 
the common law of England and the statute law as existed at the time of settlement 
(Jackson et Leopold 2001).55  It could be argued that they also took the right to be granted 
representative government in the shape of a bicameral legislature with a nominated upper 
house and an elected lower house, on the model of the British parliament (which is argued 
by Wight 1947, 5).  Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and 
Newfoundland were settled colonies and, as will be examined in detail in chapter five, the 
local variations in governance and law in the initial constitutions for these ‘islands’ and 
‘provinces’ suggest that while a predictable trajectory emerged, it was in no way assured 
and was undeniably staggered by colony in terms of when it emerged.56   
                                                 
55 This, no doubt, encouraged settlers to follow the practices they learned in England but these institutions 
were in no way assured even if their trajectory later seems predictable with hindsight.  The importance of 
common law traditions we so ingrained into ex-patriot citizens that in Henry Hudson’s fatal trip to Canada, 
faced with certain death from cold and starvation in a locale where there was no judicial enforcement or 
deterrence value in the law, in a voyage long believed to be rife with lawlessness, overwhelming loyalty to 
uphold the king’s law prevailed (Mancall 2009). 
56 The terms ‘island’ and ‘province’ are colonial terms in the British common law of the 15-19th centuries.  
While ‘dominion’ was originally a synonym, it emerged as the term to designate a largely settler state that 
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Quebec was a ceded colony.  The inhabitants of conquered or ceded colonies only 
had such rights as the British crown chose to grant, though the existing legal system of the 
colony prior to its absorption into the British empire was continued until it was altered by 
the British Crown.  However, once a ceded colony was granted a representative legislature, 
it ceased being within the crown’s authority to undo such grants unless there were 
overriding issues of public necessity.57  Keith argues that it was desirable to grant similar 
institutions of governance to conquered and ceded colonies in order to attract additional 
settlers, an argument that will be explored more fully in the following chapters (1928, 4).  
Suffice it to say for our purposes here that in all colonies, whether ceded or settled, the 
trajectory of institutions would lead to representative legislative assemblies (usually 
bicameral) and then responsible parliamentary government, but this was in no way an 
obligation on the Crown or a right of the residents of the colony. 
The distinction between ceded and settled implies a different social contract.  In a 
ceded colony the British crown had only such obligations as were identified in the treaty 
which ceded the territory and these obligations were to a social group.  Settled colonies 
were predicated on the settlers being British subjects and thus the obligation the crown had 
to its subjects. 
With the emergence of representative government, there was leeway to amend the 
constitution granted by the crown via the local legislature because a representative 
legislature has constituent powers (Wight 1947, 6).   Once the British parliament enacted a 
constitution through legislation, the crown lost its capacity to change that legislature.  The 
parliament at Westminster’s supremacy over the colonies was a paramount right, so 
regardless of the source for the colonial constitution, whether it be crown prerogative or 
British ordinary legislation, imperial parliamentary authority could be exercised to override 
                                                                                                                                                    
was on a trajectory for independence in the early 20th century, though this term has since been rejected by all 
‘dominions’ like Canada due to its predating the independence granted by the Balfour Declaration and the 
Statute of Westminster. 
57 This principle was identified by the Court of Kings Bench in Campbell v. Hall (1774). 
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and control the powers possessed by any local government (Todd 1880, 172-3).  This it did 
in Canada following the uprisings in the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada in 1838. 
The province of Nova Scotia, and the new province of New Brunswick which was 
created from it after the American War of Independence, are examples of settler colonies 
that had constitutions which saw their institutions of governance created by the crown 
through letters patent and instructions issued to the governors and then more directly 
managed by the crown on the advice of the local representative government.  Quebec as a 
ceded colony received its first authority for representative government not from the crown 
but from an act of the British parliament via the Quebec Act 1774.58  As this colonial 
constitution was an act of the British parliament, it is only through subsequent acts of the 
British parliament that new constitutional arrangements could be made for this territory, 
including the establishment of separate provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada (The 
Constitutional Act 1791), the re-union of the two provinces into a single ‘province’ under 
the name Canada (The Union Act, 1840) and then the union of four provinces into a federal 
‘dominion’ also called Canada in 1867 (British North America Act, 1867), and that all 
subsequent changes to the constitution of that federation were made until 1982 with the 
passage of the Canada Act.  As provinces were added to Canada, either by ‘joining’ 
Confederation or created new out of territory ceded to Canada, provincial constitutions 
were equally enacted or incorporated into the constitutional framework of the country. 
The Union Act, 1840, created a new concept in colonial law and this is one of 
repugnancy.  This concept was extended to all colonies in 1865 with the passage of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act.  As a result, legislation enacted by a local legislature that 
concerned ‘imperial’ matters had to be sent to England for ratification or disallowance.  
However, the inverse of this was the principle that all local matters should be the 
                                                 
58 This is one of the ‘intolerable acts’ identified in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, because it assigned 
land in the west that the American colonists had designs on to this province, and extended protection for the 
French language, catholic religion and civil law to the province, altering the oath of office in the process so 
that French Canadians could hold government and legislative positions.  This act also denied to Quebec the 
representative system promised in 1763, leaving governance in the hands of the governor and a nominee 
council.   
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responsibility of the colonial legislature.  With regards to their respective constitutions, the 
Act specified that: 
“Every representative legislature shall in respect to the colony under its 
jurisdiction have and be deemed to have, and be deemed at all times to have 
had, full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers, and 
procedure of such legislature, provided that such laws shall have been passed 
in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any act of 
parliament, letters patent, orders-in-council, or colonial law for the time 
being in force in said colony” (Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, s.5). 
This marks a shift in policy within the British government and its colonial office, 
that irrespective of the position of the British parliament, colonial legislatures should be 
responsible for managing their own affairs and that constitutional documents created from 
that time forward should have their legislative powers more clearly defined (Swinfen 1970, 
182-3). 
The British North America Act, 1867, which in 1982 was renamed the Constitution 
Act, 1867, provided for the merging of the colonies of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia, with provision for the future admission of other North American colonies, 
and established a constitutional basis for both the federal and provincial governments and 
legislatures within its territorial jurisdiction.  There was no formal provision for amendment 
through local autonomous decision making.  This would not be provided for until 1982.  
One of the reasons for this was the acceptance by legal scholars in England and in Canada 
of Dicey’s theory of parliamentary sovereignty (Oliver 2005).  As Acts of the British 
parliament were supreme over all the dominions, amendment of constitutions created by the 
British parliament could only be made by that legislature.  There were a number of 
amendments made, and these were done by the British legislature at the simple behest of 
the Canadian federal parliament, so there is no reason to assume that, in the early years of 
Canada, constitutional amendment was thought to be constrained by anything more than a 
sense of obligation to the social compact reached by the Fathers of Confederation. 
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Conventions 
Conventions form the greatest part of the Canadian constitution.  The Constitution 
Act, 1867 gave Canada “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”.  
This effectively transferred to Canada the Westminster-model of responsible parliamentary 
government and constitutional monarchy that existed in the U.K. on July 1, 1867.59  In spite 
of the model’s heavy reliance on unwritten conventions, they go largely unstudied in the 
United Kingdom and in its derivative former colonies like Canada and Australia.60 
It was John Stuart Mill (1865, 35) who first argued that there were “unwritten 
maxims of the constitution” and imbued them with then emerging democratic values.  
These were given the label ‘conventions’ by Dicey, who went further and used this concept 
to create a constitutional obligation for the crown “to secure the ultimate supremacy of the 
electorate as the true political sovereign of the state” (Dicey 1959, 422).61  Conventions are 
“a binding rule, a rule of behaviour accepted as obligatory by those concerned in the 
working of the constitution” (Wheare 1951, 179).  The existence of a convention can be 
ascertained by asking three questions: Are there precedents; is there a reason for these 
precedents; and is there agreement to be bound by these precedents which would then 
                                                 
59 Andrew Heard has the only recent book in Canada which is devoted to systematically chronicling the 
‘Canadian’ version of British constitutional conventions, including the ones guiding the governor general, 
legislatures and the very non-British idea of federalism (1991).  This paucity in books on conventions is 
disappointing in terms of continuing Canadian scholarship since it was a Canadian, Eugene Forsey, who 
resurrected the theory of a democratic basis for the reserve powers with what is still the definitive text still 
used throughout the Commonwealth on the crown’s decision making over ‘dissolution’ (1943).  The only 
recent full length text on constitutional conventions in England is Marshall (1986); and Cooray has the only 
recent book on the Australian variations (1979).  This is an equally surprising situation for Australia, as it was 
an Australian, H.V. Evatt, a contemporary of Forsey, who did the first examination of the reserve powers of 
governors(1967) . 
60 Obviously conventions are discussed in all legal texts on the Canadian Constitution, such as the popular 
texts used in law schools by Hogg (1977) and Brun and Tremblay (1982), and in specific studies on the 
Canadian system of governance including MacKinnon’s (1976) work on the crown, Mallory’s (1978) and 
Messamore’s (2006) work on governors general, Saywell’s (1986) work on lieutenant governors, Gérin-
Lajoie’s (1950) work on constitutional amendment, and Forsey’s (e.g.1974) prolific work on responsible 
parliamentary government. 
61 Of course, the grafting of democratic principles onto an institutional structure conceived of in a time of 
feudalism means that the reasons for the precedent will be artificial (Hicks 2009c).  What is more, the 
‘democratic’ obligation that is understood to govern the constitution is dependent on temporal, cultural and 
historic circumstance, as illustrated by a comparative examination of the royal prerogative in Britain and 
Canada (Hicks 2010a). 
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constitute a rule? (Jennings 1960, Ch.3).  Jennings suggested that it might be sufficient to 
show that a rule has received general acceptance by persons in authority, though Hogg 
more specifically identifies the need for acceptance by the “officials to whom it applies” 
(1977, 9), an approach employed by the Supreme Court of Canada (Re: Resolution to 
amend the Constitution 1981, 888; and Re: Objection by Quebec to a resolution to amend 
the Constitution 1982, 802-818). 
It is the Canadian supreme court’s constituent position that enforcement of such 
conventions is political and not a question of law for the court, and that even a finding of 
unconstitutionality for a particular course of action cannot prevent that course of action 
(Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution 1981).62  Conventions are left by the courts to be 
enforced by legislatures, governors (lieutenant and general) and, ultimately, the people 
through elections. 
When Dicey defined a ‘constitutional morality’ that bound the Crown (Dicey 1959, 
422), he was doing more than just identifying customs and maxims that had evolved over 
time.  He and his predecessors and successors have systematically tried to bridge the gap 
between democratic theory and legal codification in order to bind the institutions of 
governance to democratic principles.  “Conventions therefore change in accordance with 
the underlying ideas of government” (Holdsworth 1932, 161).  As the Supreme Court of 
Canada has noted, the “main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the 
legal framework of the constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing 
constitutional values or principles of the period” (Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution 
1981, 880).  In other words, conventions offer a mechanism to change the constitution and 
to change the institutions of governance without the arduous task of amending written 
constitutions, enacting new constitutions or even undertaking statutory changes.  They are 
institutional alterations that have been agreed to by the constitutional actors, something that 
                                                 
62 The supreme court of Canada (pursuant to s.53 of the Supreme Court Act) and provincial supreme courts 
(pursuant to their respective legislation) allow for governments to refer important questions of law or fact 
concerning the interpretation of the Constitution or the constitutionality of federal and provincial legislation, 
so the supreme court of Canada has commented on constitutional convention which while instructive is not 
binding or enforceable. 
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would theoretically lend itself to partisan pressures for change, but would equally be 
something that social groups would have the capacity to resist.  Constitutional law is, after 
all, a normative endeavour equally sensitive to group dynamics and to politics. 
Judicial Review 
The British legal system is hierarchical, and until the Balfour Declaration of 1926 
and the Statute of Westminster, 1931, appeals could be made be made to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in London.  Created by the Judicial Committee Act, 1933, 
the JCPC is a committee of the British privy council established to hear appeals of court 
rulings that are submitted to the monarch.  As colonists had the right to appeal to the 
monarch any decision rendered with respect to the king’s justice, it became the highest 
court of appeal for the colonies.63 
The supreme court of Canada was created in 1875, under the authority of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, which allowed for the federal parliament to create a “general court 
of appeal for Canada” (s.101).  While its creation should have ended appeals to the JCPC, 
leave was still granted by the JCPC and was only ended in 1933 for criminal cases and 
1949 for civil cases.64 
Judicial review of the constitution has always existed in Canada since, as a former 
colony and a federation, it has always had a constitution which was beyond the reach of the 
Canadian parliament (Abella 1993, 177).  While bounded by precedent and thus 
conservative in nature, decisions of all courts are matters of interpretation arising from 
disputes between people, between the state and its people or between groups of people, so 
they will always be surrounded in controversy.  This has been especially true for Canada.65  
Decisions in the first half of Canada’s history (made by the JCPC) resulted in criticisms 
                                                 
63 For a history of the origins and emergence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the supreme 
appellate tribunal for the British Empire see Howell (1979). 
64 This was grandfathered, so cases which had begun prior to 1949 were allowed to continue so the last case 
heard by the JCPC was in 1959. 
65 Bushnell points out that court bashing is a Canadian tradition, and within three years of the creation of the 
Supreme Court it was under attack (1992). 
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from the ideological ‘left’, since these decisions had the outcome of restraining the federal 
government’s ability to create social programs, and yet since 1982, the criticisms have 
come from the ‘right’, which has objected to social outcomes that seem to restrain 
parliament’s capacity to limit the activities of minority groups (Smith 2002).66  Litigation is 
therefore another mechanism to obtain constitutional change and is available to every 
citizen, subject to their capacity to frame their cause in a justiciable action and sustain the 
costs of using the legal system.  As corporations are in law deemed to be persons, this has 
meant that organized social groups can avail themselves of the courts to obtain 
constitutional change, as can members of an identified social group who wish to act in their 
individual capacity to obtain changes that benefit themselves and others with whom they 
identify. 
Summary 
In the modern era, most countries have written constitutions and these have different 
procedures designed to protect these documents from ill-conceived and intemperate 
changes.  As has been noted, Canadian scholars see amending the written constitution as 
the insurmountable barrier to institutional change.  While it is true that written constitutions 
on paper make change more challenging than unwritten constitutions and it is true that 
Canada has always had written constitutions, these constitutions, along with the institutions 
they structured and regulated, have been changed repeatedly over time in Canada.   
While it has been common for legal scholars to talk about the degree of flexibility or 
rigidity when it comes to constitutions, this is clearly not the only, and perhaps not the most 
                                                 
66 These decisions were no different than those being made in the previous century, except when it comes to 
their dealings with the people, institutions and officials of government the new decisions involved a 
constitutional obligation to live up to the earlier implied obligation to the citizen under British common law 
(Dickson 1994).  Today, those on the “right” argue in their most generous state that Parliament should have 
concurrent jurisdiction to interpret the constitution (Manfredi 2001).  Elsewhere I have argued (Hicks 2003), 
in concurrence with Justice Rosalie Abella, that this makes no sense for Canada since it has always had a 
written constitution, Canadian parliamentary supremacy was never implied.  And Roach argued that to let 
Parliament have equal authority to interpret the Canadian constitution “challenges conventional 
understandings of the rule of law which suggests that the legislature should respect the Court’s interpretation 
of the Constitution” (2001, 493). 
  
 
96
significant, consideration with respect to amendment.  In the United States, written 
constitutions at the state level have proven incredibly flexible to change, so flexible that 
constitutional amendment has become the preferred mechanism for political groups to 
pursue their financial and social policies, on everything from banning gay marriage to 
reducing tax rates and forcing balanced budgets, policies that these groups were unable to 
obtain through the much more modest approval mechanisms required for legislation and 
government policy.  As Jackson and Leopold note with respect to the English constitution, 
societal norms in the United Kingdom make it “more difficult to pass a British statute 
amending the law relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors or the opening of shops on 
Sunday than to pass a French statute reducing the period of office of the President of the 
Republic from seven to five years” (2001, 6-7).  Constitutional change would appear to be 
constrained by social forces and cultural attitudes rather than political will, something that 
would seem to support the thesis being advanced here with respect to institutional change. 
III. Constitution Act, 1867 
We turn now to the Constitution Act, 1867, or more particularly to the search for 
and enactment of rules to govern amending this Act domestically in Canada.  This is 
deserving of specific examination for two reasons.  First, the rules that govern the 
amendment are the specific constraints that Canadian scholars have argued are too onerous 
to permit alteration of the Canadian Senate.  It has been argued above that from a 
theoretical perspective such rules are nothing more than normal constraints that govern 
political action in the name of the state so as to ensure a certain level of consensus, albeit a 
higher level of political will than that which governs the enacting of ordinary legislation.  
While the examination so far has seemed to support this claim a priori, it is worth 
considering the specifics of the threshold to address whether or not the amending formula 
does contain particular social as opposed to partisan barriers that would prima facie 
challenge the argument in this thesis.  Second, the search for an amending formula is an 
exercise in constitutional amendment and since it is argued here a constitution is an 
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institution in the broadest sense, then that journey should offer some empirical evidence 
with respect to the constraints and sources of change for institutions of governance. 
Before turning to those two questions, it needs to be stressed again, as this research 
covers equally the colonial and the modern era, that for the majority of Canada’s history a 
simple order issued by the British cabinet or legislation enacted by the British parliament 
was sufficient to alter any constitution in Canada.  There were no obstacles to change 
beyond the hurdle of convincing the British imperial government, and through it the 
majority of members of both chambers in the British parliament, that change was 
necessary, something that will be explored more fully in the following chapters 
Finding an Amending Formula 
The search for an amending formula began following World War I.  Canada was 
becoming self-aware, having ‘punched above its weight’ during the war, and this may have 
activated a federal-nationalism which, in turn, primed a provincial-nationalism (Hicks 
2010c, 112).67  Additionally, decisions of the JCPC had been favouring the provinces, so 
constitutional amendment on federal-provincial division of powers, something that the 
British parliament under the influence of the JCPC would have been less supportive of 
doing without some indication of provincial support, was an increasing contemplation for 
the federal government.68  More immediately, Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King had 
made an issue of breaking the bonds of British control in the 1926 general election for 
partisan as opposed to nationalistic reasons, having briefly been deprived of his prime 
ministership by the Governor General, Lord Byng (Hicks 2010a, 2010b, 2009a, 2009c; 
Forsey 1943). 
                                                 
67 Based on my initial foray into the question of using heraldic symbols to examine ideas of sovereignty and 
identity I suggest that this possibility should be explored further.  That WWI moved the desire for a unique 
symbol in the form of the Canadian coat of arms and even the maple leaf, which was worn by the troops and 
later became the basis of the Canadian flag, already seems apparent (see Matheson 1986). 
68 That the JCPC was a political body, particularly when it came to imperial interests of the British 
government, rather than a judicial body acting as purely a court of appeal, and the membership crossover 
between the government and this body is explored in detail in Howell (1979) 
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The Liberals under Prime Minister Mackenzie King had won fewer seats in the 
1925 general election than the Conservatives under Arthur Meighan.  King decided to 
continue to govern, as was his right so long as he had the support of parliament.  But a 
scandal undermined that confidence and facing a motion of censure, King asked Governor 
General Lord Byng to dissolve parliament, a request that Byng rightly refused.  Mackenzie 
King tried everything, from asking the cabinet to submit a proposed order-in-council to 
Lord Byng for signature to asking His Excellency to wait for instructions from Britain.  
Byng stood his ground and Mackenzie King was forced to submit his resignation and let 
Arthur Meighan try to form a government.  Meighan was unable to put together a 
government that had the support of parliament, whereupon Lord Byng dissolved 
parliament.  In the ensuing election Mackenzie King hypocritically made the fact that the 
Governor General was a British representative an issue, and was returned to power. 
Motivated by his own election rhetoric, Mackenzie King took his campaign 
platform to the Imperial Conference of 1926 where he was instrumental in securing the 
Balfour Declaration and the passage of the Statute of Westminster, whereby the British 
parliament formally extinguished its authority over their dominions and their governors.  
Arthur Meighan ridiculed this accomplishment by pointing out that the BNA Act remained 
an ordinary statute of the British parliament and that Canada still had to ask Britain to make 
changes to its constitution, so the rescinding of British parliamentary control over the 
dominions meant nothing for Canada. 
Never one to be out politicked, Mackenzie King responded by convening a federal-
provincial conference between November 3rd and 10th, 1927, to consider the question of 
amending formulae.  The formulae he and his Minister of Justice proposed would have 
required that “ordinary” constitutional amendments be adopted only if the majority of the 
provinces agreed whereas “vital and fundamental” amendments would require unanimous 
consent (Dupras 1992, 3).  This proposal failed because the Quebec government would not 
agree to an amendment mechanism which would put at risk any portions of the constitution 
that protected the province’s religion and language rights (Keith 1929, 41).  The 
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Government of Quebec was not operating in this instance as the leadership of a political 
party or constitutional administrative unit, but as representative of a societal group that 
exists on one side of a series of social cleavages in Canada, namely language, culture and 
religion, and it was resisting change specifically because it could endanger that group’s 
religion or language, preferring to opt for the status quo. 
Mackenzie King tried in 1935 again to obtain agreement on an amending formula to 
govern Canada’s constitutional Acts during a federal-provincial conference held from 
December 9th to the 13th.  The outcome of that meeting was a committee struck to develop 
an amending procedure.  Their proposed four level amending formulae are very similar to 
what eventually came to be adopted in the Constitution Act, 1982 – they differ primarily 
with respect to what was determined to fall under each formula, particularly what fell 
within the jurisdiction of the federal parliament to amend on its own.69  Having failed to get 
agreement at the time, the federal government had the British parliament amend the British 
North America Act, 1867 to give it the power to amend the Constitution with respect to the 
items it felt were purely within federal jurisdiction (British North America Act (No. 2), 
1949). 
When, in 1950, the federal government tried again to obtain provincial agreement 
on amending formulae, it did so by increasing the formulae to six classes.  And in the 
meetings of 1961 and then in 1964, the ‘Fulton-Favreau Formula’ emerged, which 
continued in the tradition of majoritarian political decision making, in groupings similar to 
that set forth in 1935, though the classes of subjects over which the federal government had 
originally demanded unilateral authority for parliament to amend was reduced as a carrot to 
offer the provinces for their endorsement.  This was not forthcoming. 
The Liberals had made British control of Canada and its governor an election wedge 
issue in 1927.  This wedge, or cleavage, in Canadian politics, between the Liberals who had 
                                                 
69 Namely the office of governor general, the offices of lieutenant governor, the constitution of the privy 
council, the constitution, composition and powers of the senate (except for the representation of the provinces 
in the senate) , house of commons (except for representation in the house of commons) and the treasury. 
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touted independence for Canada and the Conservatives, who in Tory tradition had 
supported the governor and his ties to Britain, became the impetus for institutional change, 
including what would be a 55-year campaign by successive Liberal administrations until 
they obtained agreement on amending formulae for all aspects of the Constitution Acts.   
In every attempt to find a formula, Quebec found itself at odds with the federal 
government, and the reason for not proceeding can be attributed to the Quebec government 
opposing the proposals advanced by the federal government in all 14 attempts (Hurley 
1966).  The only time that the federal government and Quebec came close to agreement, 
with the other provinces in tow, was in 1971 with the Victoria Charter.  This would have 
required, for the purposes of a ‘general’ amending formula, the agreement of Ontario, 
Quebec and the majority of the provinces in Atlantic Canada and in Western Canada.  
While the Quebec government was motivated to support this formula by its desire for a 
veto over constitutional amendment, this was sold to the other provinces not as a notion of 
respect for the Francophone population in Quebec but rather a reflection of the original 
entente agreed to in 1867.  The Victoria formula reflected the principle of the federation 
used for the Canadian Senate, where Canada was defined as four equal regions (Hicks 
2007).  So the one amending formula that the Quebec government almost agreed to would 
have altered the Constitution to advance protection of its side of a social cleavage, but 
would also have been, in some ways, a preservation of the status quo principle of 
partnership already identified as being within the social contract. 
Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa subsequently backed away from the agreement 
out of concern it would not be supported by the Francophone population, or at least by 
students and the political elites, of Quebec.  Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau additionally 
suggests that Bourassa was reticent about agreeing to any constitutional change, and that 
the Quebec Premier moved to stall consensus even before proposing that he had to return to 
Quebec and seek approval from his Cabinet and gauge public opinion (Trudeau 1993, 232-
3).  This would equally support the hypothesis that the minority group on the side of a 
social cleavage will tend to support the status quo. 
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By 1975, the other provinces had distanced themselves from this formula in 
response to a perception that this would give a ‘veto’ to Quebec.  And while the federal 
government has been largely consistent in support of such a formula ever since, the 
political will has not been sufficient to obtain the formula that Quebec, as a province with a 
majority of Francophones, might find beneficial.70  There was no objection to Ontario 
having a veto, at this time or since, as Ontario’s veto was an acknowledgement of its large 
population and thus conforms to majoritarian political decision making. 
While the federal government believed that it was free to request the British 
parliament to amend the Constitution with respect to the senate as recently as 1978, it put 
this question to the test in a reference to the supreme court after it failed to obtain 
provincial support for its proposed replacement of the upper house with a House of the 
Federation.  The supreme court of Canada (Re: Authority of Parliament in relation to the 
Upper House 1980) stated that the senate, as a body established for the purposes of 
provincial representation should not be altered without some degree of provincial 
concurrence.71  This, and a subsequent supreme court ruling on the level of provincial 
consensus necessary to patriate the constitution (Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution 
1981), enshrine a bill of rights and adopt an amending formula – constitutional 
amendments that Pierre Trudeau had as justice minister in 1967 informed the provinces at a 
federal-provincial conference was the full extent of constitutional change he was willing to 
make in the first round – laid the groundwork for the first ministers to negotiate an 
amending formula in 1982, which was agreed to by every province but Quebec.  Adopted 
pursuant to the rules of sovereignty, even as modified by convention, it remains the 
unquestionable constitutional law of the land (Re: Objection by Quebec to a resolution to 
amend the Constitution, 1982).  All change from this point on must meet the majoritarian 
thresholds set out in the Constitution Act, 1982. 
                                                 
70 As Pierre Trudeau later put it, “Bourassa's subsequent career has been spent trying to regain what he was 
once so unwise as to refuse” (Trudeau 1993, 229).   
71 This proposal would have given provincial governments the authority to appoint members to the Senate, 
which was intended to strengthen its provincial dimension, making the court’s ruling not about political 
influence but about constitutional amendment. 
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Constitution Act, 1982 
The amending formula entrenched in the Constitution through the Constitution Act, 
1982 has placed “(b) the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators” and 
“(c) the number of members by which a province is entitled to be represented in the Senate 
and the residence qualifications of Senators” under the ‘general’ amending formula 
(s.42(1)).  The general amending formula requires the passage of resolutions in support of a 
change by the legislatures of two-thirds (or seven of the ten) provinces representing at least 
50 percent of the Canadian population.72  These resolutions need to be adopted within a 
three year ratification period. 
This is not the only amending formula established by the Constitution Act, 1982.  
But it is significant that Senate reform was specifically placed under the less onerous 
general amending formula, albeit more onerous than the federal parliament acting alone.  
Clearly, the framers of the 1982 Constitution saw the Senate as deserving of change but 
were also cognizant of the importance of this institution to parliament’s internal balance 
and to its intended purpose in the federation.73 
In addition to the general formula, which specifically provides for constitutional 
amendment so as to achieve what Eugene Forsey once wrote should be the objective of any 
worthwhile Senate reform package, “acceptably the method of choosing Senators, their 
powers, their numbers, and their relations with the House of Commons and the 
Government” (1984, 51), the Constitution Act, 1982 has three other formulae for 
amendment of the Constitution Acts.  That the general formula should govern most 
amendments unless enumerated elsewhere cannot be overstated.  A basic principle of 
                                                 
72 The door was opened to this amending formula by the Quebec’s Parti Québécois (i.e. independence or 
separatist) Premier, René Lesvesque, breaking with his predecessors and agreeing with other provinces to this 
majoritarian formula instead of the traditional claim of a right to a Quebec veto that had been accepted by the 
federal government to be reflected in the Victoria formula.  Given the political dynamic of these negotiations, 
“not much should be read into this abandonment other than the fact that the subsequent Constitution Act, 1982 
did not adopt an amending formula based on a four-region formula” (Hicks 2007, 24). 
73 Uhr has noted that the two chambers of a bicameral system more often than naught are designed to be in 
balance, a principle in conformity with the theory of bicameralism expanded upon at length in the writings the 
Federalist Papers and J.S. Mills (2006). 
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constitutional law is that once you define you limit and the limitations expressed for the 
other clauses should be seen as limiting those clauses to those specific classes of 
amendment.  The same is not true for the general formula where its enumerated subjects are 
illustrative.  Of course, large packages of amendments that cover multiple classes need to 
be ratified by the most onerous formula that is required for any one item in the package. 
Social groups will invariably argue that amendments which impact on their 
community should be governed by more stringent formula.  This has been the unanimous 
position of the Quebec National Assembly on the federal government’s recent bills to alter 
the Senate, including the reduction in length of tenure, and given its unanimity is evidence 
of a social group trying to restrain institutional change in the face of a partisan group 
driving change. 
The four other constitutional amendment formulae adopted in 1982 are as follows: 
1. Resolutions of all 10 provinces and the house of commons and the senate are 
required to alter the office of the queen, governor general and lieutenant governor, 
the right of a province to at least the same number of MPs as it has Senators, the use 
of French and English languages, the composition of the supreme court and to alter 
the amending formulae (s.41);74 
2. Resolutions of the provinces concerned and the two chambers of the federal 
parliament are necessary where a matter only concerns one or more province, 
including alteration to provincial boundaries or the use of French and English in a 
province (s.43); and 
3. Resolutions of the two chambers of parliament is sufficient for matters that relate 
only to the executive government of Canada, the senate or the house of commons 
(s.44). 
4. As was the case prior to 1982, the provincial legislatures have retained the authority 
to alter provincial constitutions on their own (s.45) 
In addition to these formal amending formulae, there are provisions for provinces to 
opt out of an amendment that “derogates from the legislative powers, the proprietary rights 
or any other rights or privileges of the legislature or government of a province” (s.38.2) and 
to opt out with reasonable compensation if the amendment concerns “provincial legislative 
                                                 
74 This formula, requiring unanimity of the provinces, would be the necessary mechanism to abolish the 
Senate. 
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powers relating to education or other cultural matters” (s.40).  And, as noted in part II of 
this chapter, in addition to the formal amending procedures, the constitution can be 
amended through judicial interpretation and constitutional convention.75 
Constitutional matters that are not exclusively in areas of federal jurisdiction are 
dealt with equally by the senate and the house of commons, but assuming the provinces 
have given their consent to the change they may be implemented without the approval of 
the senate if, after 180 days of it being passed in the house of commons, the commons 
passes a new resolution along the same lines (s.47).  The decision to grant only a temporary 
or ‘suspensive’ veto over amendments having provincial support is due to the Senate’s role 
protecting provincial interest being unnecessary for constitutional amendments already 
agreed to by the provinces (Smith 2003b, 103).  However, it is also to permit changes to the 
Senate without its consent as it was felt that this chamber should not have a veto over its 
own reform (see, among others Wells 1 May 1990).   
While comprehensive senate reform would require the use of the general 7/50 
amending formula, abolition of the senate would require unanimity and modest changes 
that do not alter the federal nature of the senate or its role as a chamber of sober second 
thought could be done by parliament acting alone.76  These amending formulae codify the 
principles set by the supreme court (Re: Authority of parliament in relation to the Upper 
House 1980).   
Outside of the amending formulae, one issue needs to be addressed concerning 
social cleavages and whether or not the 1982 constitutional changes may have been in 
response to pressure from social groups rather than an initiative of a political party and that 
                                                 
75 For example, the Constitution Act, 1867 allows for legislation to be held in reserve for approval by the 
Queen (s.55 & 57) or to be disallowed by the queen after assent is given by the governor general (s.56) and 
these powers were extended to the lieutenant governors of the provinces in a similar fashion (s.90)., yet there 
is general consensus that a constitutional convention has emerged rendering these clauses obsolete (e.g. Heard 
1991, 36; Hogg 1977, 120). (Though see also MacKinnon 1976, 108; Hicks 2010b). 
76 Examples of modest changes would be the replacement of the property and net worth criteria for 
appointment, which requires Senators to have a net worth and own property in the amount of $4,000 in the 
province (or in the case of Quebec in a district), with a simple residency requirement, or the reduction of the 
term of a Senator’s appointment from age 75 so long as the new terms were of sufficient length to preserve 
institutional expertise necessary for the revision of legislation.   
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is the adoption of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  This is a document that includes the 
protection of group rights. 
As Furet noted, constitutionally protecting basic human rights and freedoms reflects 
a global recognition that such protection is central to being considered a democracy (cited 
in Dworkin 1990).  The British parliament had adopted the Bill of Rights 1689, and this 
with common law precedent established basic rights in and for Canada.  In 1960, 
Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker had tried to protect human 
rights in federal jurisdiction legislatively and, while he passed a Canadian Bill of Rights, it 
was ineffectual due to the courts marginalizing this legislation.  This was a personal 
crusade of Diefenbaker’s, who had created a draft bill in 1936 as a young lawyer, four years 
before being elected to parliament, whereupon he had, as a private member, tried to 
introduce this legislation.  
“Pierre Trudeau took Mr. Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights one step further by adding 
critical provisions of his own on language rights and then waging a decades-long battle to 
persuade the provincial governments of the necessity of a Charter binding on all levels of 
government” (Axworthy 2005).  This was a change that Liberal Pierre Trudeau identified as 
central to his party’s policy in 1967, and had been a cause that he had identified long before 
entering politics in his discussions with McGill University law professor Frank Scott.   
While social groups appeared before the Canadian parliamentary committee studying the 
Charter in 1981, Prime Minister Trudeau’s justice minister, Jean Chrétien, made clear to 
that committee the government would not support the inclusion of rights for ‘new’ groups, 
such as homosexuals, but would only recognize rights already accepted as part of the 
Canadian fabric by society and the courts (see Hicks 2003).77  So while the Charter had 
social consequences, the initiative was in the first instance a normative democratic value 
and its advancement was decidedly partisan. 
                                                 
77 Though Chrétien left the door open to the court, on its own outside of the political arena, extending rights to 
groups such as gays and lesbians. 
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Post-1982 Attempts at Amendment 
The first consideration of significant constitutional amendment after the adoption of 
the amending formulae in the Constitution Act, 1982 was in response to Aboriginal protests 
over the package, including their leadership’s active lobbying in London with both the 
British parliament and the queen.  A series of constitutional meetings with Aboriginal 
leaders were agreed to and, in 1983, an acknowledgement was placed in the Constitution 
Act, 1982 (s.35.1) of the principle that federal and provincial governments should consult 
with representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada prior to passing amendments that 
affect them.  Three meetings were held between the first ministers and Aboriginal leaders 
to try to find constitutional resolution of their grievances.  These meetings did not result in 
constitutional change.  This is evidence of a social cleavage creating resistance to the 
change of the 1982 Constitution, and then being unable to drive change between 1983 and 
1987 when first ministers had accepted Aboriginal issues to be a priority for discussion. 
The next attempt at significant constitutional change was the initiative of the 
government of Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, working in coordination with 
the government of Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa, who called first ministers meetings to 
change the Constitution in what he labeled the ‘Quebec round’.  The resultant agreement 
reached in 1987, known as the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord, did not simply address 
the five demands unveiled by the Quebec government, but included a large number of other 
issues advanced by the other nine provincial governments.78  So from the start, the political 
elites had rejected the idea of making a constitution change that was only directed at one 
side of a social cleavage.  It also could be argued that Brian Mulroney’s initiative had little 
to do with responding to the demands of a minority group in Canada and more to do with 
partisan ambition, including a desire to one-up the Constitution Act, 1982 and the political 
legacy of Liberal Prime Minister Trudeau (see Newman 2005). 
                                                 
78 It was named the Meech Lake Accord because it was negotiated by the first ministers at the government 
retreat in Quebec overlooking Meech Lake. 
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Over the course of the ratification period, the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 
which had ratified the Accord when a majority in the legislature was Progressive 
Conservative Party, rescinded its ratification when the majority became Liberal.  
Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells, who was a supporter of Trudeau’s constitutional 
position, was vilified by the federal government in public and private for rescinding the 
province’s required resolution.  Wells, and an increasing number of Canadians on the 
English side of the linguistic cleavage, opposed recognition of Quebec as a ‘distinct 
society’, though Wells was also concerned about the impact of the Accord on Senate reform 
as it moved this class of items under the formula requiring unanimity and away from the 
7/50 general formula.  This is evidence that the Accord was seen as a partisan Progressive 
Conservative document that might favour one group created by a social cleavage in 
Canada. 
The other province that failed to ratify the Accord within three years was 
Manitoba.79  In this province opposition came from one lone member of the legislature, an 
Aboriginal named Elijah Harper.  His capacity to stop the Accord was due to the legislative 
requirement for unanimous consent given the short notice, though it is noteworthy that over 
the several days when he refused to give consent, he became a rallying point for 
Aboriginals across Canada.  Given the decision of the political leadership in the province 
not to press the matter in the face of growing support for Elijah Harper, this resistance to 
the Accord was clearly seen as being mounted by a minority group on one side of a social 
cleavage in Canadian society. 
The label executive federalism has been applied to this exercise in constitutional 
amendment, and much emphasis has been placed on how the Meech Lake Accord was 
negotiated in secret among Canada’s prime minister and premiers (e.g. Watts 1989; Cairns 
                                                 
79 This was an artificial political and not constitutional deadline.  Only the 7/50 formula requires a three year 
ratification period.  The Accord was being ratified under unanimity since some items in the package fell under 
the class of subjects identified in s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982 so, in theory, this accord could be still 
adopted if ratified by Manitoba and Newfoundland, though since the political actors at the time accepted the 
three year timeline, opponents of the Accord could challenge its validity on the basis of there having arisen a 
constitutional convention during those three years. 
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1988; Gibbins 1989).  Executive federalism has always been the mechanism for amending 
the constitution (Hurley 1966).  Further, the subsequent attempt to amend the Constitution 
known as the Charlottetown Accord, which had an even greater package of constitutional 
reforms designed to capture even more political support (i.e. a greater winset), involved 
both public consultation and a Canada-wide referendum.  Yet the result was also failure.   If 
executive federalism has been the primary problem, then the second attempt by the 
Mulroney Government at constitutional amendment should have remedied this defect.80 
The reason why Charlottetown failed is that these reforms were opposed by a 
number of minority groups, especially women, multicultural groups, gays and Aboriginals 
(Cairns 1992).  This was also true for opposition among the public during ratification of the 
Meech Lake Accord, even if the public was not part of the ratification process under 
executive federalism (Cairns 1988).  These are all groups identifiable by the various social 
cleavages recognized in law to exist in Canadian society.  While the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms may have been the product of normative values and driven by the partisan 
initiative of the federal Liberal Prime Minister, these groups perceived the Constitution Act, 
1982 as having included them in the social contract.  Their understanding of the new 
compact motivated them to try to stop institutional change even in the face of 
overwhelming consensus among the representatives of the political parties and 
governments that were driving this change. 
The final constitutional development occurred in 1996.  Following the 1995 
referendum in Quebec on independence, which failed by the narrow margin of 50.58% to 
49.42%, parliament adopted An Act respecting Constitutional Amendments, which prevents 
a minister of the crown from introducing any constitutional amendments under the 7/50 
formula unless the proposed amendment has been approved by the majority of provinces 
(representing the majority of the population) in each of the (now) five regions of Canada.  
                                                 
80 This was so named because of one of the locations where the premiers and prime minister met, and while 
not the original location of negotiation, its symbolic reference to the meeting place where the Fathers of 
Confederation agreed to the general outline of the British North America Act, 1867 was intended to give the 
accord additional gravitas. 
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This gives British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec vetoes over constitutional changes in this 
class, essentially adopting through legislative means the Victoria formula updated to reflect 
recent demographic shifts.81  Critics point out that this is an act of parliament so can be 
rescinded by the normal legislative process.  As no changes to the Constitution have been 
tried under this formula, its impact is unclear, but the fact it has been adopted reflects a 
recognition by the federal government and parliament that the social cleavage that separates 
Quebec from the other provinces prevents constitutional change in practice, even if the 
formal rules of the Constitution specifically permit changes like senate reform to occur 
without the agreement of Quebec.  Additionally, nothing in this Act prevents a person who 
is not a minister of the crown (i.e. a parliamentary secretary or private member) in either 
the senate or the house of commons from introducing such a resolution and yet critics of 
this bill have failed to note this omission, reflecting the widely held belief that 
constitutional amendment is the purview of a government, which is of course the leadership 
of the parliamentary majority party, something created by partisan division in society. 
There have been successful amendments of the Constitution during the period.  In 
1993, cultural institutions in New Brunswick were given equal standing and the ‘fixed link’ 
bridge replaced the constitutionally guaranteed ferry service to PEI; in 1997 Quebec was 
allowed to replace denominational schools with linguistic ones and Newfoundland was 
allowed to create a secular school system; Newfoundland abolished denominational schools 
in 1998; in 1999 Nunavut was separated from the Northwest territories and given its own 
representation in parliament; and in 2001 Newfoundland’s name was changed to include 
Labrador.  While these were all changes done under less onerous amending formulae, the 
agreement to hold constitutional conferences with Aboriginal leaders was itself a 
constitutional amendment under the 7/50 formula, and this amendment additionally 
clarified the wording with respect to the legal status of treaties and land claims.  
Constitutional amendment is possible in Canada under the formulae adopted in 1982. 
                                                 
81 Given uneven population distribution in Atlantic Canada and the Prairies, this makes the legislatures of 
Nova Scotia and Alberta central to passage in these two regions. 
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Summary 
Canada was unable to adopt an indigenous constitutional amending formula from 
1927 to 1982 for one specific reason: the amending formula that would have addressed one 
of the largest social cleavages in Canada – an amending formula that was in keeping with 
one of social contract theories that much of the political elite in Quebec believes already 
informs the Canadian constitution and is reflected in the Canadian Senate – was unpalatable 
to the majority of political actors.  The majoritarian formula that was proposed as an 
alternative and adopted in 1982 has been opposed by numerous Quebec governments of 
different political stripes, which also opposed the Victoria formula, preferring instead to opt 
for the status quo.  After adopting amending formulae in 1982, the subsequent attempts to 
achieve comprehensive constitutional change resulted in failure.  The political will 
appeared to be there to make wide sweeping constitutional change on two occasions under 
the applicable formula but social groups rose up to thwart that will in both instances.  In 
both instances the change was driven by partisan interests.  This would seem to offer in the 
most general terms support for the thesis that partisan cleavages drive institutional change 
and social cleavages restrain such change, in so far as the constitution may be seen as an 
institution in the broadest sense or may act as a proxy for the institutions it mediates. 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the constitution from a philosophical perspective and 
shown that the ideas of ‘sovereignty’ and of ‘social contract’ provide the conceptual basis 
for a constitution being variously changed and restrained.  Most conceptions of sovereignty 
point to mechanisms that permit change through majoritarian political action and thus make 
change likely to be the product of partisan cleavages.  This was true during Canada’s early 
years when the British and Canadian legal communities claimed that there existed British 
‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and it continues to be the case post-1982 when ‘constitutional 
sovereignty’ dictates that amending formulae can be used to alter the Constitution.  Social 
contract theory permits the conceptualization of a constitution as a compact between 
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groups, a belief that would in turn encourage social groups that feel they are party to the 
contract to resist such changes in favour of the status quo.  Conceived of this way, 
institutional change driven by partisan groups, even groups with the requisite majority to 
meet the rules governing change, will not only be resisted by social groups that are in a 
minority but the very attempt to make such a change may exacerbate the societal divisions, 
particularly when the change is perceived to advantage one specific side of a social 
cleavage. 
This caused us to alter the third proposition in our hypothesis as follows: 
3) [Revised]: When the social cleavage and the partisan cleavage aligned: 
a. If proposals for change came from the ‘out’ group, the elites that 
represented that group would have insufficient influence to bring about the 
change. 
b. If proposals for change came from the ‘in’ group, the elites that represented 
the ‘out’ group would resist change and opt instead for the status quo. 
British and Canadian constitutional law suggests that the social contract in ‘ceded 
and conquered’ colonies involved social groups, whereas in ‘settled’ colonies it was with 
and between the colonists, something that would explain why there has been such a divisive 
debate over what compact led to union in 1867: a compact between people, between 
provinces or between the French and English.  Irrespective of the social contract, the 
constitutions that have governed Canada all had a written portion, whether enacted by royal 
prerogative or by the British parliament and these constitutions each established formal 
institutions of governance, could be interpreted by the courts and, above all, could be 
modified through amendment and, in some aspects, by convention. 
The empirical evidence from modern Canada’s debate over adopting a 
constitutional amending formula would support the contention that social cleavages restrain 
change, even in the face of political consensus in favour of change.  Once an amending 
formula was proposed for partisan reasons in 1927, until it was adopted along with a 
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Charter in 1982 (which was equally a change that grew out of a partisan cleavage), the 
Government of Quebec had been able to prevent the adoption of an amending formula even 
though the rules governing constitutional amendment were not particularly onerous. 
In the era of a formal constitutional amending formula the Constitution has been 
amended a number of times.  Yet none of the amendments that were proposed by social 
groups have resulted in change, whether it be Aboriginal groups between 1983 and 1987 or 
Quebec on behalf of its Francophone population beginning with the so-called ‘Quebec 
round’.  In instances where there appeared to be sufficient political support in favour of 
constitutional and institutional change, social cleavages in Canada fuelled sufficient 
opposition to that change to stop it just short of ratification. 
Nevertheless, the formal mechanism put in place by the Constitution Act, 1982 
clearly allows for changes to Canada’s institutions of governance by simple majoritarian 
processes, albeit with higher standards in most instances than is required for ordinary 
legislation.  These rules specifically put all the essential elements for comprehensive Senate 
reform within a formula that does not give a social group, including the government of 
Quebec, the authority in law to prevent such change.   
Comprehensive Senate reform post-1982 would be possible if a resolution were 
passed by the legislatures of seven provinces representing at least 50 percent of Canada’s 
population.  This means that Senate reform could be achieved in the future over the protests 
of the Government of Ontario, which due to that province’s large population might be 
expected to naturally favour a unicameral legislature based on representation by population, 
or of the Government of Quebec, which it has been argued here might naturally support the 
status quo.  While comprehensive Senate reform would not be possible without one of 
these provinces’ legislatures, some changes to the Senate could be made by the federal 
parliament acting alone, such as the elimination of the property and net worth requirements 
for appointment and an alteration of the term of appointment that still respected the role of 
the Senate as a chamber of sober second thought.  The fact that the Quebec legislature has 
been unanimous, across party lines, in its opposition of the federal parliament making such 
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changes – even though the divisions within Quebec reflect both the limited territorial 
boundaries of Quebec in 1867 and its religious and linguistic divisions rather than the 
francophone majority, is illustrative of the resistance to constitutional change that arises 
from a social cleavage and the construction of a constitution as a social contract. 
Parliament adopting An Act respecting Constitutional Amendments in 1996, must be 
seen as recognition by parliament that social cleavages restrain change even when nothing 
in the amending formulae can be seen to protect social group interests.  This law is not a 
constitutional requirement and could be simply repealed by legislation by the same majority 
required to adopt parliament’s requisite resolution to amend the Constitution, and it is only 
binding on members of the federal cabinet.  
The Constitution, per se, does not prevent Senate reform.  In fact, since any member 
of a legislature or of parliament can start the process of amending the Constitution by 
introducing a resolution for that change, the constitutional rules would seem on paper to 
allow for a large number of people who are members of political parties or social groups to 
initiate change to the Constitution of Canada and its institutions of governance.  The fact 
that one cannot imagine a constitutional amendment occurring in Canada unless it was 
advocated by a political party, or if it was opposed by Francophones in Quebec, would 
suggest that constitutions are an institution in the broadest sense and that they are likely one 
of the mechanisms through which partisan cleavages operate to drive change to political 
institutions and social cleavages operate to restrain these changes.   
  
Chapter 4: Resisting Institutional Change - The Province 
of Quebec 
The first period examined in this dissertation was the period from the settlement of 
New France in the 17th century, through the British conquest whereupon Canada was 
renamed Quebec, until the early 19th century when rebellions in favour of institutional 
change broke out in Upper and Lower Canada.  The results of that examination are reported 
in this chapter.  This offers a ‘best case’ to test our hypothesis. 
Our hypothesis is that when social cleavages and partisan cleavages align, 
institutional change will be opposed by the other side of the cleavage since it will be seen 
as coming from a social group to advance its interests over the other group(s).  When the 
two cleavages are not aligned, we expect to find the ‘out’ social group opposing change and 
favouring the status quo.  For change to occur in a period of cross-cleavages, we expect to 
find a partisan group driving that change that has membership from both sides of the social 
cleavage. 
There are three sections to this chapter and each reflects a period of time, first under 
the royalist French regime which runs from 1663 to 1763, which is where we identify the 
institutions that the colonists would be familiar with prior to the conquest by the British.  
This gives us the baseline.  Following that, each change and attempt to make change to 
these institutions was process traced.   
The second section runs from the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 to 1791.82 
What emerged here were very clear demands for institutional change coming from the new 
English settlers and merchants, following the conquest, which were successfully resisted by 
the French elites.  In the lead up to 1791, the French merchants and English merchants 
                                                 
82 It is referred to as La Guerre de la Conquête by Quebec scholars, in India it is referred to as the Third 
Carnatic War while the Prussian-Austrian conflict is referred to as the Third Silesian War.  English Canadian 
and European scholars most often refer to it as the Seven Years War, even though it ran for nine years, with a 
brief cessation of hostilities in North America which provided the opportunity for the expulsion of the 
Acadians.  Winston Churchill referred to this as the First World War due to its global nature and the 
involvement of all the European powers (Bowen 1998). 
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briefly united in support of the division of Quebec along its social cleavage into two 
provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada which is what occurred. 
The third section runs from 1791 to 1838.  During this period the social cleavage 
was seen to align with the partisan cleavage in each of the two provinces.  In both 
provinces, agitation for change was seen to be driven by one social group and it was 
opposed by the other group.  This led to rebellions in favour of institutional change from 
the ‘out’ social group in each province in 1838. 
I. Original ‘Canadian’ Institutions of Governance 
Samuel de Champlain founded New France and Quebec City in 1608, but it was 
only in 1663 that the province of New France became a royal province directly under the 
French king’s control.  By this time the population had only reached 2,500 of whom 800 
were living in the town of Quebec, and the public debt was around 200,000 livres (Clercq 
1691, 4).83  New France was essentially a collection of trading posts.  What little 
governance that could be seen to exist for the French traders was mercantile in nature.  
Development was left in the hands of the Company of New France, also known as the 
Company of One Hundred Associates.  They had been given a monopoly by the French 
king and charged with settling the new land, but settlement was not forthcoming and the 
company proved to be a failed mercantile venture.  The fur trade proved to be less and less 
lucrative and the Iroquois inflicted greater and greater damage on what little settlement 
there was. 
In response to this failed enterprise, the Company of New France’s control over 
Canada was extinguished in 1663, and New France became a royal colony, or province, of 
                                                 
83 The town of Quebec had 28 settlers at its founding in 1608, including Samuel de Champlain (Laverdière 
2003, III:173), and only 60 persons in 1620 (ibid., v.VI:8).  The sedentary population of New France in 1641 
was only 240 (Dollier de Casson 1927, 31). 
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the king of France.84  ‘Canada’ emerged as one of its five internal divisions.85  Even after 
its establishment as a royal colony, the administration of this territory was handled, in part 
and from time to time, by a number of mercantile corporations operating under sanction 
and even delegated vice-regal authority of the French crown, including the Compagnie de 
l’Occident.86  However, these companies also failed to meet their obligations for settlement 
or for revenue, and their influence on local governance was limited. 
It should be noted that a local governing council had existed during the time of the 
Company of One Hundred Associates.  This had been established by the royal edicts of 
1647 and 1648, though the governor was directly delegated authority by the company and 
not by the crown.  In order to curb the autocratic tendencies of governors over time, the 
company had experimented with these councils, first by adding the ranking religious 
authority, the Superior of the Order of Jesuits, and then by adding the lieutenant governor 
of Montreal and representatives from each of the three syndicates, which looked after the 
company’s business interests in Quebec, Montreal and Trois-Rivières. 
Cahall (2005, 22) suggests that these early experiments in governance from the time 
of the Company of One Hundred Associates guided Louis XIV when he established the 
first sovereign council in 1663.  He bases this conclusion on the smaller size of the council 
and the fact that there was no ‘intendant’ appointed in 1663, setting this sovereign council 
apart from the sovereign councils established within the provinces of mother France.87  This 
is an erroneous conclusion.  The establishment of royal governance for New France in 1663 
                                                 
84 Formally the officers and shareholders of the company surrendered their rights to the king on February 24, 
1663, but its financial interest in this colony had long before declined and the writing was clearly on the wall 
(Cahall 2005, 21). 
85 ‘Canada’ was by far the largest division, and included territory that is now divided between Ontario and 
Quebec.  The other administrative division being l’Acadie (Nova Scotia), la Baie d’Hudson (which was 
unsettled and the British claims through what would become known as the Hudson’s Bay company, would 
come to dominate), Terre-Neuve (Newfoundland) and la Louisiane (communication). 
86 The Compagnie de l’Occident was established by letters patent in 1664 to exploit the resources of the 
French colonies and, hopefully, compete with the Dutch and English companies that were successfully 
creating a mercantile economy for their imperial countries.  It was spearheaded by the Minister Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert, who was Minister of Finance in addition to Secretary of State for the Navy and Colonies. 
87 The sovereign councils of the French provinces of Ensisheim, Perpignan and Arras each had governors, 
intendants and bishops within their membership. 
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was a rejection of the mercantile experiments.  These earlier councils were decidedly 
corporate, and not governmental, as the administration and settlement of New France had 
been assigned to the Company of One Hundred Associates and through it to the company’s 
governor.  What is more, the experiments in these early councils under mercantile rule had 
a democratic element through the representatives of the three syndicates.  Representation of 
any interest, be it corporate or settler, was not an element that Louis XIV supported, as he 
was embarking on a systematic campaign to centralize authority into his hands and those of 
his key ministers. 
In 1672, Governor Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac, took it upon himself, 
without royal instruction, to experiment with a governance model divided by estate.  The 
three estates as had emerged in France were clergy, nobles and representatives of the 
people.  Colonial Secretary88 Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s response to Frontenac’s decision to 
assemble estates was quick and unequivocal; informing him in a Despatch dated June 13, 
1673: 
“L’assemblée et la division que vous aves faite de tous les habitants du pais 
en trios Ordres ou États pour leur faire prêter le serment de fidélité pourvoit 
produire un bon effet dans ce moment-là, mais il est bon que vous observés 
que comme vous devés toujours suivre dans le gouvernement et la conduite 
de ce pais-là les formes qui se pratiquent ici, et que nos Rois ont estimé du 
bien de leur service depuis longtemps de ne point assembler les États 
Généraux de leur Royaume pour peut-être anéantir insensiblement cette 
forme ancienne; vous ne devés aussi donner que très rarement, et pour mieux 
dire jamais, cette forme au corps des habitants dudit pais, et il faudra même 
avec un peu de tems, et lorsque la Colonie sera encore plus forte qu’elle 
n’est, supprimer insensiblement le syndic qui présente des requêtes au nom 
de tous les habitants, étant bon que chacun parle pour soi et que personne ne 
parle pour tous”.89 
                                                 
88 Colbert’s formal titles had been Comptroller-General of Finance and Secretary of State for the Navy.  The 
responsibility for the colonies was the extension of both of these roles.  Under both the French and English 
kings, secretaries of state were usually given responsibility for the colonies, as this was one of the most senior 
titles in both royal courts.  These came to be known in the literature as colonial secretaries, and for ease of 
understanding they are used in this form here. 
89 Despatch from the Collection Moreau St. Mércy, 1670-6, French Archives, Série F, vol. 178, p.208 (for 
English translation see Kennedy 1922, 16) 
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The government of Louis XIV supported neither representation by the people nor the 
syndicates of the local merchant interest, so there is no reason to believe the king was 
guided by any of the experiments of the new or old world.  What is more, the French 
monarchy was fearful of any institution of governance that might be prone to use by 
societal groups, whether these groups be social or political, and the early colonial 
experiments had been just that. 
It also seems possible that an intendant had been appointed in 1663, in the person of 
Louis Robert de Fortel, and that he had just not left for New France as planned with the 
bishop and the governor (Vachon 2000).  As it was, King Louis had difficulty even finding 
a governor for this new royal colony, with Augustin de Saffray de Mézy reportedly only 
taking the post after the king agreed to cover all his financial debts (Eccles 2000). 
What Louis XIV put in place for New France was the same institutional model that 
was used in the provinces of France in Europe.  The sovereign council was the common 
mechanism for governing provinces.  Thus 1663 offers the starting point for our 
consideration of institutional change as the population that had experienced the mercantile 
model was negligible at this time, and this was the first government established directly by 
the imperial government.  This institution of governance would be the only form of 
government the settlers, who arrived after 1663, would come to know prior to the conquest 
by the British. 
Sovereign Council of New France (1663-1763) 
As noted, the Company of One Hundred Associates had failed to adequately settle 
the French colony.  In addition, questions had been raised about the administration of 
justice in the colony.  As Louis XIV’s colonial secretary noted, “there has been in that 
colony no regular system of justice the authority of which was universally recognized, and 
through the weakness of character of those who were charged with rendering justice, the 
judgments which were pronounced were generally unexecuted” (Édits, ordonnances 
royaux, 1854, v.2, 26}.  Additionally, the Company of One Hundred’s governors’ refusal to 
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ban the trade in, and sale of, liquor to the native population placed them regularly at odds 
with the Jesuits, which was an influential religious order in France and the dominant 
Roman Catholic order in New France.  The Jesuits had made converting the Aboriginal 
population of New France to catholicism its holy crusade. 
So upset with the company’s governor at the time was the ranking Jesuit, François-
Xavier de Montmorency-Laval, Bishop of Patreau in partibus infidelum90, that he travelled 
to Paris in 1662 to lobby the king for the end of the rule by the Company of One Hundred 
or, at the very least, the recall of the company’s then governor.  In response to his entreaties 
and to the king’s ongoing concern over the state of the colony, in 1663, the Édit de 
Création du Conseil Souverain established a ‘sovereign council’ to be composed of a 
governor, the ‘bishop’, five councillors, an attorney-general and a secretary (Édits, 
ordonnances royaux, 1854, v.1, 37).  The governor was to be appointed by the king, and 
the bishop was to be appointed by the pope, but all other vacancies were to be filled by the 
governor and bishop jointly. 
The sovereign council is different than the British-model of a governor’s council.  
Where British practice was to appoint a governor and delegate royal authority to him, to be 
exercised with the advice and consent of a council, the authority to establish ordinances (or 
laws) was vested by the French king in the sovereign council.  This subtle distinction is 
important for two reasons.  First, it would allow power in New France to shift between the 
three office holders within the council – the governor, bishop and intendant – depending on 
circumstance, strength of personality and royal favour.  Second, it was predicated not on 
the right of the people to have representation with respect to the enactment of local laws 
that affect them, which is the theory behind the British governor’s council, but on the need 
to proclaim royal decisions locally and to protect the interests of the French crown. 
Augustin de Saffray de Mézy arrived with the returning Bishop Laval in 1663.  Jean 
Talon, the first ‘intendant’, arrived in Quebec only two years after the governor, in 1665, 
                                                 
90 This was a titular bishopric.  In partibus infidelum (Latin) means ‘in the territory of the infidels’ and is used 
to give a bishop the title without creating a ‘see’ (or province) of the church, which is an administrative unit. 
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and was immediately incorporated into the council.  The failure to include the intendant in 
the council at the birth of the new royal colony reflects not a lack of desire to use this office 
in a similar fashion, as was being used in France, but rather the difficulty that the young 
king and his colonial secretary were having in finding trusted persons willing to serve in 
this isolated and untamed wilderness. 
While the new sovereign council enacted important legislation for the colony early 
in its existence, including the banning of the sale of liquor to aboriginals, it quickly found 
itself divided between the competing camps of church and military governance.  Bishop 
Laval not only had to concur in appointments, but he was more familiar than the governor 
with the local gentry and thus several councillors were seen by the governor to be biased in 
favour of the Jesuit order.  The governor attempted to eliminate those he saw as subject to 
undue church influence on the council, but his attempts were thwarted by Bishop Laval.  
Laval tried to influence the king to recall the governor; something that likely would have 
happened had Mézy not died in office. 
Given the influence of the clergy, it would be appropriate to characterize the colony 
as a theocracy.  While in law there was a separation between ecclesiastic matters and civil 
matters, the bishop’s reach was into all matters, as little could be claimed to be purely civil 
given the moral dimension perceived by the church to exist in all human endeavour, and 
this reach was only amplified when it came from the pulpit every Sunday.  In a small but 
suddenly growing colony, the church became the sole instrument of culture and identity, 
with Bishop Laval beginning an ambitious campaign of building architecturally and 
artistically impressive parish churches so as to inspire devotion among the French colonial 
residents and, along with song and painting, inspire awe through which to convert the 
aboriginal people (Vance 2009). 
While different in intent, where the sovereign council was similar to the British-
model was in the assignment of judicial, executive and legislative authority to a single 
council.  But the French had no common law necessity of having a legislative body approve 
ordinances, and King Louis assigned the Coutume de Paris (commonly called civil law or 
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Roman law) to govern this province in the same way it governed France.  This law would 
be modified by subsequent ordinances adopted by governors and intendants, and placed 
into the code through the minutes of the sovereign council. 
As already alluded to, the difference in status of the sovereign council, which on the 
one hand was given direct responsibility for adopting ordinances and on the other hand was 
not a common law body for judicial interpretation or representation with respect to 
legislation, encouraged a power struggle between the bishop and governor, from the outset, 
and then a tripartite power contestation with the increasingly influential intendant. 
In France, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and a large and firmly 
entrenched bureaucracy posed a challenge to the monarch who in the person of Louis XIV 
was attempting to consolidate governance.91  So the practice had begun in France in the 
1640s for the king to appoint an ‘intendant’ to the army for each of the French provinces or 
généralités.  This independent official was tasked with examining best practices, listening 
to the people and taking corrective action, thereby allowing the king to routinely substitute 
his authority for that of the provincial military commanders, or ‘gouverneurs’, throughout 
France. 
The governors in New France were military officers and aristocrats, equally, tasked 
with overseeing defence.  The intendant came to be in charge of economic affairs and trade 
and of local administration of justice, finance, settlement and the seigneurial system.92  The 
bishop remained responsible for religious matters.  The length of time in office varied by 
office holder, with some being appointed multiple times and some being summarily 
removed from office by the king.  This shifting royal favour was a variable in determining 
the relative influence of these colonial officers, whose specific area of jurisdiction was not 
clearly delineated. 
                                                 
91 In Britain, the power of the Church had been broken by Henry VIII one hundred years earlier, when he had 
parliament severe ties to the papacy and appoint him head of the church. 
92 Seigneur in French and seignior in English (which comes from French) refers to a middle level person of 
rank in a feudal system. 
  
 
122
In law and on paper, the judicial, executive and legislative functions were assigned 
to the sovereign council, and the governor was the king’s representative and thus tasked 
with both overseeing the work of the council and for implementing its ordinances.  
However, the power of the clergy, in no small way the result of the machinations and zeal 
of the Jesuit order, made the bishop a force to be reckoned with in local governance, even 
though his purview was in theory confined to cannon law and ecclesiastical matters.  The 
intendant was, through being tasked with improving justice as the king’s inspector, 
empowered to act efficiently and beneath the jurisdiction of the council, a mandate that 
would lay the foundation for the shift of judicial power away from the sovereign council.  
While this system in many ways undermined the power of the sovereign council as a 
collective, given the overlap in jurisdiction between these three office holders, the council 
was often the forum by which the functions of the offices could be adjudicated and disputes 
between the personalities who held these positions in the early life of the colony resolved. 
A dispute between Bishop Saint-Vallier of Quebec and the governor of New France 
is illustrative of the role of the council as an intermediary between strong personalities with 
seemingly independent authority to enact ordinances.  Before even arriving in New France, 
Saint-Vallier had informed the then governor, the Marquis de Denonville, that theatre, 
dancing and balls were injurious to Christian principles and would be forbidden on spiritual 
grounds (Vance 2009, 48).  While de Denonville was too preoccupied with native attacks 
and epidemics to take issue with this instruction during his time in office, his successor 
Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac, was more urbane in tastes and never above using his 
office to enjoy life.  He was also not someone to take instructions from an ecclesiastic 
power which had no formal jurisdiction over his office.  When he commissioned a 
subordinate, Lieutenant Mareuil, to stage Molière’s play Tartuffe, a comedy which mocked 
the church for subverting religion, the wrath of the bishop rang out from the pulpit.  Bishop 
Saint-Vallier went so far as to charge the lieutenant with committing blasphemy.  As 
blasphemy was a civil matter, defined by the civil code, Frontenac was quick to rule that the 
bishop had overstepped his jurisdiction.  It was only when the bishop offered to compensate 
Frontenac in cash for his out-of-pocket expenses, essentially a bribe that Frontenac only too 
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happily accepted, that a collision between the two offices was averted.  Even then, the 
council was employed ex post facto to protect the reputation of both offices, ruling that “the 
bishop was in the wrong but that the governor was not in the right” (Cameron 1930, 17).  
And, in the end, Saint-Vallier’s decree against theatrical and other forms of social 
entertainment remained on the council’s books for two centuries. 
This example is also significant because it represents a mechanism for control that 
the church had in the colony that was clearly designed to tame intellectual, cultural and 
political dissent.  Plays and poetry in France had become avenues for political discourse, a 
development with which the Jesuit order was all too acquainted, so its prohibition was 
designed to restrain the emergence of a strong social cleavage over class in the colony.  It 
was also a mechanism by which to stifle the dissemination of political ideas that might be 
used to encourage institutional change and political reform. 
The sovereign council was chaired by the governor until 1674, when the intendant 
took over as chair and the number of councillors was increased to seven.93  From this point 
on, appointments were made directly by the king.  The number of councillors again 
increased in 1703 to eleven, and the bishop was granted the right to also have a deputy on 
the council.  These changes reflect the influence wielded by the bishop and represent the 
growth in influence of the intendant.  The intendant was always in close personal 
communication with the colonial secretary in France and, as a result, “passed, from being at 
first a spy on the governor and bishop, to a position of the widest authority, to which his 
theoretical third place in colonial precedence made little difference” (Kennedy 1922, 14).  
For his part, the governor remained in command of French forces in the colony, but his 
influence over governance became confined to his being a member of the sovereign 
council. 
                                                 
93 Laval was also granted his own Bishopric ‘see’ (or province) of Quebec in this year, firmly cementing his 
administrative hold over the church in the colony and recognizing his work in expanding its reach and 
entrenching its dominance. 
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Where in France the intendant was the mechanism best able to give agency to the 
crown in its attempt to challenge the bureaucracy and influence of the governor, in New 
France it was the mechanism that could begin to challenge the authority of the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Jesuit order.  It is noteworthy that the first intendant, Jean Talon, 
had been intendant in the French province of Hainault, prior to him being sent to Canada.  
Talon had been an intendant since the age of 30, and was tapped for the new royal colony 
precisely because he was familiar with the office and the king’s expectations.  This is 
further evidence that Cahall (2005) is mistaken in his conclusion that the sovereign council 
was uniquely Canadian, growing out of the earlier councils under the Company of One 
Hundred Associates, rather than a replica of the sovereign councils of the provinces of 
France.   
A number of factors can be identified for the rise in influence of the intendant over 
his colleagues in local administration, of which three have been widely accepted as the 
most significant.  The first is the fact that having authority to issue ordinances and decide 
legal matters at the local level gave him the capacity to circumvent the formal structure of 
colonial government, and the sovereign council, and to settle disputes.  This would be 
important when the British came as their system of justice was far more cumbersome at the 
local level in terms of cost and administration.  The second is, as authority in all of France 
came to be centred in the king, even in communities as isolated as a colony, the monarch 
had the undisputed capacity to overrule decisions of governance in response to despatches, 
something that was done regularly in furtherance of imperial policy and simply to remind 
officials of regal control.    In this climate of absolutism, the intendant, as the ‘king’s man’, 
would greatly advantage this official over the theoretically superior colonial officers.  
Again, this would have implications for the British as the fear of micromanagement in 
London would be a constant source of unease for the French Canadians.  The third, which 
we will explore more fully below, is the existence of the seigneurial system of feudal land 
allocation. 
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The overarching reason, however, which has not been identified in other literature 
on the colonial French period (given its usual interest in the offices of governor, bishop and 
intendant and the personalities who held them), lies in the sovereign council.  While local 
governing authority came to be centred in the seigneurs, and thus in the intendant, 
provincial governing authority resided in the sovereign council.  This was not simply a 
unicameral legislature but a unicameral government.  In modern political science, the 
tendency for a unicameral government to allow individuals to centralize executive power 
has been well documented (Savoie 1999), and the counterbalance inherent in legislative 
structures due to the existence of bicameralism (Tsebelis et Money 1997) and on policy 
decisions due to the existence of veto players (Tsebelis 2002), is also well known.  A single 
body vested with legislative, executive and judicial powers will be void of counterbalance 
and thus prone to the dominance of individuals. 
Where scholars of history have identified the cult of personality of leaders like 
Levis, Frontenac and Talon as responsible for the fluctuations in influence between the 
offices of bishop, governor and intendant (e.g. Kennedy 1922) and concluded that the rise 
of individual influence meant a decline in influence of the sovereign council (Cahall 2005), 
it can also be seen to be simply a by-product of institutional design.  The positions of 
bishop, governor and intendant were each vested with royal and governance authority, but 
equally they were granted overlapping jurisdiction, the oversight of which resided in the 
sovereign council.  The capacity of an individual to dominate New France temporarily can 
thus be seen to be an artefact of the sovereign council having been vested with singular 
governing authority.94 
                                                 
94 Looked at this way, it is inevitable that a prime minister would absorb the legal authority vested in cabinet 
and the crown, even though the institution of the office did not change, with the sole restraint being the 
cultural, historic and temporal circumstance (Hicks 2010a, 2010b).  While it might be interesting to chronicle 
the shift of power in modern government to the person of the prime minister (e.g. Savoie 1999), surely the 
more interesting question is why had this concentration of power not occurred more quickly.  In communist 
countries, there is an assumption that power will be centralized, but again the interesting question is why it is 
neither uniform nor absolute. 
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In terms of composition, the sovereign council by design included the largest 
landholders.  So when we look at this institutional design through the sociological lens, in 
the subsistence economy of New France, the political cleavage between religious and civil 
society and between classes, would necessarily advantage the intendant who could navigate 
both sides of each cleavage.  His capacity to exert authority at the provincial elite level is 
facilitated by his standing in society as a royal favourite, and at the local level by the 
seigneurial system. 
Our interest is in the sovereign council.  But governance in a colony is ultimately 
about land allocation, revenue and defence, three functions of which the seigneurial system 
was designed to merge at the local level under the sovereign council, which had been given 
ultimate jurisdiction as the court of appeal and as a combined legislative and executive 
council. 
Every charter, which allowed mercantile interest to develop in New France, 
included provision for the creation of seigneuries.  However, it is only with the 
establishment of a royal colony that the seigneurial system truly emerged and, second only 
to the church, began to define the cultural fabric of New France.  This was a feudal system 
of land tenure.  Instead of allowing people to acquire the title to land, lords were given 
tracts of land en fief or en seigneurie in exchange for an oath of fealty, a commitment to 
perform military service, a regular report on the use and population of his lands, and a fee 
of a quint (or one-fifth) of the price of the seigneurie should he transfer his obligations to 
another (except by inheritance).  He, in turn, would assign plots of land to habitants who 
would pay annually cens et rentes (money or payment in kind or both) for the privilege of 
farming a portion of the land, a commitment to work for the seigneur a number of days a 
year and to military service.  The seigneur was supposed to administer the king’s justice 
within the seigneurie subject to the terms of the grant, and to provide a grist mill and an 
oven for which the habitants (or tenants) would pay for use.  
Kennedy (1922, 21) suggests that it is “a surprise that a system which was honey-
combed with decay in seventeenth-century France should be introduced into a new country 
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and have continued there for more than two centuries”.  The reason for this, as will be 
explored more fully in this chapter, lies at the heart of our theoretical model, and that is a 
social cleavage will restrain institutional change and an ‘out’ social group will opt for the 
status quo rather than agitate for change.  The system began, as it was the familiar norm in 
France, it functioned effectively at the outset due to the challenges of settling untilled land 
in a harsh environment and, following the British conquest, became synonymous with the 
French cultural identity.95  Normative ideas that emerged in both Britain and France and 
spoke to the inherent flaws in feudal relationships were readily dismissed by habitant and 
seigneur, alike, as a negative and oppressive attack on their historic cultural values and 
practices. 
The seigneurial system was designed to support both church and aristocrat.  The 
seigneur was an institution designed to maintain social structures.  He was a middle 
aristocrat, who could manage local interests at a distance on behalf of the higher nobility.  
With some irony, the sovereign council was to be the council of the higher nobility, yet the 
subsistence nature of colonial life and the feudal approach to land grants was a natural limit 
on its authority and on the emergence of an aristocratic class. 
The other social cleavage that can be seen to exist during the time of royalist New 
France was between rural and urban.  With one third of the population living in the towns, 
this more affluent merchant class was, in spite of the church’s restraint of independent 
thought and behaviour, developing culture and knowledge. 
                                                 
95 That is not to suggest that habitants were entirely supportive of the system or were advantaged by the 
system even at the outset.  As intendant Raudot reported to the king, after he discovered a royal decree that 
was designed to enhance the rights of the habitant and that  had never been disclosed to the population: “It 
was the interest of the attorney-general as a seigneur, as it was also the interest of other councillors who are 
seigneurs, that the provisions of this decree should never be made public” (Munro 1899, 27).  The system was 
one to maintain a class structure, through a middle aristocratic class that could support the higher and more 
propertied nobility. 
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II. Fighting for the Status Quo 
The era under British domination offeres the first opportunity to examine how an 
‘out’ social group, even though more populous than the new British settlers, was able to 
maintain what for it was the status quo in institutions of governance.  An elected lower 
chamber was demanded by the British settlers and merchants, who had the support of 
important officials in the British government. 
There were social divisions in New France prior to the conquest of 1763 – between 
classes, between religious and civil society and between urban and rural – but these 
cleavages were dwarfed by the new French catholic and English protestant divide.  This 
was initially a religious more than a linguistic divide.  That is because language was not 
charged with identity politics in this era.  Language was a means for communication rather 
than cultural identity.  British colonial officers, and even the less educated merchants and 
traders, had the capacity to function in the language of the province’s majority, which was 
French, and many merchants and clerics learned aboriginal languages.  French had been the 
language of diplomacy and of the British king’s court.  Religious divisions had dominated 
Europe for centuries, and this caused the existing French Canadian population to close 
ranks and form a common identity in response to British protestant imperial rule.  While the 
Church of England had vacillated back and forth between protestant reformation doctrine 
and more traditional catholic practices, it was the official religion of the British empire and 
the British king was head of his own church. 
From an institutional perspective, the two social groups that emerged on either side 
of this growing cleavage over religion each wanted the status quo.96  The problem was 
obviously that one cannot have two status quos.  For the French Canadians, the status quo 
was the system of colonial government that had become familiar under royalist New 
France, a system based on the provinces of France, with a sovereign council, seigneuries 
and a civil law system.  For the British colonists it was the system of colonial government 
                                                 
96 While in the first instance it was religious, it would increasingly be defined by other identity markers. 
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that had operated in the 13 British North American colonies to the south, a model that 
found its roots in the government of the parent Britain, with a governor’s council, a 
representative assembly and common law. 
That the French were able to restrain the introduction of the new British model is 
significant.  This was a conquered people with no legal right to their law or institutions.  
The British model had support in the halls of government at Whitehall and Westminster in 
London, not simply due to its familiarity, but due to the practical benefit of its capacity to 
raise money for local public works projects and to pay for the civic list (i.e. the salaries of 
local officials like judges).  It was also commended by normative ideas about justice and 
democracy that were finding traction in this era. 
Governor’s Council of Quebec (1763-1774) 
There can be no question that the British fully intended to impose the model of 
representative government that was familiar to its officials and settlers upon the French 
Canadians, which it intended to carve out as a province in the surrendered territory of New 
France.  Article IV of the Treaty of Paris, 1763 had committed the British king to “grant 
the liberty of the Catholick religion to the inhabitants of Canada” and to “give the most 
precise and most effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the 
worship of their religion according to the rites of the Romish church”, but it had qualified 
this commitment by the clause “as far as the laws of Great Britain permit”.97 
The Royal Proclamation, 1763 subsequently divided up the territory of New France, 
and established four colonies, or provinces, one of which was to be named Quebec.  The 
colony would have a governor and a governor’s council.  The governor was instructed to, 
“with the Advice and Consent of the Members of our Council, summon and call General 
                                                 
97 It has been argued that the French regime weighed the merits of keeping Canada or Guadeloupe, and found 
Canada wanting (Grant 1912), and Voltaire reportedly planned to force the government to abandon Canada 
had the French crown not made the decision to do so (Kennedy 1922, 31).  For their part the British had 
designs on this territory as it offered a buffer against expansion by the 13 colonies to the south, something that 
would require new settlement.  These conflicting interests would explain the ambiguous commitment made to 
the catholic church on the ceded area of Canada. 
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Assemblies” and empower the “Councils, and the Representatives of the People so to be 
summoned as aforesaid, to make, constitute, and ordain Laws, Statutes, and Ordinances for 
the Public Peace, Welfare, and good Government” of the colony, “as near as may be 
agreeable to the Laws of England”.  It was the British common law that was proclaimed to 
be in force, and the governor-in-council was instructed to establish courts for the 
administering of that justice. 
The military governor, James Murray, was appointed the first ‘captain-general and 
governor-in-chief in and over our province of Quebec in America’.98  His commission of 
appointment made clear that the members of the governor’s council were to take the 
various oaths required by the statutes of the British parliament (George R, November 14, 
1763).  The form of these oaths at the time, as used in North America, included an oath of 
allegiance to the king99; the oath of supremacy denouncing papal authority;100 an oath of 
abjuration that repudiated the rights of the Stuarts to the Throne;101 and an oath repudiating 
                                                 
98 After the fall of Quebec on September 18, 1759, until the Treaty of Paris was signed on August 10, 1764, 
Canada fell increasingly under British military control, and thus military rule.  Murray, an officer under 
General Wolfe at Quebec (Wolfe having died as a result of the battle), was made military commander of the 
town of Quebec following the battle and, in 1760, military governor of the district of Quebec. 
99 The first of these oaths taken and signed by the Chief Justice William Pepperrell and other 13 court officers 
in Massachusetts circa 1730 reads: “I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear, that I will be faithful and bear 
true allegiance to His Majesty King George the Second.  So help me God.” 
100 Ibid. for supremacy: “I, A.B., do swear that I do from my heart, abhor, detest and abjure as impious and 
heretical, that damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope or any 
authority of the See of Rome, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever; and I 
do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, 
power, superiority, preeminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within the realm of Great Britain.  So 
help me God.” 
101 Ibid. for abjuration: “I, A.B, do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my 
conscience, before God and the world, that our sovereign lord King George the Second, is lawful and rightful 
King of this realm, and all his other Majesties dominions and countries there-unto belong; and I do solemnly 
and sincerely declare, that I do believe in my conscience, that the person pretended to be the Prince of Wales 
during the life of the late King James, and since his decease pretending to be, and taking upon himself the 
style and title of King of England, by the name of James the Third, or of Scotland, by the name of James the 
Eighth, or the style and title of King of Great Britain, hath not any right or title whatsoever to the Crown of 
this realm, or any other dominions there-to belonging; and I do renounce, refute and abjure any allegiance or 
obedience to him.  And I do swear, that I will bear faith and true allegiance to His Majesty King George the 
Second, and Him will defend to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts 
whatsoever which shall be made against his Person, Crown, or Dignity; and I will do my utmost endeavor to 
disclose and make known to His Majesty and his successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies which I 
shall know to be against Him, or any of them; and I do faithfully promise to the utmost of my power to 
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transubstantiation.102  These would have prevented Roman Catholics from holding office 
and, if applied to voters, as they could be and in certain places (like in Ireland where 
Roman Catholics were in the majority) they were, would have prevented French Canadians 
from voting. 
He was instructed to call an assembly “as soon as the Situation and circumstances of 
our said Province under your Government will admit thereof, and when & as often as need 
shall require” with members of the assembly also required to take these oaths (ibid., 128).  
The council and assembly was imbued with the power to enact laws, provided they were 
not repugnant to the laws of Britain; the governor was assigned the power to adjourn, 
prorogue and dissolve all general assemblies, and the power of veto over both chambers; 
and the king reserved for himself the power of reservation and disallowance.  This was the 
prevailing model for colonial government within the British empire at the time, and 
includes provisions incorporated into the British North America Act a century later – a 
document, that Canadian scholars claim was written solely and independently by the 
Canadian Fathers of Confederation. 
                                                                                                                                                    
support, maintain and defend the succession of the Crown, against him the said James, and all other persons 
whatsoever; which succession by an Act, intituled, An Act of the further Limitation of the Crown, and better 
securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subjects, is and stands limited to the Princess Sophia, Electress and 
Dutchess Dowager of Hannover, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants.  And all these things I do 
plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear, according to these express words by me spoken, and according 
to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words, without any equivocation, mental 
evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever.  And I do make this recognition, acknowledgement, adjuration, 
renunciation and promise, heartily, willingly and truly, upon the true faith of a Christian.  So help me God.” 
102 Ibid. for transubstantiation: I, A.B., do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God, profess, testify and 
declare, that I do believe that in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper there is not any transubstantiation of the 
elements of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, at or after the consecration thereof by any 
person whatsoever: And that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other Saint, and the 
sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous.  And I do 
solemnly and in the presence of God, press, testify and declare, that I do make this declaration and every part 
thereof, in the plain and ordinary sense of the words read unto me, as they are commonly understood by 
English Protestants, without any evasion, equivocation or mental reservation whatsoever; and without any 
dispensation already granted me for this purpose by the Pope, or any authority or person whatsoever; or 
without thinking that I am or can be acquired before God or man, or absolved of this declaration or any part 
thereof, although the Pope or any other person or persons or powers whatsoever should dispense with or 
annul the same, or declare that it was null and void from the beginning. So help me God.” 
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Democracy was a concept in its infancy in this era, and was tied to concepts of 
property ownership and thus responsible citizenship.  Due to the ample land in North 
America, the 13 colonies that would break away to form America had a wider franchise 
than that enjoyed in Britain, causing one MP to note in the debate over repeal of the Stamp 
Act – which had been imposed on the colonies to pay for the Seven Years War – “the 
inhabitants of the colonies are as much represented in parliament as the greatest part of the 
people in England are, among nine millions of whom there are eight who have no voice in 
electing members of parliament: every objection therefore to the dependency of the 
colonies upon parliament, which arises on the ground of representation, goes to the whole 
present condition of Great Britain” (cited in Crick 2002, 44). 
The language of democracy was emerging through pamphleteering in the 13 
colonies to the south, but the prevailing belief was in a limited form of democracy.  The 
problem with elected legislatures was they invariably “yield to the impulse of sudden and 
violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious 
resolutions” (Federalist Paper 62 by Madison 1999, 347).  An appointed upper chamber 
was always accepted to be necessary.  So while the degree of local control over taxation 
may have been unsatisfactory to the British colonists in North America, this was consigned 
to the belief in representative government, itself inspired by the British slogan of ‘no 
taxation without representation’.  Thus the institutional design, being proposed by the 
British for their new colony of Quebec, was an accepted template that existed in the 13 
colonies to the south, and which was popular among many of them. 
More detailed instructions were issued to Governor Murray, setting the size of the 
council at eight, for which the governor could make the first interim appointments subject 
to confirmation by the king, and from that point on when a vacancy occurred the governor 
was to submit three names for the king to fill the vacancy, though should the council fall 
below seven then interim appointments could be made to bring it back up to seven, subject 
to royal confirmation (George R, December 7, 1763).  Councillors could be removed for 
cause, with the concurrence of the majority of the council and subject to the king accepting 
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the validity of the cause, or they could be removed if absent for more than six months 
without the governor’s permission or 12 months without the king’s.103  The establishment 
of protestant schools and churches and British law and courts was identified as the 
governor’s principle priority.  The size of the population was approaching 70,000, with 
almost 6,000 in Montreal and 9,000 in the town of Quebec (Census of Canada, 1765). 
The first three constitutional documents issued under the British for the formation of 
civil government were clearly designed to extinguish the French institutions of governance 
and replace them wholesale with the British colonial model.  For the French Canadians this 
would have been an entirely unfamiliar system.  At the time of the surrender of Canada to 
the British, there had only been a single chamber of governance with legislative, judicial 
and executive power.  This chamber had allowed the Roman Catholic Church to dominate 
both civil and religious life.  And the intendant enforcing civil law within the seigneurial 
system had created an efficient and inexpensive, though not always fair, local legal system.  
Authority was royal and absolute, though given legitimacy through an appointed body 
composed of the largest and most influential seigneurs.  Mid-level seigneurs managed day-
to-day life outside of the towns. 
These constitutional documents made provision for a delay in the establishment of a 
legislative assembly until permitted by “the state and circumstances” (Royal Proclamation) 
and “the situation and circumstances” (George R Commission to Murray, November 14, 
1763), and while it was to be done “as soon as the more pressing Affairs of Government 
will allow”, it was also acknowledged that “it may be impractical for the present to form 
such an Establishment” (item 12 of George R Instructions to Murray, December 7, 1763).  
This provided some flexibility for the governor in terms of the calling of an elected 
assembly. 
                                                 
103 As noted in the previous chapter, the provision for removing councillors who absented themselves was to 
correct a defect in the 13 colonies where quorum was sometimes not obtainable due to absentee landlords 
serving on council. 
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That the British, in law, saw representative institutions as being a settler’s right and, 
in institutional design, favoured their own institutions for their own citizens is undoubtedly 
true.  They were also revenue generating as they could levy local taxes to support public 
works.  The only reason to delay establishing such institutions from the British colonial 
office’s perspective was that there needed to be a sufficiently large population to tax and to 
provide capable politicians to run for office.104  But what we find in Quebec is not a supply 
side reluctance to establish assemblies without sufficient social capital for their proper 
functioning, but demand side resistance to institutions that were perceived as foreign to the 
social structures of the province, at least to the social side represented by the pre-conquest 
Francophone population. 
What occurred instead, therefore, was not the planned delay in establishing the 
prescribed British institutions but rather a rescinding of the governor’s instructions via an 
Act of the British parliament.    At the request of the French Canadian elites, The Quebec 
Act, 1774 overrode the governor’s instructions and, in the process, extinguished the royal 
prerogative to establish a constitution for the province, as it variously established a 
governor’s council, guaranteed French civil law and the right to the catholic religion in the 
process.  With no elected assembly, the governor’s council could not levy local taxes, so 
the British parliament also enacted The Quebec Revenue Act. 
Colonial scholars, informed by normative law and, undoubtedly, by their personal 
loyalty to the British-model and the principles upon which it was based, are quick to 
dismiss this institutional design as anything more than a temporary aberration.  As Madden 
(1987, xxxi) writes: “These radical departures should not be construed in terms of either 
religious or ethnic liberalism.  They were seen as temporary (until an influx of settlers 
eventually took place) and were designed primarily to mollify a hostile population whose 
continued attachment to France would be a serious danger if the French were to invade 
Quebec during the next predictable Anglo-French war”.   
                                                 
104 Certainly Guy Carleton, in his despatches to London frequently expresses concern about the level of civic 
awareness among the French and, later, about the number of British settlers in Upper Canada that might be 
required to sustain the level of discourse needed for an elected assembly. 
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When one looks at the lobbying exercise that took place, a different picture 
emerges.  This is not a simple attempt to mollify a hostile population.  This was a 
conquered and subservient population that readily accepted its transfer from one king to 
another, with most of the residents living a subsistence agrarian existence within a feudal 
system of land tenure.  The local militia had proved inconsequential and with the 
withdrawal of French regulars the population had no illusion that, with the French crown 
having no interest whatsoever in their survival, the British crown had the military capacity 
to enforce its will on the populous.  Nevertheless, the elites among the French Canadians 
immediately began to petition for the continuation of their familiar institutions of 
governance, first with the governor and then with London.  The new British merchant class 
responded by demanding the implementation of the new constitutional structure and 
equally lobbied London, at the government, through the Board of Trade and Plantations, 
before parliament and at the feet of the throne. 
On the face of it, the merchant class had more resources, which they were able to 
use to get Governor Murray recalled when he failed to act on his instructions and remove 
the existing French institutions and replace them with the British-model.  For their part, the 
French had no strong support within parliament, the new British design had already 
received government support and they had powerful opposition in the Church of England 
(which sits in the British house of lords) and the Board of Trade and Plantations (which 
was sensitive to the prejudices of its North American settlers in places like puritan 
Massachusetts), and in the British people who had been at war with France for years. 
The despatches between those concerned with colonial affairs in London and the 
elites in Quebec were numerous and frenzied.  There were even hybrid positions 
considered, such as: an assembly of 27 persons elected by both catholics and protestants in 
the 6 districts and towns of the time (Board of Trade to the P.C., July 10, 1768), a new civil 
law system which would have elements from both French and English property law 
(Solicitor General of Quebec, December 6, 1772), and the use of the king’s authority to 
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appoint bishops and priests to bring the Quebec Catholic Church within the fold of the 
Church of England (Despatch from Dalhousie to Cramahé, December 1, 1773). 
With all the suggestions for compromise, it is interesting that only the two absolutes 
were given any serious consideration at the British cabinet level and in parliament.  At the 
local level, no compromise was acceptable to either the French Canadians or British 
merchants in Quebec, and neither accepted the other’s position.  It would seem that 
institutional design in the face of social division is not naturally amenable to compromise. 
The choice for the British government and parliament came down to the model with 
which the British settlers were familiar, which had already been adopted by the British 
crown for the new colony, or a reinstatement of the institutions of governance with which 
the French Canadians were most familiar.  The French Canadians had already won the 
support of the British governors.  All three of the first governors made a case on behalf of 
the French for maintaining the status quo.  What is more, each governor in turn defied their 
royal instructions and refused to alter the institutions or the laws of Quebec, writing 
regularly to argue the need for their instructions to be rescinded so that civil law could be 
continued, the seigneurial system maintained, and local dispensation of justice returned to 
an efficient and inexpensive form that had been enjoyed under the French regime.105 
One of the first victories for the Canadians was the result of a despatch to the 
colonial secretary in 1767 from Governor Carleton, who pointed out that his instructions to 
established crown lands and a system of freehold land grants are incompatible with the 
existing feudal titles.  The feudal titles themselves, in the absence of French civil law, were 
in all likelihood invalid, meaning no one had a legal right to the property they were on, and 
their current and long-established obligations, from habitant to seigneur and from seigneur 
to the crown, were in doubt.  While he noted that the Canadians were, as yet, unaware of 
this situation, he predicted that once it became public knowledge the result would be 
turmoil as people tried to transfer title, settle monetary obligations and even challenge 
                                                 
105 Among other things, this meant no juries. 
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inherited property (Despatch from Carleton to Shelbourne, December 24, 1767).106  He also 
pointed out that the new system would be more expensive for the habitants who had 
enjoyed a relatively inexpensive legal system under the French since they could have 
disputes settled by the local seigneur under the direct oversight of the intendant (who would 
directly deal with appeals), a change that would also irritate the local population.  In 1771, 
Carleton was given new royal instructions that rescinded his earlier ones, and allowed for 
the continuation of the feudal land granting system that had been established under the 
French (George R, July 2, 1771). 
Carleton went to London to help pave the way for The Quebec Act, which in the 
words of parliamentarian, constitutional scholar and philosopher Edmund Burke, was 
simply the continuation of the French colonial government that had existed prior to the 
conquest, and with its laws and institutions the same, the only difference being the 
substitution of King George III for King Louis XV (U.K. Commons Debates, May 31, 
1774).107 
Legislative Council of Quebec (1774-1791) 
The Quebec Act, 1774 shelved the idea of an assembly and the governor’s council,  
In its stead, a ‘Council for the Affairs of the Province of Quebec’ was established and 
authorized to “make Ordinances for the Peace, Welfare, and good Government, of the said 
Province, with the Consent of his Majesty’s Governor, or, in his absence, of the Lieutenant 
Governor, or Commander in Chief for the Time Being” (Article XII), though it could issue 
no ordinances with respect to religion and it could only levy taxes to build public roads and 
buildings.  Where a typical British governor’s council had the authority over ordinances 
                                                 
106 Carleton noted that the French Canadians are a very litigious people.  It is noteworthy that Tocqueville 
(2000) made the exact same observation about the Americans.  While each were making comparative cultural 
observations, the fact that these seem to run counter cultural, it is likely that what they were observing was an 
artifact of the new world, where land was readily available and thus property disputes more widespread. 
107 For an interesting discussion of Burke’s views on the conquest, beginning with the debate over the Quebec 
Act, and how it fit into his philosophical ideas, see Bourke (2007).  It is his conclusion that when one looks 
specifically at his views on conquest, Burke was less influenced by Montesquieu than previously thought.  
This, in turn, casts doubt on ‘Burkian conservatism’. 
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placed in the hands of the governor with the council given the role to advise and consent, 
this council would now approve ordinances and the governor would advise and consent.  
This was a council much more in line with the earlier sovereign council the French 
Canadians had enjoyed. 
The size of the new legislative council was increased to not more than 23 and not 
less than 17, with councillors taking a new non-denominational oath so that catholics and 
protestants could equally serve on the council.108  The Act provided that a board of no less 
than five councillors would have the authority to transact executive business, but that the 
larger council would be needed to enact ordinances.  Governor Carleton mistakenly took 
this to be a licence to create a smaller executive or cabinet, something the chief justice 
objected to, and Carleton’s successor Frederick Haldimand continued the practice until 
ordered to cease and desist by the British government.  What had been intended by The 
Quebec Act was merely a provision for lower quorum in the council to deal with the day-to-
day administrative business of governing a colony.  This confusion was remedied by way 
of a reprimand to the governor. 
The Custom of Paris, as modified by the edicts and amendments of the governors 
and intendants of New France, and interpreted by French legal authorities up until the time 
of the conquest, was fully restored as the basis for civil law, though the governor-in-council 
was given authority to alter this law, including with respect to trade and commerce.  The 
authority of the Vatican over local bishops and priests was outlawed and their appointment 
was, in theory, to be done under licence from the governor, though in practice the Roman 
Catholic Church returned to the system that existed prior to the conquest with minimal 
interference from the local or British government.  And the boundary of Quebec was 
                                                 
108 “I _____ do sincerely promise and swear, That I will be faithful, and bear true Allegiance to his Majesty 
King George, and him will defend to the utmost of my Power, against all traitorous Conspiracies, and 
Attempts whatsoever, which shall be made against his Person, Crown. and Dignity; and I will do my utmost 
Endeavor to disclose and make known to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, all Treasons, and traitorous 
Conspiracies, and Attempts, which I shall know to be against him, or any of them; and all this I do swear 
without any Equivocation, mental Evasion, or secret Reservation, and renouncing all Pardons and 
Dispensations from any Power or Person whomsoever to the contrary. So help me GOD.” (Quebec Act, 1774, 
article VII). 
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expanded so it was more in keeping with the earlier boundaries of the French province of 
Canada. 
While the seigneurie system had been restored by instruction and ordinance, The 
Quebec Act guaranteed the seigneurs’ position in the community, and allowed them to 
continue to collect rents and act as judges in local disputes.  A legislative assembly would 
have facilitated the periodic levying of local taxes and the establishment of civil lists.  This 
system required Britain to manage taxation, again replicating the formula of colonial 
micromanagement by the imperial crown that existed during the French regime.  As the 
French system of seigneurie rents provided an ongoing financial income to the colonial 
government, this made the lack of assembly more manageable.   
Table 4.1 Governing the Province of Quebec 
King Governor Council 
King George 
III of Great 
Britain 
(1660-1820) 
James 
Murray* 1764-1768 
Guy Carleton 1769-1778 
Frederick 
Haldimand 1778-1786 
Guy Carleton, 
Baron of 
Dorchester 
1786-1791 
 
Governor’s Council (1764): Chief Justice Hector 
Theophilus de Cramahé, Thomas Dunn, William 
Gregory, Samuel Johannes Holland, Paulus Aemilius 
Irving, Adam Mabane, François Mounier and Walter 
Murray. 
Legislative Council (1775): Lieutenant Governor 
Hector Thephilus de Cramahé, Walter Allsopp, 
Charles-Régis des Bregères de Rigauville, George 
Pécaudy de Contrecoeur, Gaspard-Joseph 
Chaussegros de Léry, John Collins, James Cuthbert, 
Colin Drummond, Thomas Dunn, Hugh Finlay, John 
Fraser, Conrad Gugy, Edward Harrison, Alexander 
Johnstone, Francis Lesvesque, Adam Mabane, 
François-Marie Picoté de Belestre, Paul-Roch de 
Saint-Ours, La Courne Saint-Luc, Charles-François 
Tarieu de La Naudière. 
 
* James Amherst was military governor of Quebec from 1760-1763, whereupon James Murray became military governor in advance of 
civil government. 
The domination of seigneurs on the council following its redesign with The Quebec 
Act, ensured that body would provide legislative protection for feudal property and civil 
law interests, even though French Canadian membership was not in majority (see Table 
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5.1).109  This further brought the council into line with the familiar sovereign council of 
New France, in terms of it being a body which could formalize and convey ordinances to 
the people.  For the time being anyway, the Canadiens had been successful in getting the 
system of government they were most familiar with re-established. 
One final point should be made about The Quebec Act.  Historians and 
constitutional scholars have, to a person, suggested that Guy Carleton’s strong support for a 
continuation of institutions of which the French were familiar, along with protection for the 
civil law, seigneurial system and catholic faith, was tied to a belief that such generosity and 
the resultant elite accommodation through the clergy and seigneurs would get French 
Canadians to take up arms on behalf of the British in future conflicts.  This cannot be 
disproven.  Carleton’s despatches contain frequent reference to this possibility in making 
his case to London.  Equally, the petitions from the French Canadians themselves contain 
such arguments.110  This could simply be strategic positioning on the part of both.  But 
either way, it in no way diminishes the fact that the governor and British government were 
responsive to an ‘out’ social group when they were under no legal obligation to 
accommodate their demands, particularly when such a change could cause problems in 
other colonies by way of a precedent.  In fact, The Quebec Act is one of the ‘intolerable 
acts’ referred to in the Declaration of Independence, which launched the American 
Revolution. 
Historians and constitutional scholars also read a great deal into the distain that 
Carleton had for the new English merchants who arrived with British rule in the colony.  
The contempt he held for them is evident in his correspondence.  But merchants had long 
                                                 
109 As Table 5.1 also illustrates, the persons appointed to the first legislative council had at its core many of 
the influential members of the British governor’s council.  While these persons were predominantly English, 
they had become propertied and affluent seigneurs, so their re-appointment was in keeping with the French 
template for feudal legislative government. 
110 Attached to a petition from December 1773, elite French Canadiens wrote in a detailed memo concerning 
their laws, religion and institutions of governance: “Nous demandons avec ardeur la participation aux emplois 
civils et militaires l’idée d’une exclusion nous effraye.  Nous avons prêté à l’auguste famille d’Hanovre le 
serment de fidélité le plus solennel : et depuis la conquête nous nous sommes comportés en fidèles sujets.  
Enfin nôtre attachement nous feront toujours sacrifier nos jours pour la gloire de nôtre zèle et nôtre souverain 
et la sûreté de l’état” (Mémorial of Father Simonnet, etc., attached to Petition of December, 1773). 
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been held in contempt by the upper class.  Going back to Roman times, the possession of 
property was a sign of rank, but being seen to earn money from commercial enterprise was 
looked down upon (Senators were prevented by law from owning businesses).  The middle 
ages saw the church place prohibitions on what it considered disdainful money oriented 
practices, making the lending of money illegal for christians.  In Britain of this era, 
mercantile policies had been aimed at generating staples for Britain, which could only be 
shipped to ports in England so as to prevent a local merchant class emerging that might 
move a colony towards self-sufficiency.111  And of course, the nature of war on the high 
seas and in undeveloped territory allowed for the blurring of lines between merchant and 
privateer, as the confiscation of another country’s commercial ships and merchandise was a 
state-sanctioned practice.  Thus, Carleton’s disrespect for merchants should not be seen as 
his preference for one social group, the French, over the English, as is stated by a surprising 
number of scholars.  Britain was a county for which he had risked his life in battle, in 
whose name he governed, contained the cultural group with which he self-identified and in 
whose ranks of nobility he would soon find himself a member in reward for his service.  
Any contempt for ‘merchants’, English or otherwise, was merely a reflection of the 
prejudice of his time, and times were changing with Adam Smith setting England on a path 
toward free trade and capitalism, as it got set to enter the industrial era.112 
We must conclude, therefore, that the desire to get an ‘out’ social group to 
participate in society, which in the 17th century meant picking up arms as a militia and in 
the 20th century meant willingly paying taxes, is an explanatory variable for how a social 
cleavage can influence institutional change.  Another explanation lies in a sense of moral 
obligation, something that subsequent debates in the British parliament would tend to 
support, as would the normative arguments that were emerging in British law about the 
                                                 
111 The desire to move in this direction is at the centre of the American independence movement, of which 
The Quebec Act was an additional irritant both in terms of its recognition of the catholic faith and in its 
redrawing boundaries so as to prevent American western expansion. 
112 It is interesting to contrast the prejudices of this time with the modern era, where the conflation of 
capitalism and democracy has made hereditary privilege the object of scorn and merchant success the most 
accepted barometer of personal success and socio-economic standing. 
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need for representation when it comes to such things as taxation.  The outcome in either 
instance is that the strong cleavage in this society was able to create a restraint on those 
who took over the government, even in a society and era where the consent of the governed 
through democratic election was not required.113 
III. Resisting Popular Ideas for Institutional Design 
The third period is where we see the struggle between normative ideas about 
governance in the face of resistance to those ideas by competing social groups.  In each 
province of Upper and Lower Canada, minority social groups advanced ideas for 
institutional change, including an elected upper chamber and responsible government.  The 
lower chamber came to reflect the majority in each province which was in each case the out 
social group, while the upper chamber represented the ‘in’ social group.  Frustrated by their 
inability to make institutional changes the ‘out’ social groups in both provinces would 
unsuccessfully attempt revolution.  This was a period where the social cleavage and the 
partisan cleavage were aligned.  As will be seen in the next chapter, it would take a shift in 
both cleavages and the emergence of a political party with leading members from each side 
of the social cleavage to obtain the institutional changes of responsible government and an 
elected upper chamber.  
The American Revolution, which ended with The Paris Peace Treaty, 1783, 
resulted in large-scale migration from the south.  The decision to grant representative 
institutions to Quebec was only partially tied to the influx of new Anglo-white settlers and 
must also be seen as being financially desirable to the British government, since these 
representative institutions could levy taxes in these provinces to support local governance 
and the rapid expansion of public works projects which would be necessary to 
                                                 
113 One might posit that the degree of restraint posed by a cleavage in a totalitarian regime would be less than 
in a democratic regime, even in relation to their colonial possession, as the democratic process might instill a 
sense of moral obligation.  Yet, totalitarian regimes that have had large social cleavages in the modern era 
(e.g. the U.S.S.R. or Iran) also appear more intransigent when it comes to any sort of change - institutional, 
economic or cultural - than those where the population is more homogenous (e.g. China), something that 
might suggest further approaches to inquiry and testing of this hypothesis. 
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accommodate the new settlers, something that the Council for the Affairs of the Province of 
Quebec could not accomplish.  Second, the transition to this form of government was an 
artefact of the creation of two provinces in order to sever the province along what was seen 
as its social cleavage.  Third, the influx of loyalists put a strain on The Quebec Act in terms 
of the system of land grants and civil law.  The seigneurial system, so much the fabric of 
the French Canadian colony, was not well suited for the rapid re-settlement of so many 
loyalists and was not a system of law that this burgeoning population, being settled in the 
West of the province, had even a passing acquaintance. 
Guy Carleton had been appointed commander-in-chief of British Forces in North 
America in 1782 and elevated to the peerage as Baron Dorchester in 1786.  He now found 
himself responsible for the settlement of loyalists at the end of the War of Independence 
and, to that end, he was appointed ‘captain-general and governor-in-chief of Quebec, of 
Nova Scotia and of New Brunswick, and its dependent territories, and Vice Admiral of the 
same’, as well as ‘General and Commander in Chief of all of His Majesty’s Forces in said 
colonies, and the Island of Newfoundland’.  Dorchester’s instructions in his capacity as 
governor-in-chief of Quebec laid out the specific grants to be given to families in that 
province at 100 acres for the head of family plus 50 for every other person, single men 
would get 50 acres, field officers 5,000 acres, captains 3,000 acres, 2,000 to subalterns, 
non-commissioned officers 200 acres and privates 50 acres (George R, August 23, 1786).  
 Pressure to repeal The Quebec Act had continued to be brought to bear in London 
from merchants and traders in the province, mostly non-stop since its passage.  With the 
influx of loyalist settlers there was an expectation among the existing merchant class in 
Quebec that they would soon be entitled to all the things that had been denied to them 
under The Quebec Act, including an assembly, trial by jury, common law for property and 
civil matters, construction of protestant (specifically Anglican) churches and schools, and 
the system of free and common soccage for land ownership. 
Nova Scotia had been divided in 1784 to accommodate the influx of loyalist settlers, 
and the idea of dividing Quebec was now appearing in petitions from the new loyalist 
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settlers of western Quebec, who also were petitioning for all that was their right as loyal 
British subjects – all of which had been automatically granted to loyalists who had settled 
in the newly-created province of New Brunswick.  The merchants lost no time in increasing 
pressure on London, dissatisfied as they had been for years under The Quebec Act. 
For his part, Lord Dorchester requested that the king once against change his 
instructions with respect to land grants in the province of Quebec, this time from the feudal 
tenure system that he had convinced the British government to allow, to a system of “free 
and common soccage, unencumbered with any crown rent whatever” (Despatch from 
Dorchester to Sydney, June 13, 1787).  With regards to new settlement, he recommended 
that no more than 1,000 acres should be held by any one person and floated the idea that 
30,000 acres should be set aside in each township so that in the future grants of 5,000 acres 
could be made to create an aristocracy. 
Dorchester’s desire was to prevent land speculation and absentee landlords on the 
one hand and to create a landed aristocracy who would take an interest in the development 
of the province on the other.  This idea of aristocracy was not, as suggested by many 
constitutional scholars who interpret the Canadian-British correspondence through the lens 
of U.K. governance, an attempt to replicate the Westminster model of nobility and 
commoners in the English half of the colony.  It was rather a desire on Dorchester’s part to 
keep the entire province as close to the French-model as possible.  Dorchester even notes 
that his reason in recommending any change was out of necessity for repaid land grants and 
settlement and not out of any agreement with the petitions from the British settlers and 
merchants.  He notes that he would have recommended applying the seigneurial system to 
the West of the province, but it was not conducive to relocation of a large number of 
settlers quickly and at a great distance from the seat of government in Quebec City.114 
                                                 
114 In what would become Ontario, the land had to be obtained through negotiation with the Algonkian 
Mississauga (Hayes 2002).  This surrender of land was done using the lakes and rivers.  At each tributary 
river,  town sites could then be established at the mouth and agricultural land created by settlers, deforesting 
the surrounding area.  Food could be provided by the government for the settlers at these small new towns 
while they cleared the land. 
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The British government requested a refresher course on what exactly the French 
Canadians objected to with respect to a house of assembly and common law legal system.  
The question appears rhetorical.  The British despatch has such a comprehensive 
explanation of the issues and shows such insight into how social divisions were impacting 
on the current, and would likely impact on the proposed, British institutions, that it is worth 
quoting at length: 
“In particular, They wish to be informed from what Causes the objection of 
the old Canadian Subjects to an House of Assembly chiefly arises: Whether, 
from its being foreign to the Habits and Notions of Government in which 
they have been educated, or, from an apprehension that it would be so 
formed as to give an additional Weight to the New Subjects, and lead to the 
introduction of Parts of the English Law which are obnoxious to them; or 
from an idea that being invested with a Power of Taxation, it would 
eventually subject their Property to Burdens from which they are at present 
exempted; In like manner, whether the Objections which appear to exist to a 
farther Introduction of Trial by Jury, arise either from Prejudices against the 
Nature and Mode of such a decision, or from the difficulty of finding Jurors 
properly qualified, and the species of Trial being necessarily could with 
Modes of Proof and Rules of Law, different from those to which they are 
accustomed” (Despatch from Sydney to Dorchester, September 3, 1788). 
The colonial secretary also makes it clear that the government was already considering 
dividing the province in two, given the settlement of most of the loyalists into the 
westernmost part (ibid.). 
Dorchester opposed the idea.  He believed the French Canadians did not want an 
assembly or any change to its laws.  As for the new loyalist settlements, they were not 
sufficiently developed to support its own provincial infrastructure, though he supported the 
appointing of a separate lieutenant governor for the four districts he had created in the west 
and suggested that perhaps an assembly could be created just for this western part of the 
province with respect to local matters (Despatch from Dorchester to Sydney, November 8, 
1788).   
The French merchants in Lower Canada, however, had formed an alliance with the 
English merchants in support of the division of the province (Sturgis 2004).  This 
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buttressed the case that the English merchants had been making before the Board of Trade, 
and undermined the claim of a common French position in support of the status quo.  
Presumably Dorchester knew he was beat because, included with his arguments against 
division, he offered the imperial government a suggestion on how to divide the province if 
it so wished (Despatch from Dorchester to Sydney, November 8, 1788). 
A draft Bill was sent to Dorchester for his input, stating unequivocally that there 
would be two provinces under the king, who would each have a governor, a lieutenant 
governor, an executive council, a legislative council and a house of assembly.  The thinking 
in separating the legislative and executive councils was to give the members of the 
legislative council “a right to hold their Seats during life” (Despatch from Grenville to 
Dorchester, October 20, 1789).  The government had also decided to create a local 
aristocracy, where those called to the legislative council would be given a mark of honour, 
such as a provincial ‘Baronetage’ (though higher titles might be contemplated in the 
future), either to be held for life or made hereditary.  Lord Grenville wrote: 
“The Object of these regulations is both to give the Upper branch of the 
Legislature a greater degree of weight and consequence than was 
possessed by the Councils in the Old Colonial Governments, and to 
establish in the Provinces a Body of Men having that motive of attachment 
to the existing form of Government, which arises from the possession of 
personal or hereditary distinction” (ibid.) 
Choosing the right persons for such an honour would be key Grenville noted. 
The response of Dorchester was that while “many advantages might result from an 
hereditary Legislative Council, distinguished by some mark of honour, did the condition of 
the country concur in supporting this dignity; but the fluctuating state of Property in these 
Provinces would expose all hereditary honours to fall into disregard; for the present 
therefore it would seem more advisable to appoint the members for life, good behaviour 
and residence in the province” (Despatch from Dorchester to Grenville, February 8, 1790).  
Dorchester recommended a council of not less than seven for Upper Canada (later Ontario) 
and fifteen for Lower Canada (later Quebec), with the number to increase as the wealth and 
population might warrant. 
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So how was an alliance of French and English merchants able to overcome the 
resistance offered by the aristocratic French elite in Quebec to split the province and 
achieve institutional change?  French elite representatives served on the governor’s council 
and clearly had the governor on their side.  But colonial elites had two direct access points 
into the British government: The British cabinet, which is in law a committee of the 
imperial privy council; and the Board of Trade and Plantations which was also a committee 
of the imperial privy council.  The partisan cleavage briefly became unaligned from the 
social cleavage as a divide between elites who wanted union and those who opposed 
institutional change.  Each had representation in the British privy council.  While the 
American Revolution increased the demand for institutional change, the fact that the 
partisan group of merchants wanting change included both French and English elites made 
their case easier to make. 
Legislative Councils of Upper and of Lower Canada (1791-1840) 
The period following the division of the province into two was an era where certain 
ideas about democracy, rights and liberties were gaining momentum in both the English-
speaking and French-speaking worlds, not the least of which was a belief in the right to 
representative government and the right to no taxation without the concurrence of the 
people’s representatives.  While this principle had been denied on the face of it by the 
British government in response to demands by the 13 American colonies, this was not due 
to a uniform rejection of the principle, as the local assemblies had the capacity to consider 
the financing of local public works.115  And in British law, the year of passage of The 
Quebec Act was the same year that Campbell v. Hall was decided.116  Most recently, the 
                                                 
115 The levying of fees in support of British mercantile practices, to ensure that staples travelled to England 
and that British merchandise had the advantage in the colony, was imperial policy and thus outside the 
purview of the local legislature.  And, of course, the additional taxation imposed by the British on the colonies 
to pay for the Seven Years War, including the conquest of Quebec, took an existing irritant to an intolerable 
level.  Yet the principle of representation being tied to taxation did exist in British colonies in North America 
even before the War of Independence. 
116 While this ruling did not apply to Quebec, in that the governors of the province of Quebec had resisted 
establishing such institutions when instructed to do so, they had not been irreversibly granted institutions (the 
French Canadian representatives having rejected these institutional changes); and nothing in British law could 
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American Revolution had been a fight about self-administration and self-determination and 
its experiment in democracy and institutional design had informed the French revolution, 
which, while still not fully resolved at this time, had also been about the right to participate 
not just in decisions for the raising of taxation but in its allocation and spending, and on the 
question of liberty and freedom from the very regime that had given birth to Quebec. 
These ideas had not entirely manifested themselves in Canadian politics, but the 
separating of Quebec into two provinces was an attempt on the part of the British cabinet to 
solve what they saw as the largest challenge facing the provinces, and that is a ‘racial’ 
division (no longer just a religious division) and the challenges this presented for the 
creation and management of institutions of governance.117  The solution was to essentially 
cleave the province down the deepening fault line, as the British government saw it, leaving 
each social group with its own half to develop as it saw fit.  This is how Prime Minister 
William Pitt explained the change when he introduced the legislation in the imperial 
parliament (Britain Debates, HC, March 4, 1791). 
The Constitutional Act, 1791 does not itself split the province; rather it assumes that 
such a division will take place, as there were a number of boundary issues still to be 
resolved between the two provinces, and between each province and their neighbours, the 
United States and New Brunswick.  The section of The Quebec Act relating to a council 
was repealed and legislative authority was vested in the governor (or in his absence the 
lieutenant-governor), acting by and with the advice and consent of the legislative council 
and a house of assembly in each of the two provinces, the full British bicameral colonial 
government formulation. 
                                                                                                                                                    
stop the British parliament from taking away a right given the common law principle of parliamentary 
supremacy.  Nevertheless, the decision reflects the growing influence of these ideas about rights, freedoms 
and democracy. 
117 This change to seeing the French-English divide along racial lines, instead of along religious or some other 
fault line like rural-urban or merchant-agrarian (fault lines that had pre-existed the time of conquest) is 
reflective not just of the impact conquest had on group identity, but growing national identities that statehood 
and war was fueling around the world. 
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Seven councillors for the legislative council of Upper Canada and 15 councillors for 
the legislative council of Lower Canada were to be summoned under the great seal of each 
province, though additional members could be added by royal direction.  Councillors had to 
be 21 years of age, natural-born or naturalized British subjects and appointment was for 
life.  Permission was given to create provincial nobility whose members could demand a 
writ of summons to the legislative council.118  The governor appointed and could remove 
the speaker. 
The king would authorize the governor to call, prorogue and dissolve the house of 
assembly and to divide the province into electoral districts.  The minimum number of 
members was 16 in Upper Canada (Ontario) and 50 in Lower Canada (Quebec).  These 
relative differences reflected the disparities in population at the time.  Bills passed by both 
chambers – the legislative council and the house of assembly – could be assented to by the 
governor, or reserved by him and sent to London for approval or disallowed by the British 
government directly inside of two years. 
The guarantees of The Quebec Act with respect to the Roman Catholic religion were 
confirmed; and tithes from protestants for the support of the protestant clergy was 
continued; but a new provision was added where the governor would take one seventh of 
the crown land granted and set it aside for the protestant clergy.119  For Upper Canada, civil 
law was to be replaced by British common law by the following year (An Act Introducing 
English Civil Law into Upper Canada), and trial by jury was established (An Act 
Establishing Trial by Jury in Upper Canada). 
The British had intended that the legislative and executive councils should be 
separate persons, as had been made clear in the despatch from Grenville to Dorchester.  Yet 
                                                 
118 No nobility was created at the outset, and developments in the provinces would render the entire apparatus 
moot, when the British government was forced to temporarily suspend the local government in response to 
rebellion.  Lord Dorchester had, on November 9, 1789, created by order-in-council a mark of honour for 
Loyalists and their descendants, so the post nominal ‘U.E.’ (Unity of Empire) or U.E.L. (United Empire 
Loyalist) remains the only hereditary honour in Canada. 
119 Royal direction to the governor and the executive council was that parsonages or rectories should be 
established for the Church of England out of these clergy reserves, as required by the new settlement in each 
province. 
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in both provinces the legislative and executive councils came to be dominated by the same 
people, ensuring patronage for their friends and placing them at loggerheads with the 
assembly.  The people who came to dominate these bodies became known famously as the 
‘Family Compact’ in Upper Canada, and the ‘Château Clique’ in Lower Canada.120  
The despatches from the governors of Lower Canada from this period increasingly 
show a divide between English and French, manifesting itself in constant conflict between 
the lower house and upper house.  Governor Robert Shore Milnes (1800) reports on the 
debates among the French in the lower chamber as having led to a decline in seigneurial 
authority, the increasing independence of the Roman Catholic Church from the government 
and the decline in aristocratic influence of the legislative council.  Governor James Henry 
Craig (1807) reports the formation of a political party of Canadiens, led by doctors, lawyers 
and journalists, in opposition to the executive and legislative councils which were still 
supported by the merchants and English settlers.  The British government’s ill-conceived 
solution to the reported increase in ‘racial’ tension that was pitting a predominantly French 
lower chamber against a predominantly English upper chamber was to suggest the governor 
keep using the power of prorogation and dissolution to try to bring the lower chamber into 
line (Despatch from Jenkinson to Craig, September 12, 1810). 
In Upper Canada, a social cleavage over religion was coming to the fore.  The 
lieutenant governor, beginning with John Graves Simcoe, and the members of the 
legislative council, among whom Bishop John Strachan would emerge as the most powerful 
figure, had placed their Anglican faith front and centre of the province’s development plan.  
While the clergy reserves had not been specifically designated for the Church of England, 
they were not shared with the Methodists, Quakers and Mennonites who formed a large 
portion of the growing population.   
There are strong, but different, social cleavages in both of these provinces; there is 
also the emergence of political parties.  Membership in these political parties was not 
                                                 
120 For an exploration of these relationships see Wallace (1915), Earl (1967), Craig (1963), Ouellet (1980), 
Raible (1992) and Buchner (1985). 
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strictly bound by social group, though in the reports of the governors to London they are 
frequently referred to by linguistic or cultural identity of the majority or of its principle 
leaders.  There are frequent references to a ‘French Party’ coming to dominate the assembly 
in Lower Canada, for example.  In Upper Canada, the ‘family compact’ began to refer to its 
critics as the ‘Scotch faction’, claimed they were marching under an ‘Irish rebel flag’ and 
derided the disloyal as ‘Yankees’.  Social identity was coming to dominate partisan politics. 
From these ‘out’ social groups, which were more populous in each province than 
the ‘in’ group, demands were emerging that the governor and the executive council should 
be accountable to the majority in the lower chamber.  The British government was 
convinced as a matter of law, based on the widespread belief in the Austinean-Dicean 
doctrine of British parliamentary supremacy that this was impossible.  In 1810, the colonial 
secretary again rejected the idea as impossible for Lower Canada (Despatch from Liverpool 
to Craig, September 12, 1810).   
In 1822, the English Merchants’ Party in the assembly of Lower Canada submitted a 
proposal directly to the British government that the two provinces be united to further 
economic development.  These merchants in Montreal had responded to a growing market 
for wheat in India and then in Europe.  Banking, shipping and trade made Lower Canada, 
or at least Montreal, key ports of departure for commerce coming from Upper Canada. 
  In response, the British Government introduced “A Bill for the Uniting of the 
Legislatures of Lower and Upper Canada” (U.K. Journals, Commons, July 30, 1822).  This 
was the last sitting day before the end of the session, so the seriousness of the British 
government’s move must be questioned.  Also, the majority in the British house of 
commons voted to table it for three months, thereby killing the legislation (ibid., July 31, 
1822).  But the effect in Lower Canada was great, where it further polarized the legislature 
along what members of both chambers increasingly refer to in their debates as between 
‘races’. 
In 1828, a petition against union signed by 87,000 people in Quebec was taken to 
London.  The house of assembly in Upper Canada equally sent its list of grievances with its 
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upper chamber and executive council.  The first of a long series of committees of the 
British house of commons was struck to look into the problems in governing the Canadas.  
The agent hired by Lower Canada to deliver their petition, John Neilson, was asked by the 
committee what could improve the legislative council and he replied that appointing 
individuals who were not members of the executive, which he had no confidence would be 
done by the governors using the royal prerogative, or making the body elected.  The 
committee concluded that the constitution had not been properly administered in either of 
the Canadas, placing the blame on the members of both legislative chambers and the 
governors, though it made several specific recommendations such as the removal from the 
legislative council of all judges except for the chief judge (ibid., July 18, 1828). 
The commons’ committee noted that the assemblies in each province had their own 
mechanisms to remedy grievances, such as the withholding of supply.  But the fact that the 
government had independent revenues allowed it to operate independently of the wishes of 
the majority in the lower chamber.  Included in the demand for institutional change coming 
from the assembly, therefore, was that crown revenues be placed under the control of the 
legislature and that the lower chamber be the lead chamber on all money matters.  In Upper 
Canada, a committee on grievances was established by the assembly each year to chronicle 
its on-going dispute with the upper chamber and with the executive council. 
In Lower Canada in 1831, what the upper chamber called “a violent and wreckless 
party in the lower house”, namely the Patriote party led by Louis-Joseph Papineau as 
speaker of the assembly, called for the abolition of the legislative council (Lower Canada 
Journals, LC, April 31, 1933).  In 1833, the assembly adopted an “address to the king” 
which proposed that a special ‘general assembly’ of delegates chosen across the province 
be convened and that this special assembly be empowered to decide upon replacing the 
legislative council with an elected chamber structured as follows: 
• Voters would be landowners who lived in the district for at least one year 
with a net annual income of £10 in the country or £20 in the city; 
• To be elected one would need to be a British subject, at least 30 years of age, 
have resided in the province for at least 15 years and own £100 of property 
in the country or £200 in the city; 
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• The council would not dissolve when an election was called for the lower 
chamber, but rather councillors would be elected for six year terms with one-
sixth elected every year; 
• The number of councillors would be equal to the counties, cities and 
divisions, such as boroughs, over 2,000 persons, so that the council would be 
half the size of the assembly (Lower Canada Journals, LA, March 20, 1933). 
The legislative council responded with its own address to the king calling for the 
constitution to be preserved and accusing the majority party in the assembly of being 
against the British constitution (Lower Canada Journals, LC, April 31, 1933). 
In 1834, the assembly adopted an address to the king asking that the constitution be 
changed so that members of the legislative council would not be permitted to sit in the 
executive council and vice versa, and for the removal of judges from both councils (Lower 
Canada Journals, LA, February 10, 1834).  That same year, the assembly in Lower Canada 
adopted Ninety-Two Resolutions, which called for a series of institutional changes (ibid., 
February 21, 1834).  Included in the list was a request that the upper chamber be made 
elected with a property qualification for electors and a property qualification to serve on the 
council (article 12).  While the 92 resolutions became symbolically significant for the 
Francophone population in the province, the actual request for institutional change was 
contained in a lengthy address to the king, and identical addresses to each chamber of the 
British parliament, which chronicled the divisions between the two chambers, highlighted 
the behaviour of certain English ministers and councillors and called for an elected upper 
chamber using both a property qualification to vote and a property qualification to serve 
(Lower Canada Journals, LA, March 1, 1834).  In response, the British government 
expressed its unwillingness to make institutional changes, though threatened that if the 
issue of granting money (supply) for the local government could not be resolved, it was 
prepared to introduce legislation in the British parliament to suspend the local legislature 
(Despatch from Rice to Aylmer, June 29, 1934). 
In Upper Canada, the assembly was being led by a Scot, William Lyon Mackenzie, 
and was equally fighting the upper chamber over supply for the operations of the executive 
branch.  He authored the Seventh Report on Grievances which called for the establishment 
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of responsible government (Upper Canada Journals, HA, 1835, appendix 21).  The 
assembly then adopted the report of the finance committee which detailed the money that 
was outside of the control of the legislature as well as a resolution calling for the placing of 
all revenues, and sources of revenue, including Crown and clergy reserves, under the 
control of the legislature and authorized forwarding the same to the British colonial 
secretary (Upper Canada Journals, LA, April 15, 1835).  Finally, it adopted an address to 
the king, outlining the fact that the legislative council and assembly were constantly at 
odds, that the executive council dominated the upper chamber and asked the king to remedy 
the situation, though did not suggest a preferred course of action (ibid.). 
In response to the demands coming from the two provinces, Lord John Russell 
introduced ten resolutions into the British house of commons.  While not an outright 
rejection of the elected principle, it states at item 4: “That in the existing state of Lower 
Canada, it is unadvisable to make the legislative council of that province an elective body; 
but that it is expedient that measures be adopted for securing to that branch of the 
Legislature a greater degree of public confidence” (U.K. Debates, HC, March 6, 1837). 
Lieutenant Governor Francis Bond Head had been told in his instructions that he 
was not accountable to the local legislature in Upper Canada, nor bound by local officials 
on the executive council, since a governor takes his direction from the colonial secretary, 
who is accountable to the imperial parliament (Despatch from Glenelg to Head, December 
5, 1835).  And Lord Russell put the point again before the British house of commons when 
he tabled his 10 resolutions to be sent to the Canadas as a response to their demands for 
institutional change: 
“That part of the constitution which requires that the Ministers of the Crown 
shall be responsible to Parliament, and shall be removable if they do not 
obtain the confidence of Parliament is a condition which can only exist in 
one place, namely, the seat of empire.  Otherwise we should have separate 
independent powers existing not only in Great Britain but in every separate 
colony” (U.K. Debates, HC, March 6, 1837). 
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Frustrated over Russell’s response, armed insurrection, led by Papineau in Lower Canada 
and Mackenzie in Upper Canada, occurred in each province, in succession, and were 
quickly put down.  These rebellions have been well studied.121 
The immediate result was the British parliament adopting An Act to make temporary 
provision for the Government of Lower Canada, which was proclaimed on November 1, 
1840.  This law did not suspend the Constitution Act, 1791 (as suggested by Kennedy 1922, 
115), but rather allowed for the governor to appoint a special council and, together with the 
special council, assume all the powers of the Legislature of Lower Canada.  Only the 
governor could propose laws, and laws passed by the special council would have the same 
effect as if they had been passed pursuant to the Constitution Act, 1791 by the house of 
assembly and legislative council and given assent.  Any laws so passed would not extend 
past November 1, 1842, unless continued by competent authority, nor could this body 
impose taxes or make constitutional changes.  Lord Durham would be sent as governor 
general for British North America to examine the problem, but in the meantime John 
Colbourne summoned 21 members to sit on the special council, of which 11 were French 
Canadians. 
The breakdown in the model used for both of these provinces, it has been argued, 
was the result of confusion over who controlled supply and the lack of accountability of the 
executive to the legislature (Kennedy 1930), and, in the alternative, that simply land 
speculation and graft destroyed the proper functioning of government in Upper Canada 
(Gagan 1978) and Lower Canada (Kennedy 1922, 91).  The actions of Louis-Joseph 
Papineau may have led his followers to a dizzy height of foolishness (Kinchen 1956; 
Ouellet 2000a) and William Lyon Mackenzie may have been too erratic to lead anyone 
(Dent 1885).122 
                                                 
121 For example, with respect to Upper Canada see Kilbourn (2008) and da Silva and Hind (2010); and for 
Lower Canada see Bernard (1983), Greer (1993), Schull (1996) and Filteau (2003); for an examination of the 
legality of the trials and sentences given to the rebels see Greenwood and Wright ; and for William Lyon 
MacKenzie’s own perspective see MacKenzie (2000). 
122 For a contemporary rebuttal of Dent, also drawing on the experiences of those present, see King (1886). 
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Yet when one steps away from the minutia and the personalities involved in these 
events, natural trends of institutional development in Britain and its colonies begin to 
emerge.  The breakdown in the model may, in fact, simply be a natural breakdown in the 
British monarchical model, and thus would inevitably have occurred in each of Canada’s 
provinces.  In England, the monarch had experienced a loss of influence in specific stages 
as follows: (i) The legislature came to object to being asked to levy some taxes without 
having a say in where and how the money was spent (this happened first with the nobility 
and then with the commoners, as they each in turn came to be taxed); (ii) and then the 
legislature began to object to the monarch having outside sources of revenue that made him 
less dependent on the legislature for supply.  In response, the monarch began (iii) to use the 
power of the purse to co-opt legislators, by offering them positions on the executive; (iv) 
used its prerogative for appointments and to build public works so as to dispense patronage 
and influence electoral and local politics directly and; (v) used the upper chamber and its 
own royal prerogatives to try to keep the lower chamber in check, (vi) resulting in the 
elected lower chamber, emboldened by the normative claim that it had a mandate from the 
people, objecting to the appointed upper chamber having an equal say with respect to 
money matters and to the composition of the executive council.  These had been the 
developments in mother England centuries before, and, as we have seen in this chapter, 
these were equally the developments in both of the provinces of Canada with respect to the 
governor, the governor’s council, then the legislative and executive councils. 
In England, the next developments were that (vii) the monarch began to appoint 
persons to the cabinet who could ensure passage through the lower chamber of ‘supply’ 
(i.e. a budget for government spending) and of a civic list (i.e. salaries for office holders).  
These ‘ministers’ of the crown (viii) came to be accountable to the legislature individually 
for their departments and then (ix) collectively for the actions of the executive.  With 
collective responsibility (x) the cabinet then demanded that its advice be followed without 
question.  It is these developments in terms of individual and collective ‘responsibility’ 
which led to the identification of a system of ‘responsible government’, which is the focus 
of the next chapter. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In formulating our hypothesis that institutional change will be restrained by social 
cleavages, it was believed that restraint operated through the institution itself.  Groups that 
had formal or informal representation within the institution would likely oppose change in 
the belief that any change in the way the institution was formed or composed might lessen 
their relative representation.  This was based on a very modern conception of 
representation. 
By going back to the early colonial governments and tracing the councils through 
their development, we see a different picture emerge.  Resistance to change is magnified by 
a social cleavage.  If ‘out’ social groups perceived that the advocacy for a change was 
coming from the ‘other’ social group, their resistance to change became absolute, even in 
situations where change would have likely been beneficial to their interest.  French 
Canadians opted for governors and appointed legislative councils over representative 
assemblies, and clung to their feudal systems of land ownership, initially because they were 
familiar, but, even after other models became understood, the continued attachment can 
only be attributed to a perceived connection between it and their social identity.  This 
resistance to change extends to a resistance to political ideas that have a temporal or 
normative popularity. 
Much of our understanding of how political movements and policy communities 
operate in modern times is tied to modern assumptions about representation and a belief 
that political pressure can be brought to bear through political institutions.  Even when 
political communities are seen to influence policy outcomes at the bureaucratic level, it is 
believed that the elites of these communities have been successful because of their capacity 
to represent larger communities of interests that might have an impact on the institutions of 
governance through the mechanism of election.  However, in the pre-democratic period of 
Canada, social groups were able to restrain change even when they did not have 
representation. 
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This would support our initial hypothesis that a divisive cleavage in a society will 
restrain institutional change.  In the case of Canada after the conquest, the British 
parliament had taken control of institutional design and had even made decisions to 
establish a governor’s council, elected legislative assembly and English common law, with 
the usual exclusion of catholics from the public sphere.  Yet it was resistance from the 
elites of the French social group that led to the maintenance of the status quo of a sovereign 
council and seigneurial system. 
When the cleavages aligned, the changes being advocated in each of the provinces 
were seen as coming not from a political party that had the confidence of the local citizens, 
but from a social group.  This is evident in the despatches to and from the governor and in 
the debates in the British house of commons.  This opposition is perhaps more significant 
than resistance coming within the province from the ‘in’ social group, as the changes being 
advocated would lessen that group’s hold on power.  The British government and 
parliament opposed the changes because they were seen to be demands from one side of the 
social cleavage. 
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Chapter 5: Effecting Institutional Change - The Province 
of Canada 
This chapter examines the period following the rebellions of 1838 in the two 
provinces of Canada, Upper and Lower, until 1856.  This was a period where institutional 
change occurred.  The provinces were united and a single bicameral legislature was created: 
with equal representation from the two halves; responsible government was obtained; and 
the upper chamber was made elected.  This all occurred in a relatively short period of time. 
Our hypothesis is that for institutional change to occur the partisan cleavage and the 
social cleavage would not be aligned.  In the previous period they had been seen to be 
aligned, except for the one period surrounding the division of the province in 1791.  For 
change to occur, it is expected that it would be driven by a partisan group that has, among 
its leadership, representatives of both sides of the social cleavage.  It is also expected that 
shifts in the social cleavage would precede change in a province where previous attempts to 
achieve change had been successfully resisted by social groups. 
Our methodology is the same as in the previous chapter.  The constitutional and 
institutional changes are process traced and then placed in a societal context to examine the 
social and partisan factors surrounding the proposed unsuccessful and successful changes.  
The first half of this chapter reports our analysis of the shifts in societal cleavages and 
group identity, first social and then partisan.  This allows us to place the current period of 
change in context with the previous period of resistance to change and to identify the shifts 
in cleavages and in social and partisan group identity.  The second half returns to a 
chronological reporting of institutional changes which were proposed and occurred in the 
united province of Canada, and the societal events surrounding these changes.  In each 
case, a partisan group that had leadership from both sides of the social cleavage, which in 
the new united province of Canada was a French-English cleavage, drove the institutional 
change. 
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I. Shifting Cleavages 
Our examination of societal cleavages in this section begins in advance of the union, 
so as to place the shifts in cleavage in context.  What we find during this period is a shift in 
group identity.  This begins with the elimination of the strong social cleavage in Upper 
Canada, which becomes subsumed by the French and English cleavage of Lower Canada, 
and ends with an emergence of a new ‘Canadian’ identity.  In terms of a partisan cleavage, 
as will be shown in the second section, we observe the emergence of partisan movements 
surrounding agitation for institutional change and then more organized political parties as 
vehicles for change.  This allows for the establishment of responsible government and then 
the introduction of elections for the upper chamber.   
Social Groups 
At the time of the British conquest, there had been divisions within New France that 
separated religious and civil society, merchant from fur trader, seigneurs from habitants, 
and urban from rural.  The conquest of Quebec by the British introduced an English 
merchant class to replace the French merchant class, as mercantilist trade policy required 
that goods be shipped to and from the imperial parent, and London thus replaced Paris as 
the centre of trade.  While by no means homogeneous, the ‘Canadiens’, as the French were 
known even before the conquest, and the British merchants and landed gentry co-existed in 
relative harmony for the first three decades of British rule, with a class division of wealth 
trumping any group identity based on ethno-religious-linguistic origin. 
The Constitution Act, 1791 had been enacted to separate the province of Quebec 
along the lines of what was emerging as a social cleavage, between the British Loyalist 
settlers who had been added mostly, but not exclusively, to the west of the province in the 
wake of the American Revolution, and the Canadiens in the east.  It had two seemingly 
contradictory unintended consequences with respect to group identity.  The first is that it 
facilitated the formation of multiple sub-group identities which reflected class, country of 
origin and religious divisions in each of the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada.  
The second is that it solidified the French-English cleavage for the residents of Lower 
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Canada, the very province it was intended to emancipate from this emotionally charged 
division. 
In Lower Canada, the French merchant class and English merchant class, which had 
briefly teamed up in support of the Constitution Act, 1791, had turned on each other after 
the provinces had been divided (Sturgis 2004).  There was an emerging Francophone 
middle class of lawyers, notaries, doctors and journalists, and the introduction of 
representative institutions gave this group a forum (Riendeau 2000, 112).  Leaders of these 
groups were aspiring to replace the seigneurs and the British merchants as the elites of 
Lower Canadian society.  This French Canadian political class were economic 
conservatives who defended traditional agriculture in the face of commercial expansion, but 
also political radicals, given their demands for greater provincial autonomy, the supremacy 
of the lower chamber over the executive branch and a flirtation with American-style 
republicanism (Paquet et Wallot 1988). 
The legislature, with an elected lower chamber and an appointed upper chamber, 
became a cauldron for social cleavage formation, as policy disagreements helped to 
transform a nascent political movement into a social identity.  This began with policy 
disagreements over the day-to-day issues of governance, like taxes and spending, and grew 
into more philosophical and constitutional disagreements over power-sharing through 
institutional change, which, when conflated with a growing group identity, helped to widen 
this province’s social cleavage.   A good summary of the political situation in Lower 
Canada in the lead-off to the rebellion and then union is as follows: 
“The French-dominated Assembly sought to preserve a rural society in 
which public funds would be directed to building roads and other local 
improvements beneficial to an agrarian economy.  The English-dominated 
oligarchy strove to expand international trade and to promote urban growth 
through public expenditures on canals and other improvements to the St. 
Lawrence system of waterways” (Riendeau 2000, 113). 
While the cleavage in Lower Canada could be just as easily characterized as rural 
versus urban, agrarian versus commercial, or one of class, the despatches and legislative 
debates reflect how a group identity surrounding French and Anglo-Saxon ‘races’ was 
coming round to colour all discourse in the province.  The sense of identity that a common 
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language and religion manufactured for people in this province, reinforced by shared stories 
of their history and culture, came to trump all other possible identity markers that could 
have united or divided this population. 
In this socially divided province, Thomas Cary, a one-time member of the executive 
council under Governor Robert Prescott, established the Quebec Mercury as a political 
organ and newspaper for the ‘British’ residents in 1805.  It was conservative, advocated for 
the assimilation of French Canadians and argued that the rise of a French middle class and 
French majority in the assembly was a threat to Anglo commercial interests (Gauvin 2000).  
In response, Le Canadien was founded in 1806, which was also conservative, though 
advocated for institutional reform and the replacement of the English elites by the French as 
the distributors of patronage and the wielders of political power (Ouellet 2000b). 
Specific policy initiatives further exacerbated the ‘racial’ division in Lower Canada, 
as these policies were seen as direct threats to the preservation of a French and catholic 
community in North America.  First, the Anglican Bishop of Quebec, Jacob Mountain, tried 
to get education taken away from the Roman Catholic Church, a move that was supported 
by the legislative council and opposed by the Francophone majority in the lower chamber 
of the legislature (Millman 2000).  In 1801, the Royal Institution for the Advancement of 
Learning began to establish a non-denominational educational system which was seen as a 
direct challenge to the Roman Catholic Church.123 
Governor James Craig pressed for the right to make clerical appointments within the 
Roman Catholic Church, which was opposed by Archbishop Joseph Octave Plessis of 
Quebec, and Craig’s prejudices led him to accuse the catholic clergy of being in league 
                                                 
123 The Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning had as its goal the establishment of a broad non-
denominational educational system for the province at its outset.  It created two Royal Grammar Schools in 
1816, which were supported financially by the provincial government through salaries.  The original two 
schools closed in 1846 and it lost control of the 82 other schools it had established shortly thereafter.  The 
only thing retained was McGill University, which had been founded as McGill College in 1821 from a 
bequest by legislative councillor James McGill of £10,000 and a 46-acre estate.  The Board of Governors of 
McGill University are the only ‘members’ (these for a non-profit company are the equivalent of shareholders) 
of the Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning, which owns the assets of the university as a 
separate provincial corporation from McGill University. 
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with the nationalists (Sturgis 2004).124  Between 1807 and 1811, Craig had troops seize the 
printing press of Le Canadien and imprison its writers for treason, and he advocated 
increased immigration from Britain and the merging of the two Canadas as a way to reduce 
the political influence of the French in the province.  While he was recalled to Britain over 
his behaviour, his ‘reign of terror’, which included frequent prorogations and dissolutions 
of the assembly and the use of the military and the law courts for partisan purposes, helped 
to politicize social identity.  Thus, when the Canada Tenures Act was adopted in 1825 to 
allow landholders to change from seigneurial to freehold tenure, and the British American 
Land Company acquired significant property in the Eastern Townships, French political 
leaders were convinced that the elimination of the French ‘race’ was the government’s 
motivation. 
This rise in French Canadian nationalism was not happening in isolation.  Where the 
Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century had laid the groundwork for the rise of nation-
states, the 18th century saw the emergence of ‘race’ as an identity marker.  As race was seen 
as immutable, this would have a significant impact not just in Canada but around the world.  
The debates of both chambers of the legislature of Lower Canada, in advance of union, are 
peppered with allegations of race being the motivation for virtually every policy initiative, 
spending scheme and constitutional reform proposal advanced by members of either 
chamber and between the chambers.  ‘Racism’ had not yet emerged as a word (it would not 
be until the 1930s), but all initiatives advanced for institutional design were debated in 
terms of whether or not they would diminish the other ‘race’. 
The conclusion of Lord Durham was that “I expected to find a conflict between the 
government and the people – instead, I found two warring nations within a single State; I 
found a struggle, not of principles, but of races; and I perceived that it would be idle to 
attempt any amelioration of laws or institutions until we could first succeed in terminating 
the deadly animosity that now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada into the hostile 
                                                 
124 Plessis was in fact very accommodating to Craig.  He described the British conquest as ‘la conquête 
providentielle’, as it had saved Canada from the horrors of the French revolution, and he would have Craig’s 
proclamations read out loud in catholic churches. 
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divisions of French and English” (Durham 1912a, 22-3), which reflects the language of 
discourse of the era, and especially in Lower Canada.  It also reflects the way social 
cleavages colour discourse surrounding institutional change. 
To Durham, and to the British government that received his report, institutional 
change as demanded by the ‘other’ social group or ‘race’ should not be granted as it would 
be used to their advantage over the other side of the social cleavage, the loyal British 
subjects.  The fact that armed insurrection had occurred made this prejudice impossible to 
shake.  Remove the bias of ‘race’, and Durham would have simply been an advocate of the 
right of any people to have self-government, which was the position he took when he met 
with English politicians from the other provinces of Upper Canada and Atlantic Canada. 
The language of ‘race’ did not simply colour the discourse of the time.  It has 
coloured scholarly analysis since.  The similarities in aspirations between the emerging 
middle class in both Upper and Lower Canada are never pointed out, even though the 
demands for change coming from the assembly in Lower Canada, and the disagreements 
between the two chambers of the legislature over economic policy, were identical to that 
which was occurring in Upper Canada.  The only difference between the two provinces is 
that in Upper Canada the social cleavage was seen as racial. 
In Upper Canada, the province had its social cleavage, from before the time of the 
American Revolution until after the War of 1812, defined by British and Yankee mistrust.  
‘Yankees’ were seen as a breed of North American settler who had no allegiance to crown 
and empire, only to the potential for profit in the new world.  They did not respect borders, 
and some trafficked and traded materials restricted under British mercantilist law, including 
liquor and guns.  The American Revolution instilled mistrust in the Loyalists for Yankees, 
even some of those who had been in Quebec prior to the revolution.  Irrespective of their 
date of arrival, those who were not Loyalist were potential spies in a period where 
annexation by the U.S. was a threat for some and a political goal for others.  This mistrust 
is reflected in the province’s electoral law.  From 1800 onward, immigrants from the 
United States would be required to live in Upper Canada for seven years and take an oath 
of allegiance to the king before they could vote (Massicotte, Dufour, Young et Jorgensen 
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2007, 23).125  Even then, those who had once lived in the U.S. were not accepted as equals 
by many, and the label Yankee could run for generations. 
Added to this mistrust of Yankees before the War of 1812 was a mistrust of British 
immigrants who arrived afterwards, and soon the ‘banished Briton’ became a solid ‘out’ 
social group which would redefine the social cleavage in the province (Riendeau 2000, 
115).  While the province might have looked racially homogeneous to outsiders, especially 
in contrast to Lower Canada, the province of Upper Canada was divided by English, 
Scottish and Irish ancestry.  The Anglican English elite held the power and made up the 
majority of government officials, bankers, military officers and professionals (Romny 
1984, 12).  Scots formed the bulk of the middle class, including merchants and 
manufacturers.  Irish immigrants arrived bitterly divided between protestant and catholic 
and, with few skills and little money, were relegated to the building of canals and railways, 
with many ending up as part of the underclass of urban poor. 
In Upper Canada, it was the policy issue of the ‘clergy reserves’ – where one-
seventh of the land in each community was held in reserve for the building by the church of 
schools, hospitals and places of worship – that politicized the province’s dominant social 
cleavage.  The Anglican Church leadership had successfully used its advantaged position in 
the upper chamber of the legislature, and in the executive council, to make this land 
singularly of use to them, pitting the two chambers against each other as devotees of other 
faiths were able to win election to the lower chamber (Wilson 1969).  The Church’s 
favoured status in England, where the king was formally head of the church and its senior 
members sat in the house of lords, helped to buttress the provincial elite.  
The rebellion in Lower Canada was a product of the social cleavage created by the 
French and English languages and protestant and catholic religions, and exacerbated by 
differing conceptions of the future of the province, including divergent economic interests 
(Ouellet 1979).  In Upper Canada it was assumed that it was not identified with a particular 
social group and it was simply partisan opposition to the Family Compact (Read 1988).  
                                                 
125 When the Reformers won a majority in 1804, they tried to repeal the law but the Conservatives were able 
to use their majority in the legislative council to protect the legislation. 
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But this is incorrect.  In both provinces the agitation for reform came to be linked at the 
time to that province’s social cleavage.126  
The union of Canada altered group identity in the two provinces, but not in the way 
Durham expected.  By creating a single province of Canada which would be governed by a 
single bicameral legislature and which would have the power to make laws for the two 
halves, it solidified an Upper and Lower Canada cleavage that would be seen as English 
and French, respectively (even though there was a minority of the other in each half of the 
province and in its legislature).  By creating a new dominant cleavage, this forced both 
halves to subsume their own social divisions.  So Scots, Irish, Yankees and English were 
united as English Canadians, just as those who spoke French had come to be united as 
Canadiens.  
Table 5.1 reports census data for the two parts of Canada from the time of Union to 
the lead up to Confederation.  They are reported here as data from Canada West and East, 
because those are the labels given to the two halves of the united Province of Canada by the 
Act of Union, 1840, but it should be noted that residents of Canada continued to refer to the 
two halves as Upper and Lower Canada.  Two things are apparent from this data.  The first 
is that while English speakers are consistently dominant in the West and French speakers in 
the East, migration was changing the internal structure of both parts of the province.  There 
was increasing diversity of source country for immigrants, with the greatest change 
occurring in the West of Canada.  The second is that the relative influence of the two halves 
shifted during this period, with Canada West going from less populated and thus over-
represented in the legislature to being the more populous half of the province and thus 
under-represented in the legislature. The growth in population in Canada West was a 
product of the ‘pull’ factor of land being marketed (both crown and clergy reserves) 
aggressively by the Canada Company, but also ‘push’ factors like the great potato famine in 
Ireland, between 1845 and 1852, which forced millions from the rural countryside to move 
to North American cities.  
                                                 
126 Though it is noteworthy that only one to two percent of the population participated in either rebellion 
(Riendeau 2000).   
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Table 5.1: Birth Place of Canadians 
 West 
1842 AD 
East 
1844 AD 
West 
1860/1 AD 
East 
1860/1 AD 
England and Wales 40,684 11,895 114,290 13,179
Ireland 78,255 43,982 191,231 50,337
Scotland 39,781 13,393 98,792 13,204
British Possessions   1,058 815
French Canadian 13,969 524,244 33,287 847,615
English Canadian 247,665 85,660 869,592 167,949
Atlantic British Provinces   8,085 2,061
United States 32,809 11,946 50,758 13,648
Europe 6,581  25,917 2,075
Other Foreign Countries  1,329 1,194 270
Not given 27,309 4,633 1,394 414
TOTAL POPULATION 487,053 697,084 1,386,091 1,111,566
Source: E-Stat Table(s), Statistics Canada (accessed July 21, 2011) 
This shift in relative influence created a tension between the two sections.  Where 
the circumstances surrounding union had created a mistrust and antagonism on the part of 
the French Canadian elite towards Canada West, the shift in population generated 
antagonism in the West to what was seen as “French Canadian domination” (Skelton 1963, 
333).  As the legislature was divided equally in terms of seats between Canada West and 
East, this sectional divide was the backdrop for party politics, as will be discussed in the 
next section. 
The English community in Canada West, while united on one side of the new 
province’s English-French West-East social cleavage, was not homogeneous.  The social 
divisions of Europe and the British isles were imported by immigrants to Canada.  
Elections had long been fought by religious and ethnic groups rallying voters through 
strong arm tactics and free alcohol.  This could have dangerous consequences, like the nine 
fatalities during the election of 1841 (Massicotte et al. 2007).127  Groups of thugs would 
                                                 
127 Election violence was not unique to Canada West. There had been three fatalities during election riots in 
Montréal in 1832 and another death in 1844, two in Quebec City in 1858, one in New Brunswick in 1843 and 
another one in 1866 and three in Prince Edward Island in 1847. 
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ensure their candidate’s supporters could vote and then block the polls until they were 
closed.  Rival groups would come to blows. 
One of the most effective of these groups was the Orange Order, a society formed in 
Ireland that was militant protestant (given its Scottish Presbyterian roots) and fiercely 
supportive of England and the British empire.  As a structured (albeit secret) social group 
that had been imported to Canada West with the Irish immigrants, it was ideally situated to 
organize its members for political purposes.  Its militancy and the strong arm nature of 
Canadian politics made it prone to violence, and, from the time of union until 1860, there 
were at least twenty-five riots in Toronto and almost all of these involved the Orange Order 
in some manner (Kealey 1984, 44). 
A provincial commission established to look into Toronto municipal politics 
concluded that the “officers of the Corporation [of the City of Toronto] and the Police, are 
for the most part open and avowed Orangemen.  Orangeism has become the watchword and 
symbol of the party which supports the Corporation, and the most efficient if not the 
indispensable recommendation to civic favour or employ.  At the late Election, Orangeism 
was the Shibboleth of the Corporation Party. At the riots which ensued, Orangemen 
systematically brought into the City from the surrounding country were the most 
conspicuous actors” (Report of the Commissioners, Canada Journals, 1841, app.S).  The 
Family Compact controlled the Corporation party and also controlled liquor licenses, and 
thus the distribution of liquor at election time.  While the highest echelons of the Family 
Compact were Anglican, they found natural allies in this pro-England Irish protestant 
group. 
But when we look more closely at religion in Canada West, as reported in Table 5.2, 
it becomes apparent that religious factionalism through immigration would have altered the 
province’s social divisions, even if they were not being subsumed by the English-French 
West-East cleavage of the larger united province.  The relative weight of the Church of 
England, and its offshoot Church of Scotland, was diminishing.  Once the clergy reserves 
issue was settled, which it was during this period, religious affiliation as a source of social 
group identity began to decline. 
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Table 6.2: Religious Denominations in Canada West 
 1842 AD 1860/1 AD 
Adventists  1,050 
Baptists 32,822 61,559 
Christians  5,018 
Catholics 130,406 258,151 
Church of England 215,582 311,559 
Congregational 8,506 9,357 
Jews 2,210 614 
Lutherans 9,048 24,299 
Methodists - British Wesleyan 46,684 218,427 
Methodists - Canadian 64,630 23,330 
Methodists - Episcopal 40,250 74,616 
Methodists - New Connection  25,199 
Methodists - Bible Christians  8,801 
Methodists - Others 14,282   
Mormons  74 
Moravians 3,556   
Presbyterians - Church of Scotland 155,858 108,963 
Presbyterians - Other Presbyterians 36,440 21,378 
Presbyterians - Dutch Reformed 
Church 
1,892   
Presbyterians - Free Church  143,033 
Quakers 10,400 7,383 
Unitarians  634 
Universalists  2,236 
Other Protestants  7,514 
Other Denominations 38,844 27,396 
Not given 162,696 25,500 
TOTAL POPULATION 974,106 1,396,091 
Source: E-Stat Table(s), Statistics Canada (accessed July 21, 2011) 
In contrast to the religious and cultural group identities that immigrants brought 
with them to Canada, and its attendant animosity and sometimes violence, there was the 
counterbalance of an emerging sense of ‘Canadian’ identity.  This is in part due to shifts in 
public attitudes in England towards the colonies.  The British public was increasingly 
dissatisfied with the cost of the empire, and there was pressure on the British government to 
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reduce its military presence overseas.  With a shift in British economic policy from 
mercantilism to free trade, Canadian loyalty to the British people and empire was 
weakening at the same time as an awareness of what it was to be North American was 
taking hold (Kennedy 1922).  The U.S. Civil War further pitted Canadian public opinion, 
which was sympathetic to the North, against British public opinion, which appeared to 
favour the South, and there were increasing demands from British newspapers and 
politicians that Canada should defend itself if the U.S. conflict widened to threaten Canada 
(and these only increased when the provincial assembly in Canada failed to adopt a Militia 
Bill for the province’s own defence).  In response to these developments, a new ‘Canadian’ 
identity began to emerge. 
Partisan Groups 
When Charles Thomson was dispatched to Canada as governor general, following 
Durham, and assigned the task of implementing unification of the two provinces, he 
claimed that he found in Lower Canada “no such thing as a political opinion.  No man 
looks to a practical measure of improvement.  Talk to any one upon education, or public 
works, or better laws, let him be English and French, you might as well talk Greek to him.  
Not a man cares for a single practical measure; the only end, one would suppose of good 
government.  They have only one feeling, a hatred of race.  The French hate the English 
and the English hate the French, and every question resolves itself into that and that alone” 
(Scrope 1844, 68).  This is not an accurate reflection of partisan politics in Lower Canada, 
but it does reflect the post rebellion prejudices which were at the fore in British society. 
Following the introduction of representative institutions in Lower Canada in 1791, a 
new Francophone middle class came to dominate the elected lower house.  This middle 
class increasingly espoused “liberal, democratic, and ultimately republican ideas” 
(Riendeau 2000, 112).  The newspaper Le Canadien became the organ for the Parti 
Canadien.  This was not a singularly Francophone party, though it would come to be seen 
as a French Canadian movement by the British government and the British public, and it 
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has since emerged as such in the popular mythology of Quebec during the 20th Century.128  
The candidates for the lower chamber in the assembly put forth by the Château Clique were 
known as the British Party, Tories or Parti bureaucrate. 
Since the social cleavage and partisan cleavage in Lower Canada were closely 
aligned prior to union, many Francophones in the Parti Canadien had policy objectives that 
they argued were essential to the preservation of their social identity.  For example, Pierre-
Stanislas Bédard, emerging as an early leader of the movement, believed that the best way 
to preserve the French catholic ‘race’ was through agriculture, the seigneurial system and 
the Coutume de Paris, “protected from the American danger by England and the British 
constitution” (Ouellet 2000b). 
When Bédard was imprisoned temporarily for his association with Le Canadien 
newspaper by Governor Craig, James Stuart emerged as the principle leader between 1813 
and 1817, leading a personal attack on Craig’s principle supporters in the legislative and 
executive councils, Jonathan Sewell and James Monk (Kolish 2000).129  While this party in 
the lower chamber of the assembly had membership which crossed the social cleavage, the 
non-Francophone leadership in this party began to decline with the emergence of Louis-
Joseph Papineau.  Papineau would come to dominate the party as speaker of the assembly.  
For his part, Stuart would switch parties and become a leading spokesman for the British 
Party in the assembly after his colleagues voted to extend a salary to Sewell in order to get 
a salary for Papineau.130 
By 1826, the Parti Canadien had been renamed the Parti patriote, as Papineau and 
others became more demanding in terms of reform, embracing elements of republican and 
American-style reform.  Even in its more militant form, there were still some non-
Francophones in the party (Wolfred Nelson, Robert Nelson and Edmund Bailey 
O’Callaghan) though it lost some moderate reformers (like John Neilson).  The moderates 
                                                 
128 Among its leading members were John Neilson, Daniel Tracey, Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan and Andrew 
Stuart. 
129 The ‘address’, demanding their impeachment, was rejected by the privy council in London. 
130 Stuart would even support the 1822 proposal to unite the Canadas.  The contradictory positions he was 
forced to take as a member of the British party and of the government provided ample fodder to his opponents 
in the assembly.  
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would be known as the Constitutional Party.  But in the eyes of the governors and the 
British government, the Parti Canadien and the Parti patriote were simply the ‘French 
party’. 
In Upper Canada, the Family Compact would run candidates who came to be known 
as Tories and less flatteringly, but more universally, as the Family Compact Party.  They 
would adopt the label Constitutionists, under the direction of Lieutenant-Governor Sir 
Francis Bond Head, in an effort to portray their opponents, the ‘reformers’, as disloyal to 
the British crown and the British constitution.  The reform movement was a less cohesive 
partisan group than had emerged in Lower Canada.  William Lyon Mackenzie and John 
Rolf, like their Patriote friends, advocated for an elected legislative council and a 
republican model of government.  Moderates like Robert Baldwin and Egerton Ryerson 
were in favour of making the executive responsible to the assembly as it was in the British 
parliament at Westminster. 
In both provinces the policy issues that created a partisan cleavage between the 
Tories and Reformers included disagreement over: (i) economic priorities, between the 
commercial interests that wanted the St. Lawrence developed and the agricultural interests 
that wanted expenditures on roads; (ii) supply, and whether or not the legislature should 
have full control over the revenues of the province; (iii) government appointments, and 
whether the leadership in the assembly should have a say; (iv) the civil list, which set the 
salaries of government officials and was a constant source of conflict between assembly 
and executive; (v) more generally which chamber should have ascendancy on money 
matters; (vi) crown land, how it should be used, sold and settled, and by whom; (vii) clergy 
reserves, how they should be used or sold, and for the benefit of what religions; (viiii) 
education, and the role of churches; (ix) the executive’s  use of the upper chamber to thwart 
the will of the lower chamber; and, as a logical extension of disagreement over the 
foregoing, (x) broad constitutional questions surrounding institutional design and change. 
Historians have concluded that these were not actual political parties, but rather 
movements and loose affiliations.  However, they reflect policy disputes and thus the 
emerging partisan cleavage.  It was how politics was done in North America at the time, 
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which involved pamphleteering under labels chosen to reflect the principle issue or partisan 
objective of the candidates who ran for public office.  Governors routinely involved 
themselves in electioneering, with the goal of defeating reformers and, on the occasions 
that they were successful, obtained temporary harmony between the two chambers of the 
legislature, otherwise only the upper chamber could be counted on to support the executive 
council. 
In the first election after union, there were six ‘parties’ elected to the legislature, 
including seven members affiliated with the family compact, 24 who supported the 
governor, 20 from the French party, five ultra-reformers and 20 moderate reformers 
(Scrope 1844, 217).  The most cohesive group was the French Party.  Yet Governor 
Thomson, who had now been raised to the peerage as Lord Sydenham, chose to ignore both 
them and the Family Compact candidates, and form a ministry from only the moderate 
English parties.  To that end he included in his first ministry Robert Baldwin, a reformer, as 
solicitor general for Canada West, and William Henry Draper, a conservative, as attorney 
general for Canada West. 
Baldwin, a believer in responsible government, entered negotiations with the French 
Party to form a United Reform Party out of the French Party from Canada East and the 
Reformers from Canada West.  Believing his coalition had the support of a majority in the 
lower chamber, Baldwin informed Lord Sydenham that the four conservative members of 
the executive did not have his support.  When the governor refused to remove them, 
Baldwin resigned.  Sydenham then appointed Samuel Harrison, another reformer, as 
provincial secretary alongside the conservative Draper, and this ‘government’ found itself 
in the minority in the lower chamber of the legislature, forcing Sydenham to fall back on 
the upper chamber, patronage, the procedural tools of prorogation and dissolution, and 
tireless work as he alternated between being his own prime minister and being the 
governor. 
Sydenham received a brief respite in the first year of his governorship when through 
gerrymander, patronage and the use of troops, he was able to get an over-all majority of 
supporters elected (Metcalf 2000).  One of the candidates the governor helped to defeat was 
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Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine, who was subsequently given by Baldwin the riding of York 
to run in, further reinforcing their party allegiance (Monet 2000).  Together, La Fontaine 
and Baldwin would successfully command the support of the majority of the members of 
the legislature. 
The reason historians argue that this was not a political party is that it lacked 
discipline and would see its supporters frequently shift allegiances, making them more akin 
to ‘loose fish’ (Paltiel 1970).  That it was the result of a partisan cleavage is without 
question.  It had formed in opposition to the governor and the chosen candidates of the 
provincial Tory elites.  This political movement in favour of reform was able to cross the 
social cleavage of Canada East and West, and as a result was able to achieve institutional 
change in the form of responsible government.  It would also be the first step in the creation 
of the Liberal-Conservative Party that would bring Sir John A. Macdonald to power and 
keep him in power in the first decades after Confederation.  
Skelton argues that union did not result in party fusion but rather party alliances 
(1963, 334).   Certainly there was no shortage of labels under which candidates ran in both 
halves of the province of Canada.  In the West, there was the Ministerialist Party or Centre 
Party, which succeeded Baldwin’s moderate Reformers; on the right there were diehard 
Tories, who opposed responsible government, which succeeded the Family Compact, as 
well as a Conservative Party led by John A. MacDonald; and on the left there were 
independents and Clear Grits, the latter led by George Brown.  In Canada East, the 
Ministerialists included Morin, Drummond, Chauveau, Taché and Cartier; on the left were 
the Rouges, successors to Papineau’s Parti patriote in terms of membership and 
Jeffersonian policy, and the English-speaking Liberals, including Luther Holton, John 
Young and A.T. Galt; while the right was less active in Canada East, being confined to the 
odd independent member. 
It is true that allegiances shifted frequently by issue and election.  But that was the 
way partisan politics was played in this era, with few institutional or system requirements 
for party cohesion and with no real carrots and sticks that enabled a party leadership to 
control its members.  The multiple and varied labels were also a by-product of  social 
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cleavages in Canada West and East, which necessitated different party names to be used in 
each region,  where different issues were relevant. 
The governors, who involved themselves in partisan politics, had familiarity with 
British politics, and while the United Kingdom was seeing two dominant parties battle each 
other, the definitions of these parties were also fluid, as was individual allegiance.  The 
Tory Party emerged out of the Court Party and, in 1834, it had turned into the Conservative 
Party (Cooke 2010).  It split in 1846 on the issue of free trade, with those opposed to free 
trade taking the term Protectionist or sometimes the older label Tory.  For its part, the 
Whigs were originally also known as the Country Party (in contrast to the king’s supporters 
who were called the Court Party), and it would break into the Grenvillite, Bedfordite, 
Rockingham and Chathamite factions (Elofson 1996).  By 1859, Conservative leader 
Robert Peel’s supporters (known as the Peelites) joined with Whigs and Radicals to form 
the Liberal Party.  William Gladstone would go from High Tory to Peel Conservative to 
Liberal prime minister.   Benjamin Disraeli (once a Radical candidate for parliament) 
would become a Conservative prime minister, as would Lord Stanley (a former Whig).  It is 
simply not true that political parties did not exist because allegiances shifted. 
It is noteworthy that the despatches of the governors throughout this period have 
frequent complaints about the obsession of the colonists with party politics.  For example, 
the Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, on the latter’s appointment as Lord Sydenham’s 
successor, recommended that if he had to decide between the political parties in the 
legislature, he might consider selecting members of the Family Compact Party for his 
executive council (men like Sir Allan Napier MacNab), “rather than the ultra-liberal party” 
(May 17, 1842).  His successor, Sir Charles (later Lord) Metcalfe chronicles the breakdown 
in control of the legislative assembly by his two predecessors as being the result of Lord 
Sydenham “trying to win the party calling themselves Reformers, to crush the party called 
the Family Compact, and to form a Council of the moderate men of the Reform and 
Conservative parties”; then the “Conservatives retired to make way for the French Party, 
and what was considered the extreme Democratic, or Reform party”; Sydenham’s attempt 
to subdue the French party caused them to unite “themselves with the extreme Democratic 
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party; these were strangely joined by the extreme Conservative party” who, after 
overthrowing the council, were dropped (as their only common cause was to oppose the 
executive council); after which the French and Reform parties remain united  (Despatch 
from Metcalfe to Stanley, August 5, 1843).  Lord Elgin, in proposing that responsible 
government be formally conceded, expressed concern about how “personal and party 
interests have overwheening importance” in local politics, something he attributed to the 
high standard of living, low taxes and lack of genuine grievances (Despatch from Elgin to 
Earl Grey, April 30, 1849).  
The conclusion has to be that this was a period where party politics was emerging as 
a result of multiple divisions on policy and constitutional principles.  It would take a shift in 
the partisan cleavage to coalesce these groups around two competing vehicles.  But clearly 
Canada in the 1800s was experiencing partisan politics. 
Halfway through the 19th century, with issues like the clergy reserve and the 
seigneurial system settled, and responsible government in full swing, the issues around 
which party politics had found some cohesion gave way again to sectional division.  The 
Clear Grits had emerged in the context of the growing population in Canada West, and thus 
advocated universal male suffrage, representation by population, reduction in government 
expenditure, and free trade with the United States.  While no strong party of the right 
emerged in Canada East, members like Joseph Cauchon were vocal in opposing the 
‘socialism’ of the Rouges and Clear Grits.  The grant of responsible government meant that 
the partisan cleavage between the governor and the assembly had been eliminated, and the 
cleavage became one of election platforms and ideology. 
In 1854, Canada East elected Reformers and Liberals while Canada West voted in 
the Conservatives.  While a coalition government was formed at the time, it was beholden 
to moderate members who switched allegiance on every vote.  Increased factionalism 
proved ungovernable, with ministries being unable to master the support of the legislature 
(for a compilation of the ministries during this period see Côté 1860, 12-5).  But it also 
created an incentive to create more effective political vehicles, and for institutional reform. 
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By the election of 1858, the Bleu movement in Quebec (former Ministerialists who 
had become French Canadian Tories) had fully emerged in competition to the Rouges.  The 
election of 1861 saw the Liberal Party finally become united, and 29 Liberals were elected 
from each half of the province of Canada in opposition to 35 Conservatives.  Out of party 
factionalism had emerged a single partisan cleavage that crossed the two halves of the new 
country of Canada, separating the governing Conservative Party from its opponents.  These 
opponents, the Liberals and Grits from Ontario and Rouges from Quebec would, through 
Confederation, add Reformers and Liberals of the Atlantic Provinces to create a Liberal 
Party of Canada.  
II. Institutional Change 
Turning to the specific institutional changes that occurred in the province of 
Canada, beginning with union in 1840, followed by responsible government, which we 
argue should be dated from when it was first experienced in 1842 and not when it was 
irreversibly obtained in 1848,  and then an elected legislative council in 1856.  As will be 
seen in the next chapter, it is the debate over these ideas and developments in the province 
of Canada that informed politicians’ positions in the Atlantic Provinces.131 
During this period, as noted above, there was a shift in the social cleavages, first 
with the French-English East-West cleavage becoming dominant for the united province of 
Canada and then with the emergence of a new ‘Canadian’ identity.  The partisan cleavage 
also shifted, first as a movement in opposition to the rule by British governors and the local 
elite ‘compacts’, and then in the form of party politics which saw candidates running for 
and against the government of the day.  While these shifts in cleavages were significant in 
shaping the particular demands for institutional change, change occurred in each case after 
a partisan group emerged whose leadership included representatives of both sides of the 
social cleavage. 
                                                 
131 The one exception is the emergence of a political party, which occurred first in Prince Edward Island due 
to circumstances surrounding land ownership unique to that province. 
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Unification of the Province of Canada 
Lord Durham came to Canada with the belief that perhaps all the British provinces 
in North America should be united in a federation.132  He found the Atlantic Provinces were 
not in favour of some form of federation, so he settled for recommending that the two 
Canadas be united as a single province and given responsible government.133  This he felt 
could be done without altering the royal prerogatives that governed the British constitution, 
writing as follows: 
“I would not impair a single prerogative of the Crown; on the contrary I 
believe that the interests of these colonies require the protection of 
prerogatives which have not hitherto been exercised.  But the Crown must 
on the other hand submit to the necessary consequences of representative 
institutions; and if it has to carry on the government in unison with a 
representative body, it must consent to carry it on by means of those in 
whom that representative body has confidence” (Durham 1912a, 279). 
Durham’s solution to the dilemma imposed by the Austinian-Dicean construction of British 
parliamentary supremacy was to suggest that some matters were merely local.  Letting the 
governor accept the advice of Canadians on local matters would in no way interfere with 
the British government continuing to instruct the governor on matters in which Britain had 
an interest.  Imperial matters he defined as the “constitution or the form of government; the 
regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British 
colonies, and foreign nations; and the disposal of public lands” (ibid., 280). 
He recommended that imperial legislation be immediately introduced for the 
reunion of Canada (ibid., 324), and argued that the establishment of municipal governments 
should be included as “an essential part of any durable and complete” wider union (ibid., 
                                                 
132 This is suggested by Charles Buller (Durham 1912a, 336), and the idea may have been given to him by the 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg (ibid., 309). 
133 He intended that responsible government should be granted only when a majority of the new province was 
English speaking, given his prejudice against the French who had led the rebellion, his paternalistic belief that 
the English language would permit French Canadians to better succeed in English North America and his 
statement that: “Our first duty is to secure the well-being of our colonial countrymen; and if in the hidden 
decrees of that wisdom by which this world is ruled, it is written that these countries are not forever to remain 
portions of the Empire, we owe it to our honour to take care that when they separate from us, they shall not be 
the only countries on the American continent in which the Anglo-Saxon race shall be found unfit to govern 
itself.” (Durham 1912b, 310) 
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322).  Additionally, the legislation “should contain provisions by which any or all of the 
other North American colonies may, on the application of the legislature, be, with the 
consent of the two Canadas or their united legislature, admitted into the union on such 
terms as may be agreed on between them” (ibid., 323) 
The British parliament introduced a Bill for the unification of the two provinces of 
Upper Canada and Lower Canada in June of 1839, though without responsible government 
or provisions for municipal governments.  Immediate opposition came from the lower 
chamber in Upper Canada, which caused the British government to postpone consideration 
of the Bill until Thomson could be sent to North America and installed in office as 
governor general.  The legislature in Lower Canada had been temporarily suspended 
following the rebellion, illustrative of how the British saw the insurrection in racial terms, 
or opposition would, undoubtedly, have come from its lower chamber as well. 
Thomson was issued three despatches which laid out the British government’s 
position.  First, he was to convince the local population of the merits of “a legislative union 
of the two provinces; a just regard to the claims of either province in adjusting the terms of 
the union; the maintenance of the three estates of the provincial legislature; the settlement 
of a permanent civil list for securing the independence of judges, and to the executive 
government that freedom of action which is necessary for the public good; and the 
establishment of a system of local government by representative bodies freely elected in the 
various cities and rural districts” (Despatch from Russell to Thomson, September 7, 1939).  
Second, still guided by the Austinian-Dicean concept of British parliamentary supremacy, 
he was instructed to only go so far as summoning councillors and employing in public 
service “those persons who, by their position and character, have obtained the general 
confidence and esteem of the inhabitants” (ibid., October 14, 1839).  The governor was not 
to be accountable to the legislature since the power for which a minister in England is 
responsible is the crown’s, so the governor must only serve the crown of England.  
Membership in the executive council was at pleasure, councillors would “be called to retire 
from public service as often as any sufficient motives of public policy may suggest the 
expediency of that measure”, and the installation of a new governor would be sufficient to 
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alter the membership in the council so that the governor would have councillors with whom 
he could work, subject to the future confirmation of the monarch (ibid., October 16, 1839). 
Thomson set out to sell the package.  In Lower Canada, he opted to use the special 
council which had been established by James Colbourne for the temporary governance of 
the province, as he felt creating a new council would leave him vulnerable to allegations 
that it had been selected to get the outcome he wanted (Despatch from Thomson to Russell, 
November 18, 1839).   This council accepted his six resolutions, including agreement for a 
civil list and for the blending of the public debt of the two provinces.  In Upper Canada, 
which still had its legislature intact, Thomson met with the legislature in December of 
1839, and he laid out the case for the resolutions, including the fact that Lower Canada 
would be effectively absorbing the debt of Upper Canada and, given its capacity to raise 
more revenue and to control navigation and shipping, Lower Canada would be essential for 
future development of Upper Canada’s resources.  As noted in the previous section, 
Thomson ignored the office holders and Family Compact, as well as the French Party, and 
forged alliances with the Reformers and moderate Conservatives (Despatch from Thomson 
to Russell, December 24, 1839). 
Thomson avoided the issue of responsible government, telling the legislature that he 
had been commanded to administer the government in accordance with the wishes and 
interests of the people and to give due deference to the opinions of their representatives.  
This ambiguous response allowed for some legislators to assume that the old colonial 
system was dead, and Robert Baldwin shared his belief that responsible government had 
finally been granted with his constituents in Toronto.  Privately, Thomson was telling his 
friends that he intended to put an end to the idea of responsible government, saying “I 
cannot get rid of my responsibility to the home government, I will place no responsibility 
on the council; they are a council for the governor to consult, but no more” (Kennedy 1922, 
188). 
In Britain, Sir John Pakington, who would become a colonial secretary and secretary 
of state for war when the Tories came to power, asked Whig Colonial Secretary Lord 
Russell, whether the Bill for Union was “attempting to unite people dissimilar in law, 
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dissimilar in language, and dissimilar in manners, an attempt which so high an authority as 
Mr. Burke had pronounced to be highly absurd” (U.K. Debates, HC, May 28, 1840).  In 
response, William Gladstone, who also would become a colonial secretary under the Peel 
Conservatives before going on to become a Liberal prime minister, argued that the 
legislation was “backed on the other side of the water by the concurrence, not only of the 
Special Council of Lower Canada… but also of the Legislative Council of Upper Canada 
and of the House of Assembly of that province” (ibid.).  In the House of Lords, the Tories 
repeatedly raised concerns that this Bill would lead to responsible government and 
independence, something the Whig government denied by asserting that “it was perfectly 
well known there that the opinion of this country and this Government was entirely 
opposed to ‘independent responsible Government’” (Viscount Melbourne, U.K. Debates, 
HL, July 13, 1840).  The legislation passed both chambers on party division. 
The general structure of government the new constitution established for the 
Province of Canada was largely unchanged from the model that existed in each of the two 
provinces prior to union.  Executive government rested in the hands of the governor and the 
persons he appointed to the executive council.  The legislature was bicameral, with an 
upper chamber styled as a legislative council where persons were appointed for life on good 
behaviour.  There were originally 24 members appointed, 12 each from Canada East and 
Canada West (as was seen in Table 6.1, Canada West had less than 500,000 inhabitants and 
Canada East had almost 700,000 following union).  The lower chamber of the legislative 
assembly was elected, and here too the number of representatives elected in Canada East 
and Canada West was to be equal at 42 seats each.  The speaker of the legislative council 
was appointed by the governor, and the speaker of the assembly was to be elected by the 
members.   
The Union Act, 1840 also ordered that all laws in force in either province continue 
until altered by the new legislature, and the Church of England and the Roman Catholic 
Church continue their privileged status with mandated toleration for other religions.  The 
new province would absorb the debts of the two previous provinces, and establish a 
consolidated revenue fund to pay for the courts, government and pensions for which the 
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governor would submit a budget in which the two chambers would have to concur.  The 
English form of all laws would take precedence if there were differences in wording, 
though French could be used by the legislature. The assembly later adopted rules requiring 
the translation of papers and the reading of motions in both languages.  
Responsible Government 
Following Baldwin’s resignation after having been rebuffed by the governor general 
over the dismissal of the Conservatives in his first executive council, Sydenham was able to 
keep the legislature occupied with day-to-day matters of governance and to use the 
legislative council to keep the lower house under control.  Nevertheless, the issue of 
responsible government was a priority for many in the legislature, and particularly Baldwin, 
informed as these politicians were by democratic principles that were emerging in other 
countries, including the principles underlying the Westminster-model of parliamentary 
government and the changes that had occurred in cabinet government in response to the 
Reform Act in the United Kingdom. 
Baldwin moved for the production of the despatches that had been sent to 
Sydenham concerning responsible government, and they were tabled in the assembly.  He 
then moved six resolutions intended to reconcile the British position, as identified in the 
despatches, with his idea of responsible government.  The resolutions acknowledged that 
members of the executive council must be responsible to imperial authorities for actions 
that “constitutionally belong to those authorities” (Canada Debates LA, September 3, 1841, 
res.6), but asserted that “the house has the constitutional right of holding such advisors 
politically responsible for every act of the provincial government of a local character” 
(res.5) and thus the men appointed to the executive council “ought always to be men 
possessed of the public confidence” (res.4). At Sydenham’s direction, Samuel Harrison 
introduced counter-resolutions that were cleverly designed to sound similar in spirit, and 
these were substituted by the assembly, with Baldwin agreeing, and received the support of 
all sides.  While the spirit of conciliation had been struck, the letter of institutional change 
had not been met, as the resolutions adopted maintained that “the head of the executive 
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government of the province, being within the limits of his government the representative of 
the sovereign, is responsible to the imperial authority alone” (res.2) and only promised that 
“the chief advisors of the representative of the sovereign, constituting a provincial 
administration under him, ought to be men possessed of the confidence of the 
representatives of the people” (res.3).  This was billed at the time as the “Magna Carta of 
responsible government” (Metcalf 2000).  It was a concession, in that it was a formal 
acknowledgement of an obligation on the part of the governor to appoint advisors who had 
the confidence of the lower chamber, but it was not responsible government as posited by 
Baldwin.  The governor conceded no responsibility to the legislature. 
Sydenham’s successor as governor general was Sir Charles Bagot, whose 
instructions were to preserve the union, avoid party politics and govern according to the 
wishes and interests of the people.  With the ultra-Conservatives willing to support the 
French party against the moderates in spite of ideological and social differences, and with a 
complete inability to co-opt French members into his council (those who joined were 
quickly labelled les vendus), Bagot quickly realized that the Sydenham concession that the 
governor should choose councillors who enjoyed the confidence of the lower chamber was 
an impossible compromise with a legislature where the Reform and French Party members 
had on many matters formed a united front. 
His frequent despatches to London reflect his desperation.  The responses from 
London were unhelpful, suggesting he should consider appointing the type of men who are 
in the Family Compact party (Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, May 17, 1842).  The 
colonial secretary was getting equally unhelpful advice from his prime minister, who told 
him to emulate the skill of George III and Louis-Philippe in “combatting a majority in the 
popular assembly” (Peel to Stanley, August 28, 1842).  Bagot was instructed to only 
consider appointing Francophone councillors when “it is manifest to this country, and 
manifest to the conservatives and supporters of British influence in Canada generally, that 
you cannot carry on the government without the French Party, and that you cannot carry on 
through and by them.  Do not mistake me.  When I say the French party I mean that party 
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conducted by its present leaders and headed by men more or less implicated in the late 
rebellion” (Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, September 1, 1842). 
Bagot finally turned to La Fontaine and began negotiations.  The outcome was the 
appointment of Baldwin and La Fontaine as attorneys-general for Canada West and East, 
respectively, the removal of members that Baldwin and La Fontaine did not support from 
the executive council and their replacement with members acceptable in their stead.  A 
motion expressing the confidence of the lower chamber in the new executive passed with 
only five opposed.  Bagot reported to London: 
“I have met the wishes of a large majority of the population of Upper 
Canada and of the British inhabitants of Lower Canada.  I have removed the 
main ground of discontent and distrust among the French-Canadian 
population.  I have satisfied them that the union is capable of being 
administered for their happiness and advantage and have consequently 
disarmed their opposition to it.  I have excited among them the strongest 
feeling of gratitude to the provincial government, and if my policy be 
approved by H.M.’s government, I shall have removed their chief cause of 
hostility to British institutions, and have added another security for their 
devotion to the British crown” (Despatch from Bagot to Stanley, September 
26, 1842). 
The colonial secretary begrudgingly accepted Bagot’s claim that this had been 
necessary, though he indicated that what would be decisive was whether the British 
monarch, parliament and public accepted this change, and not the approbation it had 
received in the colony (Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, November 2, 1842).  Approval 
was forthcoming, though Bagot was instructed to remind the legislature of “the propriety 
and necessity of adopting the Act of Union as a whole, and of declaring their intention to 
stand by its provisions, including the civil list and every other debateable question—to take 
it in short as a [fait] accompli, which in the main has secured to them good government and 
the power of self-government” (Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, November 3, 1842).  
Baldwin likened the change to the glorious revolution (Canada Debates LA, September 16, 
1842).  And Bagot acknowledged that he had essentially conceded responsible government 
(Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, February 3, 1843). 
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Bagot’s successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, took it upon himself to try to stop any 
further advance towards responsible government and to preserve the remaining prerogatives 
of the governor, as he and the British government were still clinging to the belief that a 
governor’s imperial authority was intractable.  He knew this would be a challenge, and 
acknowledged that he expected “a difference with them in their claim that the government 
shall be administered in subservience to their party views.  They expect that the patronage 
shall be bestowed exclusively on members of their party” (Despatch from Metcalfe to 
Stanley, April 24, 1848). 
Metcalfe had his personal secretary, Captain James Higginson, use the intended 
appointment of an aide-de-camp, a junior officer of no particular importance to 
government, to canvas La Fontaine on whether he felt this appointment required the input 
of the council.  La Fontaine made detailed records of the conversation, including his 
interpretation of the Harrison resolutions adopted by the assembly and agreed to by the 
crown under Lord Sydenham (Hincks 1884, 93).  It was La Fontaine’s position that 
members of the executive council had the right to recommend all appointments and, while 
the governor could refuse their recommendations, the council was collectively responsible 
to the legislature for all decisions of the government, including these appointments, so, 
should he refuse to take their advice, they would free themselves of responsibility for his 
decision by resigning. 
Through his despatches to London, it becomes evident that Metcalfe was the last in 
a long line of the governors who believed he was the head of government, more than he 
was a representative of the head of state, and thus could involve himself in local elections 
in defence of his ‘party’.  Patronage was the tool to ensure party cohesion and, in this era of 
party formation, he was not simply fighting for the prerogatives of the crown but for the 
right of the governor to use such appointments to the advantage of what he saw as the 
governor’s side of a growing partisan cleavage.  Giving the opposing political party the 
tools of patronage made no sense to him.  It would only make sense in “the hands of a party 
thoroughly attached to British interests and connexions, there would be a ground of mutual 
cordiality and confidence which would render real co-operation more probable, concessions 
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more easy, and even submission more tolerable” (Despatch from Metcalfe to Stanley, 
October 9, 1843). 
Metcalfe first came to verbal blows with La Fontaine over the Secret Societies Act, 
which was introduced by the government with Metcalfe’s consent to force the closing of 
the orders of the Orange Lodge.   Metcalfe reserved the legislation for approval of the 
British government, which then disallowed the legislation as being too broad.  La Fontaine 
felt this legislation was strictly a local matter and should not have been reserved, 
particularly since the governor had agreed with the council for the introduction of this 
legislation. 
The religious cleavage in Canada West was being fueled along its earlier fault line 
as well.  Baldwin’s legislation to secularize King’s College and establish the University of 
Toronto, brought former Family Compact leader, Anglican Bishop Strachan, to the fore.  
Strachan claimed that the “atheistical character of the popular dogma of responsible 
government” was destroying the province (Church newsletter, reprinted in Kennedy, 1922 
#365@242}.  In a petition against the proposed change, he likened the situation to the 
excesses of the French revolution, “patronizing equally within the same institution an 
unlimited number of sects whose doctrines are absolutely irreconcilable” (Canada Journals, 
LA, November 6, 1843). 
Without any consultation with the executive council, Metcalfe appointed René-
Édouard Caron to be speaker of the legislative council.134  The governor, acting alone in 
making this appointment, emerged as a criticism of Metcalfe’s tenure in office when what 
would become known as the ‘Canada crisis’ or ‘Metcalfe crisis’ made it to the floor of the 
house of commons in England (John Roebuck, U.K. Debates, HC, May 30, 1844). But in 
the province, at that  moment, it was the appointment of Francis Powell, a Tory, to the post 
of clerk of the peace by the governor that forced the resignation of the executive council on 
                                                 
134 He did consult with Peter McGill, who was the ranking Family Compact member on the legislative 
council, and with the speaker of the lower house, John Neilson. 
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November 26, 1843.135  Historians have argued about the motives of both the governor and 
La Fontaine in manufacturing a drama over what was a junior position.  This ignored the 
fact that the clerk of the peace was the provincial appointee who could most directly 
influence local law enforcement; without local law enforcement, election gangs like those 
organized by the Orange Order, had free reign (see Kealey 1984). 
Only one member of the executive council, Dominick Daly, remained loyal to 
Metcalfe, as he believed he had a duty to the governor above partisan politics and had few 
ideological beliefs (Gibbs 2000).  Metcalfe called on the conservative leader in Canada 
West, Draper, to form a provisional government, and he surprisingly was able to recruit 
Denis-Benjamin Viger as the representative from Canada East.  Viger had emerged with 
John Neilson, after the 1841 election, as an opposition leader to Governor Lord Sydenham 
in the legislature, he had repeatedly denounced the union because it did not have sufficient 
representation from Canada East (which had the greater population at the time), he had 
supported Baldwin’s resolutions on responsible government and he even mused about 
republicanism (Ouellet et LeFort 2000).  These three, Daly, Draper and Viger, would 
constitute the entirety of the executive council or government going into the election, which 
Metcalfe then called. 
As surprising as Viger’s appointment, by Metcalfe, was the approval given by Lord 
Stanley to the appointment, given that Stanley had refused to allow the previous governor, 
Bagot, to appoint Viger to the legislative council on the ground that he was a traitor.136  The 
explanation lies in the desire by the colonial secretary to limit the Harrison resolutions, 
telling the British house of commons: “Sir Charles Metcalfe went out to Canada to carry 
out fairly the new colonial system, but equally determined to resist those extravagant 
demands which were inconsistent with the authority of the Crown and of the true rights of a 
colonial legislature” (U.K. Debates, HC, February 2, 1844).  The Tory Prime Minister, 
                                                 
135 Bonenfant (2000) suggests that La Fontaine and Baldwin did not choose to object to this appointment 
because of the “personal qualities of the man”. 
136 Citing his involvement in the rebellions, his imprisonment and his refusal to post bail in order to guarantee 
he would not rebel in the future, he wrote “I cannot consent to confer a mark of distinction on one who was 
foremost in the ranks of disaffection” (Despatch from Stanley to Bagot, April 1, 1842). 
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Robert Peel, while distancing himself from Metcalfe137, repeated what was British colonial 
policy under the Conservatives, that “the position of an Executive Council towards a 
Governor was perfectly distinct from the relation of a Minister towards his Sovereign.  The 
very fact of a Governor standing in a double relation as it were, responsible to his 
Sovereign, at the same time that it was his duty to defer to the Colonial Legislature, at once 
established that distinction” (U.K. Debates, HC, May 30, 1844).  Metcalfe was simply 
following Austinian-Dicean theory of parliamentary supremacy and implementing British 
colonial policy, as well as trying to put the genie of responsible government back into the 
bottle. 
In Canada, the resulting election was a very bitter war of pamphlets, newspapers 
and vindictive diatribe on the ‘hustings’, with the governor’s party winning a slight 
majority of three seats, which in turn elected former Family Compact party member 
MacNab to the speakership.  But this legislative support would be short-lived.  Metcalfe 
spent his remaining time, before he had to depart due to cancer, at odds with the assembly. 
Lord Cathcart, a lieutenant general in the British army, had become commander of 
the British forces in North America in 1843, and as tension with the United States had been 
mounting over the disputed boundary of Oregon, the British government decided to appoint 
him the next governor general, thus uniting civilian and military command (Cooke et 
Hillmer 2000).  Cathcart was issued instructions that commended him to follow Metcalfe’s 
example, maintain the union, stay free of party connections and govern according to the 
well-understood wishes and interests of the people (Despatch from Gladstone to Cathcart, 
February 3, 1846).  The one change was that he was told to assent to laws “which properly 
belonged to the internal government of the province and which did not involve what was 
dishonourable and unjust” (ibid.). 
His appointment was controversial.  One member of the assembly suggested his 
appointment was a move back in history to the time of military governors (Canada Debates, 
                                                 
137 Peel stressed that no member of the government knew Metcalfe personally, and his appointment was 
simply due to his good work in India and his capacity to implement the imperial government’s policy in the 
colony. 
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LA, March 30, 1846).  Cathcart himself offended Baldwin and others in the Reform Party 
in his speech from the throne by praising Metcalfe (ibid.).  Perhaps it was this unpleasant 
reception that discouraged him from following his predecessor’s active participation in 
provincial politics, concentrating instead on what he knew, military defence.  His one 
legislative initiative was the passage of the Militia Act 1846.138  With the signing of the 
Oregon Boundary Treaty on 15 June 15, 1846, two British military regiments were recalled 
from Canada and the British government began to look for a new governor general. 
On June 29, 1846, the Peel government fell over the Irish Coercion Bill, though it 
was the repeal of the Corn Laws that had bitterly divided the Whig party.139 The 
Importation Act 1846 ended a series of protectionist measures designed to protect British 
farming interests, beginning with the Importation Act 1815, and marked the end of 
mercantilism and the birth of free trade as the cornerstone of British economic policy.140  It 
was also significant in assisting the Industrial Revolution, as it forced inefficient British 
farm workers out of agriculture and into the cities where they became cheap labour for 
industry.  Not surprising, this change in British economic policy drew the attention of Marx 
(1967, v.3).  More importantly for our purposes, it left Canadian farmers without favoured 
trading status. 
Whig leader Lord Russell thus replaced Peel as prime minister on June 30, 1846, 
and Lord Grey became his colonial secretary.  Henry Grey, the third Earl Grey, had been 
under-secretary of state for the colonies when his father, the 2nd Earl Grey, had been prime 
                                                 
138 This provided for the establishment of a 3000-person militia through compulsory service. 
139 The Coercion Bill was one of many legislative initiatives considered by the British parliament to bring 
martial law to Ireland, ban secret meetings and membership in military organizations and suspend civil rights 
in an effort to restore law to Ireland where the protestant-catholic divisions, fueled in this period by the potato 
famine, had resulted in armed conflict among residents. 
140 The Importation Act 1815, introduced following the Napoleonic Wars, had banned the import of any grain 
(the British produced wheat and oats) unless the price of British grain was at least £4 a quarter.  In the 1820s, 
Britain gave preference to imports from its colonies. In 1828, William Huskisson, president of the Board of 
Trade, proposed a sliding scale so that the higher the price of British grain, the lower the duty on imports, 
which was intended to balance protection with inflation of bread prices (one of the artifacts of the Corn Laws 
was that bread became too expensive for the poor). 
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minister during the early 1830s.141  He was an early advocate of Wakefield’s political 
economy model which coupled self-government and locally sustainable economic 
development with expanded colonial settlement, and he was an advocate of free trade and 
the end of mercantilism (Grey 1953).  He was aware that the British public was tired of 
military expenditure and loss of life in support of empire, so partisan self-interest came to 
trump the Austinian-Dicean theory of British parliamentary supremacy. 
Grey decided to appoint Lord Elgin, a liberal Conservative in the house of lords, to 
replace Cathcart as Governor General in North America.142  Grey was concerned that 
Cathcart, a military officer, would be ill-equipped to bring harmony between the legislature 
and the executive council in a colony where there was such a strong social cleavage.  In 
terms of domestic politics, Grey hoped that Elgin’s standing in the Conservative Party 
would keep what were now inevitable institutional changes in the colonies out of British 
party politics. 
Shortly after Lord Elgin arrived in Canada, in January of 1847, Draper attempted to 
convince La Fontaine to join the conservatives in the ministry, by advancing the idea of an 
executive council that was supported, not by a majority in the legislature, but by a majority 
in each half of the legislature (Canada East and Canada West).143  La Fontaine was un-
swayed by the idea of double majorities, and Draper resigned and obtained an appointment 
to the courts.  Henry Sherwood, who had emerged by default as the leader of the 
Conservatives in the West, became attorney general with Daly remaining as the 
representative from the East (Beer 2000).  The government’s only attempt at controversial 
legislation was a Bill to reverse the creation of a non-sectarian University of Toronto in 
                                                 
141 It is after his father, the prime minister, that the tea is named, though the reason for the naming is a matter 
of some dispute. 
142 Queen Victoria had suggested Lord Elgin to Lord Stanley, before the Conservative government fell.  As 
head of the Bruce clan, and thus distantly related to my maternal grandmother after whom I take my first 
name. 
143 Baldwin suggested to La Fontaine that any attempt to run a government by a double majority would 
“perpetuate distinctions, initiate animosities, sever the bonds of political sympathy, and sap the foundations of 
political morality” (a letter found in the Baldwin papers of the Toronto Archives, reprinted in Kennedy 1922).  
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favour of four sectarian colleges, but this was defeated by the United Reform Party and two 
defecting Conservatives. 
Lord Elgin dissolved the assembly on December 6th of that year.  He allowed the 
Tory ministers to meet the House of Assembly following the election, and on March 3 the 
House expressed its lack of confidence.  On March 7, true to his word, Governor Elgin 
called upon Baldwin and La Fontaine to form a government and on March 11, he appointed 
their recommended 11 ministers to the executive council. 
Creighton (1965) argues that responsible government is a method of government 
and not an institutional change.  It is a system of political relationships and, as such, he 
argued that it should be judged not on being established but on what substantive policy it 
creates.  For these reasons he, and other historians, have concluded that it was the re-
appointment of Baldwin and La Fontaine and the passage of the Rebellion Losses Act which 
marked the birth of responsible government in the province of Canada. 
The Rebellion Losses Act was a significant piece of legislation.  The issue of 
compensation for rebellion losses and even amnesty had been raised repeatedly since union.  
Bagot had even offered it unsuccessfully as a way of trying to sustain the Sydenham 
executive council he inherited, before appointing Baldwin and La Fontaine the first time.  
Now La Fontaine moved to form a ‘committee of the whole house’ on February 9 to “take 
into consideration the necessity of establishing the amount of Losses incurred by certain 
inhabitants in Lower Canada during the political troubles of 1837 and 1838, and of 
providing for the payment thereof” (Canada Debates, LA, January 28, 1849).  
It is particularly noteworthy that the attitudes towards compensation had, from the 
start, been dramatically different in Canada West144 and Canada East145, and this can only 
                                                 
144 In Canada West, or Upper Canada, in 1840, a Bill had been passed to compensate parties without inquiring 
into the loyalty of persons and £40,000 was included in the Bill to cover the claims, but no monies were 
dispensed since the two chambers of the legislature could not subsequently agree on supply.  On March 29, 
1845, An Act to provide for the payment of Claims arising out of the Rebellion and Invasion in Upper 
Canada, and to appropriate the duties on Tavern Licences to local purposes was adopted by the legislature 
and a sum of £38,658 was raised between 1845 and 1849.  In 1846, the revenues from wedding licences were 
also allocated for the same purpose.  
145 In Lower Canada, or Canada East, the Special Council of Lower Canada had agreed to compensate parties 
who were loyal to the crown for the damage to their property.  The Draper-Viger government set up a 
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be explained by the emotion that ‘race’ imbued to the uprisings in Lower Canada.  In the 
provincial legislature, the debate ran from February 13 to 20 and was vitriolic, with even 
threats of physical violence.146  Tory Sherwood and Family Compact member MacNab 
argued that compensating ‘rebels’ was an insult to those who had remained ‘loyal’.  
Reformers and government ministers Hincks and Blake argued that the Tories were the 
rebels since they had broken faith with the British constitution, and they referred to the 
rebellion as a ‘civil war’. 
On February 22, Henry John Boulton moved an amendment that persons who had 
pled guilty or been found guilty of treason should not receive compensation.  This was 
supported by the government, but opposed by Papineau and Pierre-Joseph-Olivier 
Chauveau who argued that this would amount to recognition that Governor Colborne was 
justified in executing prisoners in 1839.  On February 23, La Fontaine presented a Bill to 
provide for the Indemnification of Parties in Lower Canada whose Property was destroyed 
during the Rebellion in the years 1837 and 1838, which authorized payments up to 
£90,000.  On March 9th the Bill passed the lower house 47 to 18 (MLAs from Canada West 
voted 17 to 14 and in Canada East 30 to 4), and on March 15th the legislative council also 
approved the bill, 20 to 14.   On April 25, 1849, Governor General Elgin assented to the 
Bill. 
In England, the matter was raised in the British parliament.  Specifically the 
government was asked whether (i) “any instructions have been given to the governor 
general of Canada as to the course which he is to pursue, in the event of its being proposed 
to him by his advisers to allow them to introduce into the house of assembly any bill giving 
compensation to any persons known to have been implicated in the rebellions of 1837 or 
1838 on account of the damage sustained by them in those rebellions, or in the event of the 
passing of any such bill through the two houses of the provincial legislature”, (ii) 
                                                                                                                                                    
commission to address the claims from Lower Canada, which submitted their first report on April 1846.  They 
too had been instructed to distinguish between claims made by persons participating in the rebellion and those 
who had remained loyal.  The commissioners concluded that damages to the property of those who had been 
loyal would not exceed £100,000, even though the government had estimated damages as over £200,000. 
146 John A. Macdonald almost ended up in a duel with William Blake. 
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“according to the usage of Canada, if any such bill should have passed through both houses 
of the legislature, and should have become an act by the governor general's assent without a 
suspending clause, the money thereby authorized to be paid would be payable forthwith, or 
before her majesty's servants had had an opportunity of advising her majesty with respect to 
the allowance or disallowance of such act” and (iii) “any official information had been 
received by her majesty's government from Canada with regard to these proceedings; and if 
so, whether they had any objection to place it upon the table of this house” (Gladstone, 
U.K. Debates, HC, March 22, 1849).  The former secretary of state for the colonies and 
future prime minister was told unequivocally that Lord Elgin had not received instructions 
and had the full confidence of the government, and that the government’s position was that 
“all colonial laws, having passed through their formal stages and received the assent of the 
crown through her majesty's representative in the colony, come into immediate operation 
unless they contain a suspending clause” and immediate operation meant as soon as the 
governor general had assented (Hawes, ibid.).  No further debate ensued. 
In the house of lords, there was a motion that “by an act passed in the parliament of 
Canada entitled An Act to Provide for the Indemnification of Parties in Lower Canada, no 
security is afforded against compensation for losses sustained in the rebellion in Canada in 
1837 and 1838 being given to persons engaged in the said rebellion; that it is just and 
necessary, either by recommending a further amending bill to the legislature of Canada or 
by such other means as may be effectual, to provide security against any compensation for 
losses sustained in the said rebellion being given to persons engaged in or having aided or 
abetted the same” (Lord Brougham, U.K. Debates, HL, June 19, 1849).  Brougham raised 
the lack of clarity in the idea of ‘responsible government’ as advocated by Lord Durham, 
stating that: 
“I would, for my part, interfere as little as possible with the powers and 
workings of the colonial assemblies in respect to the making of roads, 
bridges, and canals, and as to all matters of a like nature; but in matters that 
touch in the slightest degree the honour of the crown, or the interests of the 
imperial government, I deny that you can have responsible colonial 
government. According to that theory, it is said that whatever the majority of 
a colony may choose to do, their acts are always to bind the minority, 
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without the power of appeal to the crown. I, for one, say that, if that is to be 
the rule, gross injustice will be done, frightful cruelty will be exercised” 
(ibid.). 
This argument that the crown needs to protect minority interests is a recurring theme in the 
British debates, but ironically it is only advanced in defence of limiting the French party 
majority’s control of the government when it has the support of a majority in the lower 
chamber of the legislature.  Brougham’s real objection was that “British loyalists are taxed 
to pay French rebels for losses which they, the rebels, sustained in a rebellion that was 
crushed by those loyalists” (ibid.).  Lord Grey responded: 
“I am as utterly unable as I was at the beginning to comprehend what is the 
great public object, and what is the great public interest, which the noble and 
learned Lord thinks will be answered by this house assenting to the 
resolutions he has moved. I have heard no explanations from the noble and 
learned Lord of how he considers the government of the province could 
advantageously be carried on after the wishes of the great majority of its 
representatives had been set at naught by a resolution of this house” (Grey, 
ibid.). 
The resolutions were defeated 99 to 96.  The argument of majority partisan rule in a 
democracy trumped the fear of social group domination, even in that deliberative body 
designed to protect social class and church, the U.K. house of lords. 
The final footnote to this event is that ‘loyal’ Canadians took to the street and rioted 
in the wake of the decision to assent to the Bill, and their rebellion resulted in the burning 
of the parliament buildings in Montreal.  They then marched on Lord Elgin’s residence, but 
as this was an era before motorized transportation, the emotion and liquor wore off before 
they reached their destination and their damage was confined to Montreal.  One person’s 
righteous indignation is another person’s rebellion (Despatch from Elgin to Grey, April 30, 
1849) 
Elected Legislative Council 
When Baldwin and La Fontaine announced that their ‘great administration’ had 
done its work in 1851, Francis Hincks and Augustin-Norbert Morin reconstructed the 
Reform ministry with two ‘clear grits’, Malcolm Cameron and John Rolph.  It asked the 
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legislative assembly to form a committee to draft an address to the queen proposing that the 
legislative council be elected, which had been part of their election platform.  The 
committee was chaired by Morin, who had obtained the support of the ministry for an 
elected legislative council of nine-year term councillors, with one-third elected every three 
years.  There was no pecuniary requirement to stand as councillor, but councillors would 
have to have held lower office, either at the municipal level (reeve and warden) or in the 
lower house of the legislative assembly (Hincks, Canada Debates LA, March 16, 1855). 
Morin’s model was modified by the committee, and the address to the queen 
recommended that the British parliament establish a legislative council where Canada East 
and Canada West would be divided into 30 electoral sections, for a total of 60 members, 
one-third of which would be elected every two years (Morin, Canada Debates LA, June 2, 
1853).  Twenty members would be elected at first, and then the current life councillors 
would be compelled to retire in two equal batches in two and four years’ time, to facilitate 
the election of 20 new councillors at each of these milestones.  To be elected, one had to be 
a minimum of 30 years of age, a British subject, in possession of £1,000 of property and 
been a member of the legislative assemblies or legislative councils of Upper Canada, Lower 
Canada or the united Province of Canada (one would have to resign from a chamber to run 
for another).  The crown would retain the right to dissolve both chambers, in the event of 
“the rejection by the said Legislative Council in two successive sessions, and at least at six 
months interval, of a measure which shall have passed the Legislative Assembly in the 
same two sessions, nor unless the said measure shall have passed the Legislative Assembly 
in the second Session by the vote of an absolute majority of the members of the said 
Legislative Assembly” (ibid.).  The powers of the two chambers would be unchanged, 
though the legislative council would be given an additional role of adjudicating 
impeachments of high public officials upon referral from the lower house.  The legislative 
assembly adopted this address to the queen, which passed 54 to 14.  In response, the 
legislative council adopted its own address opposing any such change.  Lord Elgin 
forwarded both addresses to the British government, and expressed his own concerns. 
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The issue of an elected upper chamber became the subject of the 1854 provincial 
election in Canada.  Cartier had been invited to join the previous ministry as chief 
commissioner of public works, but he had refused on the ground that the government did 
not intend to establish a pecuniary requirement as part of its reform plans for the legislative 
council.  In the end, the government was forced to compromise on this point to get the 
legislature to support its address to the queen, and a £1,000 property requirement was 
included.  But in the election Cartier came under criticism on the ‘hustings’ for being an 
aristocrat, with the press reporting that he had pushed for a £2,000 property requirement.  
George Brown campaigned against the scheme which ran contrary to representation by 
population, continuing to leave Upper Canada under-represented given its now larger 
population than Lower Canada. 
The 1854 election was the first to evidence the effects of the new emerging 
cleavage.  The Conservatives effectively took over the Reform administration, with Allan 
MacNab replacing Hincks as the leader in Canada West.  John A. Macdonald, George-
Étienne Cartier and Robert Spence emerged as new Conservative stars in what was clearly 
a coalition Conservative and Reform government, with the Conservatives in control of what 
it claimed was a continuation of the Reform governments of Baldwin-La Fontaine and 
Hincks-Morin. 
The British cabinet asked the British parliament to adopt legislation to give the 
legislative assembly in Canada the authority to amend its constitution with respect to the 
legislative council.147  Not surprising, the strongest objection came from members of the 
house of lords where reference was made to the demands by Papineau in advance of 
rebellion for an elected upper chamber and where it was suggested that the proposed 
change: 
“fundamentally destroys the constitution of one of our most important 
Colonies, and does away with one of the most important safeguards for the 
monarchical element in that constitution—a safeguard which has been 
upheld by successive Governments since the year 1791, and was solemnly 
                                                 
147 An Act to empower the Legislature of Canada to alter the Constitution of the Legislative Council for that 
Province, and for other purposes. 
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confirmed, after full reflection and deliberation, by both Houses of 
Parliament, in settling the constitution of Canada in the year 1840” (Lord 
Stanley, U.K. Debates, HL, June 29, 1854). 
The government avoided all discussion on the merits of an elected chamber, and simply 
called on parliament to “concede to the Parliament of Canada that power which at present 
belongs to the Imperial Parliament”, the right of the legislature as a whole to set the 
institutional rules for each chamber in the legislature (Duke of Newcastle, ibid.).  The Bill 
did not prescribe an institutional design, it merely handed over the authority to the 
Canadian legislature to make changes for the legislature in the future and removed the 
reference to how councillors were appointed from the The Union Act, 1840.148  Concern 
was raised as to what the elimination of the current council would mean for the clergy 
reserves, a matter of concern for the Anglican leadership in the house of lords (Lord St. 
Leonards, ibid.).  The legislation passed along party lines. 
Following the Canadian election, Morin introduced a Bill based on the address 
adopted by the assembly in the previous parliament but this did not proceed (Canada 
Journals, LA, September 27, 1854).149  On February 8, 1855, the new government 
appointed six new legislative councillors.150  And then, Joseph Edouard Cauchon 
introduced a new government “Bill to amend the imperial act re-uniting the Provinces of 
Upper and Lower Canada” to make the legislative council elected (Canada Journals, LA, 
March 16, 1855). 
The new government Bill would leave in place the councillors who had been 
appointed for life, and add to them 48 elected councillors, 24 for each of Canada East and 
West, and once the life councillors ceased to be members they would not be replaced 
making the entire chamber elected (Cauchon, Canada Debates, LA, March 16, 1855).  It 
                                                 
148 While Canada’s constitutional evolution would suggest that this devolution of authority to the legislature 
was simply another step on the road to self-government, it should be noted that the question was raised as to 
whether the British government in turning over this authority did so because it knew that the house of lords 
would not support an amendment to the Act of Union, 1840, making the legislative council elected (Lord St. 
Leonards, U.K. Debates, HL, June 29, 1854). 
149 It was formally discharged on April 13, 1855 (Journals LA). 
150 The government claimed that these appointments would ensure the passage of legislation to make the 
upper chamber elected through the upper house. 
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proposed that for the elected council one-fourth of the council would be elected every two 
years.  To be elected one would have to meet the property qualification of £1,000, the 
minimum age of 30 and be a British subject.  The speaker would be chosen by the 
government and sit in cabinet, as had become the practice with the appointed council.  
There would be no power to dissolve the upper house. 
With respect to the elected chamber that would emerge, the intent was to strike a 
balance between new members and old members at any one time.  As all 48 members 
would be elected in the first instance, they would be familiar with the wishes of the public, 
and at any time, one-fourth would be fresh from meeting with electors while another 
quarter would be getting ready to meet the electors, and half of the members would be 
removed from the shifts in public opinion (Cauchon, Canada Debates, LA, March 27, 
1855). 
“For if that House were to be a mere reflex of the lower chamber, it would 
be better to abolish it.  But if the object of the chamber was to check hasty 
legislation and give the people time to reflect, in that case it must be so 
constituted as to attain those objects” (ibid.). 
The government’s explanation for why it was introducing a Bill for election was 
that it had “bowed to public opinion” (J.A. MacDonald, ibid.).  The opposition took issue 
with the changes to the legislation, from Morin’s first position to the ‘address’ to Morin’s 
Bill to the government’s new Bill, in what appeared to be a ‘flip’ in policy (if one accepted 
the pretence that this was a continuation of the previous government).  For example, Liberal 
leader Alexander Mackenzie claimed Spence (who was now postmaster general) had 
promised his constituents in writing that he would back all policies of the Hincks-Morin 
administration still before the legislature, including the “change in the constitution of the 
Legislative Council so as to make that body elected” (Canada Debates, LA, March 16, 
1855).  Mackenzie also pointed out that Cartier and his colleagues from Lower Canada, in 
1837, had been in regular communication with him and other reformers in Upper Canada in 
defence of those without property against the propertied class, yet were now creating a 
chamber with the principle criterion being wealth. 
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George Brown pointed out that this was not the same government, but rather an 
opportunistic coalition between ideological foes (ibid.).  He told the assembly that when he 
had debated Spence during the election on the issue of an elected legislative council, 
Spence had repudiated the government’s plans.  Brown was concerned that an elected upper 
chamber would lead to deadlock between the two chambers of the legislature, and that it 
did not move Canada West to more representation of which the Conservatives who now sat 
with the government had earlier sided with him over when in opposition.  He now read into 
the record Premier MacNab’s speech against the Reform proposal for an elected council in 
the previous session as follows: 
“He believed a Legislative Council appointed by the Crown was the only 
body which could stand as a check between a corrupt House of Assembly 
and the Governor General.  He opposed an Elective Council, because he 
believed an elective government must follow, and after that, the whole 
system of government of the United States, which would lead to annexation, 
an end which he should much deplore” (ibid.). 
And, he pointed out, that with respect to the right for a government to dissolve the upper 
chamber, Cartier had “believed it necessary for the government to keep, or responsible 
government could not be maintained”, and while Cartier had wanted a property 
qualification for the upper house, he also wanted one for the lower house, and argued that 
its removal would mean that “the Upper House would possess all the weight and 
responsibility” (ibid.). 
In spite of the divisive debate, which was a continuation of the partisan politics of 
the recent election and the shifting partisan cleavage in both halves of the province, the 
house came down united in support of the legislation, with 80 members agreeing in 
principle and voting to send it to a ‘committee of the whole house’, with only four opposing 
it in principle (Canada Journals, March 28, 1855).151  At third reading, Brown 
unsuccessfully tried to have representation by population introduced for the legislative 
council and to have the power of dissolution included.  Brown would try this repeatedly at 
every stage with each incarnation of this Bill.  The Bill passed the lower chamber, 71 to 9 
                                                 
151 Brown, Cameron, Larwill and Wilson were opposed. 
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(Canada Journals, LA, May 12, 1855).152  It was delayed in the legislative council and did 
not pass before the end of the session. 
The Bill was reintroduced by Cauchon in the new session (Canada Journals, LA, 
March 7, 1856).  On second reading it again received overwhelming support in principle, 
by a margin of 83 to 6 (Canada Journals, LA, March 14, 1856).  Brown again led the small 
opposition, claiming that it would create “one of the most absolute, arbitrary, Tory bodies 
known under any system of representative government in the world” (Canada Debates, LA, 
March 14, 1856). 
In the upper chamber, Pierre De Boucherville objected to the fact that this was now 
being pushed by the government, arguing that it should have been a general Bill that 
originated in the legislative council (Canada Journals, LC, April 18, 1856).  Ten legislative 
councillors joined together in the position that the “present basis, as a check equally upon 
the hasty action of the Popular Branch, as upon the undue influence of the Crown”, an 
appointed upper chamber was preferable to an elected upper chamber that would give 
“undue preponderance to the popular element” and lead to “the destruction of Executive 
responsibility, the adoption of a written constitution, the election of the highest officer of 
the Crown, and the separation of Canada from the Parent State” (ibid.).153 
A select committee of the upper house was struck to study the Bill on April 18, 
1856, chaired by Peter McGill, and, after it reported its amendments, additional 
amendments were made in the ‘committee of the whole’ on April 24, 1856, and accepted 
by the lower chamber the same day.  On May 16, 1856, the Bill was submitted to the 
governor general for assent, and he reserved it for the British government.  An Act to 
change the Constitution of the Legislative Council by rendering the same Elective received 
the assent of the queen-in-imperial council on June 24, 1856, and was proclaimed by the 
governor general of Canada on July 14, 1856. 
                                                 
152 The former was defeated 56 to 20 and the latter 58 to 17. 
153 This dissent was signed by P.B. DeBlaquière, John Hamilton, George J. Goodhue, William Walker, C. 
Widmer, James Gordon, J. Ferrier, R. Matheson, G.S. Boulton and Walter Dickson. 
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The only significant difference between the Bill proposed by Cauchon in 1855 and 
that which was adopted by the legislative assembly in 1856 is that the property qualification 
was raised to £2,000.  Property did not have to be in the district for which a candidate ran, 
only in the province of Canada.  On the other hand, eligibility to vote for councillors was 
the same as for the lower chamber, and this was linked to owning property in the electoral 
district. 
One postscript to the debate in the legislature over this legislation is of note.  At the 
same time that this legislation was passing, the legislative council was voting on a motion 
to dissolve the province of Canada and combine it with Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island under a single central legislature with ‘municipal’ 
governments, under lieutenant governors for each of the six divisions, having greater 
authority for local matters.  The lower house was, in turn, voting on a motion to simply 
divide Upper and Lower Canada again into separate provinces.  Both motions were 
defeated.  The need to overcome the new partisan cleavage that had been so divisive during 
the previous election, which made an elected upper chamber possible, was convincing some 
that the then-current institutional arrangements in terms of a united province governed by a 
single legislature was untenable. 
III. Conclusion 
During this period of institutional change in the united province of Canada, there 
were shifts in the social cleavage and the partisan cleavage.  This is in keeping with our 
hypothesis that a shift in the social cleavage would be necessary for a partisan group to 
achieve institutional change that had previously been opposed by a group on one side of the 
cleavage.  With respect to the social cleavage, the union of the two provinces subsumed 
group identity politics beneath the more pronounced French-English East-West cleavage.  
As the relative population of the two halves altered, the group that resented union shifted 
from the French majority to the English majority.  Loyalty to Britain diminished, as the 
struggle for self-government, loss of preferential trade status and military protection, and 
changing public opinion in England fed a new and growing ‘Canadian’ identity, which 
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helped to counter the imported social group identity that immigrants brought with them 
based on their religion and country of origin. 
The partisan cleavage shifted, and with it political movements were changed.  Union 
began with a continuation of the divide that had come to dominate Upper and Lower 
Canadian politics.  This pitted the British governors and the local elite ‘compacts’ that 
surrounded him and controlled power in each of the provinces, against a growing middle 
class that entered provincial politics through the lower chambers of the assembly.  This 
cleavage would be eliminated by the grant of responsible government.  By transferring 
responsibility for governing to the leaders of the political party that could command a 
majority in the lower chamber, the seeds were planted for the emergence of a new type of 
political party.  Candidates running for and against those who were temporary custodians of 
the government, as the ministry of the day, defined the new partisan cleavage.  This was not 
ideologically based, though there were ideological threads running through the various 
movements in each half of the province.  The primary motivation for these ‘parties’ was the 
desire to form a government under the new rules imposed by responsible government. 
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that based on the experience of England 
and the early experience in Canada, the Westminster-model might result in a standard 
trajectory of agitation for institutional change.  This is different than the claim made by 
constitutional scholars, like Keith (1928), that representative government and then 
responsible government were grants of the British crown to encourage colonial settlement 
and growth, an idea that has its roots in the political economy model advanced by 
Wakefield.  Instead, it suggests that some institutional changes may occur within the British 
constitutional model, in part, as an artifact of democratic ideas being grafted onto the 
monarchical system. 
Based on the British experience, the next institutional changes after the 
establishment of representative government were expected to be: (a) the monarch 
appointing persons to the cabinet who could ensure passage through the lower chamber of 
‘supply’ and of a civil list; (b) the legislature insisting that these cabinet ministers be 
accountable to the legislature, individually, for their departments and, collectively, for the 
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actions of the executive and for the money that is allocated to them by the legislature; (c) 
that with collective responsibility, the ‘cabinet’  would insist that the governor take its 
advice or it would feel compelled to resign, the very threat of which would bring pressure 
to bear on the governor to accept responsible government.  This theory of Westminster-
model institutional development would be falsified if the trajectory ran in different 
directions in difference polities.   
What we saw during this period was a re-creation of the development of responsible 
government in England.  Each step  occurred as expected, and while Governor Metcalfe 
attempted to reverse this trajectory, with the full weight of the British government and the 
support of the British parliament behind him, buttressed by the normative theory of 
parliamentary supremacy which had become constitutionalized thanks to Austin and Dicey, 
he was unable to put the genie back into the bottle, even with the might of the British army, 
patronage and prestige of office, and the added benefit of an American threat to encourage 
colonists to toe the British line.  It is noteworthy that in England, kings and queens a 
century earlier had equally tried to limit or reverse concessions to the lower chamber they 
had made.   
As will be explored in the next chapter, these stages of development were also 
copied in the Atlantic Provinces, though at different speeds and times.  With respect to 
Nova Scotia, the government that claims to have received responsible government before 
Canada, Lord Grey was forced to address similar arguments in support of responsible 
government from Joseph Howe, in what was a less socially divided province.  His response 
would be swift and unequivocal.  Nova Scotia was thus able to progress rapidly from 
governor’s council, to representative government to responsible government.  But the 
struggle began first in Canada and the ideas, while informed by Jeffersonian and British 
ideas of democracy, were Canadian.  Even the labels used for parties, such as Reform, 
Tory, Conservative and Liberal, were adopted first in the province of Canada. 
While the battle for responsible government began in Canada, the social cleavage in 
this province prevented both the British government from acknowledging the changes it 
had accepted and the local governors from respecting the changes they knew needed to be 
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made.  A fair assessment, which was made by Governor Bagot at the time, was that Canada 
had responsible government with the first Baldwin-La Fontaine ministry.  Canadian 
politicians also were convinced of this fact, even in the face of set-backs under Metcalfe, 
and began to use labels like ‘cabinet’, ‘ministers’, ‘ministry’, ‘premier’, ‘government’ and 
‘opposition’ in their political discourse surrounding the provincial executive. 
The appointment of Elgin as governor general for North America, by the Whig 
Colonial Secretary Lord Grey, reflected the British government’s resignation that the 
partisan reality of the province of Canada, in spite of their concerns over the social cleavage 
in the province, required responsible government.  Elgin, having taken the lay of the 
partisan landscape, informed the British government and his provincial Tory executive of 
his intention to respect the electoral outcome in Canada and let the United Reform Party 
form a government if it won the next election (Despatch from Elgin to Grey, July 13, 
1847).   The independence of Grey from the Whig ministry, as a Conservative member of 
the house of lords, allowed for the British government to avoid a partisan battle in its own 
parliament, which would have been fuelled by prejudices against the French, following the 
rebellion in the Canadas.  In the end, the appointment of the government of La Fontaine and 
Baldwin was simply a response to the challenge posed by having to govern with (i) a 
legislature in which a partisan cleavage had emerged over (ii) a province which had a 
strong social cleavage. 
The 1854 election made replacing the appointed upper chamber with an elected 
legislative council a partisan issue.  This reform package reflected shifts in the partisan 
cleavage which were occurring in the province, with the Conservatives and the Blues 
emerging to replace the Reformers who had previously come to power in opposition to the 
British governors.  The partisan cleavage would lead to the creation of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties.  This shifting partisan cleavage was also pointing to a deficiency in 
the institutional arrangements in the province of Canada, beyond the method of selection of 
the upper chamber, in that it was becoming increasingly difficult for a single party to win 
both halves of the province.  The idea of dividing Canada and separating local from federal 
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matters was beginning to find ground in both chambers and on both sides of the social 
cleavage and on both sides of the partisan cleavage.   
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) predicted that social cleavages will result in the creation 
of political parties.  As we saw in the previous chapter, while the social cleavage and 
partisan cleavages aligned there were in fact political parties which reflected social group 
identity in both provinces.  In Upper Canada this would pit the largely Francophone 
Canadien and later Patriote Party against the British Party.  In Upper Canada the reform 
movement was also initially identified with cultural markers, informed as it was by 
religious aspirations for the clergy reserves, in opposition to the Anglican Church and the 
Family Compact Party.  Even at the outset, the emergence of a partisan movement in 
opposition to the holders of power was not exclusively defined by the social cleavage in the 
province, as membership on each side was decidedly mixed.  This was not the era in which 
modern political parties began to emerge. 
When a partisan cleavage emerged in the province of Canada that was strong 
enough to lay the groundwork for what would become political parties in the modern sense, 
this did not develop along the fault line of the social cleavage, but rather it crossed this 
social cleavage.  It was precisely because of the need to overcome the social cleavage that a 
partisan cleavage emerged with the principle goal of achieving institutional change. 
From the perspective of the partisan cleavage, it went through a two-step 
transformation.  The first was designed to force the ruling elites, who were admittedly 
representatives of a social cleavage, as identified by Lipset and Rokkan, to accept the 
transfer of executive power into the hands of legislators who, in turn, appeared to have the 
support of the population.  This was accomplished by a group which could cross the social 
cleavage.  Following the emergence of this democratic principle on government formation, 
the group that emerged as the first political party was that which could maintain the support 
of the majority in the legislature and, when examined through the dual lens of partisan and 
social cleavages, this ‘party’ was specifically successful, at least in the case of the province 
of Canada, because it could cross the social cleavage.  Over time this party’s ideological 
roots shifted from being progressive to conservative, based on the way the issues of the day 
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were perceived, and it cut across the social cleavage.  This is a direct contradiction of 
Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis on both points. 
The partisan cleavage shifted following responsible government, from being defined 
by institutional reform to being government and opposition.  And the party had become 
largely conservative in the ideology of the day.  This conservative ‘government’ party 
which emerged during the era of responsible government equally maintained its support 
across the social cleavage.  So the ‘first’ political party in Canada was the faux Liberal-
Conservative Party and it was not defined by the social cleavage, but by the partisan 
cleavage. 
The emergence of the first ‘party’ which cut across the social cleavage to achieve 
‘reform’ (in this case responsible government) might be attributed to the structural make-up 
of this one province’s legislature, where representation in the two chambers was equal for 
each half of the province, thereby forcing political parties to work together to achieve a 
majority, but the second development suggests that institutional change requires a level of 
consensus that includes elites from both sides of the social cleavage, a central hypothesis of 
this dissertation.  This idea will be tested in the next chapters for the Atlantic Provinces, the 
federation of Canada, and the non-British province of Manitoba. 
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Chapter 6: Staggered Institutional Development – 
Britain’s Atlantic Provinces 
While the province of Canada offers the first experience with uninterrupted 
governance by Europeans in what will eventually become the country of Canada, the first 
British institutions of governance were established in the Atlantic Provinces.154  These were 
settler colonies.155  Each had important economic and military value, and thus became 
important colonies for Britain during its quest for empire that spanned the globe through 
the establishment of fortifications and permanent settlements in competition with other 
imperial powers. 
The general approach to researching this chapter has been the same as with respect 
to the province of Canada, namely to process trace institutional change and thus to (a) map 
the development of upper chambers, (b) examine the changes which occurred as the 
colonies moved along what was expected to be a standard trajectory from governor assisted 
by a nominee council to representative bicameral legislatures and eventually to responsible 
government and (c) to place these institutional developments in their social and political 
contexts.  It is by placing these institutions in context that we are able to examine how 
social and partisan groups interact over institutional design and change.  
Our initial hypothesis was that social cleavages in these colonies would act to 
constrain institutional change: the more divisive a social cleavage, the more resistance 
advocates for change will encounter, thus delaying institutional change along what is now 
seen as a standard British institutional trajectory.  Agitation for change begins with 
normative ideas advanced by activists, writers and thinkers, which then capture the 
imagination of a polity’s elites.  These ideas are disseminated by publishing and travel, 
finding their way into the corridors of government.  The changes commended by these 
ideas may be embraced by elites in one particular social group, as was seen in Upper and 
                                                 
154 The Canadian government has established, as part of the country’s narrative, Canada’s founding as when 
Samuel Champlain established a settlement at Quebec City in 1608 on behalf of the French crown. 
155 As noted in the previous two chapters, Quebec was a ceded colony,  large sections of Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland were ceded by France, and most of Canada was ceded 
from the indigenous aboriginal populations. 
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Lower Canada, but substantive change will only occur when a partisan group emerges in a 
polity that can, alone or in coalition with other partisan groups, appeal to multiple social 
groups in that polity and, in so doing, effectively bridge the social cleavage.  It is believed 
that bridging the social cleavage is necessary to alleviate suspicion by members of weaker 
social groups, who will often assume that the intended consequence of any change will be 
to weaken their relative situation or power within society.  This suspicion of other groups’ 
motives is why, it is postulated, that ‘out’ social groups will usually prefer the status quo, 
even when changes are being advocated that have the potential to increase their relative 
standing. 
The provinces examined in this chapter are Nova Scotia (and Cape Breton), New 
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.  The prescribed institutional design 
for settler colonies was a bicameral legislature with an appointed governor’s council, which 
would act as both an upper chamber for the legislature and as a body which could 
administer the colony’s judicial and executive apparatus; and a lower chamber in the 
bicameral legislature to be elected by persons who held property in the colony.  This 
‘representative government’ was not only prescribed by the prevailing political economic 
theory in Britain, it was necessary to raise revenue in the colony for the construction and 
maintenance of public works. 
Legally, settlers were only guaranteed the common and statute law of Britain as 
existed at the time of their migration.  But the land companies offered prospecti that 
promised this model of representative government to potential settlers.  That such an 
institution was not established immediately for each of these colonies offers the first 
evidence of provincial social divisions resulting in a delay in institutional change. 
Once representative government was established in each of these colonies, in all the 
provinces except for Newfoundland, a demand emerged that the upper chamber be elected.  
This change only occurred in Prince Edward Island, where a property qualification was 
established to vote for legislative councillors, thus preserving this chamber’s 
representational role on behalf of property owners, as property ownership defined this 
province’s social cleavage. 
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At some point in all of these provinces, members of the lower chamber began to 
demand that the governor’s council be divided into an executive council and a legislative 
council, so that the upper chamber was not dominated by the executive.  Following this 
change, the next demand was that the executive become accountable to the lower chamber 
and not to the governor. 
In British constitutional law, responsible government in a colony violates the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy at Westminster.  So governors were instructed to 
oppose its introduction, as British kings and queens had a century before.  Since each 
province followed the same developmental trajectory and obtained responsible government 
in the end, it is posited that this agitation for ‘reform’ may be endemic to British style 
representative institutions.  It is also due to the settlers’ familiarity with its form, a belief 
that this would be the most acceptable to the British government, fealty to the British crown 
and because this idea was being advanced in the neighbouring province of Canada, though 
none of these explanations (except for fealty to the crown) explain why it had emerged in 
England a century earlier.  In the case of Prince Edward Island, the legislature also 
followed Canada’s lead in making its upper chamber elected.   
Having established that the standard trajectory was followed in each province, the 
question remains as to why it was not followed simultaneously.  These were colonies of an 
‘empire’, and an empire is defined by the common governance that is used to manage 
multiple territories.  Institutional structures should have been uniform and imperial policy 
implementation should have been unequivocal and absolute.  Yet it was not.  Thus, it is by 
examining the variations in staggered development that we gain insight into why popular 
institutional design as well as imperial directives can be constrained by local societal 
factors. 
What emerges is evidence that the colonies with a divisive social cleavage reflected 
in their legislature found their development along the ‘normal’ institutional trajectory 
delayed.  In each of these provinces, when change occurred, it was the result of a partisan 
group emerging that had among its membership leaders of both sides of the social cleavage.  
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Additionally, a shift in the primary social cleavage, and thus ‘in’ group boundaries, often 
occurred in advance of a significant change in institutional structure and function. 
Political parties emerged slower in these provinces than in the province of Canada, 
though in each of these provinces the party labels used in Canada came to be used by their 
politicians, providing further evidence of the portability of ideas.  More interestingly, 
however, was that in the case of New Brunswick, until political parties began to emerge, 
responsible government could not. 
I. Nova Scotia 
In the case of Nova Scotia, the province began with a clearly defined social 
cleavage that divided French or ‘Acadien’ catholic and English protestant.  This cleavage 
had a unifying effect on the English protestants who embraced the construct of being 
British.  As expected, the Acadians’ representatives repeatedly demanded the status quo.  
This was initially granted by the British officials and would have continued to be granted 
by the British government if local military officers and governors had not acted illegally 
and expelled this population.  What is interesting and often overlooked is the role of the 
appointed council, which was used by the governor to provide legitimacy for the expulsion 
and which, as the body representating the British residents, was convinced by the governor 
to defence their status quo.  With the French removed from the province, the province 
obtained representative government, with an elected lower chamber being added in 1758. 
The new social cleavage that emerged after the Acadian expulsion was between the 
Scottish catholics in Cape Breton and the British protestants on the mainland.  As expected, 
when a partisan group emerged that had representatives from both sides of this social 
cleavage, institutional change occurred.  It obtained responsible government after only a 
decade of it being a partisan issue, whereas in Canada it had taken two. 
In 1719, the commission appointing Richard Philipps, governor of Nova Scotia 
(known by the French as ‘Acadie’), established a governor’s council of twelve, with five 
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councillors required to be present for quorum.156  The authority to appoint members of the 
council was delegated to the governor, and he was authorized to appoint persons of 
substance in the colony or that he took with him to the colony, something he promptly did 
upon his arrival.  He was issued separate instructions to not increase or decrease the size of 
the council without good cause.  This council had all three functions of: advising the 
governor on the administration of local governance, acting as a legislative body and being a 
judicial court of appeal.  The seat of government during the early period was at Annapolis 
Royal. 
The governor’s council in Nova Scotia became one of the most active colonial 
councils when it came to governance of British interests overseas.  It was this council 
which organized immigration and managed the relationship with the ceded French 
colonists, the Acadians, and, eventually, it was this council that was used to provide cover 
for the governor and his co-conspirators in their unauthorized move to expel and confiscate 
the lands of this large ‘out’ social group. 
The Acadians had been largely ignored by the French crown, given their isolated 
location.   The French employed a feudal land structure, and French mercantilist policy 
forbade trade with non-French colonies and ports.  Yet, the Acadians considered the land 
they tamed to be their own and traded freely with English and French merchants alike, 
regardless of which imperial power held temporary dominance over their territory.  Some 
of the land the Acadians claimed was the best in Nova Scotia for agriculture, having been 
created through the construction of ‘aboiteaux’ (a form of dyke construction the colonists 
brought with them from France).  Since this was, from the local aboriginal population’s 
perspective, land that did not-exist, the Acadians had strong and friendly relations with the 
indigenous Mi’kmaq population and there was frequent intermarriage and cross-cultural 
                                                 
156 In 1717, Philipps had been informed by letter of his appointment as “Governor of Placentia in Newfoundland 
and Captain General and Governor in Chief of the Province of Nova Scotia”.  The commission issued in 1719 gave 
him the title, for Nova Scotia, of “Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of Nova Scotia or Acadie in 
America”. 
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exchange.157  While the Acadians considered themselves neutral in the frequent conflicts 
between the British and French monarchs and between New France and New England 
colonists, the same was not true for the Mi’kmaq who had strong economic and military 
ties to the local French garrisons and who had been proselytised by French missionaries. 
The original push of immigration that saw the Acadians flee France was the conflict 
between Huguenots (French protestants) and catholics, so their relationship with clerics was 
not one of subservience, as it was in other parts of New France; the frequent shifts in 
imperial domination meant that the presence of clergy was intermittent, with laymen often 
performing the weekly religious ceremonies, especially during times of British ascendancy 
in the region; and the early Roman Catholic clergy who came to the region were more 
interested in the glory of saving aboriginal souls than in ministering to the Acadian faithful.   
The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) turned roughly 2,300 Acadians on the territory of 
Acadie over to the British, and this French speaking population was given one year to either 
remove themselves to the territory retained by the French crown or to accept British 
sovereignty.  The symbol for this transfer of allegiance was the oath.  Requiring an oath 
was a common practice for all imperial powers in this era, and the British practice was to 
require a new oath to be taken whenever a new monarch took the throne.  As the religious 
composition of each colony varied, the oath to be administered was determined by the 
governor-in-council for each colony.  In Nova Scotia, the council did not deal with the 
question of the oath at the outset, so Acadians were not made to swear an oath in 1714 as 
required by the treaty, a decision that reinforced the Acadians’ belief for several 
generations that they could remain neutral in the continuing hostilities between the British 
and French (Bumsted 1992, 70). 
What the governor’s council did was to deal with the Acadians as a collective.  
Individual communities were instructed to select deputies to appear on their behalf before 
the council.  This was not a formal representative body for the Acadians, as under British 
                                                 
157 By creating land where there previously had been only marsh, the Acadians were not in conflict with the 
aboriginal population over land disputes the way other European settlers were in North America, since the 
Mi’kmaq did not consider the land reclaimed as having been previously theirs. 
  
 
213
law catholics could not hold office or vote.  But while unofficial, the selection of deputies 
added to the Acadian’s sense of possessing independent communities.  So well beyond the 
linguistic and cultural ties that sometimes bind individuals in a society and cause them to 
become a social group distinct from others, the Acadian communities emerged as one side 
of a distinct cleavage that defined Nova Scotia society.  The Acadian sense of identity was 
further constructed upon “individualism, in which the head of family fished and farmed for 
himself and his dependents, and collectivism, in which farmers worked together to sustain 
and extend the aboiteaux that won rich land for them from the sea” (Laxer 2007).   
When George II ascended the throne in 1727, the taking of a new oath put the 
question of the Acadians again before the council in a more serious manner.  The deputies 
of the Acadians had taken the position that their communities would take an oath of 
allegiance to the king and to the British government, but wanted to be exempted from 
having to take up arms against the French or the Mi’kmaq in the event of war.  The council 
believed that property ownership, which the Acadians were entitled to under the British 
law, requires one to defend the land.  Governor Philipps seemingly broke the impasse 
between the council and the deputies in 1729, by going community to community and 
having each Acadian male, 15 years of age or older, sign the oath prescribed by the council, 
and, in return, he would write in the margin of the oath or give verbal assurances to the 
community that they would not have to take up arms.  The oath read “I sincerely promise 
and swear in the faith of a Christian that I will be entirely faithful and will truly obey His 
Majesty King George the Second, whom I recognize as the sovereign lord of Nova Scotia 
and of Acadie.  So help me God” (Ross et Deveau 1992, 57). 
Acadians were not entirely relegated to the margins. Abbé Jean-Louis Le Loutre of 
Louisbourg, who had come in 1737 to convert Mi’kmaq to catholicism and repeatedly tried 
to get the Acadians to side with the French crown whom he served, threatened Acadians 
who had taken positions in the Nova Scotia government’s administration with 
excommunication. Similarly a priest in Minas denied the sacraments to an Acadian who 
had taken a government commission (Plank 2001, 99).  But there were no petitions by the 
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Acadians for formal representation.  This social group wanted only what it thought was the 
status quo. 
The War of Austrian Succession broke out in 1774, and the Mi’kmaq joined forces 
with the French to seize the British fort at Canso.  In response, the government of 
Massachusetts declared war against the Mi’kmaq in 1745, and offered rewards for scalps.  
Deputies of the Acadians in eastern Nova Scotia were able to convince the council in Nova 
Scotia to exempt all Acadians of Mi’kmaq ancestry from the bounty policy by pointing out 
that they had taken an oath of allegiance to the British monarch (ibid., 111).  It is 
noteworthy that Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts first expressed his opinion that 
the Acadians should be removed from the territory during this conflict. 
British policy was simply to dilute the catholic population in all of its territories and 
this would have been true for Acadie even if there had not been regular attacks by French 
and Mi’kmaq warriors, making Acadians’ loyalty constantly suspect.  To begin the dilution, 
an unprecedented relocation program was launched, with the government offering to pay 
the relocation expenses for over 2,500 people.  This population transfer included ex-
soldiers and trades people, mostly from the northeast of London, though among these were 
settlers of Irish descent (McCreath et Leefe 1990, 196-203).  These settlers arrived with 
Governor Edward Cornwallis, who set about building a new capital at a strategic harbour 
that would become Halifax. 
The commission appointing Cornwallis as governor on May 6, 1749 changed the 
method of appointment for the governor’s council from one of delegated authority to one of 
appointment by the king, with the governor authorized to make ‘provisional’ appointments, 
a change that would become key to dissolving this upper chamber in the 1920s.158  The 
governor was authorized to provisionally appoint such men as he felt were ‘fitting and 
discreet’ to form a council of 12.  Having learned from the problems with the governor’s 
councils in what would become the United States of America, the governor was also 
empowered to provisionally appoint additional councillors up to nine, if fewer than nine 
                                                 
158 Cornwallis’ formal title was ‘Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief’. 
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should cease to reside in the province; unless, of course, the king appointed additional 
councillors in the meantime.  In other words, all appointments would have to be confirmed 
by the king in England; the council would be 12, though the governor would always be 
assured of having at least nine councillors resident in the colony.  
Life was hard in the province and many settlers left, so the British government in 
1749 found a second source of settlers, and that was protestant settlers from Europe, 
specifically German, Swiss and even some French Huguenots.159  They were offered free 
passage and support for a year.  While most of these settlers remained in Halifax, some 
established communities outside of the capital and the German descendants, in and around 
Lunenburg, trace their origins to this initial wave of migration. 
Conflict with the Mi’kmaq was fairly constant between 1749 and 1755 in what is 
variously called Father Le Loutre’s War, the Micmac War, the Indian War and the Anglo-
Micmac War.  This was a period of cold war between the English and French in Nova 
Scotia, with both sides building forts and enhancing fortifications.  The establishment of 
Halifax was a strategic move by the British as a staging ground that could counter 
Louisbourg in Île Royale (what would become Cape Breton).  Of course the problem with 
Halifax is that it was built on land claimed by the Mi’kmaq.  The French fort of Beauséjour 
was another such strategic construction, at the head of the Bay of Fundy between what is 
now the boarder of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and its complication was that this 
was a region populated by Acadians and thus raised further doubts about their loyalty as 
supply lines and troop movements were at risk of being spied upon and betrayed. 
There were 24 recorded conflicts during Father Le Loutre’s War, of which 13 were 
raids on Halifax (Patterson 1994).  Abbé Le Loutre led the Mi’kmaq and French attacks, 
with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lawrence leading the British troops, and John Gorham 
commanding the New England Rangers.160  Following in the wake of this cold war build-
up, came a hot war, the French and Indian War, which, in turn, became the Seven Years 
                                                 
159 Campey (2010, 83) suggests that this was due to public opinion in Britain being opposed to the relocation 
of labour that could be used for the military or the economy to the colonies. 
160 Gorham was a member of the governor’s council from 1949 to 1951. 
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War when France and England went to war in Europe. Succeeding Cornwallis as governor 
in 1752 was Peregrine Hopson.  Shortly after his appointment, Lieutenant Colonel 
Lawrence was assigned the job of settling protestant colonists in Lunenburg.  In 
appreciation, Hopson recommended that Lawrence be appointed to the council, and then 
made him president.  When Hopson developed severe eye trouble, he temporarily 
surrendered the governorship to Charles Lawrence and returned to England in 1753. 
It was under Lawrence, and the council, that the principle cleavage in the colony 
would be irreversibly altered.  Not surprisingly, Lawrence saw military matters as his 
principle priority, and worked at length with the other governors and generals in North 
America, most especially Massachusetts Governor Shirley, for a common military 
settlement strategy.  Instrumental was the decision by Lawrence and Shirley to capture Fort 
Beauséjour, an exercise carried out with troops and ships from Massachusetts as well as the 
British troops in Nova Scotia under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Monckton. 
Even before his appointment as acting governor, Lawrence had become convinced 
that the Acadians were an obstacle to “make Nova Scotia a secure and flourishing outpost 
of the British Empire in North America” and that the best solution was expulsion (Griffiths 
1992, 86).  However, the decision for expulsion was undertaken by and with the advice and 
consent of the governor’s council in 1755.161  For his part, Governor Shirley was also an 
early advocate of expulsion, and while his views changed back and forth between 
assimilation and expulsion, New England puritanism (a fervent anti-catholic devotion 
which had led to the Salem witch trials), the ongoing conflict between Massachusetts and 
aboriginal people, the short-term goal of agricultural land for New England colonists and 
the long-term goal of continental expansion resulted in his becoming the most fierce and 
influential advocate of expulsion.  Massachusetts would provide the ships, Monckton 
would do his duty as a soldier and carry out the deportation and Lawrence would use the 
council to give it the cloak of legality. 
                                                 
161 In 1755, the governor’s council consisted of five persons: Benjamin Green, John Collier, William 
Cotterell, John Rous and Jonathan Belcher. 
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There are more than 200 books and articles in print concerning the deportation (for a 
good bibliography, see Harbec 1988), and within this literature there is disagreement over 
whether or not the bulk of responsibility for the grand dérangement lies with the British 
government, Governor Lawrence, Governor Shirley, Admirals Boscawen and Mostyn, 
Colonel Robert Monckton, the French and Mi’kmaq and their intermediary Abbé Le 
Loutre, or the circumstances of war.  Surprisingly little consideration is given to the role of 
the Nova Scotia governor’s council, since it is wrongly assumed by historians that in this 
era an appointed council would be merely a cadre of the governor’s own men. 
The analogy of the governor’s councils to the royal council of the Tudor kings, 
which has been made several times in this dissertation, is worth repeating.  Appointed 
ruling councils, even ones whose membership can be easily removed, have the capacity to 
oppose.  The very reason deliberative bodies are created in non-democratic polities is 
because they provide insulation for unpopular or even unconstitutional action; of which the 
corollary is that collectively they have the capacity to thwart ill-advised decisions.  
Individual members will have varying degrees of independence, depending on the terms of 
their appointment, their own standing in the community, their relationship to the ruler, and 
their personal capital. Thus the role of the council in an event such as this is an interesting 
one, made even more so because Nova Scotia’s governor’s council had, prior to this point, 
an effective relationship with the deputies chosen by the Acadians, and it had repeatedly 
shown the capacity to bridge the province’s cleavage even in the face of armed hostility.  
Yet the council would end up providing the cover for the expulsion of roughly 13,000 
Acadians. 
The British military demanded that the Acadians surrender their weapons and their 
boats, fearing “a potential fifth column” (Bumsted 1992, 70).  In response, 15 deputies 
selected by the Acadian community of Minas (what is now the Grand Pré region) had come 
to Halifax to deliver a ‘memorial’ (i.e. a petition) on behalf of the residents of Minas, 
Pisquid and the river Canard, asking to keep their possessions.  A meeting was held 
between the council and the deputies and the petition was examined point by point.  The 
minutes of the meeting at the governor’s house on July 3, 1755 have the council concluding 
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that the petition was “an Insult upon His Majesty’s Authority” (Atkinson et Thomas 1993, 
247). 
During the meeting, Lawrence proposed that the deputies present take an oath, 
without reservation.  In a subsequent despatch to the Board of Trade dated July 18, 1755, 
Lawrence reports that when asked to take the oath “they endeavoured, as much as possible 
to evade it, and at least desired to return home and consult with the rest of the Inhabitants, 
that they might either accept or refuse the Oath in a body; but they were informed that we 
expected every man upon this occasion to answer for himself, and as we would not use any 
compulsion or surprise, we gave them twenty-four hours time to deliver in their answer; 
and, if they should then refuse, they must expect to be driven out of the country” (NS 
Sessional Papers, re: Removal of Acadians, vol. 2, 259).  The Acadians were simply 
advocating for the status quo, including their collective right to decision-making and their 
right to consult as deputies.  However, these rights were nowhere established in law, since 
the selection of deputies was an informal practice.  So the next day when asked 
unequivocally to take the oath, they had no choice but to refuse, and were arrested.  
Lawrence reports that upon being arrested they offered to take the oath and it was declined 
to them on the grounds that they were no longer British subjects and instructions were sent 
to their communities to send new deputies (ibid., 260).162  
On July 25, 1755, one week later, the council met with 30 deputies selected from the 
Acadian communities of Minas and Annapolis Royal, who had brought another memorial, 
this one signed by the 207 inhabitants.  The memorial agreed to the surrender of all 
firearms, stressing that they would never have used them against his majesty’s government, 
attesting the loyalty to the British king and Nova Scotia government of all who signed, and 
asserting that some in the community had even risked their lives for the British crown by 
providing intelligence on French activities.  The memorial instructed the deputies to “do or 
                                                 
162 Despatches and council minutes related to the expulsion have been assembled under the authority of the 
Nova Scotia legislature in its sessional papers under the title “Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal of the 
Acadian French from Nova Scotia, 1755-1768”. 
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say nothing contrary to His Majesty’s Council” but also instructed them to contract no new 
oath.  The petitioners wrote: 
“We are resolved to adhere to that which we have taken, and to which we 
have been faithful as far as circumstances required it; for the enemies of His 
Majesty have urged us to take up arms against the government, but we have 
taken care not to do so” (ibid., 261).  
The council proceeded to question the deputies about the nature of their loyalty and what 
intelligence had been provided and found these claims unsubstantiated or, at least, found 
the deputies unable to provide evidence of where information had been provided to the 
government in a manner where it saved lives. 
Lawrence and Shirley had proposed to the British government that the Acadians’ 
land be forfeited in favour of New Englanders, but neither received positive responses, 
even from the Board of Trade which was the most favourably inclined body towards 
provincial development and expansion.  Lawrence had no authority to expel the Acadians 
on his own and he acknowledged as much to the Board of Trade in London, asking them to 
give him the authority (Mahaffie 1995, 248).  In January 1755, the Board of Trade would 
only go so far as to agree that New Englanders would make good settlers, if, following the 
capture of French military installations, the Acadians fled to Cape Breton Island, St. John’s 
Island (now PEI) or Canada, and suggested that Lawrence consult with the chief justice of 
Nova Scotia on what would be legal with respect to forfeiture of land, stressing that land 
should only be confiscated by legal means.   
On July 28, the council met again, this time with the chief justice and Admiral 
Boscawen present, and formally concluded that since “it had been before determined to 
send all the French Inhabitants out of the Province if they refused to Take the Oaths, 
nothing now remained to be considered but what Measures should be Taken to send them 
away, and where they should be sent to” (NS Sessional Papers, re: Removal of Acadians, 
vol. 2, 265).  That this decision was not in keeping with British policy was made clear in a 
despatch from the colonial secretary to Lawrence: 
“It cannot therefore, be too much recommended to you, to use the greatest 
Caution and Prudence in your conduct towards these Neutrals, and to assure 
such of them, as may be trusted, especially upon their taking the Oaths to His 
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Majesty, and His Government, That they remain in the quiet possession of 
Their Settlements, under proper Regulations” (Despatch from Robinson to 
Lawrence, August 13, 1755). 
Yet no punishment was given for the action, with Monckton who organized the logistics of 
deportation being elevated to lieutenant-governor and Lawrence being confirmed as 
governor. 
The one point on which most Acadian scholars agree is that the taking of oaths was 
designed to trap the Acadians.  It should be pointed out that this was also a trap laid for the 
council.  The council had no room to manoeuvre with respect to the oath given the fact that 
the deputies of the Acadians, while chosen by the residents, had no formal authority to 
represent their communities, and the oath in law was an obligation of every subject of the 
king, to be taken in the manner that had been set by the governor-in-council.  Phillips’ 
clever addition of addenda in the margin was designed to placate the Acadians but it did not 
alter the oath in law.  The Acadians wanted the status quo, but the status quo did not exist 
in law, only in practice.  Lawrence, backed by Shirley, had no desire to alter the status quo 
in law, or to continue Philipps’ practice of letting the Acadians at worst believe and at best 
be exempt from the obligation of property owners to take up arms on behalf of the king. 
With the Acadians and the cleavage they represented removed, the council 
proceeded to establish a full assembly, with an elected lower chamber.  The council, as far 
back as 1719, just five years after its first convening, had considered the establishment of 
an elected assembly.  Yet at the urging of the governor, it put this off until 1758. 
To replace the Acadians, eight thousand immigrants were brought in from New 
England, and land that had been tamed by the Acadian settlers became their fertile farm 
lands and fishing communities between 1757 and 1762 (Bumsted 1992, 140-4).  While the 
rest of Nova Scotia would be harder to settle and would see many immigrants leave rather 
than try to fell trees and till soil, the composition of the province is to this day reflective of 
waves of immigration such as this. 
Clarke (1960, 320-7) has mapped out how communities in Nova Scotia emerged 
through its early waves of immigration and how communities emerged clustered by country 
of origin and religion. While these communities have been diluted over time as the 
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population has grown, there continued to be strong compositional similarity along identity 
markers of religion and country of origin for much of rural Nova Scotia well into the 20th 
century.  Comparing ship manifests to census data, he and other cultural geographers have 
been able to trace the origins of settlements to specific ports of departure in the British 
Isles, and in the process identify the specific pushes and pulls that drove each wave of 
migration.  While this literature errs on the side of being deterministic, even going so far as 
to suggest that the success and failure of various North American communities can be 
traced to the ethno-religious work ethic that the ‘planters, paupers and pioneers’ brought 
with them from their European and British communities of origin (e.g. Campey 2010), it 
does reflect early group identity markers.  Here too, caution should be taken in reading too 
much into this literature with respect to group boundaries.  Group boundaries are fluid, both 
in terms of where the boundary is drawn and its relevance at any particular time.  Identity 
markers can be imposed by others or adopted by self, but when it comes to power, it is the 
principle social cleavage in a society that will often come to dominate all other identity 
markers.  In the case of Nova Scotia in the 18th century, the imperial power cleavage that 
pitted the English against the Acadians also helped to define all group boundaries in the 
province. 
The usual incentives that exist for immigrants to integrate into a society were 
present in Nova Scotia.  That is why many Germans Huguenots embraced the Church of 
England after immigrating to Lunenburg County, as a way of shifting their boundary closer 
into line with the English elites.  But the English elites themselves, while Anglican in 
practice, were not faith driven beyond being anti-catholic, because the sect of the Anglican 
Church that found its way to this province was not doctrinaire in the way it was in 
Massachusetts.163  The Anglican Church in Nova Scotia, while it was in law the 
establishment church, was funded and administered from London and thus had no 
                                                 
163 For a good analysis of the Anglican Church’s struggle with the ideas of the reformation see MacCulloch 
(2004).  He has a good chapter on how the more Protestant sects made it into some North American colonies 
and not others (ibid., ch.12).  Campey discussed how the lack of evangelizing in Nova Scotia, and a 
permanent source of off-shore funding, made the Anglican Church and its elite members an almost sedentary 
social group in this province (2010) 
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evangelical dimension.164  Most significantly, the construct of being ‘British’, designed by 
the crown for the settlement of Ireland, had been embraced by the Scots following union 
with England in 1707.  Where the province of Upper Canada saw the elite English deny to 
the Scottish and Irish immigrants to that province a shared ‘British’ social identity, the 
handful of English elites in Nova Scotia who took advantage of land grants in the province 
“drew little distinction themselves between being English and being British” (Campey 
2010, 20).   The dominant cleavage between Acadian and non-Acadian helped to reinforce 
a sense of being British.  Of course once the Acadians were removed, new waves of 
Scottish settlers who arrived in Cape Breton would not have the benefit of an Acadian-
British social cleavage and they would become the new ‘out’ social group. 
In 1763, the year the Treaty of Paris was signed, John Pownall, Secretary of the 
Board of Trade, gave a speech in London commending the Nova Scotian example and 
suggesting that all ceded colonies should be governed by only a governor’s council, since 
this was the “freest from a Republican Mixture and the most conformable to the British 
Constitution” (reprinted in Madden et Fieldhouse 1985, 189).  The lesson had at its heart 
the expulsion of the Acadians, which is not a formula easily replicated in other ‘ceded’ 
territories, such as Quebec, where the conquered formed a majority.  But the other lesson 
Pownall was more interested in was that the ‘British’ protestant population could be 
transformed into a single ethnic group, namely this new construct of British, which drew its 
identity from such things as loyalty to empire and the king, and to a British political and 
legal system.  Or, at least, this was the conclusion that Pownall and most historians and 
constitutional scholars who reflect on this time have drawn from this moment in the history 
of one of Britain’s earliest and still ‘loyal’ provinces. 
Following the American War of Independence, some 19,000 ‘United Empire 
Loyalists’ settlers, who had resided in the 13 British colonies to the south, were relocated to 
Nova Scotia.  These were mostly civilians, and they were granted 100 acres for each head 
                                                 
164 As Campey (2010, 24) notes: “Anglican missionaries, appointed by the London-based Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel, did not see it as their job to offer a cultural lifeline in the way that Roman Catholic 
priests did for the Irish or Presbyterian missionaries did for the Scots”. 
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of family and 50 additional acres for every person in the family.  This influx of people 
swelled the population of peninsular Nova Scotia fivefold (Buckner et Reid 1994, 194-
209).  Most importantly, it reinforced the new sense of cultural identity, that of being 
‘British’ and part of a larger ‘British Empire’.   
Expecting loyalist settlement in the north of Nova Scotia, Cape Breton Island was 
separated as a colony in 1784, and the acquisition of land for settlement (which had been 
banned by the crown) was authorized.  Its first great seal was issued in 1785 in the name of 
King George III for the Insulae Promontorii Britanniae or Island of Cape Breton (Swan 
1977, 134).165  But only 400 loyalists moved to the Island, of whom only about 200 were 
still resident in 1786 (Campey 2010, 64).  Drawing from these loyalists, a governor’s 
council was established but no provision was made for an assembly given the sparse 
population, including some Acadians, on this territory. 
In 1792, the so called ‘Year of the Sheep’, a forced expulsion of Scots occurred as 
part of the Highland Clearances, or Fuadach nan Gàidheal, which translates as “the 
expulsion of the Gael” (Prebble 1963).  This resulted in a large influx of ex-pat Scots to 
Cape Breton Island, mostly of the Roman Catholic faith.  As the population became larger, 
and more prosperous, petitions were sent to London demanding an assembly, but these 
were ignored and, in 1820, with the population nearing 20,000, the colony of Cape Breton 
Island was merged back into the province of Nova Scotia, thereby diluting the relative 
influence of Scottish and Acadian Roman Catholics. 
Only a handful of speculators had been granted land under Cape Breton’s system of 
tenure, so nearly all residents were tenants or tenant farmers, leasing land from the crown 
or from these landowners.  To reconcile this situation with Nova Scotia electoral law, 
which required land ownership in order to vote, the governor’s council decided to give the 
                                                 
165 Colonies which were land bound were labeled provinces and colonies which were water bound were 
labeled islands on their great seals, but has been noted earlier, these labels were used as synonyms initially to 
identify the crown’s sovereignty over a specific geographic regions or territory. 
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vote to tenants on crown land, a decision that was subsequently ratified by the Nova Scotia 
assembly (Massicotte et al. 2007, 15).166 
While in 1801, a United Kingdom had been created out of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and the British identity was extended across the U.K., the catholic-protestant division 
continued to be marked in each of the three former kingdoms to varying degrees.  On 
Canada’s side of the Atlantic, catholic religion, which was thriving in Cape Breton, created 
a new cleavage between the Island and mainland Nova Scotia.   
Catholics in Nova Scotia had been given the right to vote in 1789, which through an 
act of the legislature overturned a 1757 council ban on voting by “popish recusants” (Miller 
1993).  Now that Cape Breton had been reunited with the mainland, the first catholic was 
elected in 1823 and Nova Scotia had to deal with the thorny issue of oaths, something it did 
by allowing the catholic assemblyman to take only the oath of loyalty to the monarch.167 
The rapid expansion of the U.S. and shifts in economic influence as the west 
emerged as new territory for Canada’s expansion worked as a counterweight to 
manufacture a common Nova Scotian identity that could overtake the religious and ethnic 
divide, though it would never entirely overcome the regional-class cleavage reinforced by 
Cape Breton’s island boundaries.  From 1815 to 1838, it is estimated that 39,235 
immigrants arrived in Nova Scotia from Britain, of which five percent were English, 56 
percent were Scots and 33 percent were Irish. 
As noted in the previous two chapters, Robert Baldwin, William Baldwin, and 
Marshall Spring Bidwell had begun to campaign in earnest for responsible government in 
Upper Canada as far back as 1828 and had dubbed those who controlled the governor’s 
council in Upper Canada a ‘Family Compact’, to illustrate the close relationships between 
council members; and similar agitation was occurring in Lower Canada over their Château 
Clique.  A British parliamentary committee had looked into the demands for reform 
                                                 
166 Elsewhere in Nova Scotia, crown land leaseholders would not obtain the right to vote until 1851, some 30 
years later. 
167 The Nova Scotia legislature passed an act removing all state oaths in 1827, but this was reserved by the 
governor for the British government’s approval and it rejected it on the ground that it was unconstitutional.  
The Roman Catholic Emancipation Act 1829, passed by the British parliament, removed the requirement for 
oaths. 
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emanating from the Canadas in 1828, and based on the questions it raised over the 
inadequacy of those province’s colonial institutions, the colonial secretary took it upon 
himself to write to the lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia (and also to the lieutenant-
governor of New Brunswick) in 1830, and suggest that it might be advisable to make the 
governor’s council more independent in their respective provinces.  Specifically, he 
proposed that there should be more members who were not government officials and that 
the puisne judges should be removed.  This was not a change the lieutenant governor and 
his council in Nova Scotia were amenable to making. 
By 1835, Joseph Howe, a son of a loyalist and owner and editor of the 
Novascotian168, was using his paper to make allegations against Nova Scotia’s council.  He 
was charged with seditious libel at the behest of the governor’s council after he had 
published two letters signed ‘The People’169, condemning the magistrates who ran Halifax 
and served on the council for accepting bribes, siphoning profits from public institutions 
and misappropriating over £1,000 of public money a year.  For most historians, the trial is 
seen as “a discourse on the need for a free press” (Adams et Bawtree 2004, 20).  But it is 
also the opening salvo in a campaign for institutional change that has its origins in the ideas 
being advanced further west in Canada. 
Howe was elected to the legislative assembly the following year and popular 
support for Howe and his campaign for institutional ‘reform’ saw the emergence of a 
political party in ‘opposition’ to ministers entrenched in the governor’s council, most of 
whom did not hold elected office.  Thus the 1836 election can be seen as the creation of a 
partisan cleavage, with the election polarizing into a contest between reformers and those 
who supported the status quo, who came to be known as the Tories.  The similarity in 
labels to those which had emerged in Canada is not coincidental. 
                                                 
168 In the interest of full disclosure, my great-great-grand uncle, Angus Morrison Gidney, was editor and 
publisher of the Novascotian and the Morning Chronicle  during some of this period, and fought alongside 
Howe in several of these causes (see Hicks 2005, Ch.11).  He was also a descendant of United Empire 
Loyalists, both military and civilian. 
169 They were actually written by his friend, George Thompson. 
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Elected to the assembly for Halifax, Howe became the de facto leader of the 
reformers.170  In 1837 he introduced 12 resolutions in the assembly that, if adopted, would 
have formed an address to the crown requesting either “an Elective Legislative Council” or 
by such other re-construction of the Local Government, as shall yield satisfaction to the 
People” (resolution 1).  The idea of an elected upper chamber was one he had appropriated 
from Lower Canada, where Louis-Joseph Papineau had proposed this change in 1834 in his 
92 resolutions.  At the very least, Howe argued that councillors should not serve for life, as 
this led to “treating with indifference the wishes of the People, and the representations of 
the Commons”, but rather at pleasure which is how they are in law appointed (resolution 
11).  Howe was not proposing responsible government, even though his reference to the 
house of assembly as the ‘commons’ drew an analogy with the parliament at Westminster. 
As with all the other provinces in North America, the council was at regular 
loggerheads with the elected assembly, as the council was controlled by a few families and 
business associates, which included the chief justice and the Anglican bishop.  Tory 
minister James B. Uniacke was Howe’s fiercest and most eloquent opponent.  When the 
council threatened to refuse the supply Bill, Howe withdrew his resolutions, but only after 
they had secured a majority in the assembly and thus could take the form of an address 
from the house of assembly to the king.  
The British government initially refused to separate the governor’s council into a 
legislative council and an executive council, or to accept the principle that “some members 
of the popular branch” should sit in the governor’s council (Despatch from Glenelg to 
Campbell, April 30, 1837).  Having had a change of heart with respect to separating the 
governor’s council, given the problems in Nova Scotia and clear public support for Howe’s 
proposals, the colonial secretary finally agreed to the change with the caveat: “Her 
majesty’s government must oppose a respectful but at the same time a firm declaration that 
                                                 
170 This label of ‘reform’ or ‘reformer’, which emerged in Canada as the label of the opponents to the 
traditional supporters of the crown and the status quo, would later be subsumed by the Grit label (which 
emerged in England for similar reasons), with ‘tory’ being the label used to identify the crown’s party.  The 
Grit movement is now part of the antecedent claims of the Liberal Party (federal and provincial), though 
political parties only emerged in Canadian politics in the 19th century and only came to be organized through 
electoral rules in the 20th. 
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it is inconsistent with a due advertence to the essential distinctions between a metropolitan 
and a colonial government and is therefore inadvisable” for an executive council to be 
accountable to the elected legislature (Despatch from Glenelg to Campbell, July 6, 1837).  
Separate legislative and executive councils ‘yes’; responsible government ‘no’.  The 
commission appointing John Lambton, Earl of Durham, as Governor General for each of 
the provinces in North America would allow for the summoning of the two bodies. 
Acting precipitously, the lieutenant-governor, Sir Colin Campbell, went ahead and 
temporarily appointed many of the same Tory officials, who had previously dominated the 
provincial government, to the executive council and the legislative council.  He 
subsequently had to adjust their number when he learned of the numbers of councillors 
permitted under Durham’s commission.  And some of these appointments had to be altered 
again when the colonial office objected to them being too blatant.  Howe and the reformers 
would come to refer to these groups of permanent office holders as an ‘Official Compact’, 
in reference to the ‘Family Compact’ label in Upper Canada. 
Durham had been sent to Canada to consider what to do in the wake of the 
rebellions, and he recommended the establishment of ‘responsible government’, an idea 
that Howe would quickly embrace and which would move him away from his earlier 
advocacy of an elected upper chamber.  It is noteworthy that Durham visited the maritime 
provinces during his tenure as governor general as he prepared his report, and he met with 
Colin Campbell and William Young in Nova Scotia, as well as John Harvey in New 
Brunswick and Charles Fitzroy in P.E.I., among others. 
Howe wrote four letters to the Whig colonial secretary, Lord John Russell, on 
September 18, 1839, to endorse the spirit of the Durham Report, and ask that responsible 
government be considered for Nova Scotia. The last of these letters advocated an appointed 
upper chamber, which is a reverse of his earlier suggestion that the upper chamber should 
be elected.  Howe concludes that the defect in the upper chamber would be remedied by 
responsible government making the executive accountable to the lower chamber with a 
mandate from the people.  An appointed legislative council, with appointments for life, 
would provide a moderating influence on both the lower chamber and on the executive. 
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In 1840, the reformers, under Joseph Howe, won a majority in the general election.  
The lieutenant governor, Sir Colin Campbell, had sided with the official compact from 
1836 on, and had found himself in constant conflict with the assembly which even passed a 
motion asking for his removal.  So Charles Edward Poulett Thomson, who would be made 
Lord Sydenham later that year, travelled to Halifax in his capacity as governor general of 
British North America to resolve the matter.  He proposed, over Campbell’s objections, that 
Joseph Howe become part of the executive council and some of the Tory members of the 
executive council were removed so membership could be divided between the two now 
widely recognized political parties.171  This approximation of a coalition government was 
not determined by the assembly but rather a governor, trying to make legislative peace. 
Howe became speaker of the legislative assembly in the 16th general assembly of 
Nova Scotia.  Three years later, the new lieutenant-governor called a general election and 
Attorney-General James William Johnstone, a Tory member of the executive council 
alongside Howe, resigned his seat in the legislative council to run for the assembly.  
Johnstone was able to win election and become the de facto government leader in that 
chamber, having the support of independent members.  Reformer William Young became 
speaker of the legislative assembly. 
The following election, in 1847, was the first to be conducted after adoption of the 
Simultaneous Polling Act, which required that elections be held throughout the province 
over the course of several days, rather than whenever the government thought 
advantageous.172  This election would result in responsible government.  Johnstone was 
unable to win a majority for his favoured candidates and was subjected to a vote of ‘no 
confidence’ in the legislative assembly and resigned.  The lieutenant-governor then asked 
                                                 
171 Those who supported the crown were called Tories, which is an appellation appropriated from England, 
though these government councillors did not identify themselves as a political party.  It is only through the 
emergence of a reform movement that two political parties could be seen to be contesting elections. 
172 Elections in Nova Scotia, and most Canadian colonies, were held over the course of weeks and not days.  
This allowed a government to hold elections first in ridings where it knew it could win, in advance of ridings 
which were seen to be susceptible to influence based on the electoral outcome of neighbouring ridings.  In this 
way it could manufacture momentum towards a majority win.  While Nova Scotia was the first to move to 
reduce, if not eliminate, this practice, it continued to be used in Canada well after Confederation and was 
instrumental in maintaining Sir John A. Macdonald as Canadian prime minister for the early years. 
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Uniacke, the former Tory minister who had defended the official compact against Howe’s 
early calls for reform, but who had crossed the floor to run as a reformer, to submit a 
proposal for a new executive council, in which he was appointed attorney-general.173  Both 
Uniacke and Young owed their personal elections to the legislature to the catholic vote on 
Cape Breton Island. 
Nova Scotia is now acknowledged to be the first colony in British empire to obtain 
responsible government in 1848, though I have argued in the previous chapter that 
Canada’s first experience with responsible government should be its commemorative date.  
The reason Nova Scotia obtained responsible government when it did was because of the 
emergence of a partisan cleavage over the issue of institutional change; and the political 
party that was able to achieve change was the one that had within its membership 
representatives of different social groups, including both sides of the dominant social 
cleavage in the province.174 
II. New Brunswick 
New Brunswick’s development towards responsible government provided some 
unexpected results.  The province was given representative government at its creation.  But 
due to a restricted electoral franchise, the legislature was socially homogeneous.  The fact 
that it did not get responsible government until 1854, the second last province to obtain it, 
was not due to the fact that the province was much more socially divided than Nova Scotia, 
though it was since its social cleavage was between French or Acadian catholic and British 
protestant.  It was due to the lack of a partisan cleavage.  It was only when political parties 
began to emerge that responsible government had to be conceded by the governor. 
New Brunswick was created out of Nova Scotia in 1784 to accommodate the influx 
of United Empire Loyalists following the American War of Independence and it was given 
                                                 
173 Attorney- General, in the provinces, was usually considered the most senior government position and the 
holder of that office is now seen with the benefit of institutional hindsight to be the ‘premier’, ‘prime’ or first 
minister. 
174 Howe returned to a position of leadership in this party once Uniacke’s health began to decline and he is 
today seen popularly as the person who delivered responsible government to the province. 
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both an appointed governor’s council and an elected assembly, by royal prerogative.  The 
commission appointing Thomas Carleton as ‘captain-general and governor-in-chief’ of this 
new province authorized the establishment of these two bodies.  There was no maximum 
number set for the council, only that if there were less than nine at any time (including if 
councillors were to leave the province), the governor could appoint interim councillors, 
subject to approval by the king, five being required for quorum.  The king made the formal 
appointment of councillors, which meant the colonial office had a veto on appointments.  In 
practice, the number appointed was 12 councillors.175  In short, the same structure as 
existed in Nova Scotia was adopted for the province which was created out of its territory.  
The first council was summoned in 1784 and the first election for the lower chamber, which 
was referred to generally as the ‘assembly’, was held in the fall of the next year.  The first 
councillors were appointed by Thomas Carleton and drew heavily from recently arrived 
New York United Empire Loyalists.  The balance was appointed by 1786 when the council 
began to perform its legislative duties. 
The council acted as an executive, legislative and judicial council, just as it did in 
the predecessor province of Nova Scotia at this time.  These were loyalist persons of 
property.  The positions did not carry with them, ex post facto, an income, so it is unclear 
why MacNutt (1965, 51) concludes that the council gave “leading Loyalists, without the 
benefit of permanent office that yielded an income”, gainful employment. 
The first speech from the throne occurred in 1786, when Thomas Carleton, now 
demoted to lieutenant-governor with the arrival in Canada of his brother Guy Carleton, 
ennobled Lord Dorchester, as governor of all the British provinces.176 In the speech the 
                                                 
175 Subsequent gubernatorial commissions and instructions would formally fix the maximum at 12, though 
this number was rarely filled. 
176 Much time and space is wasted in Canada’s pre-colonial scholarship on whether or not Guy Carleton was 
in charge of all of the British colonies, with both English and French scholars trying to trace the emergence of 
an uniquely Canadian ‘governor general’ to coincide with the diminution of British control or Canadian 
authorship of the Constitution Act, 1867, and of course English Canadian scholarship seems to take exception 
to the idea Carleton could govern English Canada from Palace St. Louis in Quebec City.  There can be no 
question that Dorchester was made governor of all the provinces.  In the British hierarchy, governors had 
lieutenant-governors who could assume their powers when they were out of province, smaller provinces had 
this so that a nearby more experienced governor could take over, and this became the norm for Canada (in the 
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lieutenant-governor tasked the assembly with crafting “a Bill providing for the Election of 
Members to serve in General Assembly, and for regulating all such elections as well as 
determining the qualifications of Electors” and with approving land grants (N.B. Journals, 
LC, January 9, 1786).  The council he tasked with preparing laws, both civil and criminal, 
noting that “as the assistance of the Judges will be required in forming or reviewing them, 
they will of course, I suppose, originate with you” (ibid.). 
The voting franchise for the first assembly included all white males over 21 years of 
age who had lived in the province for at least three months, provided they take the oath of 
allegiance, which resulted in a challenge by the losing candidate in Westmorland alleging 
that he had been defeated by the Acadian vote (Massicotte et al. 2007, 17).  The assembly 
unseated the member elected in Westmorland, replacing him with his opponent, and five 
years later established one of the most restrictive election laws in British North America, 
with the requirement for white males over 21 to have £25 of debt free property in the riding 
(or £50 if voting in a riding in which one did not live) and the taking of three oaths, 
including the renunciation of the popish religion. 
In British North America prior to the conquest of Quebec, it had been standard to 
require four oaths to be taken in order to hold public office, and these oaths could also be 
the requirement to vote.  These included an oath of allegiance to the king;177 the oath of 
supremacy denouncing papal authority;178 an oath of abjuration repudiating the rights of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
absence of a governor and lieutenant-governor, a temporary administrator would take over).  Lord Dorchester 
not only had lieutenant-governors for the provinces where he was not present, but he had a lieutenant 
governor for both Upper and Lower Canada, even though his presence and constant attention in Lower 
Canada made the role seemingly redundant.  It is true that Guy Carleton liked the title ‘governor general’, but 
this was over ‘captain-general and governor- in-chief’, which was the traditional British title.  Many formal 
titles and styles the British took from the French, like field marshal and its symbols of rank (see Hicks 2002) 
and it was natural for Carleton to want to use a title that the French colonists in Canada would respect.   
177 The first of these oaths taken and signed by the Chief Justice William Pepperrell and other 13 court 
officers in Massachusetts circa 1730 reads: “I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear, that I will be faithful and 
bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George the Second.  So help me God.” 
178 Ibid. for supremacy: “I, A.B., do swear that I do from my heart, abhor, detest and abjure as impious and 
heretical, that damnable doctrine and position, that princes excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope or any 
authority of the See of Rome, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatsoever; and I 
do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, 
power, superiority, preeminence or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within the realm of Great Britain.  So 
help me God.” 
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Stuarts to the Throne;179 and an oath repudiating transubstantiation.180  The New Brunswick 
legislature instituted the requirement that voters take the first three of these oaths and while 
the most prohibitive to catholics, being the repudiation of the transubstantiation, was not 
required, the situation in New Brunswick stands in marked contrast to Great Britain, which, 
in 1778, replaced the three oaths for public office holders with a simplified oath of 
allegiance so as to no longer prevent catholics from holding office (Papists Act 1778).181  
                                                 
179 Ibid. for abjuration: “I, A.B, do truly and sincerely acknowledge, profess, testify and declare in my 
conscience, before God and the world, that our sovereign lord King George the Second, is lawful and rightful 
King of this realm, and all his other Majesties dominions and countries there-unto belong; and I do solemnly 
and sincerely declare, that I do believe in my conscience, that the person pretended to be the Prince of Wales 
during the life of the late King James, and since his decease pretending to be, and taking upon himself the 
style and title of King of England, by the name of James the Third, or of Scotland, by the name of James the 
Eighth, or the style and title of King of Great Britain, hath not any right or title whatsoever to the Crown of 
this realm, or any other dominions there-to belonging; and I do renounce, refute and abjure any allegiance or 
obedience to him.  And I do swear, that I will bear faith and true allegiance to His Majesty King George the 
Second, and Him will defend to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts 
whatsoever which shall be made against his Person, Crown, or Dignity; and I will do my utmost endeavor to 
disclose and make known to His Majesty and his successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies which I 
shall know to be against Him, or any of them; and I do faithfully promise to the utmost of my power to 
support, maintain and defend the succession of the Crown, against him the said James, and all other persons 
whatsoever; which succession by an Act, intituled, An Act of the further Limitation of the Crown, and better 
securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subjects, is and stands limited to the Princess Sophia, Electress and 
Dutchess Dowager of Hannover, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants.  And all these things I do 
plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear, according to these express words by me spoken, and according 
to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words, without any equivocation, mental 
evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever.  And I do make this recognition, acknowledgement, adjuration, 
renunciation and promise, heartily, willingly and truly, upon the true faith of a Christian.  So help me God.” 
180 Ibid. for transubstantiation: I, A.B., do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God, profess, testify and 
declare, that I do believe that in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper there is not any transubstantiation of the 
elements of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, at or after the consecration thereof by any 
person whatsoever: And that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other Saint, and the 
sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous.  And I do 
solemnly and in the presence of God, press, testify and declare, that I do make this declaration and every part 
thereof, in the plain and ordinary sense of the words read unto me, as they are commonly understood by 
English Protestants, without any evasion, equivocation or mental reservation whatsoever; and without any 
dispensation already granted me for this purpose by the Pope, or any authority or person whatsoever; or 
without thinking that I am or can be acquired before God or man, or absolved of this declaration or any part 
thereof, although the Pope or any other person or persons or powers whatsoever should dispense with or 
annul the same, or declare that it was null and void from the beginning. So help me God.” 
181 The British oath for public office holders read: “I, A.B., do hereby declare, that I do profess the Roman 
Catholic religion. I, A.B., do swear, that I do abjure, condemn, and detest, as unchristian and impious, the 
principle that it is lawful to murder, destroy, or any ways injure any person whatsoever, for or under the 
pretence of being a heretic; and I do declare solemnly before God, that I believe, that no act in itself unjust, 
immoral, or wicked, can ever be justified or excused by or under pretence or colour, that it was done either for 
the good of the church, or in obedience to any ecclesiastical power whatsoever. I also declare, that it is not an 
  
 
233
The adoption of this requirement is both a holdover from these loyalists’ time in the 13 
former colonies to the south and a mechanism to exclude Acadians from democratic 
participation. 
Around 15,000 loyalists had settled in New Brunswick and these were mostly 
former soldiers who were granted land according to their rank, with 100 acres given to 
privates and 1,000 acres to officers.  Just over 60 percent of New Brunswick loyalists came 
from New York and New Jersey and a small number (13 percent of the total) came from 
Connecticut, meaning that the settlers of New Brunswick were far more heterogeneous than 
Nova Scotia and much more socially stratified, given the apportionment of land to military 
rank.  During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, some of the deported Acadians found 
their way back and joined others who had avoided the deportation by hiding in the woods 
of the eastern and northern shores, but few Acadians owned property so, even when the 
mandatory three oaths were eliminated in 1810, there was not an immediate change in 
representation.  Additional immigration waves included Scots, Irish and English 
immigrants in the early 19th century, including a large influx of Irish to Saint John and 
Miramichi region, following the potato famine in 1845. 
As Campey (2010, 116) illustrates by mapping the 1871 census data, the province 
has a decided cleavage between the north and the south due to the early loyalist English 
settlement.  While his interest is in the settlement of migrants of English (as opposed to 
Scottish, Irish and French) origin, this reflects the principle cleavage in the colony and that 
                                                                                                                                                    
article of the Catholic faith, neither am I thereby required to believe or profess that the pope is infallible, or 
that I am bound to obey any order in its own nature immoral, though the Pope or any ecclesiastical power 
should issue or direct such order, but on the contrary, I hold that it would be sinful in me to pay any respect or 
obedience thereto. I further declare, that I do not believe that any sin whatsoever, committed by me, can be 
forgiven at the mere will of any Pope, or of my priest, or of any person or persons whatsoever, but that sincere 
sorrow for past sins, a firm and sincere resolution to avoid future guilt and to atone to God, are previous and 
indispensible requisites to establish a well-founded expectation of forgiveness, and that any person who 
receives absolution without these previous requisites, so far from obtaining thereby any remission of his sins, 
incurs the additional guilt of violating a sacrament; and I do swear that I will defend to the utmost of my 
power the settlement and arrangement of property in this country, as established by the laws now in being; I 
do hereby disclaim, disavow and solemnly abjure any intention to subvert the present church establishment 
for the purpose of substituting a Catholic establishment in its stead; and I do solemnly swear, that I will not 
exercise any privilege to which I am or may become entitled, to disturb and weaken the Protestant religion 
and Protestant government in this kingdom. So help me God!” 
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is between Francophone Acadian communities in the north and the English-speaking 
communities in the south.  This spatial cultural divide continues to dominate New 
Brunswick’s culture, language and politics to this day.  Not only were the Acadians isolated 
through electoral law and by conscious choice in the early years of this province, but the 
land-to-rank apportionment and strict electoral rules meant that the composition of the 
assembly was, in terms of representation, drawn from the same socio-economic elites as the 
council. 
The one difference between the council and the assembly was that the assembly 
included elites from across the province, whereas the council was composed of a more 
localized elite given its dual role as being a committee of public office holders and the 
legislative upper chamber.  In 1830, the secretary to the colonial office wrote to the acting 
administrator of the province, in the absence of a lieutenant-governor, suggesting that the 
council should have more members who are not office holders and that judges should be 
removed from the council (Despatch from Goderich to Black, December 7, 1830).  Thus 
began a series of despatches, with Black taking the position that “persons possessing 
qualifications highly to recommend them for such a situation are not numerous at present” 
and that if the judges were removed that it would be sufficient to simply replace their 
number (Despatch from Black to Goderich, March 1, 1831).  Judges William Botsford and 
Ward Chipman tendered their resignation from the council, noting that politicians in the 
province had instilled in the population a belief that members of the council such as 
themselves “hold our places in the Council for purposes of private interest in the way of 
influence and patronage, and that we combine in our persons powers legislative, executive, 
and judicial in a manner altogether unconstitutional” (Despatch from Botsford and 
Chipman, March 31, 1831).  
Lieutenant-Governor Archibald Campbell arrived in the fall of that year, and was 
instructed to fill the vacancies so as to ensure “the representation of different parts of the 
Province” (Despatch from Goderich to Campbell, October 29, 1831).  Of the eleven 
councillors, five were from Fredericton.  Again, despatches concerning the appropriateness 
of judges serving on the council and the availability of qualified candidates criss-crossed 
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the Atlantic.  Campbell offered the council’s argument for its retention in its current form 
as a means to restrain the impulses of the popular assembly (Despatch from Campbell to 
Goderich, January 16, 1832).  He raised the spectre of the council being dominated by 
merchants, argued that the council’s composition had to be such that it could protect the 
executive from the legislative assembly and he defended the concentration of councillors 
geographically due to poor transportation and the need to have them close by when the 
assembly was in session (ibid.). 
As noted in the previous sections, having dealt with the questions raised by the 
parliamentary report on the Canadas in 1830, the colonial secretary had written to the 
lieutenant-governors of both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to suggest the advisability of 
making their councils more independent by appointing a greater number who were not 
government officials.  Two years later, a commission was issued separating the governor’s 
council into an executive council and a legislative council.  In a subsequent despatch to the 
lieutenant-governor of New Brunswick, the colonial secretary proposed that the separate 
legislative council “consist of gentlemen independent of, and unconnected with, the 
Executive Government” (Despatch from Goderich to Campbell, May 1, 1832).  Having the 
Anglican bishop on the council served no “practical utility” and while having judges on the 
council had been important in the early stages of colonial development, it raised doubts 
about the body’s independence.182  In spite of the colonial secretary’s recommendations, six 
persons carried over to the legislative council from the previous council, including the chief 
justice and the bishop of Nova Scotia, and four new persons were added. 
A delegation from New Brunswick travelled to London in 1836 to ask for the same 
offer that had been made to the Canadas, namely legislative control of all crown revenues 
in exchange for a civil list, and reform of the crown lands department (they made no 
demands for responsible government).  The colonial office in London agreed.  However, 
Lieutenant Governor Campbell felt the colonial office was making too many concessions to 
the assembly, and he used a separate pretext to dissolve the legislature and call an election.  
                                                 
182 Where judges are now seen as independent of the crown, the fact that they received a salary from the 
crown made them the choicest patronage appointments in colonial times. 
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The election did not bring him an assembly any better disposed to his governing with the 
executive council, and he resigned. 
When John Harvey became lieutenant-governor in 1837, he found a province that 
was not going through the popular agitation for institutional change that was apparent in 
other provinces and that Campbell had alluded to in his despatches.  While he found an 
assembly at odds with the council, the reason for this disagreement was because Campbell 
had supported the one faction of powerful lumber families who had long dominated the 
governors’ council and controlled the patronage of the province, and he had ensconced 
them and their supporters in the new legislative council. 
Where other provinces were having disputes over accountability and financial 
control, rooted in normative arguments surrounding democracy and constitutional law, that 
pitted assembly against council, the main dispute over money Bills between the two 
chambers was over the fact that appropriations Bills (which by law must originate in the 
lower chamber) did not include salaries for legislative councillors in the upper chamber, 
and inversely that projects carried out by the government favoured the areas of the province 
from which the legislative councillors all hailed. 
Harvey made a number of reforms as soon as he arrived, including the surrender of 
crown revenues in exchange for a civil list, thus giving the legislature control over the 
province’s finances.  In addition to the leaders of the faction that controlled the council, he 
appointed to the executive council persons who had the support of the assembly, including 
Assembly Speaker Charles Simons, and he expanded the legislative council to include 
people from the elites of communities that had long been excluded.  MacNutt (1965) 
suggests that this makes New Brunswick the first province in Canada to obtain responsible 
government.  Buckner (2000) defends this assertion by pointing out that in England, 
responsible government had long been understood to be the appointment to the cabinet of 
leading members from both chambers of parliament who had the capacity to get legislation, 
particularly money Bills, through their respective chambers and who would, in turn, be 
accountable to the legislature for the crown’s spending of this money.  But to be true to 
responsible government, power has to be vested in the council, and it still rested with the 
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governor, and the council had to be removable through the loss of confidence of the 
assembly, and this body was neither.  This was simply a governor being advised by a 
coalition of leading men in the legislature, which is one common step each province and 
England took on the road to responsible government. 
Others suggest that responsible government came to New Brunswick in 1848 with 
the arrival of Lieutenant-Governor Edmund Walker Head (Gibson 2000).  In that year the 
assembly adopted a resolution endorsing the principle of responsible government.  Head 
appointed leaders of the legislative assembly to the executive council and he arrived with 
the knowledge that the colonial office’s now supported responsible government for the 
North American provinces.  But with no political parties in the province, in practice Head’s 
governmental appointments were no different than Harvey’s.  Further, he saw all decisions 
as ultimately his and the council could do nothing without his approval; and he took 
decisions, including the appointment of a chief judge, in opposition to the advice he 
received from the executive council. 
Not surprisingly the legislative council and assembly continued to be at odds, as the 
legislature was the battlefield between factions of the elites in the province.  In 1850, the 
assembly adopted a resolution, 26 votes to 5, calling for the legislative council to become 
elected (N.B. Journals, HA, February 1, 1838).  Head forwarded this to London as a 
proposal endorsed by the assembly and added his tacit support, but when the following year 
he included this idea in the Throne Speech, the legislative council had the opportunity to 
express an opinion on it and defeated it 10 to 8.  In retaliation, the assembly delayed 
passage of the supply Bill which provided pay for legislative councillors (who in the 19th 
century had begun to receive remuneration).  The most that could be said is that Head was 
more supportive of the faction of lumber barons who controlled the assembly over the 
faction which controlled the legislative council.  Significant change with a singular socio-
economic elite controlling both chambers was the last thing the bicameral legislature had an 
interest in undertaking.  The attempt to make the upper chamber elected was simply 
reflective of the leading faction in the assembly, assuming it could come to dominate both 
chambers if the same rules of the electoral game were applied to the upper house. 
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Responsible government arrived in 1854.  Charles Fisher, as a member of the 
executive council, had previously argued that responsible government did not require 
partisan politics and that New Brunswick, with only 200,000 people, could not sustain 
partisan divisions.  He returned to the legislature at the head of a ‘liberal’ party that 
organized itself in opposition to the province’s ‘official compact’.  Using the reciprocity 
treaty that was tabled by the executive in the assembly, following the election, Fisher 
moved an amendment stating “that your Constitutional Advisers have not conducted the 
Government of the Province in the true spirit of our Colonial Constitution”, and he had a 
sufficient majority to pass it, 27 to 12 (N.B. Debates, HA, October 28, 1854).  Fisher was 
then called upon by Lieutenant-Governor Manners-Sutton to form a new government.  This 
was responsible government in that the leader of the party with a majority in the lower 
chamber was being asked to form a government.  However, Fisher’s aversion to political 
parties and the homogeneity of membership in both chambers meant that he drew for his 
cabinet representatives from other factions, most notably the president of the legislative 
council.183 
Interestingly, where other provinces saw the appellation ‘reform’ as the early label 
for opposition to the status quo and the elite compacts, which controlled power in their 
colony, in New Brunswick, the appellation ‘liberal’ emerged as the identifier for persons 
who advocated change.  This is due to the province’s elite’s initial rejection of party politics 
and its attempt to manage change through coalitions between those who supported and 
benefited from the status quo (conservatives) and those who advocated change (who were 
characterized as more liberal).  Lieutenant-governors Harvey and Heard contributed to this 
by referring to the addition of persons from opposing factions as adding ‘liberal’ members 
to the council so as to curry favour with the opposition.  Thus, when party politics arrived 
in New Brunswick, it was not through the emergence of a ‘Reform Party’, as in the other 
provinces, it was through the emergence of a ‘Liberal Party’. 
                                                 
183 The modern conception of responsible party government, whereby the leader of the party which wins a 
majority forms a government out of his own party members in the legislature, only emerged in New 
Brunswick, as in other provinces, when partisan politics became firmly entrenched. 
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Fisher did undertake some reforms.  He convinced the Anglican bishop to resign 
from the council and introduced legislation preventing any person who conducted business 
with the government from being elected to the assembly or holding a seat in the upper 
chamber (Wallace 2000). 
The assembly expanded the electoral franchise in 1855 to add persons who earned 
an annual income plus debt free assets of over £100 in addition to persons of at least £35 in 
property, which continued the tradition of this province having some of the most restrictive 
electoral rules until well after Confederation (Massicotte et al. 2007, 16).  As a result, the 
representatives in the assembly, to which the government was responsible, continued to be 
persons with property and wealth, and the addition of moneyed persons from the city 
merely reflected the electoral interests of the partisan party which coalesced around one of 
the elite factions as a mechanism through which to obtain political power. 
New Brunswick, a province governed by the Anglophone economic elite, achieved 
modest institutional change through a partisan cleavage, but did so much later than Nova 
Scotia.  The leading members of the assembly and the government were familiar with the 
normative ideas surrounding institutional design that were advanced in other provinces, like 
Nova Scotia and Canada.  They corresponded and met with Howe and Lord Durham.  They 
adopted some and rejected some of the language of reform that had spread through the 
other provinces.  Yet they resisted change because each faction that had influence shared a 
common goal of keeping other social groups from gaining power.  This left them prone to 
manipulation by governors who could simply use power-sharing between the factions to 
stall institutional change.  
III. Prince Edward Island 
Prince Edward Island is unique in that it was able to transform its council from an 
appointed body into an elected one.  It did this by establishing a property qualification for 
voters, thereby maintaining this chamber’s role.  Property ownership defined the principle 
cleavage in the province.  It was hypothesized that for change to occur it would have to not 
significantly alter the social group representation in the institution or the overall structure of 
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governance and that was the case.  As with the other provinces, this change, and the change 
to responsible government, was driven by a partisan group that had representatives from 
both sides of the social cleavage. 
Britain acquired l’Île Saint-Jean through the Treaty of Paris in 1763 and 
immediately King George was lobbied by the British nobility for the land.  For example, 
John Perceval, Earl of Egmont, asked for the entire island and promised to divide it into 50 
sections, 40 of which would be given to men of substance who would become provincial 
lords and who would be obliged to divide their land into 20 manors of 2,000 acres each and 
each of these manor lords would be required to further divide the land with a feudal 
structure of ‘rents’ (Egmont 1763).184 
Instead the British government decided to use the land to reward persons who had 
played a significant role in the Seven Years War.  The Island was divided into 64 lots, a list 
of such deserving individuals was assembled, and a lottery was held.185  The crown would 
keep the rights to a five hundred foot belt of land above the high tide mark for the use of the 
fisheries, one lot for governmental purposes and reserved lands for the clergy to build 
churches and schools.186  The British landowners were required to pay for local governance 
on the island through ‘quit rent’ (a form of feudal tax that was paid in cash instead of 
service and goods), and this would go toward the construction of roads and other public 
works (like jails) and the salaries of officials (like judges).187  They were also expected to 
settle one protestant settler for every 110 acres, and the protestant settlers were to come 
from outside of Great Britain so as not to diminish the protestant majority in the mother 
country. 
                                                 
184 Lord Egmont also committed to building a fortified castle on the island for its defence and for the 
protection of the settlers.  The island would have had forty market towns and four hundred villages under this 
proposal.  After turning down his offer and adopting the lottery instead, Egmont was offered one entire parish, 
but declined the offer. 
185 Approximately 1.4 million acres were given away in a single day. 
186 The 67 lots that made up PEI were grouped into fourteen parishes (and this in turn was grouped into the 
three counties of Prince, Queens and Kings). 
187 The more valuable the land the higher the quit rent, at least in theory.  In practice, few absentee 
landowners paid quit rents on their lots.  Even if they had been forced to by the British government, the lots 
left undeveloped were considered less valuable, creating added disincentives to both development and 
revenue collection on the part of the crown. 
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The Island of St. John was officially separated from Nova Scotia in 1769, in 
response to petitions by many of the landlords, and given its own governor, with the first 
appointee being Walter Patterson, one of the landlords.188  Patterson was given instructions 
to establish a nominee council with the standard functions of assisting the governor with his 
executive and judicial functions and an elected assembly which would share legislative 
authority with the council.  As is well known by now, a bicameral legislature, with an 
elected lower house and appointed upper house was the standard colonial design for the 
British at this time, and seen as a safe institutional design by the Board of Trade for a 
colony that was being established by pre-determined land grants to loyal British protestant 
favourites.  Since voting was tied to land ownership and each of the first 64 had been 
instructed to settle colonists in a feudal tenure system which would prevent even these early 
settlers, mostly indentured servants, from any aspiration beyond working the land to pay off 
their transport, governance would remain in the hands of affluent land owners, protestant to 
a man.  Nevertheless, it would take until 1773 for even this ‘safe’ legislative assembly to be 
summoned. 
The main reason for the delay in the governor holding an election for a legislative 
assembly was that most of the British landowners failed to settle the land.  It turns out that 
land speculation was the intent of a fair number of lottery participants, even if this land had 
been granted them in return for service in the war.  Over one-quarter of all lots changed 
hands at least one time in the first ten years.  It was also difficult to attract settlement, since 
there were opportunities elsewhere in North America to acquire land with full title. 
The handful of lottery winners that did develop their lots ignored the rule 
concerning migration, with the result being that the largest migration to the Island in its 
early years, from 1769 to the beginning of the American Revolution in 1775, was Scottish 
Roman Catholics, followed by English and Scottish protestants.  They were brought in 
groups by the few large landowners who tried to settle and develop their lots, and thus they 
                                                 
188 The name of the Island was changed to Prince Edward Island in 1799.  An earlier attempt by the assembly 
to change the name to New Ireland, in its session of 1780, was overturned by the colonial office on the 
grounds that they intended to establish a New Ireland on the mainland. 
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were settled in homogeneous cultural and religious communities.  Some Acadians had 
escaped deportation by living in cabins in the woods, but they remained in isolation, and 
the indigenous Mi’kmaq population was equally marginalized.  Clarke (1959, 59) has 
mapped the early settlement on the Island and it shows approximately 669 Acadians, 1,814 
Highland Scots, 310 Lowland Scots and 1,579 others of mainly English extraction (though 
some of these came by way of other North American colonies). 
Scottish Presbyterianism was decidedly anti-catholic and Calvinist puritanical.  So 
the cultural division between Highland and Lowland Scot at this time was intense, as were 
divisions between Acadians and English, though life on the Island was essentially 
subsistence living.  Most people were bonded to the landowners through an obligation of 
four years’ service in return for their passage and promise of cheap rents.  Their 
communities were isolated and some operated singularly in the French or Gaelic language. 
The American Revolution introduced an influx of English-speaking settlers from the 
13 colonies of the south, but not in the numbers that the rest of Canada experienced as the 
feudal system of land tenancy made the island even less attractive to people who had 
previously migrated to North America with the intention of owning their own land.  Of the 
five hundred Loyalists that came to the island, several hundred left when the landlords 
refused to honour their commitment to sell these loyalists the land they cleared or when 
they realized some of the land they were promised was disputed in terms of ownership, 
with the remainder becoming mostly tradesmen, merchants and professionals (Baldwin 
2009, 50).189  Not reflected in the 1789 census is approximately 10 percent of the Island 
which was Irish.  Many of these came from catholic Southern Ireland via Newfoundland, 
and while their migration to Newfoundland was initially due to natural migratory ‘push-
pull’ of Irish poverty and new world economic opportunity, Newfoundland adopted the 
practice of forcibly deporting their unemployed to PEI where there was a need for labour in 
the winter (O'Grady 2004, 50). 
                                                 
189 Much of the land offered turned out to be disputed and some landlords simply had no intention of 
honouring their commitments. 
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Patterson’s commission had called for a council of 12, which was the standard 
configuration as granted for New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and designated the first 
three, including the lieutenant-governor and chief justice.  Patterson chose four other 
persons in September 1770, and notified the British government in a despatch that he could 
not find any more than seven.190  The governor-in-council, in turn, decided that the elected 
lower chamber should be comprised of only 18 persons, with all male protestants who were 
21 years of age or older on voting day, July 4, 1773.  The election was conducted “by 
taking the voices of the whole people collectively, as belonging to one county, and waiving 
all kinds of qualifications, except their being Protestants and residents: it is impossible to 
have any other terms, owing to the unequal distribution of the inhabitants over the Island, 
and the small number of freeholders there among them” (Despatch from Patterson to 
Dartmouth, February 17, 1773). 
The ethnic social groups on the island were distinct and bitterly prejudiced against 
each other.  This is reflected in the accounts of the early elections on the island.  As polling 
was done in Charlottetown until 1787 and ran for several days, the supporters of each 
candidate would take turns marching to the polling station, usually from a tavern, 
brandishing signs and singing.  Voting in all of the colonies was not done by secret ballot in 
this era, so voters were often offered rum in exchange for support.  The burgeoning gangs 
of drunken supporters would often degenerate into ethnic or religious brawls when they 
encountered one another.  This was not confined to the 18th century.  The election of 1847 
had two reports that “mobs of Irish and Scottish tenants attacked one another with clubs, 
fists, and feet.  When the electoral officials attempted to assist the victims, they were also 
beaten.  At least three people were killed, and the blood of countless others stained the 
freshly fallen snow” (Baldwin 2009). 
Prince Edward Island was not unique for its ethnic and religious divisions or for its 
electoral violence, but the poverty and feudal land structure compounded the tension 
between social groups.  Land ownership created a class cleavage that impacted directly on 
                                                 
190 The first council comprised: Thomas Desbrisay, Lieutenant-Governor; William Allanbey, Chief Justice; 
David Higgins; Phillips Callbeck; Thomas Wright; John Russel Spence and Patrick Fergus. 
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the politics of the Island. Absentee landlords were not only failing to settle and develop 
their land, they were failing to pay the quick rents, which were also lower on property that 
was undeveloped.  This created an immediate challenge for the council in that it had 
insufficient funds to pay salaries, let alone undertake public works.  Patterson travelled to 
London to work with the landlords, and while he was not successful in getting them to 
settle their arrears, a petition signed by the proprietors was submitted to the British cabinet 
(April 10, 1777) and this resulted in the British parliament allocating £3,000 that year, an 
amount that became annual, to offset the salaries of the island’s officials. 
There was tension between the assembly and council in Prince Edward Island, but 
this was the by-product of its class divisions.  P.E.I. is the first province to have political 
party politics, and that occurred in the 1784 election (MacKinnon 1951).  Jack Stewart 
appropriated the language of the Whigs in England to run with a slate for election to the 
assembly against Governor Patterson’s chosen candidates, by dubbing his opponents the 
‘Court Party’.191  His own slate of candidates became known as the ‘Country Party’, which 
reflected their base of electoral support among rural voters.  The persons elected for the 
Country Party were drawn from elites, albeit those who were inexperienced or not currently 
in favour, and Stewart himself was the son of the chief justice.  Patterson dissolved the 
assembly after Stewart was elected speaker.  He also began the practice of having the nine 
councillors who had responsibility for the executive government meeting as an executive 
council, with the full 12 members meeting as the legislative council. 
One could make the case that this initial foray into party politics was agrarian based; 
it could also be argued that this was nothing more than the cult of personalities, given the 
small number of elites and the bitter rivalry between Patterson and the chief justice.  
Stewart went on to draft a report on the failure of proprietors to develop their land in 1792, 
and this started the escheat movement.  The goal of this movement, which was driven by 
                                                 
191 For a good examination of the development of English liberal thought and discourse, including the 
emergence of the Whig Party, see Robbins (Robbins 2004) 
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elites, was to see land that was undeveloped by absentee landlords taken back by the crown 
and given to local landlords who would develop and settle the land.192 
In 1830 William Cooper was elected to the legislature and set about creating the 
Escheat Party.  England had adopted the Roman Catholic Relief Act in 1829, ending the 
barriers to catholics sitting in parliament, and the colonial secretary had instructed each of 
the colonies to follow suit.  Prince Edward Island’s Catholic Emancipation Act gave the 
right to vote to Roman Catholics on the Island, and also followed Britain’s example and 
raised the property qualification so the poorest tenants could still not vote.  Nevertheless, 
many catholics received the franchise and the concept of escheat was redefined by Cooper 
as not a mechanism to replace absentee landlords with new owners, but to enable them to 
acquire the land on which they had settled or to acquire land in undeveloped lots. 
With a political party in the assembly, the issue of reform of the governor’s council 
quickly came up in the assembly.  In 1834, the assembly passed a motion asking that the 
governor’s council be formally divided into an executive council and a legislative council.  
This was refused. 
Cooper had been a land agent, though one who had been reportedly sympathetic to 
tenants, and he campaigned on the need for an escheat court, which would research which 
landlords had failed to settle tenants or pay their quit rents to the government and seize the 
land of those in breach for distribution to tenants.  In the 1836 election, the Escheat Party 
won 18 of the 24 seats in the assembly. 
In 1838, one year after it had been done in New Brunswick, the British government 
replaced the governor’s council with a separate executive council and legislative council.  
This was a modest change, in that the executive officers had been meeting separately from 
the full council, but it had been refused only four years earlier and would open the door for 
                                                 
192 Escheat is a common law doctrine that land should not be left in limbo and ownerless.  Under feudal land 
tenure, the unused land would revert upwards to the feudal lord, and ultimately the crown.  Escheat was 
usually used in instances where an individual would die without heirs, in which case the crown would take the 
land for a year and a day and then it would revert to the lord on whose estates this land was situated.  
Ultimately, at the top of feudal tenure is the crown itself, and in the case of Prince Edward Island, the land 
was granted by the crown (though the situation would have been different if Lord Egmont had been granted 
the entire island as he had originally proposed).  
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the governor to appoint members of the lower chamber to the executive council and thus try 
to regain control of the legislature.193 
That year, the assembly sent Cooper to England to lobby for an escheat court.  Both 
Stewart and Cooper were undone by their respective governors, Patterson in the first 
instance and Lieutenant-Governor Sir Charles Fitzroy in the second, who through 
despatches were able to convince the colonial office that these men simply represented 
“extremely ignorant and illiterate farmers of the poorer classes” (Baldwin 2009).  The 
upper class proprietors who held land in Prince Edward Island had privileged access to the 
higher echelons of the British government and were able to stop any attempt to alter land 
title. 
George Coles was elected to the assembly in 1842 for the rural constituency of New 
London as an independent, though he was known to oppose the Escheat Party and voted 
often as a Tory in his first period in office (Robertson 2000).  His criticism of escheat was 
that it was not practical and that Britain would never agree, but his independence from the 
Tories, voting against them as he saw fit, resulted in his being seen as part of a growing 
‘reform’ movement that desired institutional change over a quick solution to the land 
question.  As a reformer, he was invited by the lieutenant-governor, Sir Henry Huntley, in 
1847 to join the executive council. 
When the next lieutenant-governor, Sir Donald Campbell, arrived in 1849, Cole 
found himself at odds with the establishment and resigned from the executive council.  That 
same year, the British government announced it would not be paying for the civic list any 
longer, as it felt the Island was affluent enough to support its own officials.  This became 
the impetus for the establishment of the Reform Party, which would take up the cause of 
the reform movements that had arisen in the other colonies, and demand responsible 
government for Prince Edward Island. 
Coles found an ally in Edward Whelan, the editor of the semi-weekly Charlotte 
Town paper, the Palladium.  Like Howe of Nova Scotia, Whelan found himself in court for 
                                                 
193 The colonial secretary had asked the outgoing lieutenant-governor, Fitzroy, for his recommendation on this 
matter the year before and, while he had originally opposed this change, this time he lent his support. 
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libel and, like Howe, for him membership in the assembly was a way of advancing the 
ideas which he had espoused in print.  Whelan was able to swing the Irish tenants behind 
the more moderate reformers and away from both the Escheat Party and the Tories, and in 
1850, “Cole and Whelan’s Reform Party won eighteen of the twenty-four seats in the 
assembly” (Baldwin 2009).  Lieutenant-Governor Sir Alexander Bannerman arrived on the 
Island the following year with instructions to accept responsible government with the 
Reform Party at the helm, and Cole became the province’s first premier. 
So while the class cleavage may have led to the first emergence of party politics in 
this colony, it was through a political party that could bridge the cleavage that responsible 
government was achieved.  One of the first accomplishments of the now Liberal 
government was the establishment of a free public school system, which was financed 
through the levying of taxes on households in each school’s area.  Over 150 schools were 
built, including a dozen for Acadians (Whitcomb 2010). 
Reading the Bible was broadly supported as part of the curriculum in the era in 
question, but when it was proposed that instruction would accompany the reading, the 
Roman Catholic Church objected to what it saw as the advancement of protestant ideas.  In 
1855, a new Normal School was opened and the superintendent announced there would be 
prayers and religious education, and the catholic-protestant divisions were brought to the 
fore in island politics.  The Conservatives were able to use the religious issue to rally the 
protestant majority and defeat the Liberals in 1858.  In the end, as Whitcomb (2010) 
reports, the only solution on the education question that was acceptable to both religious 
communities, protestant and catholic, was a return to the status quo. 
While religious divisions were significant, the primary cleavage in the province was 
class, and the land question dominated the politics of the island for most of its history and 
would only be resolved after Confederation.  In fact, it was the reason Prince Edward Island 
did not join Confederation in 1867 and would be the reason it did join in 1873.194 
                                                 
194 In 1867, the provincial government had asked that Canada provide funding so it could purchase land from 
absentee landlords, but the Canadian government was unwilling to sweeten its offer.  The construction of a 
railway that was unsupportable by the provincial government would provide the urgency for union, and the 
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While propelled into office by the religious education issue, the Conservatives 
claimed that they could solve the land question, given their capacity to bridge the divide 
between wealthy landowners and tenants.  They opposed the reform of responsible 
government that the Liberals had obtained, and under their leader, Edward Palmer, they 
proposed a move to “non-departmentalism” which excluded paid officials from serving in 
either the assembly or the legislative council (Whitcomb 2010).  This was within Palmer’s 
constitutional purview, and while it was opposed by the lieutenant-governor and a number 
of members of his own party, this experiment in limited responsible government where 
only the premier was responsible to the legislature for every department of government ran 
until 1864, whereupon it was quietly discarded. 
This change is significant for our study of the legislative council in that it reduced 
the incentive for people to serve in either chamber.  It was also the first in a reform 
initiative which was informed by the move in the province of Canada to an elected upper 
chamber which began in 1856.  The first change was that the assembly was to be increased 
to four dual member constituencies in each county from three, something easily 
accomplished that year as redistribution in the lower chamber was accepted to be the 
purview of that chamber, even if the legislation had to go through both legislative chambers 
and receive royal assent.195  This act put a property qualification on candidates, that they 
own property worth at least £50, and restated the franchise that to vote one need only be a 
male over the age of 21 in possession of property worth at least 40s in the riding for at least 
12 months.196 
The change proposed for the upper chamber was to make this chamber elective, 
with half the number of councillors as assemblymen, specifically six dual-member districts 
with an additional councillor from Charlottetown, and they would be elected for fixed terms 
                                                                                                                                                    
Canadian offer would be sufficient to set the stage for the acquisition and distribution of this undeveloped 
property. 
195 An Act to increase the number of Members to serve in the General Assembly and to consolidate and amend 
the Laws relating to Elections, 1856. 
196 You could cast ballots in more than one riding, providing you met the property qualification, and the 
property could be co-tenancy, so male children could vote, provided the value of the property subdivided met 
the minimum threshold of 40s. 
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of eight years, staggered so half the councillors were elected every four years (Despatch 
from Dundas to Newcastle, July 22, 1861).  To serve as a councillor one would have to be 
at least 30 years of age and possess at least £600 of land in the district in which one was 
elected.  The change would be grandfathered so as not to impact on the current councillors. 
The response of the British government to the proposal was: (i) the proposed change 
had been done in Canada and elsewhere so was constitutionally sound;197 (ii) the fixed 
terms and staggered election would preserve the role of the chamber as a check on “any 
popular or governmental influence”; (iii) the current councillors could be immediately 
removed as they had only been given the trust of the crown which could be withdrawn; and 
(iv) electors should be the holders of property rather than the councillors, as an upper 
chamber is to “represent not only the settled principles, and what on a large scale is called 
the traditionary policy of the country, but also, to a certain extent, its property, experience 
and education” (Despatch from Newcastle to Dundas, February 4, 1862).  In support of this 
last point, the colonial secretary wrote: 
“Speaking broadly, a well chosen constituency will choose a good 
representative, and any limitation upon its choice can only operate by 
occasionally preventing them from choosing the best.  An ill-chosen 
constituency, on the contrary, will tend to choose an indifferent 
representative.  But this tendency will not be controlled by any property 
qualification, which can never be so stringent as to prevent their finding 
within the prescribed limits some man as they may desire” (ibid.). 
The despatch from the colonial secretary was laid before each chamber, and the 
assembly reworked its Bill to reflect his input, setting the property qualification to vote for 
a councillor at £100 of property, councillors would have to be at least 30 years and resident 
in the province for five years.  Whelan was the strongest opponent of the legislation, and 
tried to delay consideration (P.E.I. Journals, HA, April 3, 1862).  This is not surprising as 
his political career had been launched by the Irish tenants, in opposition to the property 
owners.  For his part, Coles attempted unsuccessfully to lower the property qualification to 
£50 and reduce the residency requirement for councillors to three years (ibid.).  As he had 
                                                 
197 In addition to Canada, it had been done in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. 
  
 
250
won election from this broader constituency, his motives were, undoubtedly, partisan.  And 
the legislative council, for its part, sought to delay the coming into force of the legislation 
(P.E.I. Journals, LC, April 11, 1862).  This was simply self-preservation, though they knew 
the writing was on the wall and the despatch from the colonial secretary had removed any 
normative claims they could make based on bicameral theory.  The disagreement between 
the two chambers was resolved through several conferences, and the Bill was given royal 
assent (P.E.I. Journals, HA, April 17, 1862).198  Thus Prince Edward Island had two elected 
chambers when it joined Confederation in 1873. 
The idea of this change came from the province of Canada.  Support for this change 
crossed party lines, and was close to unanimous, with opposition interestingly enough 
coming from the leadership of both parties.  The resulting change preserved the social 
cleavage in Prince Edward Island society that the earlier council configuration had 
originally reflected, with the propertied class and tenants each having a chamber to 
represent their interest. 
IV. Newfoundland 
Newfoundland was a province equally divided between catholics and protestants.  It 
was only able to get representative government in 1832 when the demand for an elected 
lower chamber was no longer a demand of a single social group, the Irish catholics, but 
instead driven by a partisan movement in support of reform that included protestant 
merchants and catholic leaders.  This group had emerged when the issue of tax in support 
of local government had created a partisan cleavage.  This would be a temporary alliance 
and the province would revert to its social division as its social and partisan cleavages 
returned to being aligned. 
Newfoundland would be the last province to obtain responsible government in 1855, 
and this would only occur after a partisan group emerged that had representatives from both 
sides of the social cleavage.  The government’s solution to the social divide would be to 
                                                 
198 The legislation was entitled An Act to change the Constitution of the Legislative Council, by rendering the 
same Elective. 
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double all government positions and services so catholics and protestants were equally 
represented and equally served at every level of government.  This would be financially 
crippling for a province with limited capacity to raise revenue due to the province’s reliance 
on seasonal fisheries and, in 1933, the government would be placed in a form of 
receivership by the British, which would manage the provinc’es affairs through a 
commission until it joined Canada in 1949. 
In 1634, King Charles I by Royal Charter established admiralty law for the fishing 
fleets that were by then regularly visiting the West Coast of Newfoundland (the text of the 
‘Western Charter’ can be found in Matthews 1975).  Five years later, by letters patent, the 
“whole Continent Island or Region commonly called Newfoundland” was granted to four 
men – the Marquis of Hamilton, the Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, the Earl of 
Holland and Sir David Kirke – who were created as the Company of Adventurers to 
Newfoundland.199  This was a grant for the purposes of economic exploitation of the 
abundant fisheries found around this island, rather than for colonization or settlement, and 
the island was ruled by proprietary governors until 1728, at which point military governors 
were appointed instead. 
Under both proprietary  and military governors there was a concerted effort to limit 
the local population, and the seasonal workers were mostly Irish fishermen brought in via 
fishing fleets, so ‘justice’ continued to be administered pursuant to the ‘Western Charter’ 
by fishing admirals (Bannister 1997).200  Codified in the King William’s Act 1699, this was 
designed to ensure that new fishermen were brought from the British Isles each year, and to 
advantage those fishermen over any local inhabitants.  This laid the groundwork for naval 
governorship of the island. 
                                                 
199 Sir David Kirke was the driving force behind this company.  In 1629, he had led an expedition that forced 
the surrender of Quebec where he remained until it was restored to the French in 1632.  Kirke was knighted 
that year and his plans for Newfoundland, which he had seen during his expeditions, were approved two years 
later. 
200 The fishing ‘admirals’ were the captains of the fishing, and sometimes naval, ships, with the admiral being 
the captain of the first ship which arrived in the harbour during the season (the vice-admiral the captain of the 
second ship, etc.). 
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The first military governor was Captain Harry Osborne of the H.M.S. Squirrel, and 
along with his commission came instructions for the appointment of a sheriff and a justice 
of the peace (Page 1860, 18).  The military presence steadily increased due to competing 
interests over this land, by first the Spanish and then the French, who in the mid-1700s 
began establishing small settlements, placing this territory from the French king’s 
perspective under the governor of New France.  Most of the French claims to Terre-Neuve 
were abandoned by the Treaty of Paris (1763), though fishing rights in this area and the 
right to come ashore to collect lumber were central points of conflict. The treaties that 
settled these conflicts between the French and English were the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 
through The Paris Peace Treaty (1783) and the Treaty of Paris (1814) up to the Anglo-
French ‘Entente cordiale’ of 1904, whereupon the last French governed area on the island, 
the so-called ‘French shore’, was ceded to Newfoundland. 
While it was normal in settler colonies for government to be created and altered 
through royal prerogative, the British parliament became involved with Newfoundland due 
to problems with the administration of justice on the Island, and a court of common pleas 
was established by statute in 1789, followed by a civil court in 1791.201  Along with this 
more formal legal system, limited education was introduced in 1803 when sundry schools 
were established in some communities (Page 1860, 22).  Nevertheless, the British 
government’s policy towards Newfoundland continued until the beginning of the 19th 
century to be that of discouraging settlement. 
Keith (1928, 8) uses the coincidence of the British government policy of 
discouraging local settlement and the lack of local representative government in 
Newfoundland to support his thesis that representative institutions were a policy 
mechanism of the imperial government to encourage settlement.  However, little was 
known about Newfoundland at the office of the colonial secretary in London, falling as it 
did under the navy, and so no active steps were taken by the colonial office to grant local 
                                                 
201 The challenges posed by custom and admiralty law, and reforming the diverse legal process at the local 
level, is reviewed more fully by the Law Reform Commission of Newfoundland (1989). 
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institutions of governance as had become the practice in other British North American 
provinces (Page 1860, 25). 
Under British colonial policy and the terms of the original grant, Newfoundland was 
founded as a ‘plantation’, so the level of interest in this territory was commensurate with 
the amount of produce and profit it generated for the mother country. Furthermore, there 
was a strategic advantage to discouraging local development, as British fishermen would 
frequently be drafted into the royal navy during times of war. It is only with the Treaty of 
Paris (1814) and the ultimate end of the Napoleonic Wars that the British felt confident that 
hostilities with the French and the Americans had sufficiently ended to permit the colony to 
be transferred from military governance under the royal navy to civilian governance.  In 
1819, the British government authorized the granting of a great seal for use in the 
administration of the colony and reference to this seal and to the appointment of an 
attorney-general can be found in a royal warrant issued in 1820 (Swan 1977, 87), all 
evidence that the British fully intended to transfer government into civilian hands.  In 1824, 
key vestiges of naval law were replaced with British common law (Fisheries, Judicature 
and Marriage Acts) and the Judicature Act abolished the surrogate courts (Commission 
1989, 25-35). 
In 1825, a royal charter was issued to the colony placing it firmly under the colonial 
office and a new great seal was issued on September 1, 1827 (Swan 1977, 87).  The first 
civilian governor was Sir Thomas Cochrane and his commission established a governor’s 
council, composed of the chief justice, two assistant judges and the commander of the army 
garrison. 
Page (1860, 26) suggests that the emergence of local institutions of governance in 
the province was the result of a civilian governor being appointed who could advocate on 
behalf of the residents, something he claims occurred with Cochrane’s appointment.  It is 
true that Cochrane was an advocate of catholic emancipation and established the first 
governor’s council.  He even proposed three catholics to sit on the council (Despatch from 
Cochrane to Bathurst, October 11, 1829).  He also proposed that the oaths be eliminated, as 
had been done for Quebec.  But he opposed representative government.  So the 
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establishment of the governor’s council was not the result of his advocacy, but reflects 
British policy and while this policy should have seen the establishment of an elected lower 
chamber as well, the divisions in the province between catholic and protestant, exacerbated 
by poverty, would delay the creation of this body until 1832. 
The British colonial secretary had rejected Cochrane’s proposal of including 
catholics on his first council, but in 1829, the Roman Catholic Relief Act eliminated the 
final prohibition on catholics serving in the British parliament.  Having spent time in the 
province, his initial generosity towards catholics had soured.  He made no moves to appoint 
catholics to the council.  When the British law officers informed him that the elimination of 
the oaths did not apply to colonies, he was reportedly heavy handed with catholics who 
organized a meeting on the question (Greene 1999).  Nevertheless, the meeting succeeded 
in passing resolutions to petition the British parliament and Patrick Morris was chosen at a 
subsequent meeting to take the resolutions to London; where in 1830 the emancipation was 
extended to Newfoundland. 
In Newfoundland, local histories all make reference to the agitation for reform that 
came from religious minority communities, such as the Irish catholics, the emergence of a 
local free press and the outspoken leaders, such as William Carson and Patrick Morris, 
leading the crusade (Project 2000, civil).  Certainly agitation for representative institutions 
came originally from the Irish catholic settlers.  But their demands were ignored. 
When the governor’s council imposed a tax, a partisan issue emerged that crossed 
the province’s social cleavage.  The protestant merchant class teamed up with catholic 
reformers to demand a representative assembly.  That this was seen as a bi-social (catholic 
and protestant) movement in support of institutional reform is reflected in the way the 
debate was framed in the local media and in the British parliamentary debates (see Project 
2000).  Finally, in 1832, an additional elected assembly was created by royal prerogative, 
which was to consist of 15 members, and catholics were free to vote and to hold office. 
Newfoundland and Labrador had a population of about 19,000 at the start of the 
19th century.  The largest concentrations were at Conception Bay and St. John’s and in 
these communities the Irish were in the majority.  With the Napoleonic Wars raging in 
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Europe from 1803 to 1815, the colony had an almost total monopoly of the international 
salt fish trade, England having been cut off from Europe.202  This created a pull factor in 
immigration, as the island had the capacity to absorb a great number of immigrants.  The 
push factors of poor harvests, the failure of local industries, and overpopulation combined 
with the well-established shipping routes to and from ports in England and Ireland, resulted 
in the population swelling, reaching approximately 220,000 people living in more than 
1,000 settlements scattered across the island by the end of the century.   Throughout this 
growth there were three large identifiable groups: Anglicans, Methodists and Roman 
Catholics.  
The population of Newfoundland quadrupled from 19,000 in 1803 to 75,000 in 
1836.  However, the division between protestants and catholics, who were also English and 
Irish, respectively, in terms of birth or descent, remained equally balanced in terms of total 
population (Mannion et Handcock 1993).  English settlers dispersed across Newfoundland 
and Labrador, whereas most Irish immigrants settled at Conception Bay and St. John’s on 
the Avalon Peninsula.  There were of course other ethnic groups, but the predominant 
cleavage was Irish catholic/English protestant.   
There had been local unrest and demands for reform as far back as the era of 
proprietor governors, and the other British colonies in Atlantic Canada had all received 
representative government by this time.  Newfoundland was denied the institutions granted 
to other colonies in the first instance because responsibility for this island rested for so long 
with the navy and thus was out of the influence of the colonial office where various models 
for colonial institutional design were being advanced.  However this was remedied in 
advance of large waves of settlement.  So the delays rest on the colonial side.  
The initial foray into representative government was not entirely successful and the 
reformers in the assembly found themselves at constant odds with Governor Cochrane.  So 
two years later, in 1834, the council and assembly were amalgamated so as to lessen the 
legislative influence of some of the elected assemblymen by the addition of appointed 
                                                 
202 Fish exports doubled during this period. 
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members of the council.  This was equally unworkable, and the assembly and council were 
separated again in 1847. 
In 1855, Newfoundland became the last to achieve responsible government.  As 
with the other Canadian provinces, this was achieved by a Reform Party that was able to 
muster support across the social cleavage.  At the behest of the reformers, the assembly had 
passed a resolution asking for responsible government in 1851, but the colonial secretary 
rejected the proposal on the grounds that the colony was too socially divided, and lacked 
economic and political capacity. 
Philip Little led the Reform Party to a majority in the 1853 election, having received 
the endorsement for responsible government from the catholic bishop, and  making inroads 
into the protestant community by championing funding for Methodist schools (Higgins 
2009).  Little was sent to London to plead the case with the colonial secretary, and the 
British government agreed on the condition that the assembly be increased in size. 
The Reform Party remained in power until 1861, when the governor dismissed them 
and installed the Conservatives, who were then able to win a majority in the election which 
divided catholics and protestants.  The newly elected Conservative premier Frederic Carter 
tried to bridge the social cleavage by “instituting a system whereby seats in the Assembly, 
Executive Council positions, government offices, judicial appointments and public monies 
were shared between the major denominations - Roman Catholic, Anglican and Methodist - 
on a proportional basis” (Webb 2001).  The principle was extended to education, in 1874, 
the government dividing its grant for education between the three churches.  While 
criticized as inefficient and wasteful, the compromise prevented sectarian warfare. 
Under the letters patent of March 28, 1876, the legislative council was to consist of 
members nominated and appointed by the king.  Up to 15 members could be provisionally 
appointed by the governor, though the appointment would need to be subsequently 
confirmed by the king.  Every member served at pleasure. 
Newfoundland’s failure to enter Confederation with Canada was also affected by its 
principle cleavage.  Catholics were decidedly opposed to union, though the Confederate 
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and Anti-Confederate parties (which temporarily replaced the Conservatives and Liberals 
as they had come to be known) each enjoyed protestant and catholic support.  
In the 16th Assembly, provision was made whereby money Bills had to originate in 
the Assembly wherein it claimed sole right to enact such legislation and argued that such 
bills ought not to be changed by the legislative council.  In 1917, the Legislature Act was 
adopted whereby a money Bill sent up to the legislative council one month before the end 
of a session that is not adopted by the council or any money Bill sent up in three 
consecutive sessions and not passed in the same form by the council could be given royal 
assent without the council’s concurrence.  This limitation on the council’s authority was 
based on the British Parliament Act 1911, which similarly limited the house of lords 
capacity to block money Bills.  As will be seen in Chapter 9, the idea of suspensive veto 
made its way into the Canadian provinces as well. 
In 1933, the council and assembly were suspended because of the province’s lack of 
financial capacity, and the government was placed under a British royal commission, 
composed of the governor, three commissioners from Newfoundland and three from the 
United Kingdom.  It remained so administered until 1949, when Newfoundlanders voted in 
a referendum to join Canada as a way of settling its debt and restoring responsible 
government. 
V. Conclusion 
The dates that institutional change began to be demanded and was achieved is 
contained in Table 6.1.  The date that responsible government first appeared is used here as 
we were interested not in what the British governors were willing to concede but what 
groups were able to obtain and whether or not this was obtained in the first instance by a 
partisan group or a social group.  In each province in each case, the change was obtained by 
a partisan group.  The ideas for specific institutional reform came from neighbouring 
Canada.  It was there that the idea of responsible government first emerged and that the 
idea of an elected chamber was first demanded and actually achieved.  Only Prince Edward 
  
 
258
Island changed its upper chamber to an elected body and it did this by preserving the 
representational role of this chamber. 
Table 6.1: Dates of Institutional Change in British Provinces 
 Appointed 
Council 
Established 
Elected 
Lower 
Chamber 
Added 
Demand for 
Responsible 
Government 
Demand 
for 
Council 
to be 
Elected 
Responsible 
Government 
First 
Appears 
Responsible 
Government 
Suspended 
Council 
Elected 
Canada 1663/1763 1791 1828 1834 1842 1843-1848 1856 
N.S. 1719 1758 1837 1837 1848 N/A N/A 
N.B. 1784 1785 1848 1840 1854 N/A N/A 
P.E.I. 1770 1773 1849 1856 1851 1858-1864 1862 
Nfld. 1827 1832 1851 N/A 1855 1933-1949 N/A 
 
The evidence from the Atlantic British provinces, as with the province of Canada, 
shows that partisan cleavages drive institutional change.  Partisan groups will be successful 
in achieving their preferred changes to institutions if they can bridge the dominant social 
cleavage.  Shifts in group identity and thus in the cleavage itself can be a precursor to 
change.  These two factors explain Nova Scotia’s relatively rapid slide down the 
evolutionary trajectory.  At the other end, Newfoundland stalled repeatedly along the 
institutional trajectory while waiting for a cross-social consensus in favour of institutional 
change. 
It has long been argued that the rise in importance of the lower chamber to 
dominance over the executive was due to the legitimacy conferred on this body by election.  
But this was an era where bicameral theory still included restraint on the temporary 
impulses of the lower chamber and of government officials.  The shift to responsible 
government which made the government accountable to the lower chamber was as much 
about the capacity of that chamber to claim to represent multiple social groups, which 
provided its own legitimacy over the legislative councils that were seen as representing 
very limited interests. 
The developments in these provinces stands in contrast to what Cox (1987) found 
with respect to the United Kingdom.  There he saw the changes to the franchise brought 
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about by the Reform Act(s) as leading to the rise in importance of political parties given the 
need to fight wider and more competitive elections.  Political parties and national 
campaigns required party discipline, which in turn created a party leadership centred in the 
commons, which inevitably led to government being responsible to the lower chamber.  In 
England, political parties had existed in the form of Whigs and Tories since the time of the 
Stuarts and both the commons and lords were divided along party lines.  The Reform Act(s) 
transformed the lower chamber from an offshoot of the house of lords to a body which 
reflected the other side of England’s dominant social cleavage, that of class.  In contrast, 
the electoral franchise in Canada’s provinces was already as wide as that in Britain after the 
Reform Act(s).  The emergence of political parties was the result of a desire to bring about 
institutional change.  The ascendancy of the lower chamber was due to the normative claim 
of legitimacy through election, the capacity of this chamber to channel the interests of 
multiple societal groups into political parties and to raise taxes from the growing merchant 
class. 
This evidence is also in contrast to what Lipset and Rokkan (1967) found with 
respect to political parties.  They concluded in their examination of the emergence of 
political parties in Western Europe that an ‘opposition’ party to the establishment would 
emerge from the ‘out’ group as defined by the country’s dominant social cleavage.  But this 
occurred only in Newfoundland were social groups divided along party lines, with the 
Reform Party being supported by catholics and the Tory party being supported by 
protestants.  In Prince Edward Island the cleavage over property ownership and class 
resulted in the emergence of a political party, the Escheat Party, and this party did not last.  
In all provinces, Reform or Liberal parties emerged as the ‘opposition’ parties with the 
primary purpose of achieving institutional change. 
Political parties are at their core coalitions, in so far as people rarely share identical 
policy goals.  The choice of who to include in the coalition is the result of the prejudices 
and diplomatic skills of its leadership.  The evidence from these British provinces is the 
bigger the change, the broader the coalition – with formal institutions of representation 
requiring the bridging of the society’s social cleavage so as to maintain social harmony and 
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build cross group trust.  Once created, a political party must continue to operate within the 
institution of governance that it has helped to shape and which helped to define its initial 
approach to coalition formation.  Parties become shifting coalitions of social groups with 
different electoral systems changing the incentives by which the leadership of a political 
party must adjust to changes in the cleavage, shifting group identities and partisan 
objectives. 
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Chapter 7: Confederation as Institutional Change 
This chapter examines Confederation in 1867 and the resultant creation of a 
Canadian upper chamber, named the ‘senate’, the abolition of the upper chamber in Ontario 
and its retention for Quebec.  The expectation is that there are not one but two dominant 
cleavages in a polity, one social (based on identity markers such as culture, language, 
religion and class) and one partisan (based on ideology, in this era party identification or 
shared policy interest).  It is posited that thinking of political behaviour as being both social 
and partisan offers a fertile insight into the choices actors make. 
Our hypothesis is that while a social group may advocate change, a social cleavage 
will inevitably lead to the other group resisting change.  What has been found so far in the 
research for this disseratproject is that change is achieved by a partisan group that can 
bridge the social cleavage by having, among its legislative membership, leaders of both 
sides of the social cleavage. 
The institutional arrangements adopted at Confederation were based on the 
institutions that had been in place in the united province of Canada prior to Confederation, 
though the creation of a federation was a departure from the traditional British approach 
which was unitary.  At this time, the united province of Canada had a social cleavage 
between the French in the East and the English in the West.  One of the reasons it is 
preferable to examine partisan politics in this era via the cleavage is because candidates ran 
for office under different labels in each half of the province and alliances often shifted 
between issues and with elections.  Nevertheless, there had been a clear partisan cleavage in 
the province of Canada and that was over government formation after the adoption of 
responsible government, with a governing party and an opposition emerging.  The 
governing party had given itself the label Liberal-Conservative and it repeatedly made 
claims to being non-partisan, but this was strategic.  It was a partisan vehicle to achieve the 
policy goals of the members of the executive council or the cabinet at the time.  The person 
who most effectively made these claims was Sir John A. Macdonald, who would emerge as 
the leader of this party and become Canada’s first prime minister. 
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Eventually the social divide between East and West resulted in the governing 
Liberal-Conservative Party winning the most seats in the East and the opposition winning 
the most seats in the West.  As resentment over policy heightened the tension, the number 
one priority became institutional reform.  As it had in the battle for responsible government, 
this emerged to define the social cleavage.  The result was a new alliance between the 
leadership of what had been the majority party in the West, the Liberals/Clear Grits, and the 
Liberal-Conservatives which was dominant in the East.  It called itself the ‘Great Coalition’ 
but this again was strategic.  This was a new government party on one side of a partisan 
cleavage that had been created with the goal of achieving institutional change.  It was just 
as solid and temporary as any previous government had been in this era. 
The Confederation deal was negotiated in the cabinet.  It was then sold to the other 
provinces and championed by this government in the legislature and in the province.  It was 
also opposed in both halves of the province.  In the West it was opposed by English Clear 
Grit politicians on the grounds that it did not create a unicameral legislature with 
representation by population, of which the West had the larger population.  In the East it 
was opposed by French ‘Rouges’ politicians because, with the addition of 24 members of 
the upper chamber from the Maritime provinces, they felt their province should have their 
province’s representation in that chamber increased. 
In New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the Confederation deal once agreed to by their 
respective governments would equally come to shift their partisan cleavages from being 
defined by provincial government formation to a battle over Confederation, with Pro- and 
Anti-Confederation parties emerging.  It would take several elections after Confederation 
before the partisan cleavages in these provinces returned to a battle between the provincial 
government and an opposition.  This would later occur in Prince Edward Island and 
Newfoundland, as well, when their governments decided to join the federation.  These two 
provinces would not join Confederation at the time due to their strong social cleavages, 
with tenants opposing Confederation in P.E.I. and catholics doing the same in 
Newfoundland. 
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This chapter is divided into four parts.  In the first part, the Confederation 
negotiations and the resulting deal with a federal union under a bicameral parliament with 
an appointed upper chamber will be examined.  In the second section the details of the 
Senate are reviewed, and the impact of the Constitution Act, 1867 on the provincial 
legislative councils are considered.  In the third part, how the cleavages shifted in Canada 
following Confederation are discussed, as this sets the stage for the following chapter.   In 
the final section, the few changes that have been made to the Senate since are reported. 
I. Bridging the Social Cleavage 
Federal systems allow for political power to be separated between two levels of 
government.  Thus different groups can be joined without surrendering their local identity 
and self-determination to the larger whole.  Alternately to union, as was the case for the 
province of Canada, a society can be divided geographically by social groups (what the 
Fathers of Confederation called ‘sectional interests’), and responsibility for matters that 
impact on the social can be assigned to the local political jurisdiction, while allowing 
matters of common interest to be managed collectively. 
In the struggle for responsible government, the notion of separating matters that 
were ‘local’ from ‘imperial’ had been central to the debate.  Additionally, the United States 
had created a federal system and, while it was going through a civil war at the time, it 
offered a model from which to work. 
The idea of distinguishing what was ‘local’ from ‘provincial’ had already begun in 
the province of Canada during the two decades of considering how to reconcile legislation 
that had previously been adopted in Lower Canada and Upper Canada.   So it was not much 
of a transition to begin separating ‘local’ from ‘national’, to use the language of the era, 
what later comes to be called provincial and federal. 
In the province of Canada, social group conflict emerged over legislative politics 
when (i) legislation had to do with the ‘racial’ (what we would now call cultural) identity of 
one group and (ii) when a majority of legislators on the ‘other’ side of the social cleavage 
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would impose legislation that was seen to be threatening to the identity of the opposing 
half. 
The institutional model adopted for the new federation of Canada was a 
modification of the arrangements at the time of the union of the two provinces.  It uses the 
Westminster bicameral model of responsible government.  The decision to make the upper 
chamber elected in 1856 in the province of Canada was reversed.  While it had been an 
elected chamber, the members of this chamber ran in one of 24 districts in each half of the 
province, and this number of 24 for each half (which returned to being separate provinces) 
was maintained for the appointed upper chamber for both Ontario and Quebec, with the 
additional requirement that members appointed for Quebec would each have to own 
property in a different district using these boundaries.  The same would be true for the 
upper chamber in Quebec’s provincial legislature.  This was to ensure that the English in 
Quebec had representation both provincially and federally.  This reflects the restraint on 
change exerted by members of a social group trying to protect their relative influence in a 
new political structure. 
The belief among legislators from Upper Canada was that most things would be 
federal.  In the final deal on what would be left to the provinces, they believed that they had 
limited the number of ‘local’ matters assigned to the province, in order to prevent the 
federal-provincial tension that had led to the U.S. civil war.  As education and health care 
were still largely private, the state’s role was seen as regulatory, just as it was for private 
property.  To the French legislators from Lower Canada, these were matters central to 
social identity.  To both the French and English members of the cabinet, the key to their 
goal of nation building was the power to tax, to borrow money, to sell crown lands, to 
exploit resources and to build an intercontinental transportation system, and these were to 
be federal jurisdiction. 
The restraint on wholesale change was due to the social cleavage in the province of 
Canada exerted by the French members of the legislature, as the deal was negotiated first 
among the ministers in the government.  If John A. Macdonald and George Brown would 
have had their way they would have established a unitary and not a federal system for the 
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entire country.  Brown, additionally, saw the upper chamber as an unnecessary conservative 
restraint on popular will.  Ontario, thus, would start Confederation without a second 
chamber.  Influential members of its upper chamber would be simply transferred to the 
federal senate.  Similarly members of the upper chamber from Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick would be offered seats in the senate.  It would be up to provincial legislatures 
whether or not to abolish the second chamber at the provincial level. 
The temporary realignment of party politics under the label ‘Great Coalition’ 
created a single group that had as its partisan objective the federating of the British 
provinces of North America and the settlement of North-West Territories.  Within that 
partisan group were the political leaders of both sides of the social cleavage, most notably 
Brown and Macdonald for the English in the West, George-Étienne Cartier and Étienne-
Pascal Taché for the French in the East, and Alexander Galt for the English minority in the 
East.  At the cabinet table these representatives could act for their sectional interests and 
then, more importantly, they could sell the deal to their respective social groups. 
Negotiating Confederation 
Following The Union Act, 1840, the Baldwin-La Fontaine coalition of Reformers 
had been able to bridge the English-French West-East cleavage.  This was succeeded by 
Macdonald and Cartier putting together the Liberal-Conservative Party, which was a union 
of the Francophone ‘Bleus’ of Canada East and Anglophone Tories, Conservatives and 
moderate Reformers from both halves.  As this was the first government in the era of 
responsible government, it defined the new emerging partisan cleavage in the province, 
with ‘Rouges’ running against this party in Canada East and the Clear Grits and Reformers 
running against them in Canada West. 
While a partisan cleavage was emerging through the new electoral dynamics created 
by responsible government, the new social cleavage of the province was having a direct 
impact on provincial politics within the legislature.  At the time of union both Upper 
Canada and Lower Canada had their own laws, including a different legal system; and they 
had unique institutions, which were faith-based in Roman Catholicism in the East and 
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Anglicanism in the West.  So while the province was united under one legislature, that 
legislature had to routinely pass laws that impacted on only one-half of the province.  This 
meant that a majority of legislators from Upper Canada could impose a law on Lower 
Canada over the objections of the majority of legislators from Lower Canada, and vice 
versa.  This was an era where liberal values had found followers, as they had with the 
Whigs in the United Kingdom, so policies like public education became driven 
ideologically in opposition to certain social groups’ religious beliefs.  Laws concerning 
education, such as the establishment of sectarian schools in the East or catholic schools in 
the West, or land tenure, given the seigneurial system of Quebec, were thus divisive. 
It is thus not surprising that different ideas for institutional change were frequently 
advanced by party factions in the legislative assembly of the province of Canada almost as 
soon as union occurred.  In Canada East, the Rouges tried to revive the reform agenda of 
the Parti patriote as advanced by Papineau.203  As these American ideas had little support in 
other factions, this party abandoned these policies under the leadership of Antoine-Aimé 
Dorion, who in 1856 proposed that the province be transformed into a small federation, 
where local matters would be decided by the sectional majority for each half of the 
province and matters of interest to the whole province would be handled by a general 
parliament, which could have representation by population (Riendeau 2000, 133). 
In Canada West, the Clear Grits had begun advocating representation by population 
as soon as the census of 1851-52 showed the population of Upper Canada was larger than 
that of Lower Canada (Careless 1967).  Their early reform agenda, like the Rouges in 
Canada East, was rooted in Jeffersonian democracy as filtered through the positions taken 
by William Lyon Mackenzie.  Reformer George Brown in 1856 began to argue in his 
paper, the Globe, that the lands under the control of the Hudson Bay Company should be 
annexed by Canada, and he called for the reunification of the reform movement behind this 
cause.  In 1857, he brought together 150 Reformers, Clear Grits and Liberals to adopt a 
united Liberal Reform platform, which in addition to annexation of the North-West, called 
                                                 
203 This led them to (counter intuitively) align with Montreal’s English-speaking business elite in support of a 
‘manifesto’ in 1849 calling for the annexation of Canada by the United States. 
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for representation by population, province-wide non-sectarian education and free trade 
(Careless 2000). 
While Brown was a unifying force for the Liberals in Canada West, he was a 
divisive force in Canada East, being a virulent anti-cleric who continued to speak in racial 
terms that pitted English against French, even though this social cleavage was being 
weakened through the emergence of a new Canadian identity.  In terms of the province’s 
new solid partisan cleavage, the Rouges were not successful in making much of a dent 
against the Liberal-Conservatives in Canada East, but the Liberal Reformers were able to 
take a majority of the seats in Canada West.  The Liberal Reformers and Rouges were 
unable to work together due to their strong social identity and a lack of respect for each 
other (Cornell 1967). 
During the session of 1858, Alexander Galt tabled resolutions in the assembly in 
favour of a federal union of Canada West, Canada East, the Atlantic Provinces, and the 
North-West (land held by the Hudson’s Bay Company).  In pitching his vision, Galt argued 
that the union would: 
“promote their several and united interests by preserving to each province 
the uncontrolled management of its peculiar institutions and of those internal 
affairs respecting which differences of opinion might arise with other 
members of the confederation, while it will increase that identity of feeling 
which pervades the possessions of the British crown in North America; and 
by the adoption of a uniform policy for the development of the vast and 
varied resources of these immense territories will greatly add to their 
national power and consideration” (Skelton 1963, 219). 
The defeat of the Liberal-Conservative ministry under Macdonald and Cartier on the issue 
of where the capital of the province should be situated meant that the resolutions were not 
put to a vote.204  Brown and Dorion attempted to form a Rouges-Liberal Reformer ministry, 
                                                 
204 After the Montreal parliament buildings had been burned following the adoption of the Rebellion Losses 
Act in 1849, the capital alternated between Quebec City (1853-1856; 1859-1866) and Toronto (1849-1852; 
1856-1858), but instead of bridging understanding, this added to the divide since legislators from one half of 
the province would sometimes be absent when the legislature met in the other half.  In 1857, the government 
turned to Queen Victoria to choose a capital and she chose Ottawa, but the government was severely 
criticized for involving the queen in what was so clearly a divisive debate that had split the province along its 
social cleavage. 
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but this was defeated two days later.205  The governor general, Sir Edmund Head, then 
approached Alexander Galt and asked him to form a new Liberal-Conservative government 
as the leader from Canada East.  
Galt declined the governor general’s offer, and recommended Cartier be called upon 
in his stead, which returned the Macdonald-Cartier ministry to office (Kesteman 2000).206  
Galt’s condition for facilitating and then joining this new Macdonald-Cartier ministry was 
that they adopt his plan for Confederation as government policy.  Subsequently, Cartier, 
Galt and John Ross, the provincial secretary, were sent to London where they presented a 
memorial to Colonial Secretary Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton.  The institutional structure it 
proposed for the federal government was a governor general, a senate elected on a 
territorial basis of representation, and a lower house based on representation by 
population.207  The Maritime Provinces were in London, coincidentally, at the same time 
requesting financial assistance for an interprovincial railway.  Funding for a railway was 
declined on the grounds that money was needed more urgently for other priorities of the 
British government (Despatch from Lytton to Head, December 24, 1858).  The Canadian 
                                                 
205 The Independence of Parliament Act required that if a person accepts an appointment of government 
office, they resign their seat in the legislature and stand in a by-election to ensure their constituents were 
willing to forgo having their representative on the government payroll.  Brown’s ministry had resigned their 
seats to run in by-elections and thus had insufficient votes to defeat a motion of non-confidence.  He asked 
Governor General Head to dissolve the legislature, but the governor refused.  The same fate would happen to 
Arthur Meighan’s government during the ‘King-Byng Thing’ pursuant to An Act further securing the 
independence of Parliament which had been adopted in the first Parliament of Canada.  
206 The Macdonald-Cartier government may not have been able to survive a non-confidence vote either if they 
were out campaigning, but Macdonald came up with a way to keep the government in office.  Where the 
Independence of Parliament Act required a person to resign when appointed to a ministry, they did not have to 
resign if they had been a minister during the previous month (i.e. they were simply taking a new ministerial 
appointment).  Macdonald had the governor appoint the cabinet to all new positions, and then they all 
resigned and were re-appointed to their previous ministerial posts. This event is known as the ‘double 
shuffle’. 
207 Federal powers would include customs, excise, trade, postal services, militia, banking, currency, weights 
and measures, national public works, public lands and debts, criminal justice, unincorporated and native 
lands.  Revenue from public lands would go to the province, which would also receive federal financial 
support.  The constitution would remain an Act of the imperial legislature, which could repair deficiencies, 
and sovereign power would not be given to provincial legislatures.  The scheme was designed, it claimed, to 
correct the deficiencies in the federation in the United States, and focus “local government and legislation 
upon questions of provincial interests” (Skelton 1963, 242). 
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idea of a federal union of all British possessions in North America also received little 
support in London. 
In 1862, the Macdonald-Cartier government failed to get a Militia Bill adopted, and 
resigned.  Sandfield Macdonald, a reformer, tried to form a government by committing to 
follow a ‘double majority’ voting rule.  This is mistakenly taken to be his “requiring 
majorities for government measures from both halves of the province” (Careless 1988, 
1773).  While the idea of a double majority from the two halves of the provincial legislature 
had come up before, what Sandfield Macdonald was proposing in this instance was that for 
‘local’ matters (i.e. a matter only of concern to one half of the province), in addition to 
meeting the constitutional requirement that it be passed by both the upper and lower 
chamber of the legislature and receive royal assent, the government would ensure that the 
measure had received the support of a majority of legislators that had been elected from the 
half of the province that the measure concerned.  While his ministry was able to hang on 
until 1864, this commitment did not last as long.  In fact, his most divisive piece of 
legislation, which was a separate Roman Catholic school system for Upper Canada, was 
only passed with the Canada East legislators voting down the majority of legislators in 
Canada West.  This had the benefit, however, of illustrating to all the lack of weight of non-
constitutionalized division of powers (constitutionally defined powers being one sine qua 
non of federalism). 
With the defeat of the Dorion-Sandfield Macdonald government, the Liberal-
Conservatives returned to power in 1864, only to be defeated in three months.  Realizing 
the legislature was at an impasse, Liberal Reformer Brown suggested to friends that the 
time might be right to settle once and for all the institutional divide between Canada West 
and East and make constitutional redesign a political objective.  This suggestion was passed 
on to John A. Macdonald and Cartier, whereupon a series of meetings were held.  A deal 
memorandum was prepared and approved by the governor general and the executive 
council, and Brown distributed it to his supporters.  Thus the ‘Great Coalition’ was born, 
with Étienne-Paschal Taché, a respected former Reform premier and appointed legislative 
councillor, as premier from Canada East, and Conservative John A. Madonald as premier in 
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the West, with Brown and two others from the Liberal Reformers joining them in the 
ministry.208  This Great Coalition had as a single policy priority and that was to achieve 
institutional change, and as such it remained in place as the government of the province of 
Canada until Confederation.  Once its policy objective was completed, Brown departed, 
though not everyone else did and the Liberal-Conservative Party became the government 
party once again for Canada, and for the new province of Quebec. 
The Maritime Provinces were meeting in Charlottetown on September 1, 1864 to 
consider Nova Scotia’s proposal for a Maritime Union.  They agreed to let the Canadians 
come and present their proposal for a federation of all of the British provinces of North 
America.209  After the Canadian presentation, they considered the question of ‘maritime 
union’ amongst themselves, and quickly discovered it was only supported by Nova Scotia, 
as delegates from Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick were not willing to surrender 
their local legislature and government, and the legislators from New Brunswick were 
sceptical of the financial benefits for their province being joined with the more populous 
Nova Scotia.  Federation was the only option where “strength, influence, and width would 
be satisfied with a central government, and local sentiment would not be outraged by the 
destruction of local institutions” (Kennedy 1922) 
On October 10, 1864, delegations from these provinces met again at Quebec City.  
Taché was chosen to chair the meeting, and Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island, Canada East and Canada West were given one vote each.  Macdonald set forth the 
foundational principles which included a strong federal government, a bicameral parliament 
consisting of a ‘legislative council’ and a ‘house of commons’.  The legislative council 
would have three equal regions: Canada East, Canada West and the Maritimes.  Macdonald 
claimed to be open-minded with respect to the way legislative councillors were to be 
                                                 
208 Taché had been premier from 1855 to 1857, the first half with MacNab and the second half with John A. 
Macdonald.  It was during this second ministry that Taché and Macdonald were able to turn their coalition 
into what could be considered a political party (Désilets 2000b). 
209 Galt outlined the financial aspects, Brown the organization and structure of the federal legislature, and 
Macdonald addressed the general framework of federal and local government. 
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selected, but this was a frequent claim by Macdonald who preferred to let people talk 
themselves out while he lobbied behind the scene to get the option he wanted. 
Once agreement in principle had been obtained, the Canadian delegates were asked 
to prepare resolutions, which were then considered by the delegates acting for the most part 
in “a committee of the whole’.  After resolutions were adopted, delegates from a province 
could caucus and items could be reconsidered.  This was all designed to give the delegates 
from other provinces a comfort level that all things were on the table and they were not 
being sold a bill of goods.  In total, the delegates met for 18 days, and the resulting 72 
resolutions became the basis for the British North America Act, which has since been 
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867. 
Georges-Étienne Cartier spoke about how the addition of a Maritime division to 
Canada’s French and English divisions would change the battle between the two sides of 
the social divide, essentially shifting it from a social cleavage to a partisan cleavage since 
with only two sides divided by social identity: 
“one a weak and the other a strong party – the weaker could not be 
overcome; but if three parties were concerned, the stronger would not have 
the same advantage; as when it was seen by the third that there was too much 
strength on one side the third would club with the weaker combatant to resist 
the big fighter” (Waite 1865, 40). 
George Brown called on members to overcome both the social and partisan cleavage and 
consider the new enterprise “without partisanship and free from personal feeling” (ibid., 
78).  And Macdonald, while noting that he and other residents of Upper Canada would have 
preferred a strong unitary state, acknowledged that this would have never been accepted by 
the people of Lower Canada who, due to their different language, nationality and religion, 
would feel threatened. 
As for the other parties to Confederation, New Brunswick had a strong cleavage 
between its linguistic and religious communities.  The province had two elections where 
Confederation was the principle issue.  In the first election, held in June of 1865, Acadian 
and Irish catholics were able to muster sufficient opposition to the Pro-Confederation Party 
that the Anti-Confederation party won the election (Andrew 1996).  Prior to the second 
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election, raids by American ‘Fenians’, which was a pro-Republic Irish group, weakened the 
cohesion between the two groups.  The partisan playing-field shifted as well between the 
two elections, as the United States Congress made it clear it would not enter into reciprocity 
with the province.  When the Anti-Confederation Party resigned over the lieutenant-
governor accepting a resolution from the provincial upper chamber in support of 
Confederation, the new Pro-Confederation Party government faced the electorate in May of 
1866 and won a decisive victory. 
Nova Scotia had the weakest social cleavage, which had been shifted to a 
mainland/Cape Breton division that both political parties effectively bridged.  But it also 
had the strongest partisan cleavage.  Knowing the vote would break on partisan lines, Nova 
Scotia’s premier Charles Tupper held off on introducing the resolutions until he had a clear 
indication of developments in New Brunswick.  He then used the opposition’s complaint 
over the failure to create the Maritime Union, to force a vote that would divide the 
legislature on partisan grounds.  The motion to pursue the non-starter of Maritime Union 
failed, thus leaving the only available option for union, which would provide possibilities to 
reverse the economic downturn and facilitate economic growth, the one of joining Canada 
and New Brunswick in a federation.210 
Prince Edward Island’s dominant social cleavage, a class cleavage exacerbated by a 
lack of property, ensured it did not join at the time as the original federation proposal 
lacked any mechanism to bridge that cleavage by settling the ‘land question’ (this would be 
remedied so as to permit their union in 1873).  Similarly, Newfoundland was too divided 
between Irish catholic and protestant British to entertain any consideration of institutional 
questions, as evidenced by its inability to manage its own self-government.  This would 
continue to be true until its financial situation forced its leadership to accept the 
inevitability of union, and even then the two sides of the social cleavage would insist on 
constitutionalizing the social détente with constitutional guarantees for denominational 
school boards to preserve the status quo.  The numerous concessions designed to 
                                                 
210 Kennedy (1922, 312) refers to the debate as “one of the most bitter in British American history”. 
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accommodate social groups in each of these provinces makes the Canadian Constitution an 
interesting reflection of how social and partisan interests compete. 
The delegates met again in London, England, in November of 1866 to finalize the 
wording of the Constitution.  They would go through six drafts, though stay close to the 
original 72 resolutions.  The Bill would then pass the British parliament with little interest 
on the part of their legislators: the right of Canada to manage its legislative arrangements 
having been well established; Whig domination of the U.K. parliament having also been 
established; the presence of the Canadian delegates ensured effective lobbying; and British 
self-interest in reducing financial and military obligation in the empire combining to make 
a compelling domestic economic and political case.211 
In the legislature of the province of Canada, opposition to the package came from 
the Rouges and Clear Grits.  The former argued that the lower chamber should not have 
representation by population and the latter argued that the upper chamber should have more 
representatives from their province. 
II. Federal and Provincial Upper Chambers 
With respect to the proposed federal legislative council (it would  be renamed a 
‘senate’ in London), Macdonald’s strong opposition to election as a method of selection 
emerged very quickly at Quebec City, in spite of his initial assurance that he was open to 
the suggestions of the other delegates.  Brown was even more strongly opposed to election, 
though two of Brown’s liberal colleagues, Oliver Mowat and William McDougall, favoured 
election.  The motion for election was rejected. 
In terms of numbers, the delegates from Prince Edward Island objected to the 
Maritimes being a single division, and they objected to the idea of the province having 
fewer seats than the two other provinces in the Maritime division, if one were to be created, 
but their delegates were voted down on every vote and motion to reconsider.  Concern was 
                                                 
211 This case was made all the more compelling in the context of the military juggernaut created for the U.S. 
civil war and the official policy of U.S. territorial expansion throughout North America, which threatened to 
cost the British ownership of all unsettled territory in North America. 
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raised that the federal government appointing legislative councillors would create a 
chamber that was dominated by the governing political party, but Macdonald assured them 
that the first appointments would be from the legislative councils in each of the provinces 
and would be drawn from both the government and opposition parties. 
The 72 resolutions adopted in Quebec City reflect the upper chamber in place in the 
province of Canada and were, in the end, the design proposed by the Canadian delegation.  
They set the numbers of legislative councillors at 24 for Upper Canada, 24 for Lower 
Canada and 24 for the Maritime Provinces; the later division subdivided by 10 each for 
New Brunswick  and Nova Scotia and 4 for P.E.I (res.8).  When Newfoundland joined it 
would also receive 4 seats (res.9), and the North-West Territory, British Columbia and 
Vancouver would have their representation determined through negotiations, to be later 
ratified by the Canadian parliament and the provincial legislature (res.10). 
Members of the legislative council would be appointed by the governor general for 
life, though a vacancy would occur if a councillor missed two consecutive sessions (res.11).  
The speaker would be chosen by the government (res.15).  Councillors had to be British 
subjects, over the age of 30 and have real property in the net amount of $4,000, though in 
the case of P.E.I. and Newfoundland it would be sufficient to simply have a net worth of 
$4,000 (res.12).212  In the case of Lower Canada, each councillor would have to reside or 
meet their property qualification in one of the existing 24 electoral divisions of Canada East 
(res.16). 
The first councillors appointed to the federal legislative council were to come from 
the current members of the provincial legislative councils, with the exception of those from 
P.E.I., as nominated by the local government, and “due regard shall be had to the claims of 
the Members of the Legislative Council of the opposition in each province, so that all 
political parties may, as nearly as possible, be fairly represented” (res.14).213  The provinces 
were each to be given the power to establish the composition of their own ‘local’ 
                                                 
212 In P.E.I. much of the land was still owned by absentee landlords.  In the case of Newfoundland, the 
population was mostly engaged in fishing or commercial pursuits, not agriculture, and much of the public 
land had not even been surveyed at the time, so was not available to be sold. 
213 Prince Edward Island had an elected legislative council by then.  
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legislatures, so they could abolish their provincial upper chambers if they so wished (res.41 
& 42). 
The idea of appointing existing legislative councillors to reflect the current divisions 
in the province is very significant.  It was designed to reassure both government and 
opposition parties in each province that they would have permanent representation in the 
federal upper chamber, at least during the Fathers’ of Confederation lifetime, irrespective of 
shifts in their parties’ political popularity; and it was designed to reassure legislative 
councillors that they would have a say in the new federation.  In fact, there was a clear 
enticement for provincial legislative councillors to vote for Confederation since there could 
be a lifelong position in the new federal parliament as a reward, and as there was no 
requirement to give up one’s seat in the provincial legislative council, councillors could 
serve in both legislatures.214 
The number of councillors is also significant, given that the Canadian provincial 
legislative council already was set at 24 each for Canada East and West and there were 12 
each in the legislative councils of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.  The proportions in the 
senate reflect the proportions agreed to in the province of Canada for its provincial 
legislative council during the public debate, between 1854 and 1856, on creating an elected 
upper chamber.  Additionally, while respecting the numbers agreed to in the province of 
Canada and the commitment to the delegates from all political parties and provinces to 
create a chamber with partisan diversity, it gave the Canadian government latitude in 
choosing councillors since 48 would come from Canada where there were still life 
councillors in that province’s upper chamber, alongside the elected councillors. 
In examining the entire package of constitutional agreements arrived at in Quebec 
City, the vast majority of scholars have concluded that the upper chamber was well 
considered by the Fathers of Confederation and reflected a compromise by virtue of the 
arrangements and the fact that so much time was spent in Quebec City debating the upper 
                                                 
214 There was also no requirement that one give up their seat in the lower chamber of the province to sit in the 
House of Commons, so for those who believed that the centre of gravity should be local in the union there 
would be provincial representation in the new federal parliament at the outset. 
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chamber (Creighton 1970; MacKay 1963; Ross 1914; Mallory 1984; Franks 1987).  This 
wisdom has been recently challenged by Moore (1997), who suggests that the length of 
time spent discussing the upper chamber could simply be due to it being the first item on 
the agenda and therefore might reflect the delegates from the Maritime Provinces testing 
the resolve of the Canadian delegates, noting that subsequent issues which were arguably 
more important to the Maritime Provinces were dealt with surprisingly fast.  An 
examination of the institutional arrangements adopted for the upper chamber through the 
lens of the social cleavage supports this position. 
The compromises contained in the upper chamber are undoubtedly compromises 
made among the ministry in the Great Coalition.  Where Cartier saw the 24 seats in the 
legislative council as a necessary protection for the French Canadians at the federal level, 
Galt, an Anglophone from the Eastern Townships, saw the 24 electoral divisions both 
provincially and federally as a necessary protection for Anglophones in Lower Canada.  A 
council appointed by the federal government would reverse what Macdonald saw as a 
mistake that the partisan politics of 1856 had forced on him, when he had to accept an 
elected upper chamber, and while the first appointments would come largely from the 
provincial legislative council, there would be sufficient councillors from the province of 
Canada to ensure that the chamber would be workable for the government that he was 
confident he would form.  And Taché of course was a councillor himself, and knew first-
hand the merits of an appointed upper chamber to facilitate bringing talented people, who 
could not win seats in the lower chamber, into cabinet.215 
In moving the resolutions in the legislative assembly of the province of Canada, 
John A. Macdonald defended the three equal divisions of the upper chamber in language 
which was common at the time, namely out of respect for ‘sectional interests’ (Canada 
Debates, LA, February 6, 1865).  The Maritimes, he claimed, had a single sectional interest 
(the three provinces had at one time been all part of Nova Scotia), as did Upper Canada 
(Anglo, agricultural and far away from the sea), and Lower Canada had a dominant 
                                                 
215 This is how he became a legislative councillor in Canada East, so as to join Baldwin and La Fontaine in 
1848. 
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Francophone sectional interest given its “institutions and laws which she jealously guards 
against absorption by any larger, more numerous, or stronger power”.216  Macdonald 
believed that Newfoundland had a distinct sectional interest from the Maritimes, since it 
was an economy based entirely on coastal fishing, which is why he argued it should receive 
separate seats from the Maritimes.  As for the interests in the West, he acknowledged that 
they were largely unknown by Canadians, which is why he claimed they would need to be 
determined through negotiation, but it was clear to him that they would not have the same 
interests as the other regions of Canada.  Fixed equal numbers was fair to each sectional 
interest, and it would have the added benefit of preventing a government from swamping 
the upper chamber with its own members. 
The current elective upper chamber of the province of Canada, Macdonald 
suggested, had not failed (pointing out in typical Macdonald fashion that it was he who had 
introduced the Bill to make it elected).  It had simply not lived up to expectations.  While 
the first candidates for election had been exceptional, the quality had diminished due to the 
expense of mounting campaigns across such large ridings.  It was the lower house that was 
seen as the way to public office and eventual membership in the cabinet, and to a lifetime 
of public service.  While it had not happened in the province of Canada, having elections 
for the upper chamber might embolden its members in the future to oppose the lower 
chamber out of temporary political interest, instead of being a chamber of revision and of 
‘sober second-thought’. 
Brown also argued that election had failed to attract candidates who were well 
known or had the resources to run in constituencies that were 10 times the size of those for 
the lower house (Canada Debates, LA, February 8, 1865).217  In terms of his surrender of 
representation by population as the formula for both chambers, he stated: 
                                                 
216 Macdonald likened the three sections in Canada to a state in the U.S.  This analogy would be lost on 
Canadians currently, but in this era, the three Maritime Provinces were small, had once been a single province 
and had met with the purpose of exploring what the largest of the three, Nova Scotia, saw as reunification.  
217 All references to legislative council candidates not being able to incur the cost resulted in laughter in the 
chamber. 
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“Our Lower Canadian friends have agreed to give us representation by 
population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have 
equality in the Upper House.  On no other condition could we have advanced 
a step; and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it” (ibid.). 
While Brown acknowledged that the upper chamber had not become obstructionist 
following the shift to election, he argued that it was the presence of so many life councillors 
that had been a moderating influence, and that an elected federal upper chamber would 
likely lead to deadlock.  And while an appointed chamber could also lead to deadlock, he 
did not support moving away from the fixed number of members to allow for an unlimited 
number of appointments to the upper chamber since “the limitation in numbers in the Upper 
House lies at the base of the whole compact on which this scheme rests” (ibid.).  Having 
shorter fixed terms, instead of life appointments, would also make the body too similar to 
the popular view of the day, which was already represented in the lower chamber. 
In anticipation of Confederation, the legislature of the province of Canada in 1866 
adopted An Act to postpone for a limited time the issuing of writs for the next election of 
members of the Legislative Council.  If Confederation did not occur, elections would be 
held the following year, but if it did occur, then the province of Canada would cease to 
exist and its legislature would be closed and new ones established in Quebec City and 
Toronto, long rival cities for the seat of the Canadian legislature. 
In London, the British cabinet raised concerns over the fixed number of members of 
the upper chamber, what was now to be called the ‘senate’ to differentiate it from 
provincial legislative councils.218  Since ‘senators’ were to be appointed for life, the British 
officials pointed out that a time might arise where the lower chamber and the upper 
chamber would be in a permanent deadlock and there needed to be a mechanism to break 
that deadlock.219  The delegates were unwilling to budge on the decision to have three equal 
divisions in the senate, as this provided protection to Canada East, so provision was made 
                                                 
218 The decision of the name of the new federation was in the first draft of resolutions left to the decision of 
the queen.  In later drafts it appeared as a kingdom of Canada.  In the fifth draft it appeared as “One United 
Dominion under the name Kingdom of Canada”.  In the final draft, which was how it was adopted, it 
appeared as “One Dominion under the Name of Canada” (Constitution Act, 1867, s.3). 
219 This concern had been raised by them before and dismissed by the Canadian delegates as undermining the 
principle of equality of region. 
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to summon additional senators in equal numbers of four or eight each for all three divisions 
simultaneous.  At the insistence of the delegates from Canada East, and over the objections 
of the British government, the monarch would have to agree to let this clause be used by the 
Canadian government, as these delegates believed this would prevent a government relying 
on this clause to pass a single unpopular or ill-conceived piece of legislation.220 
The resulting Constitution Act, 1867 gives the Senate equal power to the house of 
commons and to the queen, as the three parts of the Canadian parliament.  By constitutional 
convention, the queen had already relinquished her power in the United Kingdom of 
withholding her assent to legislation at the time the Act was adopted.  As for the senate, the 
Act states that “Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue, or for Imposing any 
Tax or Impost shall originate in the House of Commons” (s.53) which is also reflective of 
the constitutional convention that had developed surrounding the British parliament and is 
similar in wording to a provision in The Union Act, 1840, which had governed the 
legislature in the province of Canada.  This only prevents senators from introducing such 
legislation and from increasing the amounts in money Bills, but it does not prevent the 
upper chamber from reducing amounts or defeating such legislation.221  As Prince Edward 
Island opted not to join Confederation at the time, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were 
each given 12 seats in the first federal senate, the same number as they had legislative 
councillors in the provinces. 
As the provinces of Ontario and Quebec did not exist prior to Confederation (the 
provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada being extinguished through the Act of 
Union, 1840), they also had to be created through the Constitution Act, 1867.  Provisions 
were made to extend all laws that were applicable to Lower Canada and Canada East, and 
                                                 
220 The British officials also disagreed with placing a cap on the number of additional senators who could be 
appointed in order to break a deadlock at eight for each region. 
221 Driedger (1968) argues that this clause could have been intended to prevent any changes to money Bills 
since the house of commons  was where the people sent their representatives and that in British law 
representation was necessary for the levying of taxes.  This misses the point that like the house of lords in 
England, legislative councils in Canada originated as representative institutions, just designed to represent a 
different segment of society than the commons.  It also ignores the constitutional convention that money Bills 
require a ‘royal recommendation’ (i.e. the endorsement of the government), even if introduced in the house of 
commons, so the people’s representatives are also prevented from levying a tax. 
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Upper Canada and Canada West, prior to Confederation, would be continued and to 
empower the legislatures for the new provinces to exercise provincial jurisdiction and set 
the dates of the first election in each province.222 
In the case of Ontario there would be a unicameral legislature (ibid., s.69), which 
would initially have 82 members elected in a single chamber to be called the legislative 
assembly (ibid., s.70).  The Liberals from Upper Canada had long objected to the legislative 
council.  The majority of the politicians in this province had been fighting for 
representation by population, and there was a belief among its Liberal and Reform 
members that upper chambers were inherently conservative bodies.  Brown was also of the 
opinion that there were no social divisions based on language in the province of Ontario, as 
evidenced by his arguments on federal senators not needing a property requirement based 
on districts the way Quebec’s senators would (Canada Debates, LA, February 8, 1865).  
The Conservative Party, led in Canada West by John A. Macdonald, saw the exercise of 
Confederation as being one of creating a strong federal government, and believed that only 
limited local matters had been left in the control of provincial legislatures.  Thus the 
consensus was that there was no need for a bicameral check on local government and a 
waste of resources which were for the provinces, in this era, severely limited.223 
As for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the Constitution Act, 1867 states that: “The 
Constitution of the Legislature of each of the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
shall, subject to the Provisions of this Act, continue as it exists at the Union until altered 
under the Authority of this Act” (Constitution Act, 1867, s.88). A similar provision was 
included in the instrument admitting the other provinces.  The provincial legislature would 
                                                 
222 Provision was also made to strike a new great seal for the two provinces based on the great seal of Upper 
Canada for Ontario and of Lower Canada for Quebec (Constitution Act, 1867, s.136).  This was not done by 
the British, who created new great seals for all four provinces, causing one of the first federal-provincial 
dramas in the new country as these provinces all lost proud symbols of their historic identity.  This offers 
evidence that some delegates to the Confederation talks thought Canada was to be a compact of provinces 
(Hicks 2010c). 
223 Most of government revenues in this period came from customs and excise taxes, which were assigned to 
the federal government. 
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be free to abolish their upper chambers at the local level if they chose to follow Ontario’s 
example. 
In Quebec, there would be a bicameral legislature.  The upper chamber would go 
back to being appointed, but would retain the 24 electoral divisions for the property 
qualification.  The reason for maintaining electoral divisions was to ensure that the English 
minority in the province would have additional representation in the upper chamber, where 
local matters that impacted on social identity would be legislated.224 
So the model for the federal upper chamber and the upper chamber in Quebec was 
based on the upper chamber in the province of Canada.  The equality of seats that the 
French in Canada East had been given to protect them from domination by Canada West, 
was retained at the federal level with the expectation that the Maritime Provinces’ senators 
would side with the minority in Quebec often, due to their own minority status.  And the 
electoral divisions that provided representation for the Anglophones in that province were 
maintained at both the federal and provincial levels.  While the establishment of a federal 
system was a significant change in government, it was seen by the leadership of the 
minority groups, Cartier on behalf of the French in Canada and Alexander Galt on behalf of 
the English in Quebec, as not altering the representation their group had in these 
institutions. 
III. Post-Confederation Shifts in Canada’s Cleavages 
The Confederation deal was caused by a shift in the partisan cleavage in the 
province of Canada.  The cleavage would shift again due to the new political arena of a 
federal parliament. 
As noted in the previous chapters, during the era of representative government, 
where settlers were able to elect representatives to the lower chamber, and governors and 
local elites managed government, a partisan cleavage emerged in every province between 
                                                 
224 In support of the latter point, he criticizes the U.S. requirement at the time that candidates must live in their 
constituency. 
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those who supported the governor and those who wanted ‘reform’ of the system; 
specifically advocating that elected officials should take responsibility for management of 
government.225  When responsible government was achieved, the cleavage would 
invariably shift to be a partisan divide between those elected officials temporarily in power 
and those who oppose them.  For most historians this is seen as an era of factionalism, 
absent political parties, since there were frequent shifts in allegiances, irrespective of 
ideology (Creighton 1965; Riendeau 2000).  But as has been noted before, this was the way 
politics was played during this period, including in the United Kingdom, something easily 
accommodated by thinking in terms of a partisan cleavage rather than party labels. 
Even after Confederation, for the first decades of the ‘Dominion’ of Canada, 
patronage and electoral manipulation that had driven politics in the provinces of Canada 
continued to be the rule and not the exception at all levels of government.  Sir John A. 
Macdonald, who was made interim prime minister by the governor general, Lord Monck, 
would continue his claim of leading a government that was non-partisan.  He would use 
cabinet appointments to bring foes, like Nova Scotia’s Joseph Howe, into his 
administration.  But his most loyal supporters would occupy the most senior posts, and in 
terms of party platform, his government was relatively cohesive even when it was the 
Grand Coalition before Confederation, as it was centred on building a single nation ‘from 
sea to sea’, through the acquisition of the North-West Territories and the building of the 
railroad, policies that in principle were shared by Liberal-Conservatives and Liberal 
Reformers.  While it returned to the moniker of Liberal-Conservative after Confederation, it 
would drop the pretence of being a Liberal-Conservative union once Macdonald left as 
leader, and simply refer to itself as a Conservative Party.226 
George Brown’s partnership with Macdonald and Cartier dissolved immediately 
after Confederation, when he could not win election to the house of commons in 1867, 
                                                 
225 Those whose ideas of democracy was informed by American ideas advocated that the government officials 
should be accountable to the people in direct election; while those who were influenced by British ideas 
advocated that the officials should be responsible to the legislature.  In all provinces, the British-model 
triumphed. 
226 This occurred when Mackenzie Bowles became the first Conservative prime minister in 1894. 
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Alexander Mackenzie emerged as the ‘leader of the opposition’, a position that is central to 
the Westminster-model, and this opposition would have at its core Brown’s Ontario based 
Liberal Reformers.  Mackenzie lacked the style of a Macdonald or Brown, and without a 
cohesive platform or policy, the Liberals could only be seen to be an opposition to the 
government, even after Mackenzie replaced Macdonald as prime minister in 1873 
(Creighton 1970). 
The government had awarded the contract to build a railroad to the Montreal-based 
Canadian Pacific.  Allegations emerged that the Conservatives had received $300,000 from 
this company for its re-election campaign, with Macdonald and Cartier receiving the lion’s 
share.  Macdonald resigned and pursuant to the conventions of the constitution now in 
place, the governor general asked Mackenzie to form a government, which he did.  He also 
had the governor general call an election in 1874, which the Liberals won. 
The Liberals did not have much of a platform and there was internal party division.  
Facing an economic depression, they moved away from Macdonald`s plan to build a 
railway to the Pacific so as to encourage settlement, opting instead to only build rail lines 
where settlement already existed (Waite 1971).  Even though they differed on process, 
railway expansion was central to both parties’ priorities since it was appealing in Ontario 
where farmers, commercial interests and potential settlers had been long focussed on the 
North-West.  When unable to get a free trade agreement with the United States, the Liberal 
government fell back on cutting expenses and raising tariffs (Masters 1983). 
The Liberals were able to reform the electoral process through the secret ballot, 
election expense reporting, standardized election dates and practices and even the closing 
of taverns on election day and universal male suffrage without a property qualification 
(Massicotte et al. 2007).227  In 1875, the justice minister, was able to get the governor 
general’s power of disallowance placed under the authority of parliament. This new 
partisan cleavage was beginning to drive institutional change.  As will be seen in the next 
                                                 
227 Aboriginals were still banned from voting, even with this removal of a property qualification. 
  
 
284
chapter, it would have an impact on the abolition of the upper chamber in the province of 
Manitoba. 
Macdonald would return to power in 1878 through a more tightly woven platform 
dubbed the ‘national policy’, which included a protective tariff to encourage industrial 
development, completion of the transcontinental railway and settlement of the west 
(Creighton 1970). 
By the end of the 19th century two main political parties had been defined around 
the partisan cleavage primed by the need to form a government within the Westminster-
model of responsible government.  This was true at both the federal level and was also 
emerging at the provincial level where the Pro- and Anti-Confederation parties had 
disappeared, being replaced by government and opposition parties.   
With respect to the social cleavage, the English-French cleavage would become the 
dominant cleavage for the new country.  The change made by Confederation is that this 
cleavage was given a geographic boundary.  The political representation provided through a 
provincial legislature and government for the predominantly Francophone province of 
Quebec, has made Quebec and the ‘rest of Canada’ the social dividing line in the 
federation. 
IV. Changes to the Senate 
Just seven years after confederation, the Canadian house of commons considered a 
motion by a member of parliament, who would go on to be minister of justice, to reform the 
senate (Canada Debates, HC, April 13, 1874).  In this proposal, there would be six senators 
from each province.  Senators would be chosen by the political parties in the lower chamber 
of a provincial legislature, with the percent of seats allocated to each political party equal to 
their percentage of seats in the provincial assembly.  While he made the point of noting that 
all the authors of the Constitution had agreed to reopen debate over the senate, the truth is 
that they agreed to in the spirit of conciliation through debate that they had exercised during 
the Confederation talks.  Nevertheless, re-opening this debate marked the first of an 
ongoing debate about senate reform in Canada, of which method of selection and of the 
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number of members from each province, having been central and which continues to this 
day in much the same form. 
The only changes that have been made to the senate are that senators are no longer 
appointed for life and must retire at age 75, which was grandfathered at the time it was 
introduced so did not impact on the senate as it was then constituted (Constitution Act, 
1965), and the number of seats assigned to the territories and provinces have been modestly 
altered.  Table 7.1 shows the seats in the senate that had been decided upon in Quebec City 
and how they ended up for these provinces.  The principle was to have three equal regions 
of Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes.  Newfoundland, which had been uninterested in 
Confederation at the time, was to be enticed to join later and in the offer would be given 
four seats (the same as Prince Edward Island).  This set a precedent for seats outside of the 
equal divisions.  When the equality provision was revisited in 1915 by the parliament of 
Canada to create a Western region out of the provinces that had been carved out of the 
North-West Territories, provision was again made to entice Newfoundland, this time with 
six seats. 
Table 7.1: Founding Provinces’ Senate Seats 
  Year: 1866 1867 1873 1939 
Ontario 24 24 24 24 
Quebec 24 24 24 24 
Maritime Region 24     
  Nova Scotia  12 10 10 
  New Brunswick  12 10 10 
  Prince Edward Island     4 4 
Newfoundland 4     6 
TOTAL 72 72 72 76 
 
The agreement to immediately create a province of Manitoba out of the North-West 
Territories in 1870 necessitated creating seats in both chambers of parliament.  Manitoba 
was given two seats with provision for it to increase to four as its population grew 
(Manitoba Act, 1870).  Then British Columbia was assigned three (British Columbia Terms 
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of Union, 1871).  In 1879, the North-West Territories were granted two seats, and this was 
increased to four in 1903.  Then in 1905, Alberta was given three (Alberta Act, 1905) and 
Saskatchewan was given three (Saskatchewan Act, 1905), which eliminated the four North-
West Territory seats.  The Constitution Act, 1915 created the West as separate district, with 
24 senators, divided equally between Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British 
Columbia). 
Table 7.2: Current Senate Representation 
    
Senate 
Seats 
Ontario   24 
Quebec   24 
Maritime Region   
  Nova Scotia 10 
  New Brunswick 10 
  
Prince Edward 
Island 4 
Newfoundland 6 
Western Region   
  Manitoba 6 
  Alberta 6 
  Saskatchewan 6 
  British Columbia 6 
Territories   
  
Northwest 
Territories 1 
  Yukon 1 
  Nunavut 1 
TOTAL   105 
 
Finally recognizing that the indigenous population of the north was deserving of 
representation, the remaining North-west Territories and Yukon were given one seat each 
(Constitution Act, 1975) and Nunavut was given an additional seat when it was carved out 
of the North-West Territories (Nunavut Act, 1993), bringing the total to 105, configured as 
illustrated in Table 7.2. 
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Change to the Canadian senate has been possible.  These changes were each brought 
about by a political party that had in its cabinet representation from both sides of Canada’s 
social cleavage.  Each was sold to the parliament as not substantively changing the 
representation afforded Quebec in the federal parliament.  And the lower chamber, which 
was supposed to employ representation by population, had had its seat-distribution adjusted 
to compensate for these changes and for the decline in influence of the second chamber.  
So, as predicted, the overall representational balance in government has remained constant.  
As for the proposals that could change that balance, following the example of the first in 
1874, they have all been successfully opposed by the government of Quebec and 
Francophone members of the Canadian parliament. 
V. Conclusion 
Examining institutional change, and politics more generally, as an interaction 
between two cleavages, one social and one partisan, offers a perspective not provided by 
identifying a single dominant cleavage. 
In the province of Canada, social groups had long advocated change, almost from 
the moment of union.  When groups on either side of the social cleavage, like the Rouges, a 
nationalistic Francophone Party, and the Clear Grits, a nationalistic Anglophone Party, 
proposed change their overtures were met with distrust.  Confederation was made possible 
by a shift in the partisan cleavage that created a new political party, which strategically 
labelled itself the ‘Great Coalition’, in the province of Canada.  This was a party in that it 
had common policy objectives, namely the establishment of a federation, the acquisition of 
the territories to the West of Canada for settlement and the construction of an 
intercontinental railroad.   This partisan group was able to bridge the social cleavage in the 
province, having the leaders of each social group within its ranks. 
While creating a federation was a change for the unitary provinces of Canada, Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick, from an institutional perspective the legislature of Quebec and 
of Canada were not significant departures.  There would be a bicameral legislature with 
equality in seats between Ontario and Quebec in the upper chamber.  The 24 electoral 
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divisions that existed in Quebec at the time of Confederation would continue.  Provincially, 
Upper Canada and Lower Canada would simply be uncoupled and Lower Canada would be 
governed by its own representatives as before.  The Westminster-model would continue to 
be used. 
By using the lens of dual-competing cleavages, we can imagine how a deal was 
arrived at, even though key parts of the negotiations were done in secret: the negotiations 
between the delegates from Canada in advance of their approaching the Maritime 
delegations.  Where social interests were concerned, the delegates in a minority position 
clearly resisted change, insisting that matters concerning a social identity be assigned to the 
provinces and that the balance in representation be retained, including the guarantee of 
representation from English Quebec. 
Confederation would create new cleavages, both federally and provincially.  In 
terms of a partisan cleavage, it created two political parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, 
which could compete for government at the federal level, something that impacted on 
provincial politics as well.  The social cleavage was transformed from English and French 
to Quebec and rest of Canada. 
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Chapter 8: Canada as Imperial Government – Province 
of Manitoba 
In the British Provinces there had been a very straightforward institutional 
development trajectory, from nominee council to representative government to responsible 
government.  British constitutional and colonial scholars have suggested that this trajectory 
was the result of shifts in British policy and law, and it is clear that there were changes in 
both over time.  But there were also political forces at work at the local level, something 
that is best understood by examining two competing cleavages, the social and the partisan. 
Manitoba offers the first opportunity to examine the institutions of a province not 
created by the colonial office, but rather by a new ‘Canadian’ government in Ottawa.  This 
parent government had itself agitated for responsible government and was the by-product of 
that system.  Manitoba thus offers us a unique opportunity to examine institutional change 
removed from British colonial policy and oversight.  Manitoba also offers the opportunity 
to examine a province that had a very pronounced social cleavage which was all too 
familiar to the government in Ottawa, a French catholic and English protestant divide. 
In terms of number of years that it took to move from representative government to 
responsible government to the abolition of the legislative council, Manitoba was the 
quickest.  But in terms of tension and conflict between the two chambers, Manitoba had the 
greatest, which is a reflection of the social division in the province where English and 
French were evenly divided. 
It was this strong social division in the province that convinced the federal Liberal-
Conservative government of Sir John A. Macdonald and George-Étienne Cartier to 
establish rule through a governor and governor’s council for the, about to be acquired, new 
territory.  Taking lessons from the Patriotes in Quebec, the local population led by Louis 
Riel tried to use insurrection to establish responsible government using an American 
republican model, and were just as unsuccessful.  In response, the federal government 
established only representative government under the direction of a governor, who would 
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not be accountable to, but only advised by, a bicameral legislature with an elected lower 
chamber and an appointed upper chamber. 
Responsible government would be won at the local level when, in response to this 
system, a political party emerged that was committed to that ‘reform’, and which could 
bridge the social cleavage through its French and English membership, making it 
impossible for the governor to retain control of the levers of power in the face of an elected 
local elite.  These English and French leaders of Manitoba’s first political ‘party’ became 
the province’s first representative government. 
With representative government established, the partisan cleavage shifted from 
being defined by ‘reform’ to being defined by ‘policy’ – from opposition to the governor to 
opposition to the ministry in the legislature.  Responding to the rules of the altered 
institution, where leading individuals within the lower chamber had the opportunity to form 
a government, two political parties emerged, a government and an opposition which 
promoted itself as the government in waiting. 
As noted in the previous chapter, at the federal level, the Liberal Party emerged out 
of the opposition to Macdonald’s Liberal-Conservative party.  As will be seen below, one 
of the things it opposed was the passage of the Manitoba Act and, specifically, the 
establishment of bicameralism, with an appointed upper chamber for the province.  Not 
surprisingly, when they became the government in Ottawa, they saw abolition of the upper 
chamber as a necessary cure for the province’s financial problems.  However, this change 
had to be made at the local level under Canada’s constitutional rules; something that made 
this province in law distinct from the British provinces examined in previous chapters.  
Ottawa could offer a financial incentive, but it could not dictate, and even its advice was 
seen by some as interference. 
Manitoba would be the first province in Canada to abolish its upper chamber.  The 
motivation for doing so was financial, as the province could not afford to sustain the 
legislature.  But as the upper chamber included representation from both sides of the social 
cleavage, resistance to reform came from the social group that was quickly losing its 
relative influence due to immigration.  Due to the fact that the government had 
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representatives from both sides of the social cleavage, these party leaders were able to 
convince the lower chamber and enough of the upper chamber that (i) change was not about 
advancing one social group over another, (ii) posed no risk to either group and (iii) was in 
the province’s best interests. 
I. Road to Responsible Government 
To understand the social climate in Manitoba, and to bring it into conformity with 
the other provinces where the move to representative government and responsible 
government has already been examined, we start with the territorial acquisition of this 
region by the federal government and the establishment of its first institutions of 
governance.  As the move to representative government and responsible government 
occurred for Manitoba under Canadian federal governance, and not British rule, the 
standard institutional trajectory which this province also follows cannot be an artefact of 
British colonial policy, though Canadian legislators obviously learned lessons about 
institutional design from the British.  It was a purely Canadian decision to try to establish a 
governor’s council for the territory.  In response to local pressure for responsible 
government, it was again a Canadian decision to give it only representative government and 
to give it a bicameral institution.  The transition to responsible government was the result of 
local developments, best understood through the lens of competing social and partisan 
cleavages where, as in other provinces, a partisan group emerged that could bridge the 
province’s social cleavage. 
Immediately following Confederation, the Macdonald government set out to acquire 
the lands to the North and West of Ontario and Quebec and out to British Columbia in the 
West.  In 1670, King Charles II had established his cousin, Prince Rupert, governor of a 
“Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay”, what would become 
known as the Hudson’s Bay Company.  The governor and company were given a monopoly 
over the watershed of all rivers and streams flowing into Hudson’s Bay, land that would 
come to be known as Rupert’s Land.  On this territory the governor had full vice-regal 
authority, which could be delegated to senior company officers.  While uninterested in 
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settlement or issues of governance, the company divided the territory into administrative 
divisions which it could manage through its system of forts.  A governor and a governor’s 
council were appointed for each administrative district. 
In 1783, Benjamin Frobisher and Simon McTavish and a number of other Montreal 
businessmen created the North West Company to compete with the Hudson’s Bay 
Company (Ouellet 2000c).  Unable to find a working arrangement with the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, which had a monopoly in Rupert’s Land, they set out to explore further west and 
north, claiming the lands they ‘discovered’ in the name of the British crown.228  In 1821, 
under pressure from Colonial Secretary Henry Bathurst, the North West Company was 
absorbed by the Hudson’s Bay Company thus putting an end to corporate and trading 
conflicts. 
In December 1867, the new Canadian parliament considered a series of resolutions 
moved by William McDougall, the then-minister of public works and a Clear Grit who had 
followed George Brown into the Great Coalition (though had not departed with him after 
Confederation was achieved).  McDougall was more militant than Brown in his pro-English 
pro-Ontario farmer, anti-catholic, western expansion rhetoric and beliefs, though he was 
also more prone to coalition building if it would serve his immediate partisan objectives. 
The address which was adopted by the Canadian parliament asked the queen to 
unite Rupert’s Land and the North-West Territory with Canada.  The British parliament 
passed the Rupert’s Land Act, 1868 which authorized the crown to negotiate and accept the 
surrender of Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company and to transfer it to Canada, 
whereupon the Canadian parliament would have the power “to make, ordain, and establish 
within the land and territory so admitted, all such laws, institutions, and ordinances, and to 
constitute such courts and offices as might be necessary for the peace, order, and good 
government of Her Majesty’s subjects and others” (s.5).229 
                                                 
228 In 1793, Alexander Mackenzie joined the firm before McTavish’s autocratic business style caused a 
schism and the creation of the XY Company, which operated from 1795 until reunification with the North 
West Company in 1801, after the death of McTavish (Brown 2007).   
229 The commercial and trading rights of the Hudson’s Bay Company were saved by this Act. 
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Cartier and McDougall were sent to London to facilitate the negotiations.  The 
colonial secretary, Lord Granville, acted as an intermediary.  A price of £300,000 was 
agreed to, with the Hudson’s Bay Company keeping one-twentieth of the ‘fertile belt’ along 
the North Saskatchewan River and 45,000 acres around each of its trading posts.  The 
Canadian parliament adopted a second address to the queen asking her to unite the land 
with Canada under these terms (Canada Journals, HC, June 1, 1869).  And in anticipation 
of the imperial order-in-council which would allow for the transfer of the land as of 
December 1, 1869, the Canadian parliament adopted an Act for the temporary government 
of Rupert’s Land and the North-western Territory when united with Canada, which gave 
the name ‘North-West Territories’ to all the lands (roughly 10 times the size of the country 
at the time) and allowed for the appointment of a lieutenant-governor who would 
administer justice and establish laws, institutions and ordinances subject to ratification by 
the Canadian parliament.   He would be advised by a governor’s council.  McDougall was 
chosen to be lieutenant-governor under this Act.  
Under the Hudson’s Bay Company, the land that would become Manitoba was 
included in the administrative district of Assiniboia.  The governor, prior to acquisition, 
was William McTavish.230 He was assisted by a governor’s council, which consisted of 
representatives of the protestant and catholic clergy, and residents of the district who had 
links to the company and were of British, French and mixed Aboriginal-European descent, 
and this latter group was the largest contingent in the settled population. 
There were roughly 25,000 native and 10,000 mixed-race residents on this land 
(Stanley 1960, 1974).  The mixed race French called themselves Métis.  This population 
was the product of union between French fur traders and the aboriginal population.  The 
Métis had developed their land in the seigneurial pattern: in long tracts running back from 
the water.  The English-speaking mixed race were either descendants of the Scottish 
                                                 
230 Since 1864, he was also the governor of all of Rupert’s Land. 
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settlement founded by Lord Selkirk back in 1811 or settlers who had arrived more recently 
and chosen to take aboriginal wives.231    
Arriving on this land was an increasing number of Canadian settlers from Ontario, 
encouraged by the talk of settling the west following Confederation and by the promise of 
good farmland, which was by then in short supply in Ontario.  A ‘Friends of Canada’ 
movement formed, headed by John Schultz, to promote the annexation of the Red River 
colony by Canada and encourage more settlement by Anglophone protestants from the 
province of Ontario.  They would be supported by the Canada First movement in 
Ontario.232  To further complicate matters, McTavish was gravely ill and the Roman 
Catholic Bishop Taché was absent in Rome. 
McDougall, in his capacity as minister of public works, sent a construction crew in 
1869 to build a road from Lake of the Woods to Upper Fort Garry, now Winnipeg.  Then, 
the following summer, he dispatched a surveying party to this region.  The leaders of these 
expeditions formed relationships with Schultz and stayed at his house.  The surveyors 
began mapping in support of English style square lots, which was the practice in Ontario, 
until they were stopped on October 12, 1869 by the Métis (Hayes 2002). 
On October 19, a Comité National des Métis or ‘Council of Twelve’ was formed 
from among the French parishes, with John Bruce as president and Louis Riel as 
secretary.233  It erected barricades to prevent McDougall, his council and family from 
proceeding further into the territory, then Pembina.  The Métis then seized the Hudson’s 
Bay Company’s Fort Garry (without a fight).  To broaden their legitimacy, the Council of 
                                                 
231 Thomas Douglas, the Scottish Earl of Selkirk, had brought the settlers.  He acquired substantial stock in 
the Hudson’s Bay Company for the purposes of gaining influence, and then used that influence to get the 
company to sell him 300,000 km2 for only 10 shillings (Hayes 2002).  Constant conflicts, including armed 
raids and open battles, between the North West Company, Hudson’s Bay Company and the local aboriginal 
and Métis population was the norm for this settlement, and these conflicts were behind the colonial secretary 
urging the rival fur trading companies to merge in 1821. The difficulties in administering this proprietary 
colony proved too great and, in 1836, Selkirk’s heirs transferred their interest back to the Hudson’s Bay 
Company in exchange for company shares, though the Scottish settlers stayed, some creating their own mixed 
marriages with the native population. 
232 It advocated that Canada should only accept British immigrants so as to create an Anglo-Saxon protestant 
‘northern’ race. 
233 The communities were organized around church parishes: Métis and some Brits attending Roman Catholic 
churches and the majority of Brits attending protestant churches. 
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12 invited 12 representatives from the Scottish and English parishes to meet with them in a 
‘Convention of 24’ which began on November 16 (Hall, Hall et Verrier 2010). 
In response to what was seen in Ottawa as an armed uprising, Macdonald delayed 
the transfer of Rupert’s Land with the British government, not wanting the government’s 
failure to assert control in the region to reflect on Canada’s capacity to govern its own 
territory, either in the eyes of the residents of this territory or in the eyes of politicians in 
the United States, some of whom were agitating for U.S. settlement of this land.  Possibly 
unaware of Macdonald’s instructions to delay, McDougall, thinking he was the governor, 
issued a proclamation on December 1 and tried to assert his authority to govern at Pembina, 
but when his position became precarious, he had to retreat to St. Paul’s in the United 
States.234  
Schultz and others in the Canada Party barricaded themselves in government 
buildings, claiming to be protecting the peace by guarding supplies.  The Métis surrounded 
these men on December 7, and took most of them prisoners, though Schultz escaped (Clark 
2000).   On December 8, the Comité National de Métis declared itself a ‘provisional 
government’.  Initially Bruce was president, but Riel took over as of December 27.  Its 
activities were limited to controlling movement and monitoring communication and anyone 
suspected of undermining its efforts was arrested.235 
The Canadian government sent a number of intermediaries; the most successful 
being Donald Smith who travelled under the auspices of the Hudson’s Bay Company 
(Thomas 2000).  He convened a two-day open air meeting at Upper Fort Garry, beginning 
January 19, and promised that the land claims of the Métis would be respected, and offered 
to guarantee Métis representation on the governor’s council.236  At the end of the meeting a 
new convention was summoned; this one of 20 representatives from each linguistic 
community. 
                                                 
234 With no railway crossing Ontario into Manitoba as yet, travel to Manitoba was most easily accomplished 
by travelling through the United States where intercontinental railways had been emerging. 
235 Those willing to take an oath of neutrality and refrain from disruptive behaviour were released. 
236 Sprague suggests that Smith’s real mission was to form a counter-insurgency so as to re-establish 
Hudson’s Bay Company control and only followed his ‘cover assignment’ when he determined that it would 
not be successful and that the Métis were not interested in civil war. 
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The ‘Council of 40’ began to meet January 25, 1870, with their first order of 
business being the drafting of a ‘liste de droits’, which would form the basis of negotiations 
with the Canadian government.  Included in these demands was the establishment of a 
province to be governed by a legislative assembly, an annual subsidy of $80,000 plus eight 
cents per person to defray the costs of the provincial legislature and government, two seats 
in the Canadian senate, four seats in the house of commons, and the placing of crown land 
under the jurisdiction of the provincial legislative assembly, which would also have the 
power to set criteria for who represented the province in the parliament of Canada and in 
the legislative assembly (Smith 1994).237  It most famously demanded shared-use of the 
French and English languages in the legislature and courts of the province.238 
The Council of 40 then set out to design the legislature and government for the 
province.  The first decision was that there would be a ‘president’ (Riel was chosen to be 
the first).  A committee of six members (three French and three English) was struck to 
consider British, Canadian, American, aboriginal and local models for the legislature (Hall, 
Hall et Verrier 2010).239  In the end, it was decided that the legislative assembly would have 
28 members, 14 English and 14 French.  The assembly would have a 2/3 majority veto over 
the president, who would not have a vote in the assembly.240  The council proclaimed that 
responsible government had been established for Assiniboia. 
The first assembly met on March 9 and its first undertaking was to settle on a name 
for the province, and this renamed the body the ‘Legislative Assembly of Assiniboia’.  At 
                                                 
237 This would be a minimum number of seats and would remain in place until such time as an increase of 
population entitled the province to greater representation. 
238 The apparent contradiction between cancelling the transfer of land, the establishment of a new province 
and seats in the Canadian parliament reflects the desire to have the colony established in the first instance as 
its own royal province under the British crown which could then negotiate entry into Canada. 
239 Hall suggests that the decision to name the leader of the government ‘president’ reflected their favouring 
of an American-model.  It is more likely that this was reflective of the aboriginal structure of a council and 
chief, using Anglo-American labels. 
240 Originally there were to be 12 for each, but Alfred Scott made the case that Winnipeg should be its own 
district and not placed within a parish, which was accepted by Riel by giving them 2 seats.  This would have 
given the English two more councillors than the French, so it was decided to add two additional French.  The 
French delegates to the council decided they would select assemblymen from amongst themselves as they had 
repeatedly gone to the parishes to hold elections.  The English delegates decided they would hold new 
elections. 
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Smith’s suggestion, it selected a committee of three to travel to Ottawa to negotiate with the 
Canadian government.241 
Following a series of meetings with the representatives from this provisional 
government, the federal cabinet decided on a governmental structure for the province and 
introduced the Manitoba Act, 1870 in the house of commons on May 2 (Canada Journals, 
HC, May 2, 1870).242  Macdonald acknowledged that the issue of one chamber or two had 
been a matter of much discussion among the cabinet, but it is clear from his comments that 
a unicameral elected chamber was not considered, nor had the institutional design created 
by the local legislative assembly of Assiniboia ever been considered a viable option.  The 
unicameral-model would have been a single chamber, half appointed and half elected, but 
in the end they decided on a bicameral-model with an appointed upper chamber as this 
model offered more restraint on the influence of the politicians in an elected lower chamber 
(Canada Debates, HC, May 2, 1870).243  It was never an option to transfer crown land to 
this local government as the federal government had its own plans on settlement and 
development for the west (Cartier, ibid.).244  In spite of a number of speeches from the 
government that argued that party politics should be eschewed on so important a matter, the 
opposition benches challenged the government on everything from its handling of the crisis 
to the administrative structure it was proposing for the province, showing that while 
modern party politics may not have been fully matured, the Westminster model of a divided 
government versus opposition las aiding in its development at the federal level.  The Bill 
received royal assent on May 12 (Canada Journals, HC, May 12, 1870) 
                                                 
241 It was headed by Father Noel Ritchot, and included Alfred Scott who had American railway connections 
and Judge John Black, who was a member of the Hudson’s Bay Company governor’s council and acting 
governor in McTavish’s absence. 
242 The imperial parliament enacted the Constitution Act, 1871 (formerly British North America Act, 1871) to 
confirm the authority of the Canadian parliament to create new provinces and to legislate for the territories.   
243 Macdonald, always the politician, claimed the government had been reluctant to use the word territory in 
the first instance, since colony or province was the normal nomenclature, and in no way conveyed status, as 
Canada had had experience with many models of government in its provinces.   
244 The government modified the Bill slightly before second reading, by adding additional settlements in the 
West and setting aside for the Métis 200,000 acres more to maintain the ratio based on population 
(Macdonald, Canada Debates, HC, May 4, 1870).   
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In all, three sessions of the legislative assembly of Assiniboia were convened, with 
the last session adopting a motion to accept the Manitoba Act and join the dominion of 
Canada.  Their acceptance had no bearing on the legal establishment of the province in 
Rupert’s Land or the transfer of territory.  The institutions that were created for the 
provinces were entirely crafted by the federal cabinet and were the institutions that emerged 
under colonial Britain for its provinces.  The federal government had no intention of 
making the governor accountable to the legislature and monies would be given to him 
directly for the establishment of local services. 
The day after the Bill had been introduced in the Canadian parliament, the 
government issued orders for the payment of the purchase price to the Hudson’s Bay 
Company.  The Act for the temporary government of Rupert’s Land and the North-western 
Territory when united with Canada was re-enacted for the balance of territories with the 
change that the lieutenant-governor of Manitoba would also be the lieutenant-governor of 
the North-West Territories.245  On May 20, Adams G. Archibald was appointed the first 
lieutenant-governor of Manitoba.246  And on June 23, by order-in-council, the imperial 
government transferred Rupert’s Land and the North West Territories to Canada.  The 
initial size of the province of Manitoba was 33,280 square kilometres and it became known 
as the ‘postage stamp province’ due to its small size.247 Macdonald dispatched 1,200 
imperial regulars under the command of General Garnet Wolseley to restore order in the 
territory, and they arrived in August.248  Riel fled to the United States.249 
                                                 
245 An appointed governor’s council would advise him in his capacity as lieutenant governor of the North-
West Territories. 
246 He was also appointed lieutenant-governor of the North West Territories. 
247 It would not get its current boundaries until 1921. 
248 This expedition cost the government $100,000, which was subsequently approved by An Act to indemnify 
the members of the Executive Council, and others, for the unavoidable expenditure of public money, without 
Parliamentary grant, occasioned by the sending of an expeditionary force to Manitoba in 1871 (Canada 
Debates, HC, April 3, 1872). 
249 Riel had tried Thomas Scott, a young member of the vehemently anti-catholic Orange Lodge in Ontario, 
tried by military tribunal for hostility to the provisional government, insubordination towards his prison 
guards and inciting others to violence, having him found guilty in an improvised court martial and executed.  
“This monumental blunder, a product of Riel’s inexperience and emotional instability, in addition to the deep-
seated cultural divisions within the young nation, unleashed a storm of anger in Ontario, where residents 
regarded Scott as a martyr and Riel as a traitor and murderer.  By contrast, Quebec regarded Riel as a 
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The general consensus is that the Manitoba Act “embodied most of the demands of 
Riel’s provisional government” (Riendeau 2000, 151).  It is true that the Act established a 
province and gave it a legislative assembly and seats in both the Canadian house of 
commons and senate, confirmed the French and English languages as equal in the 
provincial legislature and courts, and set aside 1,400,000 acres of land for the Métis.250  But 
when we look at the institutions of governance a different picture emerges – the province 
was given a standard British colonial government, but this time under the umbrella of the 
Canadian government. 
Riel had wanted a single elected legislative assembly which would be half French 
and half English.  The equal French-English configuration only lasted for the first election 
in the lower chamber where there were initially 24 seats, half of which were elected by 
predominantly French communities and half by English communities.  Riel (like Papineau) 
wanted republican institutions and, instead, the province got representative government (not 
responsible government) with an appointed upper chamber.  The French were a minority in 
the upper chamber from the start.  By keeping the crown land, the Canadian government 
could work to change the province’s demographics.  Riel had wanted provincial control 
over its members of parliament and senators so as to ensure linguistic balance in the federal 
parliament, and this was not conceded. 
Historians have pointed to the parliamentary debate, and the seeming division 
between Quebec and Ontario MPs over the Manitoba Act, to suggest that parliament 
considered both the Ontario-model of unicameralism and the Quebec-model of 
bicameralism and decided that a bicameral legislature would be appropriate for the 
province since it accommodates cultural diversity (Bélanger 2007).  This is a 
misinterpretation.  Most of the Quebec MPs were following the party line as they were the 
most loyal supporters of the Macdonald-Cartier Liberal-Conservative government.  The 
                                                                                                                                                    
protector of French, Catholic rights and a distinctive way of life in the West against Anglo-Protestant 
encroachment” (Riendeau 2000, 151) 
250 Macdonald told parliament that the alterative name had been chosen since Assiniboia might cause 
confusion as it was the name of a river, as well as a district, and that Manitoba had been offered by the Métis 
delegation as an alternative (Canada Debates, HC, May 2, 1870). 
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Liberal opposition was led by Alexander Mackenzie from Ontario and this is where this 
emerging ‘party’ had its strongest support.  The Bill was written by the government after 
negotiations with the Assiniboia delegation and was passed by parliament without 
amendment.  This was party politics, not social division, so the upper chamber must be 
seen as having been designed to restrain the lower chamber and not protect linguistic 
minorities (which the French were not at this time).  Nevertheless,  speeches by Quebec 
MPs in support of the ‘Quebec bicameral-model’ as ideally suited for representation in a 
province where there are  minorities and in support of ‘traditional institutions’ would figure 
in the subsequent debates in Manitoba over abolition of the provincial upper chamber, as 
well as in Quebec as it came to question the merits of its own legislative council. 
James McKay was chosen by Archibald to be speaker of the Manitoba legislative 
council, which made him part of the governor’s executive council as well.  His father was 
Scot and his mother Métis, and he had been on the Hudson’s Bay Company’s governor’s 
council.  He had been prepared to support Canada’s claim to the territory and McDougall’s 
establishment of a governor’s council, but he was also not prepared to oppose Riel so he 
had retreated to the United States during the provisional government (Turner 2000).  While 
he was Roman Catholic, his family was Presbyterian. 
Only one supporter of Riel was included on the council, François Dauphinais, who 
also had been on the Hudson’s Bay Company’s governor’s council and had been vice-
president in Riel’s provisional ‘Government of Assiniboia’.  The other Métis who was 
appointed, Salamon Hamelin, had opposed Riel, and the other catholic appointment, John 
H. O.Donnell, had been imprisoned by Riel.  Not counting the speaker, four of the seven 
appointments were from the English community.251 
For his executive council, in addition to McKay, Archibald appointed Marc-Amable 
Girard, a Québécois, as provincial treasurer and Alfred Boyd, a merchant, as provincial 
secretary.  In 1871 he added two men from Quebec, Henry Joseph Clarke as attorney 
general and Thomas Howard as a minister without portfolio. 
                                                 
251 The other English members were Colin Inkster, a Red River local; Francis Olgetree, an Irish protestant; 
and Donald Glum, a Scottish protestant. 
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Like the British governors before him in the provinces of eastern Canada, Archibald 
acted as his own prime minister, preparing much of the legislation.  He relied on the 
legislative council to stop legislation that he did not like, and in four instances they did not, 
all in the first session, whereby he reserved the Bills for the federal government which 
withheld royal assent in support of the governor. 
Alexander Morris took over as lieutenant-governor on December 2, 1872.  The 
number of English speakers in the province was increasing with settlement and a 
redistribution bill in 1873 had reduced the number of provincial electoral districts in which 
French-speaking constituents were in the majority, but not to the extent warranted by 
representation by population.  Facing a heated opposition among English voters and their 
representatives in the assembly, Attorney-General Clarke informed the legislative assembly 
that the governor would introduce a new Bill to add additional seats for the English (The 
Daily Free Press, July 3, 1872).  It was an insufficient promise and a motion of non-
confidence in the ministry was introduced in the assembly. 
Edward Hay, who had been a member of the Canada Party, was the leader of the 
‘English party’ in the legislature and Joseph Dubuc, formerly of Quebec, was the leader of 
the ‘French party’.  They joined forces in a motion of non-confidence in the government 
and it carried, 15 to 7. 
Lieutenant Governor Morris, facing opposition from the leadership of both 
linguistic communities, asked Marc-Amable Girard to put together a ministry, as he was the 
only member of the opposition who had government experience.  Girard included both Hay 
and Dubuc in his ministry, in an attempt to unite the two linguistic communities, and 
increased the executive council to six, so there would be an equal number of catholics and 
protestants in the ministry.  This marks the advent of responsible government when, in the 
face of a legislative party that could both command the support of the legislature and bridge 
the social cleavage, the lieutenant-governor had no choice but to relinquish control to a 
ministry that was not his choosing.  The new government succeeded in getting the 
redistribution Bill carried with ‘the full support of both races’ (Rothney 2000). 
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This governing party which was forming by this exercise would, through the 
mechanism of the lieutenant governor designating a minister from the previous government 
to form the next, define legislative politics in the face of social group activism.  There was 
a clearly identified French party and an English party at the outset, and various other 
factions would spring up surrounding the issue of the day, but through the ministry various 
leaders of these factions would be aligned in a ministry that could obtain legislation from 
the assembly and provide continuity in government.  From Girard until John Norquay lost 
the premiership in 1883, each successive premier claimed to be non-partisan, but it is 
noteworthy that many ran for or served in the federal parliament as Conservatives 
(including Girard and Norquay). 
The partisan cleavage that seems to emerge after the establishment of responsible 
government, in an era where politicians would run under various temporary and shifting 
banners, is between a government and an opposition which, at some point, sees the 
opposition coalesce as an alternative government.  One such temporary banner in Manitoba 
was the Provincial Rights Party, which was created by Thomas Greenway in the wake of 
the federal government disallowing Manitoba’s local railway legislation in 1882 (Rea 
2000).  In the 1883 election, 21 government supporters were elected under Norquay and 
faced a combined opposition of nine (Provincial Rights candidates, Liberals, and 
independents), who agreed to unite under the Liberal banner with Greenway as their leader.  
In the 1886 election the government won 20 seats, the Liberals 14 and the independents 
one.  When the Norquay government resigned after a dispute with the federal government, 
and a new premier could not gain the support of the legislature, Greenway became premier 
in 1888, after which he won 33 of the 38 seats in the legislature.  
Manitoba historians mark this as the first party government.  But through the lens of 
the partisan cleavage, there was already a government party and an opposition to it.  It is 
just that after 20 years of responsible government, the opposition to the government party 
coalesced around the desire to be government and formed a single opposition party.  The 
desire to return to government would force those who had been the perennial governing 
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party to adopt the label of Conservative.  Thus federal party labels came to define the two 
sides of the partisan cleavage, but that cleavage itself had existed before.  
Manitoba had known the institutional arrangement of governor’s council under the 
Hudson’s Bay Company and was to have begun under Canadian governance equally with a 
governor’s council.  The institutional changes demanded by one side of the social cleavage, 
the Métis, were not obtained.   The group that went to Ottawa was representative of both 
sides of the social cleavage and the meetings with the federal government saw them 
establish representative, not responsible government, though in spite of this, when political 
parties emerged that created cross-cleavages the rule by governor’s ended.  Manitoba too 
had responsible government.  All of this occurred under Canadian and not British oversight.  
While responsible government was established by the Canadian parliament, the shift to 
responsible government occurred entirely in the province, providing further evidence that 
understanding local developments is important to understanding institutional change. 
II. Road to Abolition of the Upper Chamber 
The legislative assembly in 1874, following redistribution, had 14 English-speaking 
members and 10 French-speaking members.  The legislative council had the same 
membership as before, which was similar in alignment to the lower chamber. 
For its part, the legislative council was diverse in composition in terms of ethnicity, 
but homogeneous in terms of conservative beliefs with respect to government, having 
learned much of their lessons for governing from the Hudson’s Bay Company’s governor’s 
council.  While this upper chamber had helped Archibald govern and delayed the 
establishment of responsible government, it became a thorn in the side of the new 
governing party. 
In the speech from the throne the government announced it would lay before the 
house a report from its delegation who, during the recess, had travelled to Ottawa to request 
that the boundaries of the province be increased to include more territory and for its subsidy 
to be increased (Manitoba Journals, LA, November 4, 1874).  The government reported 
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that the federal government had refused to increase the boarders of the province and it was 
unwilling to increase the subsidy: 
“In declining to change the financial arrangements the [Canadian] 
Government are not insensible to the serious embarrassment necessarily 
attendant upon the administration of the government of the Province owing 
to the cost of maintaining two legislative bodies, numbering thirty-one 
members, selected from about three thousand families” (The Daily Free 
Press, July 16, 1874). 
The total revenue of the province, including the federal subsidy (which was around 
$67,000), was “$77,000 and that over $40,000 of that amount is required to pay the 
expenses of legislation, including printing, civil government and care of government 
house” (ibid., July 15, 1874). 
Premier Girard then introduced “An Act to diminish the Expenditure of the 
Legislature of the Province of Manitoba in certain respects” on July 14, 1874, which 
included provisions to abolish the legislative council.  In doing so, Girard stated: 
“Upper Houses were in the first place established not for the protection of 
the people but for the protection of the Crown and in old times might have 
rendered certain services, but that day is past.  In Ontario they got along well 
with one chamber, and this Province is in a position to do good work with 
only one House” (The Daily Free Press, July 15, 1874). 
Girard and the other ministers dismissed out of hand the normative claims that the upper 
chamber offered any benefit to government through the revision of legislature (one of the 
principle arguments offered in defence of upper chambers in this era) or that it protected the 
minority in the province.  It was in the lower chamber where identity politics were played 
out and it was the government which protected the minority.  The Bill passed the lower 
house and was sent to the upper chamber (Manitoba Journals, LA, July 16, 1874).   
Before it could arrive in the legislative council, one of the government’s supporters 
in the upper chamber, Colin Inkster, tabled a “Bill to amend the Act respecting indemnity to 
members of the Legislature” (Manitoba Journals, LC, July 13, 1874).  Catholic legislative 
councillor, Dr. John O’Donnell, accused Inkster of taking the first step towards abolition of 
the upper chamber, but committed to supporting the Bill, precisely because he felt that by 
lowering or eliminating councillors’ salaries it would remove the government’s case for 
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abolition.  He spoke at length in defence of the legislative council, arguing that the French 
members of the federal parliament had put the legislative council in place to defend 
minority rights and that it, like the legislative council in Quebec and the senate in Ottawa, 
was a protection long-sought by the French in Canada and part of the treaty between the 
French and the English (Manitoba Free Press, July 18, 1874).  He also noted that the 
people had not expressed an opinion on the matter of dissolving the legislative council.  
The speaker ruled the Bill out of order as it concerned money matters and these had to 
originate in the lower house (Manitoba Journals, LC, July 14, 1874). This led to the first of 
many acrimonious and personally accusatory debates in the upper chamber between 
government representatives and the catholic and French councillors over its abolition. 
The legislation to abolish the legislative council was introduced in the legislative 
council the next day, and it was tabled for six months by a vote of four to three, which was 
the mechanism for killing the legislation (Manitoba Journals, LC, July 17, 1874).252  In the 
lower chamber the government announced its intention of proroguing the legislature (The 
Daily Free Press, July 17, 1874). 
Robert Davis, who was originally from Ontario and was provincial treasurer under 
Girard, succeeded him as premier later that year.253  Davis was the acknowledged leader of 
the Ontario faction, and he included Royal from the Girard ministry as his Francophone 
attorney-general.  In the speech from the throne the following year, the government again 
announced its intention to abolish the legislative council, stating: 
“Inasmuch as the limited income of the Province necessitates the utmost 
economy in the administration of its affairs, a measure will be submitted to 
you to provide for the conduct of public business, by the aid of the 
Legislative Assembly only, thus dispensing with the maintenance of the 
Legislative Council” (Manitoba Journals, LA, March 31, 1875). 
                                                 
252 Gunn, Hamelin, Dauphinas and O’Donnell voted to table the Bill. Inkster, Ogletree and McKay (the 
speaker and a member of the cabinet) supported the legislation. 
253 Riel had been running and getting elected to the federal parliament in Provencher and when this happened 
again in 1874, the English community was incensed.  While Girard and the government could not control 
Riel, they felt it necessary to resign.  Davis remained as a minister and Girard recommended the lieutenant-
governor call on him to form the government. 
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The Bill, “An Act to diminish the expenditure of the Legislature” was introduced on April 
27 (ibid.). 
In addition to the explanation of cost savings, the government argued that the matter 
“had been very fully discussed at the late general election, and which had been almost 
unanimously approved of by the people and nearly all of the candidates had pledged 
themselves to support such a measure, having made it one of the planks in their platform” 
and that the “constitution of this Province has provided safeguards for the minority” 
(Norquay, The Daily Free Press, April 30, 1875).  The normative arguments advanced in 
support of the chamber revolved around its being a check on hasty legislation (Lemay, 
ibid.) and its role of protecting the rights of minorities (Cornish, ibid.).  The legislation 
passed the lower chamber by a vote of 17 to 5.  Introduced in the upper chamber (Manitoba 
Journals, LC, May 4, 1875), it was again killed by a motion to put off consideration for 
three months (Manitoba Journals, LC, May 7, 1985).254 
In Ottawa, the Liberals under Alexander Mackenzie had replaced the Macdonald 
government in the wake of the Pacific Scandal in 1873.  Mackenzie had opposed the 
institutional design in the Manitoba Act as part of his general opposition to the government.  
He was also waging his own battle with the senate at the federal level.  The understanding 
had been at Confederation that there would be balance in appointments to the federal 
senate.  But with the Macdonald government so long in power, 29 of the 31 senators 
appointed since 1867 were Liberal-Conservatives.  Mackenzie’s government passed the 
requisite order-in-council to use s.26 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and appoint additional 
senators to rebalance the upper chamber (Forsey 1946a, 1946b).  The British government 
refused to advise the queen to let the government make these appointments as there was no 
existing crisis between the two chambers that warranted its use.255  Then, in 1875, the 
senate rejected the government Bill for the construction of a railway from Esquimalt to 
                                                 
254 Again it was Gunn, Hamelin, Dauphinais and O’Donnell who stopped the legislation. 
255 They note that it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution that the clause only be used when “a 
difference had arisen between the two Houses of so serious and permanent a character, that the Government 
could not be carried on without Her intervention, and when it could be shown that the limited creation of 
Senators allowed by the Act would apply an adequate remedy” (Dunsmuir 1990). 
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Nanaimo in British Columbia.256  It was in this climate that Davis and Royal went to 
Ottawa in October of 1875 to negotiate better financial terms for the province. 
The speech from the throne the following year reported that negotiations with the 
Canadian government had been successful and the province would have its subsidy 
increased to $90,000 per annum, on the understanding the province would abolish the 
legislative council (Manitoba Journals, HA, January 4, 1876).  A Bill entitled “An Act to 
diminish the expenses of the Legislature of Manitoba” was subsequently introduced 
(January 20, 1876).  The premier argued that “if the largest members of the Confederacy 
can legislate satisfactorily by means of one chamber only, the smallest may confidently 
hope to do so too”, and that the move is “necessary to carry out the wishes of the people, 
and the requirement of the Federal Government” (Davis, The Daily Free Press, January 18, 
1876).  
Arguments against the legislation were still made on the grounds that this was a 
chamber that protected minorities.  Specifically the need for this chamber to protect the 
Métis and British mixed race people was underlined, as well as the fact that the federal 
government had not yet been turned over title to the land that had been set aside in the 
Manitoba Act to the Métis who had homes on this land (Sutherland, ibid.). 
The government’s approach to the chamber had changed.  In this debate the premier 
acknowledged that the chamber had a role in protecting the minority, but said the 
arguments in favour of abolition were more compelling, promising he “could assure the 
minority that their rights would never be trampled upon in this Province.  There would 
always be sufficient English-speaking members in this House who will insist upon giving 
their French fellow subjects their rights, to protect them” (Davis, Manitoba Free Press, 
January 25, 1876). 
                                                 
256 At this point it became public knowledge that Mackenzie had tried to use the clause and the senate and the 
house of commons both ordered the production of all papers related to the incident.  The Conservative 
majority in the senate then passed the motion expressing “its high appreciation of the conduct of Her 
Majesty’s Government in refusing to advise an Act for which no Constitutional reason could be offered” 
(Dunsmuir 1990) 
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Royal, who as minister of public works, had been in Ottawa negotiating the money, 
acknowledged that “there was a strong feeling among the people” he represented that the 
legislative council was “a safeguard to their rights and privileges” but when he saw that 
abolition was a necessary condition of receiving a larger subsidy from Ottawa, he gave his 
consent (ibid.). 
The former premier, Girard, took issue with his own government’s claim that 
abolition was a condition of obtaining the higher subsidy, noting that the federal 
government could only suggest abolition and could not make it a condition of the money to 
be voted by parliament (he was sitting in the Canadian senate as well as the Manitoba 
assembly at the time), but argued in favour of abolition on the grounds that this had been a 
body to restrain the will of the elected representatives and protect the crown in the colonial 
era (The Daily Free Press, January 23, 1876).  As such it was obstructionist to government 
policies and programs that were needed to help the province grow and provide services to 
its residents. 
In the upper chamber, the Bill was introduced on January 27, 1876 (Manitoba 
Journals, LC).  The debate was again acrimonious and personal.  The spectre of the 
growing English majority in the lower chamber trampling the rights of the minorities, 
particularly those of mixed race, was central to the debate.  At final reading on January 3, 
the Bill received three votes against and four in favour (ibid.).  It was given royal assent the 
following day (ibid.). 
Allegations were raised at the time that some councillors had been bought off to get 
it through the council.  These allegations originated in the legislative council when 
O’Donnell first suggested that French members of the council were betraying their ‘race’ 
when they sided with the speaker over the indemnity Bill on July 13, 1874 (Manitoba Free 
Press, July 18, 1874).  But this was a premature accusation as the two Métis members 
consistently voted with O’Donnell to block abolition legislation.  The speaker, James 
McKay, simply switched to a new cabinet post (as minister of agriculture) and sought 
election in the assembly, where he was acclaimed, and the other cabinet minister was given 
a government position as sheriff, but both of these ministers had consistently voted in 
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favour of abolition and a government appointment following service in cabinet was normal 
practice.  It is unclear if the one councillor who switched sides, George Gunn, received any 
assurances with respect to his career, as he had been a respected naturalist before entering 
the council and continued to work as an academic researcher and author after he left.  The 
other person who voted for abolition was a physician and continued as such.  Certainly it is 
misleading to state that “the lieutenant governor ensured passage by the simple expedient of 
guaranteeing several Councillors equivalent remuneration elsewhere in support of the bill” 
(emphasis added, Kitchin 1973, 68). 
Opposition to change in Manitoba was clearly driven by social identity.  The 
economic reality of the province’s financial situation, combined with the partisan politics of 
Ottawa and the provincial election campaign where abolition had been an issue, created a 
critical mass in support of abolition in the most socially divided province in Canada at the 
time.  In the end it was only achieved by one vote and the switch in this vote, based on the 
claims of that member at the time, were simply due to the government’s need for cost 
saving and an increase in federal subsidy. 
III. Conclusion 
Manitoba makes an excellent test of the model of institutional development that was 
observed in the British North American provinces.  Each of those provinces followed the 
same trajectory.  The original colonial institutions for governance, namely a governor and a 
governor’s council, were eventually modified to add in a representative assembly.  The 
demand for such an assembly was thought to be tied to British settlers bringing with them 
normative ideas about representation learned in Britain and advocated as a basic right in the 
age of enlightenment.  In the end, responsible government was ‘given’ by the British whose 
political leaders had become pragmatic or ‘won’ by colonial leaders (assisted by their 
enlightened governors) advancing normative arguments that could navigate British 
constitutional law surrounding ministerial accountability and parliamentary sovereignty. 
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In the case of Manitoba, British constitutional law had nothing to do with 
institutional design.  The institutions it obtained were created after Britain had 
accommodated responsible government in law.  And they were created in the first instance 
by the Canadian and not the British government; a government that itself had emerged out 
of the battle for responsible government in a socially divided province.  They were 
transformed locally without any ‘grant’ from the higher government in Ottawa and without 
the need for normative argument.  The political reality of the provincial legislature made 
government by a governor unworkable. 
In the face of these differences, the parallels between Manitoba and the province of 
Canada are striking.  In both provinces the social cleavage had led to armed insurrection 
and a demand for responsible government using an American republic design.  With 
representative government a partisan cleavage emerged in the elected chamber out of 
opposition to the governor and his councillors.  With responsible government, a governing 
party emerged and the opposition to that government first defined the partisan cleavage, 
with the opposition coalescing into a political party with the goal of replacing the 
government party, which in turn dropped the pretext of being non-partisan; Liberal and 
Conservative parties began to contest elections. 
The desire to abolish the upper chamber was part of the platform of the governing 
party which emerged to obtain responsible government.   It was a party that was 
consciously crafted to include political leaders from both sides of the province’s social 
cleavage.  It was able to achieve change by convincing people on both sides of that 
cleavage that abolition would in no way undermine the protections that representation in 
the upper chamber might provide – and that the partisan benefits (financial savings and the 
advancement of policies and programs to develop the province and improve quality of life) 
were a more important consideration than social identity concerns. 
The acceptance by a majority of the representatives in the lower house, who were 
linguistic, religious and mixed race minorities, of assurances that the rights of the minority 
would be protected by the lower chamber and the government, was made more believable 
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due to the government’s practice of equal catholic and protestant membership in cabinet 
and linguistic duality at the top of government.  That the first premier, a Francophone, had 
made abolition part of government policy from the outset and had his government 
repeatedly challenged in the upper chamber gave his party’s supporters both confidence in 
and determination to make the change. 
The provincial government was buttressed in its case for abolition by a federal 
political party that had formed its view on the Manitoba legislature in the context of 
Ottawa’s partisan debate over the Manitoba Act when it had been in opposition, and in the 
context of its own frustration with an upper chamber.  While the federal government 
provided a financial incentive, it did so for partisan reasons.  It also did not and could not 
dictate, and while the incentive clearly swayed some of the legislators, it did not deliver a 
decisive shift in support.  The decision was taken locally with opposition to the change 
being emotional and personal, centred as it was on social identity, and only passed by one 
vote. 
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Chapter 9: Eliminating Provincial Upper Chambers 
The four provinces that joined Canada with bicameral legislatures – Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Quebec and Prince Edward Island – each successfully abolished their 
upper chambers or ‘legislative councils’, though at  different times. 
What makes these four cases interesting is that each province has different social 
cleavages.  In Prince Edward Island it was initially a cleavage over property ownership; 
Nova Scotia the cleavage was first one of religion-culture and later this evolved into a class 
division and in both instances it most strongly separated the residents of Cape Breton Island 
from the people who lived on the mainland; New Brunswick’s language religious cleavage 
divided Acadian and English; and in Quebec there were competing social cleavages with an 
English minority in province, and the French a minority in Canada. 
  Two of the provinces, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, had upper chambers that 
had little connection to that province’s social cleavage, while the other two had councils 
designed with the social cleavage in mind (the upper chamber in Quebec designed to ensure 
that the English minority had representation and in Prince Edward Island the upper 
chamber was specifically designed to represent property owners).  Yet in all four provinces, 
the social cleavage was considered during abolition. 
Abolition of all four occurred in an era of political parties, so it makes the 
examination of partisan cleavages easier, and the one province that had an elected upper 
chamber, Prince Edward Island, offers an opportunity to examine a chamber internally 
divided by the province’s partisan cleavage and yet as the body for property owners 
represented one side of the social cleavage.  
In all four cases we find that change occurred when the partisan group that bridged 
the social cleavage drove the change.  In the two provinces where social cleavages were 
tied to upper chamber design, we found a shift in the social cleavage preceded change 
and/or abolition. In all of the provinces, change occurred only when the partisan cleavage 
defined the debate over institutional change.  
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In each province an abolition movement arose shortly after Confederation, and the 
initial argument in favour of abolition was the same in each province, and rested on two 
premises.  The first premise was that Confederation had transferred the role of reviewing 
poorly drafted or ill-conceived legislation to the federal government, which had the 
constitutional authority to ‘disallow’ any law enacted by a provincial legislature; and the 
second premise was that provinces had surrendered most of their jurisdiction to the federal 
government.257  Bicameralism was thus an unnecessary expense to oversee ‘local’ matters. 
In all four provinces the Westminster-model shaped provincial politics by creating a 
government and opposition cleavage.  In the era of party politics, which would emerge out 
of this cleavage, the leader of the party that wins the most seats in the lower chamber is 
usually tasked with forming a government.  So, not surprising, in all four provinces the 
opposition party was the first to favour abolition since they would have to govern having 
few party supporters in the upper chamber. 
The Constitution Act, 1867 had transferred to the new federal government all 
indirect taxation, which was the primary source of government revenue in the 19th century.  
Provinces would receive subsidies from the federal government to enable them to provide 
local services and run the local legislature.258   Thus reducing expenditures was one of the 
main motivations for abolition initiatives in all four provinces, just as it had been in 
Manitoba.  All four provincial governments were in contact with each other and shared 
strategies with respect to abolition. 
As illustrated in table 9.1, while an abolition movement began at roughly the same 
time, the four provinces abolished their upper chambers at different times, with New 
Brunswick first, Nova Scotia second, then Prince Edward Island and finally Quebec 
(though Prince Edward Island would have remnants until 1996).  
                                                 
257 The birth of the welfare state and a series of judicial decision would give provincial governments much 
wider jurisdiction than planned or assumed in 1867, and the federal government would eventually discontinue 
reviewing and disallowing legislation, but these were justifiable and widespread beliefs at the time, even in 
Quebec. 
258 They could levy direct taxation, but most governments were reluctant to take this unpopular course of 
action. 
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Table 9.1: Dates of Provincial Upper Chamber Abolition 
Province Date joined 
Confederation 
Date of 
Abolition 
Mechanism Notes 
Alberta Sept. 1, 1905 Never had an 
upper chamber* 
N/A Province created out of 
territorial land. 
British 
Columbia 
July 20, 1871 Never had an 
upper chamber* 
N/A Joined Canada without a 
legislative council. 
Manitoba July 15, 1870 1876 An Act to diminish 
the spending power 
of the Legislature of 
Manitoba 
 
New Brunswick July 1, 1867 1892 An Act  respecting 
the Legislative 
Council 
 
Newfoundland March 31, 1939 1934* Newfoundland Act. 
1949 
Joined Confederation 
without a legislative 
council as the 
legislature was 
dissolved in 1934. 
Nova Scotia July 1, 1867 1928 An Act abolishing 
the Legislative 
Council and 
amending the 
Constitution of the 
Province 
 
Ontario July 1, 1867 1866* N/A Province created at 
Confederation without a 
legislative council.  
Elections to the 
legislative council in the 
province of Canada 
were suspended a year 
earlier. 
Prince Edward 
Island 
July 1, 1873 1963 Elections Act, 1963 Joined Confederation 
with an upper chamber 
elected by property 
owners.  An Act 
respecting the 
Legislature merged the 
two chambers in 1893. 
Quebec July 1, 1867 1968 An Act respecting 
the Legislative 
Council of Quebec 
 
Saskatchewan Sept. 1, 1905 Never had an 
upper chamber* 
N/A Province created by 
parliament out of 
territorial land. 
* These provinces effectively entered Confederation without upper chambers.   
As with previous chapters, initiatives for change are process traced and then placed 
in a social and a partisan context.  The benefit of looking at two cleavages in a society, it is 
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argued, allows for a more nuanced examination of political behaviour.  It is hypothesized 
that social identity engenders resistance to change as members of one group will mistrust 
the motives of political actors on the other side of a social cleavage.  While the status quo 
may be the result in societies where there are strong social cleavages, for those who want to 
achieve institutional change the best vehicle for that change is a political party that can 
bridge the social cleavage. 
In both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where the upper chamber had no formal 
representational role with respect to the social cleavage, the principle determinant in 
achieving change was tied to the partisan debate.  As both political parties in the lower 
chamber adopted abolition policies, the issue was deprived of political oxygen.  It was only 
when the issue because partisan that genuine steps were taken towards reform.  
Interestingly, while there was no previous representation connection, in New Brunswick the 
government appointed an Acadian to the upper chamber specifically to vote for abolition.  
Nova Scotia appointed councillors from each of its counties to do the same.  And the 
political parties in Nova Scotia adopted different policies with respect to the upper chamber 
in response to the labour movement in Cape Breton, with the Liberals changing the 
council’s power to a suspensive veto in order to try to preserve it and the Conservatives 
bringing about abolition. 
In Prince Edward Island, so long as the property cleavage was strong, abolition was 
impossible.  Islanders who owned property voted for councillors whereas tenants and 
owners voted for assemblymen.  The way cost savings were achieved was to have 
councillors and assemblymen meet together.  Once property declined in importance and the 
catholic-protestant cleavage emerged as the province’s main social cleavage, the practice 
emerged where the political parties would ensure that a catholic ran against another catholic 
for one of the positions and protestants competed against each other, and the property 
qualification was deemed unnecessary and eliminated in 1963.  It was only when 
immigration and a decline in religiosity lessened this religious cleavage that the councillor 
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position could be eliminated entirely and the province moved to single member 
constituencies in 1993. 
In Quebec, the social cleavage of English and French, with the French seeing 
themselves as a minority, meant that French politicians were as resistant to change as the 
English.  But as Quebec nationalism shifted from being ethno-racially based to being 
linguistic-cultural, this resistance was eliminated.  Change became driven first by the 
Liberal Party’s desire to establish the welfare state and then by the Union Nationale 
responding to the federal-provincial cleavage which replaced government formation as the 
province’s principle partisan cleavage. 
I. Nova Scotia 
If one simply looks at the number of initiatives for abolition of the legislative 
council of Nova Scotia, absent of partisan and social context, then one might conclude that 
a fifty-eight year campaign was waged against the upper chamber.259  But prior to the 
1920s, only one government was serious about abolition, and that was the one-term 
Conservative government of Simon Holmes.  His partisan campaign to abolish the council 
was quickly neutralized by the Liberal Party adopting the same policy in favour of 
abolition.  Returning to power in 1882, the Liberals strategically introduced legislation to 
abolish the chamber from time to time, usually in an election year, and obtained written 
commitments from the councillors it appointed (that they would vote for abolition), thus 
shifting responsibility for its survival onto the councillors it appointed and depriving the 
Conservatives of an election issue.  Most significantly, this deprived the abolition 
movement of a partisan playing field on which to generate public interest and debate, and 
thus put pressure on the government, in support of its cause.   
Nova Scotia’s social cleavage at this time paralleled the territorial divide between 
Cape Breton and mainland Nova Scotia.  Initially this was principally defined by religion 
                                                 
259 This is what Beck (1957) concludes in his chapter on the legislative council, which is the only significant 
examination of the abolition of a provincial upper chamber in Canada. 
  
 
317
and language, with Cape Breton having a large number of Gaelic and French catholics, but 
by the beginning of the 20th century it was becoming increasingly defined by class 
divisions; leading to labour unrest in Cape Breton as the union movement organized 
miners.  This, in turn, impacted on partisan politics due to a socialist-communist influence.  
With respect to the upper chamber, this created a normative argument in favour of 
preserving the upper chamber as a check against radicalized labour – a resistance to change 
as defined by the social cleavage.  More importantly, though, it caused the two main 
political parties to differ on what to do about the upper chamber.  The Liberal party, facing 
a United Farmers-Labour opposition after 1920, departed from the Conservatives and began 
to support the council, which motivated them to ‘reform’ it by reducing its veto to a 
temporary ‘suspensive’ one.  With the upper chamber finally a partisan issue, when the 
Conservatives returned to power that same year, they made abolition their priority, 
something they achieved just three years later, in 1928. 
While abolition was achieved through a specific constitutional mechanism, it 
presumably would have been achieved by a different, albeit less efficient, mechanism had 
the Conservative legal strategy proved fruitless.  It is noteworthy that even in a province 
where the upper chamber did not have a strong relationship to the social cleavage, the 
government, in order to achieve change, made sure that it had representation in the upper 
chamber in support of abolition from both sides of the social cleavage, so as to neutralize 
any argument that the chamber had a role to play in protecting either side of the cleavage.  
In the end, changes were made to the upper chamber only after the two main political 
parties took different positions over what to do with respect to the upper chamber, and each 
was able to make the change they preferred while in office.  The important lesson from 
Nova Scotia, therefore, is that while change may be achieved by a group that can bridge the 
social cleavage, it must be driven by the partisan cleavage impacting on the specifics of 
change. 
Nova Scotia’s legislative council had been created by the commissions and 
instructions issued to the governor.  These allowed the lieutenant governor to summon up 
the 21 members, the persons so summoned being provisional appointments to be 
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subsequently confirmed by the queen.  In 1872, at the request of the British and Canadian 
governments, an Act was passed allowing the lieutenant governor to appoint councillors 
without requiring confirmation by the queen.  This was an uncontroversial change as it was 
merely reflective of the existing reality.  Well into the era of responsible party government, 
appointments were by this time being made by the Nova Scotia government (i.e. cabinet) so 
having the queen rubber stamp appointments was thought to be a waste of her’s and the 
Canadian and British bureaucracies’ time.260  As the Constitution Act, 1867 stated that the 
constitution of the legislature in the provinces shall “continue as it exists at the Union until 
altered under the Authority of this Act” (s.88), Nova Scotia governments were under the 
mistaken impression that the council size was 18, and that appointments were for life, as 
that was the legislative council seen to exist at the moment of Confederation. 
The first calls for abolition came from the anti-Confederation members in the 
assembly as early as 1869, on the grounds that the financial situation of the province within 
Confederation (having turned over indirect taxation to the federal government) could not 
sustain a bicameral legislature.  The Conservative opposition that emerged in the chamber 
after 1872 also adopted a policy in favour of abolition, and began to call on the Liberal 
government to leave council seats vacant.  The government in the first instance refused, as 
it had insufficient members in the upper chamber that would support its planned legislative 
programme. 
The first serious attempt to abolish the upper chamber came in 1879, when the 
Conservatives replaced the Liberals as government.  During the 1878 election, the abolition 
of the upper chamber as a way of saving money was included in the Conservative platform, 
though it was not an election issue.  Simon Holmes became the Conservative premier on 
October 22, 1878.261 
                                                 
260 The legislation is entitled: An Act to provide for the appointment of Legislative Councillors in the Province 
of Nova Scotia. 
261 They had previously been the government, with Hiram Blanchard as premier, at the time of Confederation.  
They were defeated by William Annand leading an anti-Confederation Liberal Party shortly after 
Confederation.  
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In the speech from the throne, the Holmes government noted that Confederation had 
removed most of the jurisdiction to the federal parliament, leaving only ‘local’ matters to 
be handled by provincial legislatures.  It asked the two chambers “to consider whether in 
the limited sphere of legislative action, which is now open to this Parliament, and the 
urgent necessity for a reduction of the public burdens, the legislation of the province may 
not be carried on by a single chamber” (N.S. Journals, LA, March 6, 1879).  The 
government then introduced a motion in the lower chamber repeating this argument and 
adding that legislation had been successfully managed by a unicameral legislature in 
Ontario since Confederation, and asking for a conference to be established with 
representatives of the two chambers in order to consider what steps could be taken to bring 
about the abolition of the legislative council (ibid., March 12, 1879).  This motion was 
adopted in the assembly unanimously, marking the first move by the Liberals to diffuse this 
as a partisan issue.  Conferences were then held between representatives of the two 
chambers on March 19, 20 and 23. 
On March 28, the conference committee reported that while the upper chamber 
agreed with the objective of reducing the cost of legislation, it could not agree with its own 
abolition (N.S. Journals, LA).  It noted that in the case of Ontario, there had as yet been no 
crisis to test the mettle of a unicameral legislature, so it advised waiting before undertaking 
such a drastic measure.  As an alternative, it proposed that a greater saving could be had by 
reducing the size of both chambers and the salaries paid to all members.  The specific 
proposals from the upper chamber were that no new appointments be made to the council 
until its numbers were reduced to 13, that the lower house should be reduced from 38 to 20, 
and that every councillor and assemblyman should take a 25 percent pay cut.   
Subsequently the government introduced a “Bill to abolish the Legislative Council 
of Nova Scotia” (N.S. Journals, LA, March 28, 1879).  It passed the lower chamber on 
April 2 and was introduced in the upper chamber the same day (N.S. Journals, LC, April 2, 
1879).  The council voted to table the bill on abolition for three months, effectively killing 
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the legislation (ibid., April 15, 1879).262  What the council and assembly were able to agree 
upon as an immediate step was the abolition of the office of law clerk to the council, as a 
way to save money.263 
On April 15, the legislative assembly struck a committee to prepare an address to 
the queen calling for the abolition of the upper chamber (N.S. Journals, LA).  In response, 
the legislative council formed its own committee to prepare its own address for the queen in 
defence of the retention of the council (N.S. Journals, LC, April 17, 1879). 
The address from the lower house asked the queen to place before parliament 
legislation that would permit the lieutenant-governor, on the advice of the government, to 
increase the size of the legislative council by up to nine additional councillors, which would 
then tip the vote in that chamber in favour of abolition (N.S. Journals, LA, April 17, 1878).  
It claimed that this had been an election issue and thus was the will of the people.  It 
reported the events in that legislative session, claiming the council had been obstructionist 
in not adopting the abolition legislation.  It asserted that the council cost approximately 
$15,000 per year, while the province only had revenues of $500,000 for the entire operation 
of government, whereas Ontario which had a population of 1,620,000 and revenues of 
$1,200,000 did not have a bicameral legislature, also noting that the other Canadian 
provinces were taking steps to abolish their upper chambers.264  This was adopted 
unanimously, further neutralizing this as a partisan issue for the next election. 
The ‘memorial’ of the legislative council countered the claim that it had been 
obstructionist by pointing out that the only argument raised by the government with the 
                                                 
262 In this era, sessions of a legislature ran for only two months a year, with a new session and a speech from 
the throne occurring at the start of a new session when summoned by the government (under the signature of 
the lieutenant governor) the following year. 
263 This was abolished through An Act to abolish the office of Law Clerk of the Legislative Council, which 
received royal assent on April 17, 1879, and the clerk of the assembly took over the duties that had previously 
been performed by the law clerk (N.S. Journals, LC). 
264 This address was based on a flawed constitutional understanding.  The Constitution Act, 1867 did not 
enshrine the council as it existed at Confederation, it merely retained the legislature as defined by the 
constitution of the province at the time of Confederation.  It was the commissions and instructions of the 
lieutenant governors that limited him to appointing no more than nine councillors on his own authority.  The 
queen was not limited in her capacity to appoint additional councillors, so the government would have been 
better off simply asking the queen to appoint specific councillors absent of a mention of the goal of abolition 
of the council. 
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lower chamber concerning abolition had been the need for cost saving, and that the 
council’s own committee had recommended a reduction in both chambers of number or 
members and salaries which would save far more money than the abolition of the upper 
chamber (N.S. Journals, April 17, 1879).  It objected to abolition on principle, stating that 
the example of Ontario was irrelevant since in all other jurisdictions an upper chamber 
existed, all of which were modelled on the parliament of the United Kingdom.  It also 
argued that the council had “never wilfully or wantonly interposed or caused 
embarrassment to the Government of the country, and they have no evidence, nor do they 
believe, that the people of the Province are dissatisfied with the Legislative Council as a 
constitutional member of the Legislature of the country, or desire its abolition” (ibid.). 
The cabinet adopted its own address in the form of a ‘minute’ of the executive 
council which contained a normative discussion of the history of the bicameral legislature 
in colonial Nova Scotia as a check on the assembly, arguing that the need for such a 
safeguard had been made obsolete by the powers granted to the Canadian government (N.S. 
Minutes, EC, April 30, 1879).  The federal government was the check on a provincial 
legislature given its constitutional power of disallowance.265  It cited a number of bills that 
had been passed by the legislative assembly and defeated in the council.  It reiterated the 
unnecessary expense argument and noted that while the assembly address mentioned 
Ontario, that Manitoba and British Columbia had since joined Canada without councils and 
that the other Canadian provinces were all moving towards abolition.266  The minute 
‘advised’ that the assembly’s request be granted. 
Constitutionally, the queen was only ‘advised’ by her British ministers in this era, 
who expressed disappointment that the governor general of Canada had not provided an 
impartial perspective to aid the British cabinet in considering the provincial assembly’s 
request.  Since the Constitution Act, 1867 had given the power to amend a provincial 
                                                 
265 The powers of disallowance and reservation of provincial legislation were powers that had been assigned 
to the Canadian government.  These would fall into disuse as provincial governments emerged as distinct and 
autonomous governments with interests and powers well beyond ‘local’ affairs. 
266 Manitoba had in fact joined with a bicameral legislature, but the upper chamber had been abolished (see 
previous chapter). 
  
 
322
constitution to the provincial legislature, “the circumstances, as placed before me, do not 
lead me to conclude either that an alteration of the constitution has been proved to be 
necessary, or that sufficient attempts have been made to remove the evils complained of by 
well-directed measures of reform and retrenchment” (Despatch from Hincks-Beach to 
Lorne, July 25, 1879). 
The Nova Scotia government tried to reopen the matter by presenting a detailed case 
to the Canadian government of provincial expenses, which were financed principally by a 
grant from the federal government, and asked it to have the governor general intercede on 
its behalf.267  The response from the Canadian government was that the Constitution Act, 
1867 gave the provinces the full authority to amend the provincial constitution and while it 
was regrettable that the two chambers were, in the moment, hostile to one another, perhaps 
in time harmony would be restored and, failing that, vacancies would open up allowing the 
government to appoint new councillors (Despatch from O’Connor to Archibald, April 30, 
1881). 
The government of Nova Scotia then asked the assembly for permission to 
correspond with the governments of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island to see if the 
Maritime Provinces working together could bring about abolition of all three upper 
chambers (res.6, N.S. Journals, LA, 1881).  The assembly authorized the government to 
proceed. 
No mechanism for joint abolition emerged.268  Rather, the governments of Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick developed a strategy that the two governments would try in 
their respective provinces: leaving vacancies in the upper chamber unfilled until there were 
                                                 
267This was in a letter from Holmes, but as government communication went through the lieutenant governor 
to the governor general, it is attached to a Despatch from Archibald to O’Connor (July 22, 1880) 
268 It received from the New Brunswick government an order-in-council committing to “give immediate 
consideration to any suggestion which may be offered on the subject by the government of Nova Scotia” 
(N.B. Minutes, EC, June 7, 1881).268  The government of Prince Edward Island expressed its desire to abolish 
its legislative council, but noted that it was elected so the process would likely have to be different, so asked 
for proposals as to how the Nova Scotia government planned on proceeding (PEI Minutes, EC, June 23, 
1881).  Representatives of the Nova Scotia government met with their counterparts in New Brunswick.  With 
nothing tangible to report, the provincial secretary asked the lieutenant-governor to try again with the 
governor general and Canadian government (Letter from Holmes to Archibald, October 17, 1881).  He did 
not. 
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sufficient vacancies that a group of individuals committed to abolition could be summoned 
at one time and then quickly adopting legislation abolishing the chamber.  In the short term, 
leaving vacancies would, it was believed, undermine whatever legislative credibility the 
chamber might have with the public.  When it came time to fill the vacancies, only persons 
who had signed a pledge to vote for abolition would be appointed. 
The election of 1882 brought the Liberals back to power and thus a new premier 
William Pipes.  The following year, the Pipes government introduced a resolution calling 
for the abolition of the upper chamber (N.S. Journals, March 17, 1883).  The resolution 
read: “In view of the successful experience of the Provinces of Ontario and Manitoba, the 
special need of economy in the administration of our local affairs, it is expedient to abolish 
the Legislative Council of this Province as soon as it can be done, consistently with the 
existing laws and prerogatives of this Legislature” (res.2, N.S. Journals, 1883).  The choice 
of resolution is interesting because it could not bring about abolition; it only expressed the 
desire of the lower chamber and the government for that unattainable goal.  As an 
alternative, an opposition member proposed that a committee be established to look into 
how to amend the provincial constitution with respect to the legislative council, but this 
was opposed by the government and defeated (ibid.).269  The assembly adopted the 
government’s resolution but, as already observed, the government did not have to take any 
action as a consequence.  This was the first of a long line of fainthearted initiatives 
introduced by the Liberals to show their official support for abolition and thus ensure it 
would not be an issue in the subsequent provincial election. 
In 1884, an opposition member introduced, in the assembly, the council’s proposal 
to reduce the costs of government by reducing the number of people in the lower house to 
21, the upper house to 11 and the executive council to five, but this was opposed by the 
government and defeated (N.S. Journals, LA, March. 25, 1884).  When the Pipes 
government proceeded to fill three vacancies in the legislative council, this drew an equally 
                                                 
269 The defeated resolution read: “A Committee of this House be appointed to enquire into the best mode, if 
any, of amending the Constitution of the Legislature of this Province, as respects the Legislative Council, and 
with a view, if possible, of securing a more inexpensive system” (res.3).  
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unsuccessful motion of censure which stated that the government had broken its 
commitment and claimed that with these three appointments there should have been 
sufficient councillors to bring about abolition (ibid., April 16, 1884).  The government 
responded that it had obtained from these appointees a written commitment in advance of 
their appointment that they would vote in favour of abolition, though it refused to release 
copies of these letters.270 
In 1886, with an election ‘in the offing’, an opposition member introduced a 
resolution insisting that no more vacancies be filled in the council until after the election, 
but this never made it to debate (N.S. Journals, LA, 1886, res.7).  The Liberals were re-
elected that year, now with William Fielding at the helm, and abolition of the council was 
not an issue. 
In 1887, the first meeting of provincial premiers was held in Quebec City, which 
was chaired by the premier of Ontario and included the premiers of Quebec, Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Manitoba (MacKinnon 2002).271  At the 
meeting, a series of constitutional amendments and resolutions in support of provincial 
rights and increased federal transfers were adopted.  One of the amendments would have 
put a clause in the Constitution Act, 1867 to allow for the abolition of a provincial 
legislative council by the queen in response to an address adopted by the legislative 
assembly in the province, provided it had been adopted by a two-thirds vote in the lower 
chamber.272  The government in Ottawa was Conservative (though it was still going by the 
                                                 
270 In 1894, the government finally released copies of the letter it sent and the commitments it received.  The 
letter sent by the provincial secretary to each prospective nominee read as follows: “Sir,- The Government 
have under consideration the subject of appointments to the Legislative Council.  Your name has been 
submitted to them and has been favourably considered.  In view of the probability of steps being taken at a 
future day, having in view the abolition of the Council, the Government do not deem it expedient to appoint to 
that body any gentlemen whose opinions on the subject would prevent his assisting such a movement,  They 
desire, therefore, to know whether, if appointed, you would be willing to support a measure to abolish the 
Council, should such be brought forward.” (N.S. Journals, LA, 1894, app.17) 
271 Each of these premiers belonged to the same political party, the Liberals, though Quebec’s premier had re-
labelled his party the Parti national. 
272 This was article 12 and it reads: “That in two of the Provinces of the Dominion there is no second 
Chamber; that in five of these provinces there is a second Chamber; that in one of these five of the Provinces 
there is elective and for a limited term; that in the other four appointments are made by the Lieutenant-
Governor and for life; that the experience which has been had since Confederation shows that, under 
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name Liberal-Conservative) and these premiers were all affiliated with the Liberals at the 
federal level, even if in some of the provinces they were not using party labels.  None of the 
constitutional amendments or resolutions, including a call for a reciprocity treaty with the 
United States, was considered seriously by the federal government. 
About to fill another vacancy in 1888, the Liberals introduced a “Bill to Abolish the 
Legislative Council” (N.S. Journals, LA, March 12, 1888).  During the ensuing debate, the 
government defended making appointments to fill vacancies, noting that the Conservative 
government in 1879, just as it was making abolition a priority for its party, had made 
appointments so as not to be at a disadvantage in that chamber when its legislation was 
considered (Longley, N.S. Debates, LA, March 21, 1888).  Of particular note in the debate 
is the description of the composition of the upper house by a member on the government 
side:273 
“is composed of men who are to some extent retired from active business, 
men who represent the soil, the land owners of the country, retired wealthy 
merchants, men not engaged in active legal and professional business, and 
these are men who from their calmness of demeanour, their attention to 
public affairs, their admitted knowledge and experience, are fairly entitled to 
pass upon matters and measures in a manner that any other body of men in 
this country cannot rival” (Roche, ibid.). 
Even though the practice of appointing councillors from each of the different counties of 
Nova Scotia had emerged by now, there was no suggestion that the body represented the 
regions of the province.  It is also noteworthy that the councillors from Cape Breton did not 
                                                                                                                                                    
responsible government, and with the safeguards provided by the British North America Act, a second 
Provincial Chamber is unnecessary, and the expenses thereof may, in all the Provinces, be saved with 
advantage; that under the Act a Provincial Legislature has power to amend the constitution of the Province ; 
that this power includes the abolition of the Legislative Council, or changing the method of constituting the 
same; that the provision has failed to effect the abolition of the Council in some Provinces where public 
opinion is believed to favour such change; and that the Act should be so amended as to provide that upon an 
address of the House of Assembly, the elected representatives of the people, Her Majesty the Queen may by 
proclamation abolish the Legislative Council or change the constitution thereof, providing that the address is 
concurred in by at least two-thirds of the members of such House of Assembly” (N.S. Journals, LA, 1894, 
app.17). 
273 This member of the government opposed abolition on the grounds that the chamber had repeatedly found 
flaws in legislation passed by the lower chamber and that no case had been made by the government that the 
upper chamber was being obstructionist or that a crisis was at hand. 
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identify a representational role for themselves with respect to the island.  The Bill passed 
easily through the lower chamber (N.S. Journals, LA, March 26). 
In introducing the legislation in the upper chamber, the government’s case was 
shifted from one of cost savings to one of the ‘will of the people’ as expressed by the 
political parties united in the lower chamber (Fraser, N.S. Debates, LC, March 28, 1888).  
In opposition to the Bill, it was argued that the agitation for reform in the lower house was 
a response to the upper chamber doing its job as an independent body and that if the 
government was serious about reform it should follow Prince Edward Island’s example and 
create an elected upper chamber (Baker, ibid., March 28, 1888) or arrange conferences with 
the upper chamber to see if together the chambers could come up with a better design 
(Goudge, ibid.).  There was a belief that the financial savings would not be what successive 
governments had claimed (Baker and Whitman, ibid.).  The role of the chamber in revising 
legislation was not any less needed based on the flaws the council found in recent 
legislation, which is why some councillors who had voted for abolition in 1882 were voting 
against it now (Creelman and Goudge, ibid.). 
Even if the Conservatives were, as they claimed, more committed to abolition when 
they were in government,  they were defeated in the following election, which caused 
several councillors to argue that that either meant the people did not care about abolition or 
the people did not support this cause (e.g., Goudge, ibid.).  And it was pointed out that it 
had not been an election issue.  It was also noted that, beginning in 1884, the Liberal 
government could have appointed members who wanted abolition, but instead appointed 
people who would further other legislation which it considered a greater priority (ibid.).  
With respect to the issue of the written pledges, it was said that, in asking for them, the 
premier had told the appointees that they would be free to renounce the commitment to vote 
for abolition should their views change (ibid.).  The Bill to abolish the legislative council 
was defeated 11 to 8; with three of the councillors voting against, having pledged to vote 
for any such legislation (two had been appointed by the Conservatives under Holmes and 
one under the Liberals). 
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In 1890, in advance of the provincial election, the Liberal government again 
introduced a “Bill to Abolish the Legislative Council” (N.S Journals, LA, April 11, 1890).  
It was passed the following day and sent to the legislative council where it was introduced 
on April 12 and referred to committee on April 14 (N.S. Debates, LC).  The committee 
concluded that the Bill was an affront to the rights and privileges of the upper house, as any 
change to the council should originate in the council (ibid., April 15, 1890).  It was deferred 
for three months, which meant that it died when the election was called. 
The following election was in 1894.  In advance, the government appointed three 
new councillors.  Before they could take their seats in the chamber, the leader of the 
government was asked if they had signed pledges as to how they would vote on abolition, 
but the government refused to answer, though it had asserted such in the lower chamber  
since 1884 (N.S. Debates, LC, January 24, 1894).  The matter was referred to the council’s 
committee on privileges.  A legal opinion from two respected jurists, Benjamin Russell and 
R.L. Borden, the latter of whom would go on to be prime minister of Canada, was obtained.  
The legal counsels recommended that in the absence of evidence of the existence of such 
pledges the members should be admitted and given their seats in the chamber.  They went 
on to write: 
“that the giving and taking of a pledge by which a member of the legislative 
council becomes bound to the political leader for the time being to vote for 
or against a particular measure is wholly unconstitutional” (N.S. Journals, 
LC, January 26, 1894).274   
Citing Edmund Burke’s views on representation and May’s Constitutional History of 
England, they note that the matter of extracting pledges from candidates is outside of the 
British constitution and, even if made, are not binding on the person if elected to the British 
house of commons.  If a pledge to constituents is unconstitutional then a fortiori, a pledge 
to a minister of the day, who a councillor in no way represents in the legislature, must be a 
“violation of the order and tenor of the constitution” (ibid.).  The government is free to 
appoint people who might be like minded on an issue, but it may not obtain a pledge on 
                                                 
274 R.C. Weldon, dean of the law school at Dalhousie University, gave his concurrence to this opinion. 
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how a councillor will vote on a particular piece of legislation.  Again citing May, they 
write:  
“Parliament is a deliberative body.  The appointee to the legislative council 
‘must enter the legislature a free agent, to assist in its deliberations’ not 
merely to register a decree determined upon in advance of all deliberation, 
‘and to form his own judgement’, after debate and conference with his 
associates ‘upon all public matters’” (ibid.).275 
This opinion was presented to the dean of law at Dalhousie University, R.C. Weldon, who 
gave his written concurrence.  The committee passed these opinions onto the upper house 
and recommended unanimously that no Bill to abolish the legislative council be allowed to 
be introduced into the upper chamber until the government gave assurances that it did not 
feel any member was bound by any pledge or undertaking.  The government subsequently 
acknowledged that it had received the same pledges from the ten appointees it had made 
and promised to release all correspondence.  A vote on the committee report was postponed 
at the government’s request. 
The government then introduced a “Bill to Abolish the Legislative Council” in the 
upper chamber (N.S. Journals, LC, January 27, 1894).  Copies of correspondence between 
all Liberal appointees to the upper chamber was tabled in both chambers, showing that the 
government had in fact obtained pledges from each councillor to vote for any government 
Bill for abolition and, in the one case where a councillor refused to pledge in advance how 
he might vote on an issue placed before the chamber, he had given his commitment to 
resign his seat if he could not, in good conscience, vote for such a government Bill (N.S. 
Journals, LA, January 29, 1894).276 
In moving the Bill for abolition in the upper chamber, the leader of the government 
said he had no intention of making a lengthy argument in support of the Bill, his “purpose 
                                                 
275 Thomas Erskin May was a constitutional lawyer and clerk of the British house of commons.  To this day, 
Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament; original title: A 
Treatise upon the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament is the principle parliamentary 
authority, or parliamentary rule book, for the parliament in the United Kingdom and countries like Canada 
that adopted the Westminster-model under its unwritten constitutional conventions. 
276 When the Conservative leader was challenged to release copies of his pledges or disclose how the 
commitments they claimed to have from their appointees had been obtained, he declined on the grounds that 
these were privileged and only the government can release cabinet documents. 
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mainly in moving the bill was simply to carry out the well-known policy of the 
government” and even acknowledged the good work done by the council (Murray, N.S. 
Journals, LC, January 30, 1894).  Other councillors expressed surprise that the minister had 
not given a defence of the Bill or an explanation of why it was suddenly urgent (e.g., Baker, 
ibid.).  And it was again noted that this had not been a political issue in any election 
(LeBlanc, ibid.).  The bill was deferred in the council for three months (ibid.). 
In the lower chamber, at the government’s suggestion a committee was struck to 
prepare a new address to the queen (N.S. Journals, LA, February 8, 1894).  The address, 
adopted on February 9th, recounts the long history of attempts at abolition, cites the 
agreement of the premiers with respect to constitutional amendments and asks the queen to 
put before the British parliament an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867 to permit the 
governor general to abolish the legislative council of Nova Scotia following an address by 
the assembly adopted by two-thirds vote.277  The address included copies of the 
correspondence with Liberal councillors and stated that the Conservative’s appointees had 
all made similar commitments.  Providing mutual cover to each political party going into 
the election, the address notes that: “the question of abolition of the Legislative Council has 
not assumed a party form, the political opponents of the present government being as active 
and outspoken in their advocacy of abolition as are the members and supporters of the 
Administration in the Assembly” (N.S. Journals, LA, 1894, app.17). 
As before, the legislative council adopted its own address in reply (N.S. Journals, 
LC, 1894).  It cited the important work it had done in revising legislation, and pointed to 
the salaries paid to members of the lower chamber and to cabinet ministers as offering 
much greater savings if the province were serious about costs.  And it noted that the 
premiers’ conference, where a change to the Constitution Act, 1867 had been proposed, was 
a meeting between leaders of the same political party, the Liberals, and that this party had 
                                                 
277 In other words, it asked the queen to have the British parliament make the changes to the Canadian 
constitution agreed to by the premiers at Quebec City, but not adopted by the provincial legislatures or the 
Canadian parliament 
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put its constitutional reform ideas before the people of Canada during the federal elections 
of 1887 and 1891 and the party had been defeated.278 
The cabinet adopted a minute responding to the legislative council (N.S. Minutes, 
EC, February 24, 1894).  Interestingly the government missive acknowledges the work of 
the legislative council in reviewing and improving legislation, but suggests that the lower 
chamber would take more care in drafting bills if it knew there was not a second chamber 
to catch its mistakes.  The Canadian government took no position in passing all these 
addresses on to London on the grounds that it was outside of its jurisdictional competence, 
though it attested to the facts in both chamber’s documents with one qualification (Canada 
Minutes, PC, October 8, 1894).  With respect to the legislative council’s reference to the 
premiers’ conference, it confirmed they were all affiliated with the federal Liberal Party but 
says the resolutions did not figure prominently in the party platform or subsequent federal 
elections.   The response of the British government was “that as the Province has the power 
to alter its constitution if it sees fit to do so, a resort to Imperial legislation would be 
inexpedient except in circumstances of urgent necessity” (Despatch from Ripon to 
Aberdeen, December 3, 1894).  This despatch was received two years later, when George 
Murray had succeeded Fielding as Liberal leader and premier. 
In 1897, in advance of the next election, the Conservative opposition introduced a 
motion committing the lower chamber to deal with legislation to abolish the council, and to 
pay the councillors a retirement allowance equal to three years’ salary, which was defeated 
(N.S. Journals, LA, February 9, 1897).  The Liberal government then introduced its own 
Bill for abolition of the chamber on February 18, and this was adopted by the assembly the 
following day (ibid.).  Again, in anticipation of the 1901 election, the Liberal government 
moved to introduce a Bill to abolish the upper chamber in that chamber (N.S. Journals, LC, 
1901).  The Liberals in the council would not allow the Bill to be introduced until they got 
                                                 
278 An amendment to this address was proposed, which would have committed the council to passing a Bill in 
favour of its abolition with the proviso that it not come into effect unless approved by the people voting in a 
referendum, but this proposal was defeated by the council. 
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assurances that the government did not consider any pledge by a councillor to vote for 
abolition as binding. 
The first socialist member of a maritime legislature was elected in 1911, Alex 
McKinnon.  He was elected from Cape Breton.  The socialist party of Canada had a notable 
following in this area, particularly among coal miners (Baldwin et Shell 2001; Frank et 
Reilly 1979).  The United Mine Workers of America, which shared executive officers with 
the SPC under the leadership of J.B. McLachlan, had ‘set up’ shop here in 1909.  These 
developments had an impact on the debate over the upper chamber, as members in both 
parties began to consider a role for the chamber as a way to prevent a temporary rise in 
radicalism. 
In 1911, the British parliament altered the powers of the house of lords, to reduce its 
veto to one of temporary delay (Parliament Act, 1911).  Money Bills it could delay for only 
one month provided the Bill was sent to the house of lords at least one month prior to the 
end of the session.  The ‘suspensive veto’ on all other Bills was for two years, but if at that 
time a Bill passed a second time by the house of commons in the same form, it would 
become law.  Not surprisingly this idea found followers in the Nova Scotia legislature.  In 
1916, Conservative W.L. Hall introduced a Bill to transition to a suspensive veto, in the 
hopes that it would then be possible to abolish the council through subsequent legislation.  
It was defeated.  In 1917, Liberal R.M. MacGregor introduced a private member Bill that 
would have limited the council’s veto to two years with the same Bill becoming law if 
passed by three consecutive sessions of the legislature.  The purpose of this Bill was 
genuine reform, but as he was a minister and the Liberal government had not yet adopted 
this as its policy, this Bill was withdrawn.279  In the next legislature, the assembly passed a 
resolution calling for reform of the upper chamber, and then struck a conference committee 
to work with the legislative council on possible changes (N.S. Debates, LA, 1922).  While 
the councillors on the conference committee rejected discussion of abolition, alternative 
                                                 
279 MacGregor was a cabinet minister and while he introduced this as a private member, proceeding with the 
Bill would have been embarrassing for the government.  Under current parliamentary rules, federal ministers 
are not allowed to introduce private members bills. 
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reforms such as making the council elected were raised.  The committee was re-struck in 
1923, but no concrete proposals were advanced by either chamber. 
Earnest Armstrong took over as Liberal Party leader in 1923, after 39 years of 
Liberal rule in the province.  In this parliament the United Farmers and the Labour parties 
had emerged onto the scene and formed the official opposition.  While the Conservatives 
had been reduced to three seats in the 1920 election, it was apparent that the political wind 
was shifting in the province, due to an economic downturn and labour unrest in Cape 
Breton.  There, McLachlan, now a member of the Communist Party of Canada, had been 
organizing coal miners through the UMWA to strike (Frank et Reilly 1979).  The most 
violent strike would occur between March and June of 1925, right in the midst of the 
provincial election. 
Laying the groundwork for the 1925 election with respect to the upper chamber, the 
Conservatives introduced a Bill calling for the abolition of the council on February 25, 
1924 (Corning, N.S. Journals, LA).  After a raucous debate, the assembly split along party 
lines and voted to delay the Bill for three months’ time (ibid., April 3, 1924). The Liberals 
had emerged as defenders of the council, painting it as a bulwark against communism (N.S. 
Debates, LA, April 3, 1924). 
The Liberal government then introduced legislation to set retirement at age 70, to 
limit new council appointments to 10-year terms and to limit the council’s power to a 
suspensive veto, so that a Bill rejected by the council would become law if it were adopted 
by the lower house in three successive sessions (N.S. Journals, LA, April 6, 1925).  The 
council amended the legislation, raising the proposed retirement age to 75, exempting 
sitting councillors from the 10-year term limit and preserving their full veto for any Bill 
that would alter the constitution of the legislature, and all money Bills (N.S. Journals, LC, 
April 24, 1925).  This was passed by the council on April 27.  The assembly attempted to 
get the council to back down, but it refused to back down on its amendments (N.S. 
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Journals, LA, May 1 & 5, 1925) and the amended Bill became law on May 7, 1925.280  The 
Liberals were defeated at the polls, losing all but three seats in the assembly, with the 
Conservatives taking the remaining 40. 
In 1926, the new Conservative government of Edgar Rhodes introduced legislation 
to abolish the council (N.S. Journals, LA, February 25, 1926) and this passed the assembly 
on March 16 (ibid.).281  It was introduced in the upper chamber two days before the house 
was prorogued and the council voted to not proceed on the Bill (N.S. Journals, LC, March 
18, 1926).  Again in 1927, the government introduced its Bill to abolish the legislative 
council (N.S. Journals, LA, February 8, 1927).  The Liberals in the lower chamber tried to 
kill the Bill by having it postponed for three months, but were unsuccessful (ibid., February 
10, 1927), and the Bill passed the lower chamber on February 15.  In the upper chamber it 
was postponed for three months, again killing the legislation (N.S. Journals, LC, March 11, 
1927). 
These Bills had no more hope of passing than the abolition legislation the Liberals 
faint-heartedly introduced while they were in office.  But unlike the Liberals, the 
Conservatives had a new found partisan commitment to abolition, and they were now 
differentiated from the Liberals on the need for an upper chamber.  This time the political 
posturing was not designed to neutralize a political issue; it was designed to make it a 
wedge issue and thus create general public debate and support.  The government’s real 
plans for abolition lay in its plan to appoint additional councillors.  The government only 
made one appointment to the council, that of a cabinet minister since he was needed to 
introduce and manage government legislation and to answer questions about government 
matters in that chamber.  All other vacancies it left open, planning to fill them in one shot 
whenever there were a sufficient number to tip the scales in favour of abolition and thus 
prevent the appointees from being captured by the other councillors or swayed by the work 
of the chamber. 
                                                 
280 It is entitled: An Act to amend Chapter 2, Revised Statutes, 1923, “Of the Constitution, Powers and 
Privileges of the Houses”, legislation concerning the two chambers having been brought together in a single 
act through the consolidation of the province’s legislation. 
281 It was entitled: “An Act to abolish the Legislative council, and amending the Constitution of the Province”. 
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The government approached the federal government with a legal opinion that the 
size of the council was not set at 21, but rather was unrestricted since the queen had never 
surrendered her power of appointment in the commissions she gave to the governors, 
authorizing them to make provisional appointments.  Furthermore, councillors only served 
at pleasure so could be removed.  The lieutenant-governor would appoint 20 additional 
councillors on March 15, 1926, over and above the current councillors, to bring about 
abolition.  The law officers in the federal government responded that the province should 
seek a judicial interpretation and that, in the meantime, they advised the lieutenant-
governor not appoint a council bigger than 21 persons. 
To try to entice some or all of the councillors to resign, the provincial government 
made an offer of a ten-year pension to the life members and a five year pension to term 
councillors, an offer the council declined. 
A reference was made to the supreme court of Nova Scotia by the government on 
May 12, 1926, which was heard by the court on July 12 (S.C.N.S., Re: Legislative 
Council).  The court could not agree on answers to the questions put before it, so it pro 
forma adopted the view of the chief justice as the court’s position to allow the government 
to appeal this decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, the final 
court of appeal in this period.282  On October 18, 1927, the JCPC rendered its decision that 
while the lieutenant governor had originally been authorized to only make 21 provisional 
appointments, the queen could appoint as many as she wanted, and that when the change 
had been made in 1872 to allow for the lieutenant governor to make appointments in the 
queen’s name, he assumed her unrestricted authority, which was now exercised on the 
advice of the Nova Scotia cabinet.  What is more, tenure was at pleasure and not for life for 
those appointed prior to the introduction of the 10 year term limit, so any and all 
councillors appointed prior to 1925 could be dismissed by the government. 
                                                 
282 Three judges ruled that councillors served at pleasure, but only two said it was the lieutenant-governor`s 
pleasure (one said the pleasure of the king and one said they were life appointments), two ruled that the 
lieutenant-governor could summon more than 21and two that he could not.  Following the grant of leave to 
appeal , the government by-passed the supreme court of Canada, which the JCPC expressed disappointment 
with, and presented its case to the JCPC, with counsel for the legislative council presenting its case. 
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In light of the ruling, members of the council offered to work with the government 
but it was uninterested.  The six ten-year appointees had to be worked with, the two 
Conservative members of the council were retained and all the Liberal pre-1925 members 
were given the option of resigning or being dismissed, of which three did the former and 
six did the latter.  To represent all of the counties of Nova Scotia at the time, 14 
Conservative councillors were appointed, bringing the number of the council to 22.  The 
government wanted to ensure that no region of the island could claim to have not been 
allowed to vote on the upper chamber’s abolition, something important in a province where 
the social cleavage had a territorial dimension. 
The Bill abolishing the upper chamber was passed by the council on February 24, 
1928 and given royal assent on March 2 (N.S. Journals, LC, 1928); it came into effect on 
May 31 of that year (s.6 of the Act). 
While it had been talked about for half a century, for most of that time it had not 
been defined by the partisan cleavage, since both political parties had abolition as part of 
their platforms.  In the case of the Liberals, by posturing in support of abolition in the 
assembly in advance of each election, they intentionally neutralized the issue, thereby 
depriving it of public debate.  It was only when the partisan cleavage came to define the 
abolition issue, with the Liberals favouring the retention of the chamber with a suspensive 
veto and the Conservatives remaining committed to abolition that the public and their 
elected representatives genuinely engaged in a debate over the upper chamber, thus making 
it a partisan issue.  Each party made the changes they wanted in a very short period of time, 
with the Liberals obtaining reform in the lower chamber in one parliament, and the 
Conservative achieving abolition in the next.  While the government’s partisan motivation 
for abolition was the Liberal’s majority in the chamber, the constitutional mechanism they 
were handed by the JCPC would have allowed them to simply alter the balance of the 
chamber and make it their own.  That they still wanted abolition reflected the partisan 
divide that had emerged over the future of this chamber.   
In the first fifty years of posturing with respect to abolition, the principle defence 
advanced in support of the upper chamber was its capacity to improve legislation.  No 
  
 
336
significant argument in defence of the upper chamber was advanced with respect to the 
province’s social cleavage or on behalf of any social group.  It was only during the five 
years where both parties took different positions with respect to the upper chamber, ones 
that threatened and accomplished significant changes to the status quo, that a defence 
emerged relative to the social cleavage of the province, including that it would protect the 
province from the radicalism of the workers’ movement in Cape Breton, but this defence 
was short-lived as it was not a role that members of the chamber embraced.  Further, the 
government appointed councillors for each county of Nova Scotia so that any claim to a 
representational role could be countered by the fact that the representatives from these 
communities had voted for its demise. 
II. New Brunswick 
New Brunswick achieved abolition of its upper chamber faster than any other 
province which joined Canada with an upper chamber.  That it took until 1892 is due to the 
fact that both political parties adopted policies in favour of abolition of the upper chamber, 
thus neutralizing it as an election issue.  Further, the Liberals found some benefit to having 
the upper chamber around to vilify.  When change occurred, it did so because the 
government made the legislative council an election issue, the council having embarrassed 
the government by offering to adopt a number of decade old campaign promises which the 
government had failed to deliver.  As in Nova Scotia, the government had appointees make 
pledges to support abolition in advance of being appointed.  Being accused of not being 
serious about abolition, the Liberals were forced to use the pledges it had obtained from its 
appointees to bring about abolition in record time.  While the legislative council in this 
province had no history of representation with respect to the province’s social cleavage, the 
government found it necessary to appoint an Acadian to the chamber to vote in favour of 
abolition.  From abolition becoming a salient issue in New Brunswick politics to it coming 
into effect, it took less than two years.  No special constitutional mechanism was required, 
only party loyalty spurred on by the partisan interests of the governing party. 
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When New Brunswick joined Confederation in 1867, it had a legislative council of 
12 members.  With a restricted electoral franchise for the house of assembly, both chambers 
were composed of elites.  However, the composition of the lower chamber, which had 
already been more diverse in terms of regional representation prior to Confederation (the 
upper chamber being disproportionately centred on Fredericton), was increasingly 
becoming diverse in terms of the province’s social cleavage, the English and French divide.  
Since 1810 the three oaths had been eliminated and inflation was altering the impact of the 
property requirement for voting.  Acadians and catholics were beginning to engage with 
provincial politics, helping decide who would win the ridings in the northern half of the 
province and winning seats for members of their community in the process. 
The Confederation debate had shifted the province’s partisan cleavage away from 
government formation in the years surrounding the creation of union, but it was slowly 
returning.  In 1878, John James Fraser became premier and attorney general, his 
predecessor and colleague having resigned over the non-denominational school issue.  
Fraser called an election and one of his platform promises was the abolition of the 
legislative council.  Young (2000b) argues that this was still an era of ‘loose fish’ and not 
of political parties, but there was a government party and that was decidedly defeated at the 
polls.  To stay on as premier, Fraser reached across the province’s social cleavage that had 
been primed by the school issue and included Acadians and Irish catholics in his 
government, as well as the leader of the Anglicans who had opposed the legislation.  
In the speech from the throne in 1879, the government asked the legislature to 
consider “the propriety of amending the Constitution of the Province, by vesting the powers 
of Legislation in one Legislative Chamber” (N.B. Debates, HA, April 34, 1879).  The 
government noted that Ontario did not have an upper chamber and Manitoba had 
successfully abolished its own to reduce costs.  The Bill was subsequently introduced by 
the government (N.B. Journals, HA, March 26, 1879).  The government did not bring it 
back for a final vote in the lower chamber before the legislative session ended. 
The province’s social cleavage was between the Acadians, who populated the 
northern half of the province and the English descendants of loyalist settlers, who populated 
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the southern half.  In terms of representation along the province’s social cleavage, the 
assembly and the coalition government could claim to have a role, but the upper chamber 
could not.  No argument was advanced in this period in defence of the council with respect 
to the cleavage. 
In 1881, a Bill was again put before the legislature in the context of reducing the 
cost of governance (N.B. Synoptic Report, HA, February 18, 1881).  The arguments 
advanced against the bill were that there needed to be an upper chamber to prevent hasty 
and ill-conceived legislation, and those in favour were based around the cost, and the 
government stressed that there was no constitutional requirement to have a bicameral 
chamber (ibid., March 21, 1881).  The Bill passed the assembly 29 to 3 (N.B. Journals, 
HA, March 21, 1881).  The issue had support on both sides of the partisan cleavage that 
was forming between government and opposition.  While it passed easily in the lower 
chamber, it did not make progress through the council. 
Andrew Blair was acknowledged to be the leader of the ‘opposition’ going into the 
election of 1882.  The government appeared to win 22 of the seats in a 41 seat legislature in 
that election.  Both the government and opposition had adopted abolition of the council as 
part of their platform in that election, thus neutralizing it as an election issue.  Blair’s 
platform included a number of other specific measures to reduce the size of government 
(Young 2000a).  The premier who had faced the electorate in that election was Daniel 
Hanington, who had never faced the legislature, having been appointed on the 
recommendation of Fraser while the house was prorogued.  When Hanington did meet the 
legislature he found his support not as solid as the election returns might have led him to 
believe.  By 1883, Blair was able to cobble together the opposition to form what would 
come to be known as the Liberal Party, defeating the government on a motion of non-
confidence and forming a government that would last for 20 years. 
Throughout the following decade, both political parties, usually referred to as 
government and opposition rather than by the federal labels of Grit or Liberal and 
Conservative, included abolition in their platforms, making it a non-issue in elections.  The 
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Blair government blamed the legislative council for its failure to deliver on promises.  Yet 
it made no serious attempt to abolish the chamber. 
In October 1887, Blair and David McLellan, the provincial secretary, attended the 
premiers’ conference at Quebec City.  They returned with the resolutions agreed to at the 
conference, including the resolution asking for an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867 
so that provincial legislative councils could be abolished by a two-third vote in the lower 
chamber on an ‘address to the queen’ requesting its abolition.  The bulk of the resolutions 
concerned provincial rights and an increased subsidy from the federal government.283  The 
legislative council refused to pass the resolutions. 
The legislative council used a government supply Bill to issue a financial report 
that, if adopted, would have put in place most of the financial changes Blair had proposed 
in the election of 1882, with the one exception being its own abolition.  Blair appointed two 
legislative councillors to avoid the embarrassment of having to vote against his own 
election agenda and obtained his original supply Bill.  He then called a snap election in 
1889.284 
The opposition accused the Blair government of simply failing to deliver on its 
promises irrespective of the council, and accused the government of being insincere about 
abolition.  Blair’s Liberals were suffering from internal divisions and the election was not 
decided at the polls but rather in post-election machinations.  By making the issue of the 
legislative council interfering in money Bills a major issue in the election, Blair had barely 
hung onto power.  But having made it an issue, the government could no longer sit on its 
hands and blame the council for its shortcomings.  It had to act. 
In the speech from the throne opening the session of 1891, the government 
announced its determination to proceed with abolition of the legislative council.  As the 
lieutenant governor informed the two chambers: 
                                                 
283 Blair did not introduce the resolution in favour of reciprocity, saying that it had not been formally adopted 
by the premiers, though he told the chamber that he supported this policy.  That would be central to the party 
platform of the federal Liberal Party. 
284 The previous election had been 1892, with the tradition in this era that elections would occur every four 
years, governments formed from within the legislature when a government lost the confidence of the lower 
chamber in between elections. 
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“It is believed by my government that the time had now arrived when 
decisive action may be taken towards amending the constitution of the 
province, and vesting the legislative functions now existing co-ordinately in 
the two branches, exclusively in the elective branch” (N.B. Synoptic Report, 
HA, March 12, 1891). 
The government argued that the people had been expecting it to act on the matter which had 
been before the legislature for over a decade, that being the upper chamber had too 
frequently defeated legislation which passed the lower house and that the money spent on 
the chamber could be better spent on public services (Colter, ibid.). 
The opposition repeatedly accused the government of not being serious about 
abolition, having appointed new legislative councillors, but committed if the government 
were serious to lend its support (Atkinson, Alward and McKeown, ibid.).  The opposition 
also tried to make the government’s failure to appoint Olivier J. LeBlanc, a government 
minister and representative of the Acadian community in the cabinet, to the council in its 
latest appointments an issue.  LeBlanc had resigned in 1891, and ran unsuccessfully for the 
house of commons on behalf of the Liberals. 
After letting the opposition repeatedly accuse the government of insincerity and 
attack its decision to appoint councillors, the premier disclosed that when he had appointed 
councillors he had asked them each to make the following pledge: 
“Having been notified that the government has it in contemplation to ask my 
acceptance of a seat in the legislative council and to appoint me thereto at an 
early day, I beg to assure you that in case my appointment shall take place I 
will accept the same upon the understanding that I will at all times vote for 
any measure or measures introduced and promoted by the government for 
the purpose of bringing about the abolition of the council, and I hereby 
pledge myself accordingly” (ibid., 1891). 
As noted in the previous section, this idea of extracting pledges from councillors first 
emerged in Nova Scotia and was shared in 1881 at an intergovernmental meeting of Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick and then subsequently discussed when all the provincial 
premiers met in Quebec City in 1887.  In Nova Scotia, Liberal premiers had extracted the 
pledges without intending that they be followed, and it is possible this was Blair’s intention 
as well.  After all, a private member’s Bill in support of abolition the year before had been 
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defeated in the upper chamber and two government members there voted against its 
introduction.  Certainly this is what the opposition accused the government of during the 
debate. 
The government took the greatest umbrage with the opposition trying to make the 
Acadians part of the debate over the council.  It responded by appointing LeBlanc to the 
upper chamber.  LeBlanc would vote in favour of abolition. 
The government Bill introduced that year passed the lower house and was sent to 
the council (N.B. Journals, HA, April 10, 1891).  Councillors, including members 
appointed by the government, amended the Bill to put off abolition to 1894 or at the next 
provincial election.  This led to renewed accusations by the opposition that the pledges 
were a sham and did not reflect a firm commitment on the part of the government for its 
abolition.  The government denied this, using its majority to accept the amendments (N.B. 
Synoptic Report, HA, April 16, 1891).  An Act relating to the Legislative Council was given 
royal assent that same day.  Blair called a general election on September 28, 1892 and the 
legislative council ceased to exist. 
The reason it took a decade from the first Bill to abolish until it was finally 
accomplished reflects the lack of salience on this issue as both political parties endorsed the 
abolition movement thereby removing it from election debate.  Once the government made 
the legislative council an election issue in 1889, it created momentum for this issue.  
Abolition was achieved in a very short period of time.  The province’s social cleavage was 
not a serious factor in its abolition as the upper chamber had no representation function 
with respect to the French-English cleavage, while the lower chamber and the government 
did.  Yet the government still found it necessary to appoint an Acadian to the chamber to 
secure passage of its legislation.  He took his seat in the chamber on the day the abolition 
Bill came up for vote in the council, and it passed. 
III. Prince Edward Island 
Prince Edward Island is an interesting case because its upper chamber was elected 
and had a specific representational role, that of representing property owners.  Property 
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ownership was the dominant social cleavage in the province when it joined Confederation 
in 1873.  The upper chamber would resist abolition until 1963, with the last remnants of 
bicameralism disappearing only in 1996.  Given the small island population, reducing the 
cost of the legislature was a significant issue and the two political parties came to differ 
over policy with respect to the council.  While the institution was able to resist abolition for 
so long, there were, however, three specific and limited institutional changes and each 
change was tied to a shift in the social cleavage at the time: 
• From Confederation until 1893, the councillors and the property owners refused to 
support abolition.  While the Conservatives favoured abolition, when the Liberals came 
to power, they reduced the size of both chambers and merged them, with councillors 
still elected using the property qualification.  While it marks the end of bicameralism, 
this was not abolition, as both assemblymen and councillors continued to be elected, the 
former by universal male suffrage and the latter by property owners as before. 
• In 1963, the property qualification was eliminated, again by a new Liberal government.  
By then, property ownership was no longer the dominant cleavage in the province, 
which was now catholic-protestant.  As the province was evenly divided between the 
two groups, and there were two representatives elected in each riding – an assemblyman 
and a councillor – the practice had emerged where the political parties ran catholic 
against catholic and protestant against protestant.  While the property qualification was 
eliminated, the distinction between assemblyman and councillor was maintained so as 
to permit this practice to continue.  As this was an informal arrangement and the role of 
councillor had been to represent property owners, this was the abolition of the upper 
chamber. 
• By 1996, the changing demographics of the province and a decline in religiosity had led 
parties to stop the practice of using the councillor and assemblyman positions to 
provide religious balance.  So the province changed the electoral law to move from 
dual- to single- member constituencies, eliminating the title councillor in the process. 
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It is the shifts in the social cleavage that made change possible; just as it was resistance 
from one side of the social cleavage that prevented abolition for so long in the face of a 
desperate fiscal situation. 
In switching to an elected upper house in 1862, the upper chamber had been made 
half the size of the lower chamber.  The council had six dual member districts (two 
councillors elected in each county) plus an additional councillor from Charlottetown, while 
the assembly had 15 dual member districts.  The property qualification to vote for a 
councillor was $325 of property, whereas to vote for an assemblyman one need only be a 
male of 21 years of age and resident in the riding for at least 12 months.  There was a 
modest property qualification of owning or occupying property worth 40 shillings. 285  
Voters could cast a ballot in more than one riding, provided they met the property 
qualification.  Councillors were elected for eight year terms, half every four years, while 
assemblymen were elected in general elections called by the government of the day at 
intervals of usually four years. 
To serve in the council one had to be at least 30 years of age, but to serve in the 
assembly one needed to be at least 21 years of age and have $162.22 worth of property in 
the riding which he represented.  The property qualification for assemblymen had been set 
in 1856, when the currency was in pounds sterling (£50 at the time), so this amounts 
reflects simply the currency conversion.  While the intention was to have a higher property 
qualification for councillors, the decision not to have a property qualification in the law 
adopted in 1862 was at the suggestion of the British colonial secretary, who advised the 
provincial government and legislature that it was better to impose a property qualification 
on the voters than on the candidates.286 
                                                 
285 This was the equivalent of universal male suffrage and was the least restrictive voting franchise in Canada 
at the time (Massicotte et al. 2007) .   
286 This lack of a property qualification to serve in the council, and the more partisan nature of this body, are 
the reason John A. Macdonald and the Canadian delegation did not offer to appoint senators from this 
chamber (if it had entered Confederation at 1867). 
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The property requirement to vote preserved the social cleavage in Prince Edward 
Island that the earlier council configuration had been designed to reflect, with the 
propertied class and tenants each having a chamber to represent their interests.  This made 
abolition of the upper chamber nearly impossible. 
The issue of ‘absentee landlords’ was settled upon entering Confederation.  First, 
the federal government provided money with which the province could acquire land.  
Second, the Land Purchase Act, 1875 was adopted to allow tenants to purchase their 
property.287  Third, it transferred the British powers of disallowance and reservation to the 
Canadian government, so these absentee land owners lost their capacity to block local 
legislation from overseas.288 
The change in land ownership had an interesting effect on the province’s social 
cleavage.  While it removed the influence of overseas landlords, it swelled the ranks of 
people who could meet the property qualification.  This new propertied class was even 
more militant in their desire to protect the upper chamber as a defender of their interests. 
Like all small provinces at the time, where provincial budgets were limited in size 
due to the inability to levy indirect tax, Prince Edward Island could not carry the cost of so 
many legislators and of having two chambers which doubled the cost in terms of services, 
printing and administration. 
The Liberal-Conservative Party defeated the coalition government of Louis Henry 
Davis on a motion of non-confidence in 1879.  During the election, the leader of the 
                                                 
287 It required owners of estates 500 acres or more to sell their land to the government at prices determined by 
a three-person commission.  Owners who lived on their estates were entitled to retain up to 1,000 acres.  This 
law had originally been adopted in 1874 and had been reserved, as with previous legislation, for approval by 
the colonial office. 
288 The Land Purchase Act had previously been passed by the legislature in 1874, but following earlier 
precedent from when Prince Edward Island was under British control, all Bills relating to the land question 
were reserved by the lieutenant governor for the parent government’s approval.  So in this instance it was sent 
to the Canadian Governor General, Lord Dufferin, an Irish landlord, who found the legislation ‘monstrous’ 
and rejected it without even consulting the Canadian cabinet.  The new Act had one small change that made it 
acceptable to the governor general in that the chair of the commission would be chosen by the Governor 
General-in-Council (McCallum 1981).  The other two commissioners were chosen, one by the landlords and 
one by the provincial government (from a list approved by the legislature). 
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Liberal-Conservative party, William Wilfred Sullivan, had promised to cut government 
expenses and to press for the settlement of the province’s claim for increased federal 
funding as a means of balancing the budget while eliminating direct taxation.  The promise 
of eliminating taxes resulted in him winning 24 of the 30 seats in the lower chamber 
(MacBeath 2000).  Part of his promised government cuts was the abolition of the upper 
chamber, though in his election material he vowed that “ample protection would be given 
to rights of property-holders” in the new unicameral assembly (Yeo, P.E.I. Debates, HA, 
March 17, 1880). 
On summoning the legislature, the government announced its intention to proceed 
with the abolition of the upper chamber.  It then introduced a Bill that would have 
abolished the council, and raised the property qualification for assemblymen to $600 and 
the residency requirement for voters to five years (P.E.I. Journals, LA, 1979).  For its part, 
the legislative council proposed its own legislation that would have reduced the size of each 
legislature by half and combine them in a single legislative assembly, with seven 
councillors elected using the existing council districts and 15 assemblymen elected using its 
existing districts (P.E.I. Journals, LC, 1979). 
In the speech from the throne in 1880, the government informed both chambers that 
it would proceed with: “A measure for lessening the expense of Legislation by the abolition 
of the Legislative Council” (P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 4, 1880).  On March 12, the 
government re-introduced its Bill.  In introducing the legislation, the premier rejected the 
council proposal of combining the chambers, and argued that the savings of $6,000 per year 
was sufficient reason to abolish the upper house.  He noted that after all the public meetings 
convened by property owners, there had not been a single petition submitted in support of 
the council (Sullivan, P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 12, 1880).  It was additionally argued that 
if the cost of elections were factored in, the savings brought about by abolition would be 
closer to $8,000 a year (Perry, ibid.).  The opposition countered that the public had been 
quite emphatic at its public meetings that the property owners should not lose their 
representation and argued that the lack of petitions was a reflection of the people’s 
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confidence in the council to protect the existing constitution and defeat any government 
Bill, as it had the year before (Yeo, ibid.), and that there had equally been no petitions 
submitted calling for the abolition of the council (Yeo, P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 17, 
1880).  The Bill was passed by the house on April 21 and defeated in the legislative 
council. 
The following year the government introduced a Bill to ‘abolish’ both chambers and 
establish a new assembly of 22 persons, with 15 elected using the districts of the assembly 
and seven elected using the districts of the council, but with the same property 
qualifications for each (P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 4, 1881).  To be elected one would need 
property of $600 and to vote there would be a minimal property requirement and a 
residency requirement of a year.  The opposition attempted unsuccessfully to amend the 
Bill so that councillors would be elected by only property owners (P.E.I. Debates, HA, 
March 9, 1881).  Government members, however, were able to reduce the residency 
requirement to one month (P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 11, 1881).  The Bill passed the 
house, but did not pass the council.  In response, the government introduced legislation to 
force all the councillors to face the electorate at the next general election alongside 
members of the assembly (P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 28, 1881).  This was defeated in the 
council.289 
The following year, in anticipation of a provincial election, the government 
introduced a straightforward resolution in favour of the abolition of the legislative council 
which would have vested all the powers of the legislature in the assembly (P.E.I. Debates, 
HA, March 13, 1882).  Given the government majority, this resolution was adopted in the 
lower house.  It then re-introduced its Bill to establish an assembly with different districting 
but the same qualifications, which met the same fate as the previous Bills, passing the 
assembly and going on to defeat in the council. 
                                                 
289 It would have been entitled “An Act to amend an Act to change the constitution of the Legislative Council 
and by rendering the same elected”. 
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In 1886, again in anticipation of a general election (and a partial election of the 
council), the government introduced its Bill again on the pretext  it would be opportune to 
have it before the people to let them decide.  It forced the house to vote on a series of 
motions, first to go into committee of the whole to consider the merits of introducing a Bill, 
then to state that it was expedient to do so and then to strike a committee to prepare the Bill 
(P.E.I. Debates, HA, April 28, 1886).  The Bill was then introduced on May 10.  Its 
provisions were the same as its last incarnation, with the council being abolished and the 
assembly becoming the legislature but with a $600 property qualification to sit in the 
assembly.  It was adopted by the lower house as the last piece of legislation before the end 
of the session, meaning that it didn’t go on to the council (P.E.I. Debates, HA, May 13, 
1886). 
Direct taxation had been ended in 1882 with the repeal of the Assessment Act.  By 
blurring the distinction between loans and grants and capital and operating accounts, 
Sullivan was able to make the province’s finances appear better than they were (MacBeath 
2000).  But his party’s popularity was dwindling.  Seeing the writing on the wall in advance 
of the 1890 election, Sullivan left the premiership by having himself appointed chief 
justice, leaving it to his successor, Neil McLeod, to face the voters.  McLeod barely won 16 
of the 30 seats (Driscoll 2000).   
In 1890, Prince Edward Island undertook a consolidation of its statutes.  The laws 
were prepared by an independent commission.  This commission did not propose changes 
to the laws or institutions they governed.  It simply brought the laws together into a set of 
more manageable statutes.  During the assembly’s consideration of the election law, which 
was to be the Act respecting the Representation of the People, the opposition expressed its 
desire to see the two chambers amalgamated with councillors elected by property owners 
and assemblymen by universal male suffrage (P.E.I. Debates, HA, April 16, 1890).  The 
premier claimed the government had proposed just that in 1881 (McLeod, ibid.), a claim 
the opposition rejected, arguing that that “plan was to abolish the Council, pure and simple” 
(Sinclair, ibid.).  The government was able to use the fact that the opposition did not have a 
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coordinated plan in terms of the relative balance of councillors and assemblymen in such a 
chamber to prevent their proposal from proceeding. 
The next opportunity to consider the amalgamation came when the legislature 
considered An Act respecting the Legislature.  This Bill brought together the powers and 
qualifications of the respective chambers into a single piece of legislation.  Debate occurred 
over the property qualification for assemblymen and whether or not it was an unfair 
restriction, given there was no such restriction to serve as a councillor.  Arguments in 
favour of the qualification were that anyone worth their salt and eager enough to seek 
election would be able to meet the minimum requirement and that it prevented outside 
influence, particularly from Americans, who had been influencing elections in other 
provinces where candidates had been put up for election or paid money to run (P.E.I. 
Debates, HA, April 17, 1890).  In the end, the only change made by the legislature was that 
the property qualification was rounded to an even $160, instead of the $162.22. 
In March 1891, three of McLeod’s members resigned to contest the federal election 
and the Liberals won two of the ensuing by-elections.  The third was won by John 
Theophilus Jenkins, an independent Conservative at odds with his party (Driscoll 2000).  
This meant the Liberals had a majority and Frederick Peters became Premier.  
Upon joining the assembly, Jenkins moved that “the number of members of the 
House be reduced to fifteen (15), and the members of the Legislative Council be reduced to 
seven (7).  The members of both Houses to sit in one Chamber, and to act conjointly” 
(P.E.I. Debates, HA, July 11, 1891).  As this was the last day of the session, the matter 
went no further. 
In the next session, the attorney-general in the new Liberal government introduced 
the government’s plan to amalgamate the two chambers (P.E.I. Debates, HA, March 31, 
1892).  There would be 15 districts, each electing two members: one a councillor elected by 
voters who met the existing property qualification and the other an assemblyman elected by 
the wider franchise that was in place for the lower chamber.   The Conservatives, now in 
opposition, claimed that the Liberals were adopting their plan (McLeod, ibid.).  While this 
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was not true, what was true was that only the Liberals would be able to change the 
legislature because the councillors did not trust the Conservatives and would reject any 
proposal they made. 
The Bill was introduced into the legislative council on April 11 (P.E.I. Journals, 
LC).  The Council debated the Bill for four days (P.E.I. Journals, LC, April 13, 14, 18 and 
19).  The debate in the council broke down along party lines.  There were members of the 
council who had been elected under the Conservative banner and who had committed to 
abolition.  While they tried to amend the Bill and to kill it, the majority of the council voted 
for the change and it passed the council on April 28 (P.E.I. Journals, LC).290  The Bill was 
reserved by the lieutenant-governor for the federal government to pass judgement on (P.E.I. 
Journals, LC, May 5, 1892). 
In the speech from the throne of 1893, the government informed the two chambers 
that it would again have placed before them: “A measure to reduce the cost of legislation in 
this Province will be submitted for your consideration” (P.E.I. Journals, LA, March 8, 
1893).  Then at the start of the session the government tabled the federal government’s 
response to the lieutenant-governor reserving the previous legislation to combine the two 
chambers, namely that the federal government did not feel it appropriate to advise the 
governor general to offer a judgement on the law as this was entirely a provincial matter 
(ibid., March 15, 1893).  P.E.I.’s Liberal government then reintroduced its “Bill to lessen 
the cost of Legislation, by abolishing the Legislative Council of the Province, and 
providing for one Chamber, to be called the Legislative Assembly, possessing the same 
powers and authorities now vested in the Legislative Council and House of Assembly” 
(ibid). 
The new chamber established by the Act respecting the Legislature in 1893 
consisted of 15 dual member constituencies, half elected using the property qualification of 
$325 of freehold or leasehold property and half elected by men who were British citizens, 
                                                 
290 The council made some minor amendments and these had been concurred in by the lower chamber (P.E.I. 
Journals, LC, April 25, 1982). 
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having attained the minimum age of 21 and who own or occupy property in the riding 
worth $6 a year.  Property owners could vote in more than one riding if they owned 
property in that riding.   To be a candidate for either councillor or assemblyman one need 
only be at least 21 years of age and male.  Councillors would campaign against each other 
in the riding, as would assemblymen, and the winner need only get a plurality of votes.  The 
bill passed the council on April 19 (P.E.I. Journals, LC).  It received royal assent the next 
day (P.E.I. Journals, LC, April 20, 1893). 
The preamble to the Act states that the express condition for the council agreeing to 
merge with the assembly was that half of the members of the new body would be elected 
using the property qualification and that this qualification and the proportion of councillors 
cannot be changed unless agreed to by at least 2/3 of the assembly.  This institution 
remained virtually unchanged until 1963. 
In 1922, women were granted the vote and made eligible to be elected as either 
councillor or assemblyman.291  This Act kept the property qualification to vote for a 
councillor at $325 worth of property, which one needed to have held for six months.  
People, who served in the war, including aboriginals, were also entitled to vote for 
councillor.  To vote for assemblymen one needed to live in the riding for at least two 
months, in the province for at least a year, be a British subject and be 21 years of age.  
Aboriginals who lived on a reserve could not vote.  Non-residents were prohibited from 
canvassing or campaigning. 
As the 20th century proceeded, the significance of absentee landlords passed from 
voter’s memory into the island’s history.  With property ownership slowly becoming more 
common and the $325 requirement having less relevance as the value of money shifted over 
                                                 
291 Interestingly, during the years of Conservative governments, the council had proposed amending the 
voting rules for the upper chamber so that women who inherited property could vote, the criteria for voting 
simply being property ownership.  This was defeated in the assembly.  When the Liberals first brought in 
legislation to merge the two chambers, it was raised again as a possible amendment but was dropped because 
it may have had the effect of causing the legislation to fail in the lower chamber (Mackenzie, P.E.I. Debates, 
LC, April 14, 1892).  Given that Conservatives in the upper chamber had offered to support the amendment 
and voted to oppose the bill altogether, this seems a likely outcome. 
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time, the social cleavage in the island shifted from class and property to religion.  The 
province was evenly divided between catholics and protestants.  Informal arrangements had 
developed such as designating one public school as catholic and another as protestant, or 
alternating teachers between the two (Sharpe 1976).  Banks even alternated managers 
between catholic and protestant (Sellick 1973).  So relations were cordial, but the cleavage 
was pronounced. 
Due to the small population, island politics became polarized between Liberal and 
Conservative.  Third parties were shut out of elections.292  Voters were roughly evenly divided 
between Liberals and Conservatives and party identification took on an almost “religious 
significance” (MacKinnon 1978).  To not identify as either Liberal or Conservative made one a 
“political heathen” (ibid.).  Small swings in popularity would shift the legislature dramatically 
between the two parties and it was normal for the party that was several percentage points 
ahead to garner almost all of the 30 seats.  In the 19 general elections from 1893 to 1963, 10 
percent of all elected representatives owed their seats to 25 or fewer votes (Clark 1973). 
The two political parties responded to the religious cleavage by ensuring their 
candidates were on the same side of the cleavage, so protestant ran against protestant and 
catholic against catholic.  With two seats in each district, one a councillor and one an 
assemblyman, both religious groups could be evenly represented.  Strong party ID and 
competitiveness between the two parties meant that the same party would usually win both the 
councillor seat and assemblyman in a district.  Even though it had little impact on outcome, 
there was resentment over the property qualification in the era of the automobile.  Some people 
would spend all Election Day driving from riding to riding where they owned property (as 
property voters could vote in any riding where they owned property). 
In 1961, a royal commission was appointed to look at electoral reform in the 
province.293  Reporting in March of 1962, its main recommendation was that aboriginals be 
                                                 
292 From Confederation, only in one election (2000) was a third party (NDP) able to win a single seat in the 
legislature. 
293 It was appointed under the authority of The Public Inquiries Act, which is similar legislation to that 
enacted in other provinces and federally.  Historically royal commissions were appointed under the royal 
prerogative, as were judges, but the legislatures in Canada has over time codified judicial power, thus 
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given the vote, that a provincial ‘election act’ be created and an independent ‘chief electoral 
officer’ appointed (DesRoches, MacKinnon, O'Connor, Ross et Grindlay 1963).  The 
commission provided draft legislation for the legislature to enact should it wish to follow 
all of its recommendations. 
In its review of the property qualification for voting, it recounted the “extremely 
bitter turmoil” between 1773 and 1893 over the elimination of the legislative council, 
which it appropriately described as a “consolidation of upper and lower houses” (ibid. 
report, 8).  In addition to noting that this solution was the only one that was acceptable to 
the two houses in a time of financial difficulty that necessitated downsizing, it added the 
normative endorsement to the change in terms of subsequent party politics by suggesting 
that this merger prevented “the pitting of members of one party against each other which 
would have result from a four – or more – man contest, and enabling the political parties to 
arrange balanced contests from different areas, religions and occupations” (ibid.).  The four 
person contest was what existed when parties ran candidates in dual member constituencies 
for both the council and assembly.294  As an argument in favour of the existing system it 
claimed that “decades of experience lie behind the present electoral legislation” (ibid.).  It 
recommended that the property vote be retained, though noted that in presentations before 
the commission some citizens argued for its abolition. 
The one change the commission recommended was that ‘multiple voting’, where a 
person who owns property can vote in every riding in which they own property, be 
eliminated (ibid., 9).  It reported the overwhelming consensus of the province was, on this 
                                                                                                                                                    
necessitating enabling legislation for commissions.  Additionally, Canada, unlike the United Kingdom, had 
since 1867 eschewed prerogative for most offices, which is why the authority of cabinet ministers in Canada, 
particularly at the federal level, are defined by statute.  The commissioners for this inquiry were Judge J.S. 
DesRoches (chair), Frank MacKinnon, Louis O’Connor, J. Stewart Ross and R.A. Grindlay. 
294 The reference to four ‘or more’ candidates from one party refers to the reality of that era when electoral 
legislation did not designate party members and thus enable political parties to narrow the field of its 
‘approved’ candidates to persons chosen by the party, either by its elites, as was the early mechanism, or a 
structured nomination process that involves party members, as has emerged as the practice federally and 
provincially in Canada (in the United States, a party’s nominee for many elected offices must win the 
approval not of party members, but of registered voters who self-identify as loyalists to the party, though this 
varies by state). 
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one point, that this was unfair and should be abolished.  Specifically, it identified the fact 
that property values varied by county.  Furthermore, owners and their spouses could 
‘double’ ballot and thus disproportionately influence vote outcome.  While not expressed as 
such, this was clearly a reflection of the belief in this period that since women had the vote, 
their votes would be cast in support of their spouse’s vote choice, thus giving married male 
‘property owners’ two votes in contrast to their single male counterparts.  As the same party 
would usually win both the councillor spot and the assemblyman spot, there is no reason to 
believe that either being allowed to vote in multiple ridings or ‘double’ balloting was 
distorting the election count on the council side.  But there is clear evidence that 
anecdotally it was believed to be a factor and thus created resentment.  The solution, the 
commission concluded, was that property owners should vote in the constituency they 
reside and, if they did not own property in that constituency, they could opt for one specific 
constituency where they held property.  On the main aspect of its mandate, the commission  
recommended a redistribution of electoral boundaries so the population of each riding was 
more evenly distributed.295  Its proposed legislation would have raised the property 
qualification to vote for councillor to $1,000. 
The Conservative government introduced an Election Act that incorporated many of 
the commission’s recommendations, but on the property qualification it parted ways from 
the commission.  It retained the distinct title of councillor and assemblyman so that the 
religious balance in elections could be retained.  Any citizen resident in the riding the day 
the election was called, provided they had lived in the province for the preceding 12 months 
and were at least 21 years of age, could vote for both positions.296 
                                                 
295 The property qualification by this time was ownership of $1,000 of property.  The provincial legislature 
had added two additional groups into the ‘property owner’ category, those who had served in a war (as a way 
of incentivizing military service) and clergy who were in charge of a parish (as the main religions prevented 
them from owning property – and the Roman Catholic Church has long before prevented them from marrying 
– so as not to subdivide or lose church property which had been assigned to them by the crown in an era 
where religious authority and political authority were mutually reinforcing). 
296 The term ‘British subject’ was replaced by ‘citizen’ through the Canadian Citizenship Act, 1947. 
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This maintained the legislature’s practice of accommodating the new dominant 
social cleavage, while finally abolishing the remnants of the upper chamber.  While it 
simply reflects the shift in the social cleavage, it is not insignificant that it was done at the 
same time as aboriginal residents were given the vote.  Historically, aboriginals were 
denied the vote because they did not own land, the reserve land being held in trust by the 
crown for a ‘band’(now ‘nation’) to use collectively.  The federal government had also 
historically tried to get aboriginals to take individual title to the land with the offer of 
voting rights as a way of assimilating them into mainstream Canadian society.  Normative 
theory had been shifting away from property ownership as a criterion.297  What had 
emerged as the new theory permeates the debate, as evidenced by one of the speeches 
delivered in support of the Bill: 
“Democracy realizes that every individual citizen has the right to vote but it 
is not altogether the right to vote that is necessary, it is the right of every 
individual to have equal rights in voting with special privileges to none” 
(Harrington, P.E.I. Debates, LA, March 21, 1963). 
There was opposition to the change reflecting the residual belief in the duality of the 
legislature and in voter behaviour, the obligation to respect the merger of the two chambers 
and the belief that property owners required representation.  But the chamber passed the 
Bill without amendment (P.E.I. Journals, LA, April 16 & 19, 1966).  The Election Act, 
1963 was given royal assent on April 23, 1963 (P.E.I. Journals, LA). 
It would take until 1996 for the distinction between councillor and assemblyman to 
be eliminated.298  In the intervening time, the demographics of the Island shifted; the 
population grew, diversity in faiths grew and religiosity declined.  As this occurred, the 
political parties slowly phased-out the practice of having protestants run against protestants 
and catholics against catholics for the councillor and assemblyman position. 
                                                 
297 It was a slow shift.  The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Lortie Commission) 
as recently as 1922 contains detailed discussion about the connection between property ownership and the 
vote, and, in many cities across Canada, while residency is the central determinant, property owners who are 
not resident in the municipality are often entitled to vote. 
298 The minimum age for voters was lowered to 18 years of age by An Act to amend the Election Act, 1967. 
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In 1974, the legislature established an Electoral Boundaries Committee which held 
hearings on changing the electoral system.  It recommended retaining the dual member 
ridings and the titles councillor and assemblyman, not for any religious balance (as this 
practice had ceased), but so as to maintain the single member plurality voting mechanism in 
dual member ridings that were needed to elect a 30 person legislature.  The belief was that 
single member constituencies would be too small given the island’s small population and a 
smaller legislature would not be workable with so many cabinet ministers. 
The Election Act 1993 established an Electoral Boundaries Commission.  This 
commission recommended the province switch from dual member ridings to 30 single 
member districts. The government did not proceed with the recommendation at the time.  
But a private members bill was introduced the following year to move the province to 
single member districts.  The Electoral Boundaries Act, 1994 established 27 single member 
electoral districts.  The title councillor was eliminated in the process. 
While P.E.I. moved to unicameraliam in 1893, it took until 1963 for property 
owners to lose their separate representation in the council and until 1996 for the position of 
councillor to be eliminated.  These changes to the legislature in Prince Edward Island are 
all linked to shifts in the province’s social cleavage.  The Liberals and Conservatives took 
different positions with respect to abolition, making the future of the upper chamber a 
publically debated issue.  This was also a public issue since the upper chamber was elected.  
The Conservative plan for abolition was resisted by property owners.  While the council 
was merged with the assembly under the Liberals, it was only when the catholic-protestant 
cleavage replaced property as the principle social cleavage that the property qualification 
could be removed as a vote criterion.  When the religious cleavage lessened, the province 
was able to move to single member constituencies, the last province in Canada to do so.  
IV. Quebec 
The abolition of the legislative council in Quebec makes an interesting case study 
because in this province the social and the partisan cleavages each shifted so quickly in 
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such a short period of time, in what had become known as the ‘quiet revolution’.  The 
province has consistently had a very identifiable social cleavage, with a minority English 
population in a majority French province.  But this French majority is also a minority in a 
predominantly English federation. 
While representatives of the English minority in Quebec, led by Alexander Galt, 
had originally pressed for an upper chamber, this institution quickly became tied to 
Quebec’s Francophone identity.  George-Étienne Cartier, the Francophone leader in Sir 
John A. Macdonald’s federal government, strategically ‘sold’ the proposed federal-
provincial institutional configuration for the province as being the preservation of Quebec’s 
historic institutions, the protection of which had long been the rallying cry of the French 
minority in Canada in defence of its civil law, seigniorial system and Roman Catholic 
religion, each of which had been threatened by the British government and English settlers.  
With the rise of an ultramontane nationalism, which was conservative and faith-based, the 
preservation of an upper chamber was seen as an important safeguard against liberalism.  
Beginning in the 1960s, Quebec nationalism was being transformed, eschewing religion 
and traditionalism, thus eliminating its connection to so called historic institutions. 
In terms of the partisan cleavage, the internal requirements of the Westminster 
model generated a government and opposition, with the Conservatives being the initial 
government party and the Liberals in opposition.  The Liberals would be the first to try to 
abolish the upper chamber in 1878, after the Conservatives in that chamber tried to force 
the lieutenant governor to remove them from office.  Former Liberal cabinet minister 
Honoré Mercier would try again when he became premier in 1887, but he would be 
opposed by both French and English members of the assembly, including in his own party 
which had been forced by the council from office a decade earlier.  The reason for their 
lack of support for revenge against the governor and their political opponents in the upper 
chamber was that French leaders had come to see these institutions as central to 
Francophone identity in Canada.  As for the English, they saw them as institutions that 
provided a safeguard for their community as Quebec’s largest minority. 
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The Union Nationale in the 20th century would replace the Conservatives as the 
principle governing party until 1960.  The Liberals, who came to power under Jean Lesage 
that year, saw the council as an obstacle to their adoption of liberal policies and programs, 
from the creation of a state-own hydro-electric company to the establishment of the welfare 
state.  They made abolition of the upper chamber a partisan issue.  This was a period of 
great shifts in provincial politics as the federal government and constitutional change 
became dominant provincial issues.  As this happened, the Union Nationale shifted its 
position from defence of the council to reform of the council and to eventually abolition, 
quite rapidly.  In the end, any claim for this chamber as a defender of the English minority 
was dwarfed by the need for partisan gain.  A unicameral ‘national assembly’ was billed as 
the institution Quebec needed for its ongoing struggle with the federal government over 
money and jurisdiction. 
As Quebec did not exist at Confederation, the Constitution Act, 1867 established the 
new province in which the provincial powers would be exercised by a legislature composed 
of the lieutenant governor, a legislative council of 24 seats (s.71) and a legislative assembly 
of initially 65 seats (s.80).299  Legislative councillors in the upper chamber would be 
appointed by the executive council acting through the lieutenant-governor, one for each of 
24 separate divisions which corresponded to the 24 electoral divisions in Quebec prior to 
Confederation, divisions that were also being used for Quebec in the senate of Canada 
(s.72).  Legislative Councillors had to have $4,000 of property (net worth) in the district for 
which they are appointed (s.73).300  Quorum was ten, including the speaker who was 
appointed by the government (s.78). 
As noted above, Cartier had strategically sold the existence of an upper chamber for 
Quebec as central to the French identity.  The social cleavage of Quebec had long pitted 
                                                 
299 Both numerical values are significant in that they match identically the seats assigned to Quebec in the 
federal parliament.  The Confederation deal had, after all, been achieved by partisan groups overcoming the 
social cleavage of the province of Canada, which federally would come to be represented by Quebec on the 
one side and, within the administrative division of Quebec, would return to being an internal cleavage for 
provincial purposes (education, etc.) between English and French Quebecers. 
300 This is the same property qualifications as members of the Canadian senate from Quebec. 
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French against English over institutional change.  But the institution itself had been a 
compromise between the English and French in the cabinet of the Great Coalition and it 
was the English cabinet minister from Quebec, Alexander Galt, who had been most 
insistent about its configuration.  For Galt it was about ensuring English representation, and 
for Cartier it was about conservative restraint.  But the long history of French resistance to 
institutional change made it possible for Cartier to marry bicameral institutions to 
Francophone identity, something that would be seen in the debates over its abolition up 
until the 1960s. 
Quebec began Confederation with a strong governing party organized through 
Cartier’s wing of the Liberal-Conservative Party.  For Quebec, the Conservatives had free 
reign in government formation and in appointments to the upper chamber.301  The province 
of Canada was still in place until the new Constitution Act, 1867 was proclaimed, so  
Joseph Édouard Cauchon was tasked with taking over as premier of Canada East in 1866 
and forming a government that would then become the first government of Quebec to face 
the electorate (Désilets 2000a).  The issue of legislation to give autonomy to minority 
communities so they could organize their own school boards in each half of the province 
was his undoing.  Realizing he was suddenly unpopular among English protestants in 
Canada East, and unable to find an Anglophone in the legislature to be part of his cabinet in 
the new province, he relinquished the position to Pierre-Joseph-Olivier Chauveau, who 
became Quebec’s first premier (Hamelin et Poulin 2000). 
The Conservatives were able to govern Quebec until 1878, with the last premier 
being Charles Boucher de Boucherville.  Boucher found himself at odds with Lieutenant 
Governor Luc Letellier de St-Just, who had been appointed by the Liberal government in 
Ottawa, and Boucher kept matters from him fearing he would disclose them to his 
opponents in the legislature (Rumilly 2000).  While this caused tension between the two, it 
                                                 
301 Macdonald had committed to working with the opposition to ensure a balance in appointments, but when it 
came to Quebec, the Liberals had very little following and years of Conservative governments had led to half 
of the province of Canada’s legislature being predominantly Conservative, and quite cohesive for the politics 
of the time. 
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was when Boucher issued proclamations in the lieutenant-governor’s name, without 
consulting or showing them to him, that Letellier dismissed the premier (Munro 2000). 
The lieutenant-governor called on the Liberal leader, Henri-Gustave Joly de 
Lotbinière, to form a government, which he did, even though the legislature was decidedly 
Conservative (that party had a 20-seat majority).  Both chambers of the legislature passed 
resolutions condemning the lieutenant-governor’s actions.  Even in Ottawa, Prime Minister 
Alexander Mackenzie, and his Quebec lieutenant Wilfred Laurier, were taken by surprise 
and thus condemned his actions (Rumilly 2000).302  Joly dissolved the legislature so his 
government could face the electorate. 
The Conservative firebrand Joseph-Adolphe Chapleau opened that campaign with 
the rallying cry: “Silence the voice of Spencer Wood and let the mighty voice of the people 
speak”, referring to the lieutenant governor’s official residence at Spencer Wood (ibid.).  
But more substantive issues such as the construction of rail lines were of greater interest to 
the voters and, in the end, they elected a divided legislature (Hamelin 2000).  This left Joly 
in power, and he included in his cabinet a young Honoré Mercier, who was a dynamic 
speaker and could effectively counter the rhetorical skills of Chapleau. 
The constitutionality of the governor’s behaviour would plague the government.  
While Joly claimed that the electorate had already pronounced on the matter, the 
Conservatives in the upper chamber refused to grant supply unless the lieutenant-governor 
would agree to remove the government it claimed was illegitimate.  At the time, the 
Conservatives had a 2 to 1 majority in the legislative council.  Joly responded by having his 
government introduce “un bill pour modifier la constitution de la Législature de cette 
Province en ce qui concerne le Conseil Législatif” (Québec Journaux, AL, 19 Juin, 1878).  
                                                 
302 The practice prior to Confederation was that when a ministry was defeated, the lieutenant-governor would 
ask another member of the party which seemed to have the majority, often a member of the cabinet who was 
not directly implicated in the issue on which the ministry was defeated, to try to put together a new ministry 
and then face the chamber.  In the modern era, where there are political parties, the governor (like the queen) 
removes himself from all decision-making, so they simply turn to the leader of the opposition, who is the 
leader of the party with the next greatest number of seats in the chamber.  This was an era of transition where 
party politics were emerging so it is perhaps not surprising that the conventions surrounding the governor’s 
decision making choices were unclear.  They are still unclear today (Hicks 2009a) 
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This Bill to abolish the legislative council was adopted by the lower chamber, 31 to 29 
(ibid., 47 Juillet, 1878).  It went nowhere in the upper chamber. 
As for the lieutenant-governor, when the Conservative government returned to 
power in Ottawa, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald came under pressure from the 
provincial Conservatives to fire Letellier.303  Cartier had died in 1873 and Hector-Louis 
Langevin had replaced him as Quebec lieutenant.  Macdonald sent Langevin to London to 
get a ruling on what the federal government could do and whether or not Latellier’s actions 
had been legal.304  Upon his return, the decision of the law officers that the lieutenant-
governor had acted constitutionally, but equally the governor general of Canada had the 
authority to remove him (and had to do so if advised by his ministers), in hand, Macdonald 
then removed Lettellier from office and appointed long-time Conservative, Théodore 
Robitaille, as lieutenant governor in July of 1879.305  With a new governor in place, the 
legislative council again blocked supply at Chapleau’s urging.  While the Liberals were 
busy trying to drum up public support against the council, the Conservatives quietly 
siphoned off some of their members in the lower house and, when they had a majority in 
the assembly, the new lieutenant governor dismissed Joly and called on Chapleau to form a 
government. 
Chapleau entered into talks with Mercier, hoping he could attract the Liberal into a 
coalition government and heal some of the political wounds that had been opened through 
the use of the legislative council and the lieutenant-governor for partisan purposes.  One of 
the conditions for Mercier to join the government became the abolition of the legislative 
                                                 
303 Chapleau who had campaigned against the lieutenant-governor’s interference which he called a coup d’état 
was convinced that the best way back to power was to get their own man in the governor’s residence and have 
him do the same, telling members of the Conservative government in Ottawa: “At this moment Spencer Wood 
is a real barometer.  If the old man goes out, it’s fine weather, if he stays in, it’s bad!  And to think that it’s 
you in Ottawa who control the climate”(Désilets 2000d). 
304 Langevin was not as adept at handling the block of federal politicians from Quebec known as ‘Club 
Cartier’ and out of his league with the new ones rising to prominence in provincial politics (Désilets 2000c).  
Macdonald became increasingly frustrated as pressure in Quebec mounted, including a threat by his own 
Quebec ministers of resignation.   
305 He retired, financially ruined and physically broken, having suffered a heart attack during the controversy.  
He died in 1881. 
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council.  When the ‘ultramontanes’ learned of the talks, they forced Chapleau to break off 
talks and to govern with only the Conservatives. 
The term ultramontanes has its origin in Europe where conservative forces in the 
early 19th century looked ‘beyond the mountains’ to the papacy for leadership in their fight 
against the new ideas emerging in the wake of the French Revolution.  In Quebec, since the 
1840s, the Quebec Catholic Church had re-engaged with the Church in Rome and was 
being influenced by the Syllabus of Errors issued by Pope Pious IX in reaction to the 
enlightenment.  It was anti-modernist and anti-democratic.  For the ultramontanes, 
preservation of the provincial upper house was an essential bulwark against North 
American liberalism. 
Provincial politics was changing through this rise in nationalism.  This was rooted 
in catholic religion’s fight against the growing secularism of society, and ‘clerico-
nationalisme’ was seeing an active entry into legislative politics.  Due to this activism on 
the French side of the social cleavage, it was getting increasingly hard for premiers to 
recruit Anglophone leaders into their ministries to bridge the social divide, making politics 
in the assembly all the more volatile and alliances temporary. 
It was in this climate that Louis Riel was hanged in 1885, having tried to recreate 
his Manitoba rebellion in Saskatchewan on behalf of their Métis.  This caused 
reverberations throughout Quebec, on both sides of the social cleavage, with the 
Francophone leaders using inflamed rhetoric to achieve short-term partisan goals and 
forcing Anglophone leaders to retreat from co-operation.  One such Francophone leader 
was Honoré Mercier, who used the opportunity to create the Parti nationale, by uniting 
moderate Francophone Conservatives and Francophone Liberals, and using this new 
electoral vehicle to ride popular outrage into office in 1887. 
Committed to abolishing the upper chamber, in 1890, the government introduced: 
“un bill modifiant la constitution de la Législature de cette province, en ce qui a rapport au 
Conseil législatif” (Québec Journaux, AL, 4 décembre, 1890).  At second reading, the 
government argued that Ontario had abolished its upper chamber at Confederation, that the 
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council cost taxpayers $66,000 per year and that the upper chamber represented no 
constituency that required representation, unlike the house of lords in England, and that it 
was simply an artefact of history (Rochon, Québec Débats, AL, 11 décembre, 1890).  The 
premier’s true reason for wanting it abolished was its machinations on behalf of Chapleau 
in 1879, saying: “La conspiration ourdie à Spencer-Wood a triomphé dans la Chambre 
haute”.  Toute le monde sait parfaitement bien que le jour ou la Chambre haute refusait les 
subsides à Sa Majesté, elle était avisée par le représentant de Sa Majesté” (Mercier, ibid.).  
The abolition movement had little resonance in the lower chamber with either the English 
representatives or the ultramontanes.  Mercier had to accept its lack of support and agree to 
table his own legislation after only a short debate (Québec Journaux, AL, 11 décembre, 
1890). 
The increased importance placed on social identity had deepened the social cleavage 
in the province to such a degree that Mercier could not even get the support of his own 
partisans in the legislative assembly, including some who had voted in favour of abolition 
in ’78. 
This marrying of culture and religion created a strong social identity, and it would 
remain entwined with Quebec partisan politics until the quiet revolution.  As a result, there 
was no great friction between the upper chamber and the government when the Union 
Nationale replaced the Conservatives as the government, even though this party did not 
have any formal members in the upper chamber.306  The same was not true for the Liberal 
Party which was starting to embrace a secular agenda of reform. 
The Liberals came again to power in 1897, under the premiership of Félix-Gabriel 
Marchand.  Marchand was successful implementing most of his platform, particularly his 
promise to tighten provincial purse strings, but where he stumbled was in the area of 
education reform (Brassard et Hamelin 2000).  Due to a negative reaction to his platform 
                                                 
306 A bill proposing a luxury tax was defeated under Premier Maurice Duplessis of the Union Nationale in 
May 1945.  It is rumoured that Duplessis was actually pleased by the defeat, because it was an unpopular 
measure that had been pressured on him by his party and cabinet colleagues (Bonenfant 1968).  Regardless, 
there were no initiatives to change the upper chamber until 1965. 
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from the church, Marchand lessened his ambition and introduced a Bill with the goal of 
improving education through better teacher training and a system of school inspections, 
standardized textbooks and a reduction in tuition fees through government subsidy to 
common schools. This was still seen as a threat by the ultramontane bishops.  Marchand got 
his Bill passed in the assembly (Quebec Journals, LA, January 5, 1898).  The archbishop of 
Montreal, Paul Bruchési, gave the legislative councillor Thomas Chapais the task of 
blocking the Bill in the upper chamber.  Which he successfully did (Quebec Journals, LC, 
January 10, 1898).307 
Marchand responded by introducing a “Bill to amend the constitution of the Quebec 
legislature in so far as the Legislative Council is concerned” (Quebec Journals, LA, March 
13, 1900).  In a variation on the argument that an appointed upper chamber in Canada, 
unlike in the United Kingdom, does not have philosophical underpinnings in terms of 
representing a unique constituency, the government argued that the composition of the 
chamber in terms of the type of man who was currently ensconced was identical to those 
who were sitting in the lower chamber (Robidoux, Québec Débats, 9 mars, 1900).  The 
government did not feel the party that had lost the election should be able to stop its 
legislation.  The Bill passed the lower chamber, 30 to 14 (Quebec Journals, LA, March 16, 
1900).  It was defeated in the legislative council. 
But Quebec was changing through a rejection of “les trois dominantes de la pensée 
canadienne-française: l’agriculturisme, le messianisme et l’anti-étatisme” (Brunet 1957).  
Since the newspaper Le Canadien had been established in Lower Canada proclaiming as its 
objective the protection of ‘notre foi, notre langue, nos institutions’, these three pillars had 
been at the centre of Quebec’s identity.  Even in advance of the quiet revolution, 
institutions of the past were starting to be abandoned and the faith of catholicism discarded, 
leaving language as the central marker of French group identity. 
                                                 
307 Marchand had to settle for a simply codification of the existing school laws, which he introduced two days 
later. 
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Jean Lesage and the Liberal party came to power in 1960.  This was an era where 
democratisation and equality, standard of living and a social safety net, accessibility to 
education and state intervention in the economy, were emerging as governmental policy in 
North America and Europe, through an emerging welfare state.  What made Quebec unique 
is that it had to come from behind to catch up, and it did this with such speed that a Toronto 
journalist dubbed it a quiet revolution (Thomson 1984; Bélanger 2000). 
Lesage made René Lévesque the minister of natural resources.  In early 1962, 
Lévesque started a public campaign for nationalization of hydro-electricity, and by 
September he had convinced his cabinet colleagues to proceed (Chanlat, Bolduc et 
Larouche 1989).  An election was called on the issue, and the liberals ran under the slogan 
“Maîtres chez nous”, with Lesage claiming the time for Quebec to take control of its 
economic destiny was: “Maintenant ou jamais!” (CBC, November 7, 1962).  Daniel 
Johnson, the leader of the Union Nationale, argued that the Liberals were on a slippery path 
to socialism.  Since a large number of legislative councillors served on the boards of the 
largest corporations in Canada and Quebec, Lesage decided to use the election to launch a 
pre-emptive strike against the council, warning it not to block the will of the people of 
Quebec, which was “still a democracy” he said (ibid.).   
The Lesage government was re-elected with an increase in its seats from 51 to 63 in 
the 95 seat lower chamber.  Just before the end of the year (December 28), Hydro-Québec 
launched a hostile takeover, offering to buy all of the stock in 11 electricity generating 
companies at a price slightly above market value.  In addition to these companies which 
were acquired at a cost of $604 million, most electric co-operatives and municipally-owned 
utilities were also taken over, making Hydro-Québec the largest electric company in 1963. 
As this was happening, at the premier’s suggestion, the legislative assembly of 
Quebec had struck a committee to consider the constitution and the future of Quebec.  
While the committee was principally interested in Quebec’s place in Canada, an amending 
formula, federal institutions and Quebec’s jurisdictional relationship with the federal 
government, the committee also considered the possibility of a written constitution for 
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Quebec and it reviewed the structure of the provincial institutions of governance.  This was 
a period of great interest in the Canadian constitution and in institutions of governance 
more generally. 
There was a nominal change to the council that year, as tenure in the council was 
altered from an appointment for life to an appointment until age of 75.  Mandatory 
retirement was being established for most government and private sector jobs at age 65.  
There would be a constitutional amendment to reduce the tenure of appointments to the 
federal senate to 75, two years later.  None of this was particularly controversial, as it was 
tied to the growth of pension plans. 
In the United States, members of both legislative chamber in congress had been 
provided pensions upon retirement at age 60, having served a minimum of 10 years at age 
62, with a minimum of five years in office, since 1946.308  In Canada, members of 
legislative chambers had been on salary for some time, with Ontario and Quebec being the 
first to establish full-time salaries.  The British house of commons’ pension was revamped 
in this same year following a commission report under the chair of Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, 
which established a pension for MPs payable at age 65.  Members of the British house of 
lords, being hereditary peers of the realm, held their seats for life and then it went to their 
eldest son, upon death.309  Quebec, in establishing a mandatory retirement for the upper 
chamber, had established a pension plan for them, based on the one for members of the 
assembly. 
                                                 
308 In the race to establish these pensions, provision was made for minimum ‘buy ins’ (i.e. recipient 
contributions to achieve a full pension based on service and not on contribution , to date, as these pensions 
were designed to fill a gap  in the social safety net for older and younger alike, created by mandatory 
retirement).  In the U.S., a legislator only needed to have contributed for five years.  In the Canadian 
parliament, the buy-in was set at 1963 in 1968, following the U.S. model, when it redesigned its pensions to 
meet the example set by Quebec and Ontario -- see the study commissioned at the time by the government 
from the Emeritus Dean of Graduate Studies and Research, C.A. Curtis (1969). 
309 The Life Peerage Act, 1958, allowed for the appointment of non-hereditary peers, of which four women 
were appointed that year (sociology professor and judge Barbara Wootton was the first), but their 
appointments are equally for life.  Their seat in the chamber does not go to an offspring but, along with their 
titles, reverts to the crown.   
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In 1965, Lesage introduced a “Projet de Lois du Parlement du Québec”, which was 
inspired by the Parliament Act 1911 in the United Kingdom and which would have 
changed the veto power of the upper chamber into a ‘suspensive veto’ (Quebec Journals, 
LA, January 22, 1965).310  The legislative council could delay money Bills for no more than 
one month, at which time the Bill would be given royal assent and become law (s.1).311  All 
other bills the council could amend or defeat, but they would become law if adopted by the 
lower house in two sessions no less than a year apart (s.4). 
The Bill was only modified slightly in the lower chamber from the form presented 
by the government (Quebec Journals, LA, February 16, 1965).  The definition of money 
bills was tightened so that it applied just to Bills that “contain only provisions for 
appropriating” etc. (s.2) and the certification of the speaker was replaced with a 
requirement that a clause be placed in each Bill stating that it was a money Bill to be 
adopted by the assembly along with the Bill (or removed if it so chose), the clause equally 
being non-justiciable as the speaker’s ruling would have been (s.3). 
The Union Nationale opposition in the lower chamber proposed an amendment 
which would have exempted any amendment to the Canadian or provincial constitutions 
(Québec Débats, 1965).  If there was a dispute between the two chambers over any such 
amendment, it would be decided by Quebec voters in a referendum.  The year before, the 
federal government had convened a conference of premiers to adopt an amending formula 
for the constitution and Lesage had agreed to the Fulton-Favreau formula and it was also 
before the legislature.312  In support of giving the council control over constitutional 
amendments, the Union Nationale argued that the upper chamber would protect Quebec’s 
                                                 
310 The Parliament Act limited the upper chamber to a delay of three parliamentary sessions or two calendar 
years on most legislation. 
311 The speaker of the assembly would certify what was a money Bill (s.3) and his ruling could not be 
challenge in court (s.8).  The legislation defined money Bills as: All Bills for appropriating any part of the 
public revenue of the Province, or for imposing, altering or repealing any tax allocated to such revenue, or for 
legislating on any subordinate mater incidental thereto” (s.2). 
312 It was based on a formula first developed by federal justice minister E. Davie Fulton and then modified by 
another federal justice minister Guy Favreau.  Some matters, such as the use of English and French, 
unanimity would be required to amend the constitution.  For other matters resolutions of 2é3 of the provinces.  
It is similar to the formula that was adopted in 1982 where some matters require unanimity, some require.  
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rights, even when an assembly might be convinced to surrender them, and was a necessary 
protection under the Fulton-Favreau formula, which the Union Nationale opposed.313  The 
Union Nationale amendments were rejected and the Bill was adopted by the lower chamber 
(Quebec Journals, May 16, 1965). 
The legislative council received the Bill on February 17 and adopted it in principle 
on March 24 (Quebec Journals, LC).314  The legislative council amended the legislation to 
exempt legislation that (i) affected the constitutional rights of minorities or (ii) the 
Canadian Constitution, Quebec’s constitutional status or the “constitutional or jurisdictional 
status of the Legislative Council, including the rights, indemnities, allowances, pensions 
and other prerogatives of its members” (Quebec Journals, LC, March 24, 1965).  When the 
lower house received the amendments, it postponed consideration until May 11, when it 
debated and rejected the amendments (Quebec Journals, LA, March 25, 1965). 
The government then announced that it would approach the British parliament to 
amend the Constitution Act, 1867 to make the changes to the powers of the council that had 
been passed by the assembly, and confirmed that it had received assurances from the 
federal government that any request would be forwarded on with a favourable 
recommendation (Québec Débats, May 11, 1965).315  The following day Premier Lesage 
moved an address to the queen asking that she put before the parliament of the United 
Kingdom “An Act to amend The British North America Act, 1867” which would add all 
the clauses of the government Bill to that Constitution Act, 1867 (Québec Débats, AL, May 
                                                 
313 Lederman et. al (1966-7, 353), in their examination of the machinations surrounding the Fulton-Favreau 
amending formula, write that  “it is not clear whether this was done wholly or partly to prevent Council 
reform from being achieved without Council’s consent by later use of the Fulton-Favreau Formula”.  But the 
Union Nationale took the position that Lesage had failed to protect Quebec’s interests in agreeing to the 
formula and saw the upper chamber as key to stopping this amendment and to stopping future amendments.  
And the council, in its address to the queen, states that its objective was to protect the constitutional rights of 
minorities. 
314 At the same time as this bill was passing, debate was raging in Quebec over the Fulton-Favreau amending 
formula as agreed to by Lesage. The Montreal Star urged adoption in order to end the constitutional impasse.  
Laval University students voted 2485 to 482 against and the Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec 
threated to organize a march on the legislature in May, if the government tries to ratify it (Montreal Star, 
March 18, 1965). 
315 On May 20 the government removes the “Projet de Lois du Parlement du Quebec” from the order paper.   
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12, 1965).316  Subsequently, the leader of the opposition in the upper chamber announced 
he would introduce an address requesting the queen reject the assembly’s proposals for 
reform of the council (Asselin, Québec Débats, LC, May 20, 1965).  The assembly’s 
address was adopted on May 26 (Quebec Journals, LA) and the council’s address on June 2 
(Quebec Journals, LC). 
The council’s address points out that it had adopted most of the restrictions to its 
powers as proposed by the lower house “except only the constitutional matter, the vested 
rights of the members of the Legislative Council and the constitutional rights of the 
minorities” (Quebec Journals, LC, June 2, 1965, art.2).  It also points out that the lower 
chamber had not communicated its decision to reject the amendments as was the usual 
process (art.3), and that all means to reconcile the two chambers had not been exhausted 
(art.4).  It claims it would have concurred with the amendment proposed by the Union 
Nationale in the assembly.  And it points out that the Constitution Act, 1967 gave the 
provinces control over their own constitutions (art.6), that what the government proposes 
violates the spirit and letter of the Constitution (art.7) and constitutes an intervention of the 
parliament of the United Kingdom in the constitutional affairs of Quebec (art.10).  It 
concurrently adopts an address to the governor general, insisting that the government of 
Canada remain neutral in the matter. 
In the house of commons, the Canadian government set out its position that this was 
unprecedented and thus not a constitutional amendment in the usual sense, which would 
have required the concurrence of parliament, but rather a matter that only concerned one 
province of which the government would be instructing the governor general to forward the 
address from the Quebec legislative assembly onto the queen (Martin, Canada Debates, 
HOC, June 16, 1965).317  As this was a provincial matter, the government would allow the 
advice of the ministers of the crown for Quebec to be substituted for its own advice, so the 
                                                 
316 The proposal was to add these clauses as a 79A of the Constitution Act, 1867.  A second address was 
adopted concurrently to ask the Governor General of Canada to forward the first address to the queen. 
317 The governor general had, Martin told the assembly, asked for the government’s advice in a letter dated 
June 8. 
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queen would be advised to support the address, and the government asked the Canadian 
parliament to refrain from sitting in judgement on the developments in this province.318  
Parliament did nothing to interfere with the transmission of the addresses.  The British 
government advised the queen not to involve the parliament of the United Kingdom as the 
province of Quebec had full authority to amend its own provincial constitution. 
Defeated in 1966, Lesage tried as leader of the opposition to introduce “An Act to 
abolish the Legislative Council” (Québec Débats, AL, 7 décembre 1966).  The new 
premier, Union Nationale Leader Daniel Johnson, stopped its introduction on procedural 
grounds.319   
At the Union Nationale party convention in 1966, resolutions were adopted to 
“abolir le Conseil législatif sans l’intervention de Londres, ni d’Ottawa dans les affaires 
internes du Québec” and to “procéder à une réforme de nos institutions parlementaires pour 
en faire un instrument moderne et efficace au service de la communauté québécoise” 
(Bertrand, Québec Débats, LA, 26 novembre 1968).  The Union Nationale was beginning 
to shift its position.  It still favoured replacing the council with some other representative 
body.  Constitutional issues had emerged in Quebec’s provincial politics as a dominant 
issue, with both parties agreed on the need for more provincial exclusive jurisdiction and 
more money, but they had bitterly split over the idea of an amending formula which the 
Liberals had seen as a means to an end and the Union National has framed as a surrender of 
Quebec’s claim to a veto over constitutional change.  Lesage had made the legislative 
council part of this constitutional debate when he had the legislature ask the queen and 
Ottawa to interfere in Quebec’s internal constitution rules and to bring about abolition of 
the chamber. 
                                                 
318 Martin informed the house of commons that the queen and the governor general had each given their 
permission to inform the Canadian house of commons of this advice, even though advice to the crown is 
normally a matter of utmost secrecy. 
319 The item on the order paper was ‘public bills’ and only the leader of the government can determine what 
can be introduced at this point in the assembly’s proceedings.  After debate, the speaker ruled that the one 
exception, which is a matter of urgency, could not be seen to apply since the legislative council had been 
around 99 years. 
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Premier Johnston proposed that the legislature reconstitute the committee on the 
constitution (Québec Débats, AL, 21 février 1967).320  In addition to preparing Quebec’s 
demands vis-à-vis the Constitution of Canada, which had been its primary focus, Johnston 
proposed that the committee also examine the possibility of abolishing the legislative 
council as it was presently constituted and replacing it with “un organisme représentatif des 
corps intermédiaires, des minorités du Québec, des agents de l’économie au des 
professions, avec des structures et des pouvoirs conformes aux besoins de notre époque”.  
And he informed the lower house that the majority in the upper house would be in favour of 
such a change.  As the provincial political party that could convince the council to accept 
reform, the Union Nationale sought to take the lead on the issue.  The Liberals dismissed 
the proposal as too complex and argued that a committee on the constitution should be 
primarily focussed on altering the federal constitution, which it argued had been the focus 
of the previous committee on the constitution that it had established. 
Lesage again introduced “An Act to abolish the Legislative Council” on February 
22, 1967 (Quebec Journals, LA).  Before the Bill could be debated in principle, the premier 
challenged the Bill on the basis of the rules and procedures of the assembly that prevent 
anyone but the lieutenant governor-in-council (i.e. the cabinet) from introducing a measure 
that impacts on the prerogatives of the crown, arguing that the Bill could only be introduced 
by the government (Québec Débats, AL, 28 février 1967).  The speaker put it to the 
assembly on whether or not the Bill touched on a royal prerogative and the assembly voted 
54 to 37 that it did, so in a subsequent vote the assembly voted to rescind second reading, 
which in parliamentary procedure means it removed agreement to proceed with debate on 
                                                 
320 In 1967, Ontario Premier John Robarts convened the ‘Confederation of Tomorrow’ conference in Toronto 
as part of Canada’s centennial as a way to break what was then seen as a constitutional impasse and address 
some of Quebec’s concerns.  This led to the federal government convening a meeting with the premiers 
wherein the new Justice Minister, Pierre Trudeau, would lay out his plan for constitutional renewal.  It would 
be a three stage process: first, ‘patriation’ of the constitution with an entrenched amending formula and a Bill 
of rights; second, improving federal institutions of governance (which included the supreme court and the 
senate, so as to allow the provinces to have an equal say in appointments); and then third (and the federal 
government would only agree to discuss this after the first two had been done), a redistribution of federal and 
provincial jurisdiction and powers.  At the conference, Trudeau would verbally spar with the delegation from 
Quebec, bringing him Canada-wide prominence and launching him into contention for the leadership of the 
Liberal Party.  He accomplished the first phase as prime minister in 1982 and left politics in 1984. 
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the merits of the Bill, whereupon a further motion removed it from the order paper 
altogether, preventing it from being considered later in that session (Quebec Journals, LA, 
February 28, 1967). 
Succeeding Johnston as premier was Jean-Jacques Bertrand.  As deputy leader, he 
took over as temporary leader when Johnson died of a heart attack in 1968.  He would win 
the party leadership the next year.  The Bertrand government introduced a “Bill to Abolish 
the Legislative Council” on October 22 (Quebec Journals, LA).  In the speech from the 
throne the government had maintained its position that the upper chamber should be 
replaced by a different body, so this was a recent departure, though in introducing the Bill 
the premier suggested the change of the lower chamber into a ‘national assembly’ respected 
the party platform concerning new institutions (Bertrand, Québec Débats, LA, 26 novembre 
1968). 
Included in the Bill was provision to give councillors a $10,000 a year pension, 
essentially a continuation of their salary, immediately upon the abolition of the council until 
death.321  This was the main point of debate during deliberation in both chambers, which 
centred on the fact that most councillors had not contributed sufficiently into the pension 
plan to warrant such a high pension, as it had only been established when the mandatory 
age 75 retirement was adopted (Lesage, ibid.).  It was claimed that when other provinces 
had abolished their upper chambers they had not provided compensation (Laporte, ibid.) 
It has been argued that this pension created an incentive for councillors to support 
the legislation.  The true incentive of public office is not financial, as Curtis notes in his 
study of government pensions at the time:  
“Few people go into public life for the money income involved; indeed the 
real income of the position comes in the form of prestige, power and the 
ability to influence decisions.  In the main, this is non-pecuniary” (Curtis 
1969). 
                                                 
321 Upon death the spouse, if there were one, would receive a pension of half this amount. 
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Further, the criticism of the Quebec legislative council at the time was that too many 
councillors were also directors of corporations.  These councillors were sought after by 
larger corporations in Canada and Quebec because they served in the legislature and thus 
could influence legislation and government policy, so if income was the only or primary 
consideration, then it was in councillors’ self-interest to remain legislators with salary and 
directorships, rather than accepting the reduced income of pension alone. 
The issue of the council revising legislation and being a protection for minorities 
was raised in debate, but on both points the opposition in the lower chamber was the most 
vocal in rejecting these roles for the chamber (Lesvesque, Québec Débats, LA, 26 
novembre 1968).  The government chose instead to take the high road and praise its work 
and the competence and contribution of the people who had been councillors for the 
province (Bertrand, ibid.).  The popular press took issue with the pension, with one 
editorialist liking it to a disability pension which councillors were entitled to because they 
had become ‘moribund’ (Cormier, La Presse, 22 novembre 1968), and another noting that 
only in Quebec could someone get paid $10,000 to commit ‘hara-kiri’ (Daoust, La Presse, 
30 novembre 1968). 
The Bill passed the assembly on November 29 (Quebec Journals, LA).  It was 
introduced into the upper chamber on December 6 (Quebec Journals, LC).  The councillors 
defended the role the chamber had provided in revising legislation, noting that between 
1960 and 1968, they had proposed 1,074 amendments, of which 1,053 were accepted, nine 
accepted with a revision and only 12 rejected by the lower house (Asselin, Québec Débats, 
LC, 12 décembre, 1968).  The compensation was defended on the grounds that it was not a 
pension but compensation for being terminated prematurely or when a contract is broken 
(ibid.).  No arguments were raised in the upper chamber concerning its role in defending 
minority interests. 
With some irony, the upper chamber proposed two technical amendments to clear 
up the language with respect to cancelling the current pensions and salaries and establishing 
the new pension, and to be accommodating to the tight timeframe and the chamber 
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suspended its rules to allow for the Bill to be adopted immediately and returned to the 
lower chamber (Quebec Journals, LC, December 13, 1968).  The assembly accepted the 
amendments (Quebec Journals, LA, December 13, 1968).    On December 18, An Act 
respecting the Legislative Council received royal assent and became law (ibid.).  It came 
into effect on December 31 of that year (s.95 of the Act), whereupon the legislative 
assembly became the unicameral ‘National Assembly of Quebec’.322 
While the abolition of the upper chamber in Quebec had been a partisan issue from 
the beginning, with the Liberals supporting abolition and the governing party, first the 
Conservatives and then the Union Nationale, opposing it.  It was only when the council 
became part of the debate over the constitutional issues, including an amending formula, 
that the issue became salient for the public and institutional change became a priority for 
both political parties.  While Quebec had an English minority that favoured the upper 
chamber, the primary social cleavage was between English Canada and a federal Québécois 
minority.  Once shifts in that cleavage transformed nationalism from conservative and 
religious into linguistic and cultural, the resistance of that group to institutional change 
disappeared.  In the end it was the Union Nationale government of Jean-Jacques Bertrand 
that achieved the change, and of the two political parties, this was the one most able to 
bridge the smaller social cleavage internal to Quebec, which it would try to do the 
following year over education, marking the end of this party as a governing party.323 
V. Conclusion 
In the two provinces where there was no significant relationship between the 
province’s social cleavage and the upper chamber, both sides of the partisan cleavage 
supported abolition as early as 1879.  While we might have assumed therefore that 
                                                 
322 Councillors who had been speaker or leader of the government or opposition were given $12,000 a year 
pensions. 
323 The key provision of what became known as ‘Bill 63’ stated that schooling “shall be given in the English 
language to any child for whom his parents or the persons acting in their stead so request at his enrolment”.  
Immigrants would not be compelled to send their children to French school and French parents could send 
their children to English schools if they so wished. 
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abolition should have occurred quickly, it did not.  In New Brunswick abolition occurred in 
1892 and in Nova Scotia it took until 1928 to achieve.  The reason for the delay in both 
these cases was that since both political parties supported the change, their concurrence 
effectively neutralized it as a political issue, thus depriving it of election discourse.  It was 
only when it became a political issue that the public engaged with the debate.  
What is key is not that the political parties disagree on the outcome.  In Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Quebec, change occurred only after the two parties 
disagreed over what changes should be made.  In New Brunswick, the two parties agreed in 
terms of platform from the start, but change occurred only after the council became part of 
a partisan election debate.  It is when the issue becomes a public partisan issue that 
governments have political capital at stake and this necessitates their delivering on the 
platform promise. 
In New Brunswick, the government found it useful to have the council around as a 
scape goat.  It is only when the council countered the government’s claims that it was 
responsible for all the financial problems by offering to pass all the cuts to government that 
the government had originally promised that the party made it a serious issue in the 
election. The government had been getting councillors to sign pledges that they would vote 
for abolition in advance of appointment, though there is some evidence that it did not 
initially intend to hold them to these pledges.  When abolition became a partisan issue and 
the seriousness of the government’s intention was challenged, the government made 
councillors honour their pledges.  It is noteworthy that on the day the council voted its own 
abolition, the government added an Acadian to the chamber to vote for the bill. 
In Nova Scotia, governments of both political parties also obtained pledges.  But 
again there is evidence that, at least, the Liberals never intended to hold them to these 
pledges.  No serious attempt was made to abolish the chamber, as bills, resolutions or 
addresses to the queen were usually introduced in advance of an election.  In the 1920s, 
with the rise of labour unrest and socialism in Cape Breton, the two main political parties 
separated their policy over the future of the council, with the Liberals favouring ‘reform’ as 
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a check against temporary radicalism and the Conservatives continuing to support abolition.  
The Liberals had the council accept a suspensive veto.  The Conservatives brought about 
abolition. While a judicial decision gave the Conservatives an efficient mechanism to 
achieve abolition, they were leaving seats vacant so abolition would have occurred, just 
more slowly had this decision been different.  Two things are noteworthy, one is that the 
councillors were offered pensions if they resigned on their own, and they refused, and the 
government felt it necessary to appoint councillors from every county in Nova Scotia to 
vote for abolition. 
In the two provinces where the upper chamber had a specific representational role 
with respect to the province’s social cleavage, developments concerning the social cleavage 
were instrumental to making changes.  In Prince Edward Island, the elected legislative 
council represented property owners, and given the province’s history of absentee land 
ownership, this emerged early as the defining social identifier for the province’s residents.  
Abolition proved to be impossible, so the only solution to reduce the cost of legislation was 
to reduce the size of both chambers and have councillors and assemblymen meet together in 
a single chamber.  Once the property cleavage disappeared as the province’s principal 
social cleavage, being replaced by the catholic-protestant cleavage, political parties began 
to navigate this cleavage by using the councillor and assemblyman positions to give 
representation to each side of this cleavage.  In 1963, the property qualification for voting 
was eliminated, effectively abolishing the legislative council positions, though the two titles 
of councillor and assemblyman were retained to allow this informal representation of 
protestant and catholic in the chamber to continue.  By 1996, immigration and a decline in 
religiosity meant the religious cleavage had lost relevance and the province moved to single 
member constituencies. 
With respect to Quebec, the legislative council was structured the same as the 
province’s representation in the federal senate, with 24 separate districts, so as to ensure 
that the English minority in the province always had representation.  But while there was an 
English minority in a French province, the French majority was defined by being a minority 
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in a wider Canadian cleavage.   Given the historical identification with institutions in this 
province and a conservative nationalism among the French elites for the first half of the 
province’s history, it was the French who most strongly resisted change.  This ethno-
religious nationalism would give way to linguistic cultural nationalism.  The cleavage over 
constitutional issues was also replacing government formation as the principle partisan 
cleavage in the province.  Resistance to change thus dropped away from the French side of 
the social cleavage and the need for change became tied to partisan objectives, first to build 
Quebec’s welfare state and then to battle Ottawa.  While the Bill bringing about abolition 
provided a pension for each councillor equal to their salary, this was the era of pensions and 
compensation and there was a greater financial incentive to stay in office, so abolition 
occurred not due to this expenditure but due to the chamber’s acceptance of the 
government’s partisan objectives.  It is significant that the party that achieved the change 
was the political party which could best bridge the internal social cleavage of the province, 
even though this cleavage was less significant than the one which made Francophones 
identify as a minority in Canada.  Additionally, the overall representation of the 
Anglophone minority in the provincial government was not altered as the English 
representatives in the assembly and in the cabinet were maintained and, based on the 
language of education question that was decided at this time, was seen as effectively 
representing this community’s interests. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
A popular first year university text on Canadian politics by Dyck (2011) uses a 
number of cleavages and identity markers to provide the societal context for ongoing public 
policy disputes in Canada.  Among the ones identified are regionalism, aboriginal/non-
aboriginal, French/English, ethno-cultural, gender, class, urban/rural, religion and age.  
This approach ‘only gets us so far’ (Lipset et Rokkan 1967).  For their part, Lipset and 
Rokkan suggest that identifying a single social cleavage in the society is a preferable 
approach for an analysis of politics.  This led them to conclude that there were four 
cleavages that could explain the emergence of political parties in Western European 
countries.  The four they identified were owner/worker, church/state, urban/rural and 
centre/periphery.  Where their approach might have gotten them further, it equally only gets 
us so far. 
As the starting part for this dissertation, it was posited that a preferable approach for 
an analysis of the societal context for politics would be to identify not one but two 
cleavages in the society, one ‘social’ and one ‘partisan’.  Partisan cleavages were defined as 
those that emerge due to differences over ideology, policy and/or obtaining and retaining 
public office.  Social cleavages arise from group identity markers and can form around any 
ascriptive or constructed characteristic such as race-ethnicity, class, religion and/or 
language.  The research question to be answered was what societal factors drive and 
restrain institutional change.  Each of these two cleavages was expected to impact on 
change differently, with a strong social cleavage expected to create an ‘out’ group that 
would impede change, so that a cross-cutting by the partisan cleavage of the social would 
be necessary to achieve change. 
Institutional change is under-theorized, understudied and not properly understood.  
Yet many governments and organizations expend a great deal of resources trying to achieve 
institutional change.  With respect to formal institutions of governance, ‘second’ or ‘upper’ 
chambers in legislatures are most often singled out as in need of change, since many of 
these institutions were created in eras where different theories on governmental design were 
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popular than the prevailing ones today.  This is particularly true for Canada, where ‘reform’ 
of the federal upper chamber has been the focus of numerous public campaigns, as 
governments and organizations have tried to introduce provincial or democratic selection 
for senators. 
Institutional change has been possible for upper chambers in Canada.  The first 
institutions established in Canada became the provincial upper chambers and were 
eventually abolished.  Two of these were also made elected and two of them had their veto 
reduced to a suspensive one prior to abolition.  This offered a number of cases to examine 
in order to develop a theory of institutional change. 
The approach to this dissertation project was to hypothesize how societal cleavages 
might impact on institutional change and then process trace the changes which were 
proposed and occurred to test those hypotheses.  Most of the propositions that formed part 
of the hypotheses were found to be solid, while two were found to be ill-conceived or 
wrong.  The results of that research are presented in detail in the previous chapters as an 
historical narrative.  They are presented here in summary. 
An attempt has been made in reporting this research to fill gaps and correct errors in 
Canada’s historical record.  Additionally, two previous theories surrounding institutional 
change were revisited.  Specifically, Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of how political parties 
emerge, and the prevailing colonial studies theory on why institutions of governance 
developed along a common institutional trajectory, were examined.  The conclusions on 
those two are presented in section one and two, respectively.  In section three, the theory of 
institutional change that emerged from the testing of the initial hypotheses is presented as 
restated propositions. 
I. Political Parties 
While the focus of this dissertation was on changes to formal institutions of 
governance, the corollary to an examination of partisan cleavages and their shifts is an 
examination of the emergence, evolution and disappearance of political parties.  This 
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offered the opportunity to test Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of how political parties emerge.  
Their study of political parties in Western Europe using a single social cleavage led them to 
conclude that the dominant social cleavage in a society led to the formation of parties.  Our 
approach has been to conceive of a society as having two cleavages, one social and one 
partisan, which may align or be cross-cutting.  If Lipset and Rokkan had been right, then 
the two cleavages would have been in alignment when the main political parties emerged in 
each of the provinces studied during this dissertation. 
In the case of Newfoundland, the social cleavage and partisan cleavage were 
initially and frequently aligned.  The Reform Party became the first political party to 
emerge in opposition to the governor and his Tory elite and to win elections to the 
assembly in the era of representative government.  Its members were mostly Roman 
Catholic.  This Reform Party developed into the modern Liberal Party of Newfoundland, so 
this would support their theory on party formation.  It is worth noting, though, that it was 
only when this party was able to cross the social cleavage and win support from protestants 
as well as catholics that Newfoundland was able to get responsible government in 1855, 
becoming the last province to make the change.  And the divisiveness of sectarian politics 
in this province resulted in the Tory government, which came back to power seven years 
later, restructuring the assembly, the cabinet and other government offices so that 
Methodists, Anglicans and Roman Catholics would be equally represented, including 
within the two main political parties. 
In the case of Upper Canada and Lower Canada, the social cleavage and the partisan 
cleavage was aligned in the era of representative government.  So one could make a case 
that the first incarnation of the Reform Party in Upper Canada, which was seen as being 
dominated by Irish, Scottish and Yankee social outsiders, and the Parti Canadien and the 
Parti patriote in Lower Canada, which were largely Francophone parties, were the first 
reform parties and thus predecessors to the modern Liberal Party.  This reasoning would 
suggest that the Tories, which were Anglican in Upper Canada, and defined by class in both 
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provinces, led to the Conservatives.  But this ignores the machinations surrounding 
government formation in the united province of Canada. 
To achieve responsible government for Canada, the reform parties in both Upper 
and Lower Canada had to merge.  The merged Reform or Liberal Party was created 
specifically to cross the social cleavage.  This Liberal Party was taken over by conservative 
elements and given the label Liberal-Conservatives so as to appear to be bi-partisan.  While 
they ran for office using different labels. (e.g. the Blues in Lower Canada and the 
Conservatives or Tories in Upper Canada), they governed as the Liberal-Conservatives.  
This party was designed to hold onto government by crossing the social cleavage and 
would eventually surrender its claim to being the successor to the Reform Party of 
Baldwin-La Fontaine and become the Conservative Party of Canada after Sir John A. 
Macdonald ceased being its leader.  This is the first formal political party in Canada.  The 
Liberal Party of Canada would emerge out of the opposition to this governing party and this 
party would incorporate some former Clear Grits from Ontario and Rouges from Quebec, 
but it equally emerged as a cross-social cleavage vehicle to win power.   
In Prince Edward Island, which was the first province to have a political party with 
the emergence of an Escheat Party, it clearly had its first partisan experience defined by the 
province’s social cleavage; and in Manitoba there was an initial English Party and a French 
Party.  But these party experiments were short-lived, precisely because they were defined 
by the social cleavage.  Reform or Liberal parties emerged specifically to obtain 
responsible government, and these crossed these provinces’ social cleavages.  
In Nova Scotia the social cleavage and the partisan cleavage were not in alignment 
when the Reform Party fully emerged.  The Reform Party had members from both sides of 
the province’s social cleavage and it achieved responsible government in a very short 
period of time.  In New Brunswick, the electoral rules denied one side of its social cleavage 
the vote, when political parties began to emerge.  Once Acadians began to vote in 
significant numbers, the social and partisan cleavages aligned over the issue of 
Confederation, but two parties had already emerged prior to this point and, while these 
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elections resulted in a temporary departure from those parties, they returned to their original 
configuration after several elections. 
While the social cleavages cannot explain the emergence of political parties in 
Canada, our examination of the partisan cleavage provided insight into how and why 
parties emerged in each of these provinces and in the new federal country, see figure 10.1. 
Figure 10.1: Partisan Cleavage Group Formation 
 
When the governor had autocratic or semi-autocratic authority, in that he was only 
advised and assisted by the upper chamber of the bicameral legislature, this created a 
cleavage between him and those who objected to his decisions and to the council’s structure 
and membership.  This cleavage between governor and opposition led to party formation.  
While this may have been initially defined by the social cleavage, the need to achieve 
change forced alliances and thus emerged a partisan group that could achieve institutional 
change.  It is because it was not a single social group that it was able to achieve change.  
The first political party, therefore, was the party that obtained responsible government. 
There will invariably be people who oppose the government’s decisions and policies 
and people will seek election by running against the government’s record and platform.  
The cleavage between government and opposition will convince some who run against the 
government to join forces as a political party in order to replace the government.  This is 
what creates the second political party. 
In both eras, the partisan cleavage over who should control the power of the state 
motivated legislators to come together and form political parties.  The successful parties in 
terms of achieving institutional change, but it would also appear in terms of forming 
governments and having longevity, were those that could cross the social cleavage.  The 
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political parties that represented a single social group disappeared and their members who 
remained in the legislature either joined the main contenders for government formation or 
remained independents. 
II. Standard ‘Westminster’ Developmental Trajectory 
In the colonial studies literature, the prevailing theory on why colonial institutions 
developed the way that they did is that the British government established representative 
government to attract settlers.  This conclusion is based on the prospecti issued by the land 
companies to settlers and the fact that the prevailing political economy model favoured by 
the British government prescribed such institutions.  As to why responsible government 
was finally granted, these scholars suggest it was the result of normative arguments being 
advanced in the colonies and a pragmatic British government departing from the doctrine of 
British parliamentary supremacy.  This theory sees colonial institutions as being given.  
Thus it offers no insights into why institutions appeared in some colonies before others. 
Figure 10.2: Institutional Changes leading to Responsible Government 
 
The other argument advanced in this literature was that there was no standard 
developmental trajectory in the colonies.  It concludes that the institutions given to a colony 
were the result of the prevailing institutional design favoured by the colonial office at the 
time.  Yet our examination of the British North American provinces, each of which did not 
achieve institutional change through revolution, found that a consistent series of 
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institutional changes were followed in each province, though at different times, as 
illustrated in figure 10.2. 
In the literature on bicameralism, the explanation for why the lower house comes to 
dominate the upper house is the legitimacy that comes with elected membership.  
Legitimacy is not in the early stages a by-product of election.  The lower chamber obtained 
the lead in levying taxes because of being given authority by the king in England and the 
governors in the colonies, and this lead was given to them because the tax base shifted 
away from the most significant landowners and towards a larger and more diverse merchant 
class, and the elected lower chamber lent the king and governor legitimacy towards these 
taxpayers.  In other words, it was the legitimacy to levy taxes on the people and not the 
legitimacy of these chambers towards the king on behalf of the people, rooted in some 
democratic mandate, that made the lower chambers emerge as the lead chamber with 
respect to taxation and supply.  In fact, the establishment of an assembly for the colony, just 
as it had been in England, was in part a strategic move by the British crown to legitimize 
the levying of taxation on the local population so as to support local government and 
defence. 
While ‘no taxation without representation’ has been a reform mantra in England and 
throughout the world, particularly in the era of representative government in Canada’s 
provinces, it needs to be remembered that taxation requires a level of compliance that can 
only be partially enforced by the power of the state, so there is a benefit to a ruler, even in a 
non-democratic environment, to make the levying of taxes appear voluntary.  That is what 
was behind the very first Magna Carta.  Having the taxes set by any legislative body is as 
much about enforcement as it is about accountability – and that is why the nobility had the 
power in the first king’s councils of England and landed gentry had the first influence in the 
governors’ councils in the colonies.  That being said, the perceived legitimacy created by 
democratic theory will inevitably embolden elected legislators and will result in an increase 
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In just 100 years, the colonial institutions of governance in British North America 
were transformed from a Tudor-style monarchical system to a Victorian model of 
government with a bicameral legislature.  Growing out of that original governor’s council 
were two, three, four and then five distinct institutions for governance: the officials who 
would become the executive council and form the basis for a cabinet; the appointed or 
nominee members who would become the legislative council or upper chamber; an elected 
legislative assembly as the lower chamber; and, under the auspices of the last two bodies 
working together as a parliament or general assembly for the province, a separate and 
independent judiciary would be structured. 
As noted there will be demands that emerge from the legislature with respect to 
institutional design and decision-making authority.  These also followed a standard 
trajectory in the era of responsible government and are illustrated in figure 10.3.  This 
discourse between governor and the leadership in the legislature occurred in England, the 
British provinces of Canada and the Canadian province of Manitoba.  It is hypothesized, 
therefore, that this may be a natural breakdown in the British monarchical model.  The 
ruler, be it king or governor, after accepting the need for representative institutions in order 
to more easily levy taxes, encounters a series of challenges to his or her authority. 
As this interaction and response occurred in England, in all the non-revolutionary 
provinces of British North America and in the non-British province of Canada, it is clear 
that the standard trajectory of institutional development was a response to developments 
within the polity and the institutions of governance and not simply a grant from the colonial 
office.  Why these changes occurred at different times brings us to our central research 
question. 
III. Institutional Change 
It was hypothesized that social cleavages would not lead to change but rather to 
restraint, as social groups would distrust one another’s motives.  While initially it was 
thought that each social group would advocate competing institutional changes that might 
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advance their group’s political influence, after reviewing the constitutional rules in Canada 
and recent attempts to change the Canadian Constitution, it was concluded that ‘out’ social 
groups would opt for the status quo, given their fear that any change might weaken 
whatever relative influence they have in the institution in question or in the overall 
structures of government. 
The hypothesis that began this dissertation was that there were not one but two 
cleavages that were at play in politics, one being ‘social’ and one being ‘partisan’.  Both are 
‘political’ cleavages in that they involve power relationships and both are ‘societal’ in that 
they operate across the polity, but the social cleavage is created out of a person’s 
sociological identity while the partisan cleavage emerges out of competition over policy 
outcomes and the pursuit of public office. 
Normative theory will be advanced in support of and in opposition to any change to 
the institution of governance being advocated by any group.  Inertia and path dependency 
will neutralize normative arguments in favour of change, no matter how compelling or 
temporally popular they might be.  What will determine the success or failure of the 
proposed change is the interaction of elite representatives on the two sides of the competing 
societal cleavages. 
In every change that was successful, the group driving the change had among its 
senior members the leaders from both sides of the social cleavage.  This was true for 
achieving responsible government, reducing the second chamber’s veto to suspensive, and 
election and abolition of the upper chamber, even for Confederation. 
It had originally been hypothesized that: “The social cleavage will be a stronger 
determinant of the success or failure to achieve change than the partisan cleavage. The 
more socially divided a society is, the harder it will be to achieve institutional change.”  
The assumption in sociology is that issues concerning social identity are more important to 
people than policy issues (Lipset et Rokkan 1967).  However, the partisan cleavage would 
appear to be as important as the social cleavage in determining whether or not change 
occurred.  The existence of a social cleavage in a society does not necessarily mean that the 
  
 
387
‘out’ group that will resist change.  In New Brunswick, changes occurred taking the 
province from representative government to responsible government and then to abolition 
without the leadership of the French community opposing the changes, because, in the first 
era, they did not have representation in either chamber that would make them want to 
preserve the status quo and, in the second era, they opposed Confederation, but when it 
came to abolishing the upper chamber their representation was in the lower chamber and in 
cabinet, so changes did not impact on their influence in the overall structure of government.  
Nevertheless, the government still appointed an Acadian to the upper chamber the day of 
the vote, to vote for its abolition. 
The other proposition was that turned out to be wrong was that: “Change that is 
supported by both sides of the partisan cleavage will be the easiest to achieve”.  In Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Quebec, it was only when the two political parties 
differed that change occurred.  In New Brunswick, the parties agreed over change but it 
was only when it became an election issue that abolition occurred.  It seems that it is 
necessary to have a partisan debate over change so that the government party has political 
capital invested in carrying it out. 
Responsible government was bitterly debated in the provincial legislature and 
public press in each of the provinces, with Newfoundland’s and Nova Scotia’s legislative 
debates being the most bitter.  While Canadian history focuses on how Confederation was 
achieved by a ‘Grand Coalition’ in Canada and how the delegations from each province 
contained the leadership of the government and opposition parties, it was equally bitterly 
debated and, in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, 
provincial parties realigned temporarily around this issue as Anti-Confederate parties 
emerged specifically to fight the issue.  Where we posited that the bigger the change the 
more cross-cleavage support might be required, it would also seem that the bigger the 
change the more engaging the partisan debate needs to be so that holders of public office a 
vested interest in achieving the change. 
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The propositions that were first hypothesized have been restated based on this 
research as follows: 
1) In instances where change occurs, the partisan cleavage will have created a group 
that can overcome the resistance to change advanced by elite representatives of 
social groups. 
2) The partisan cleavage and the social cleavage are equal determinants of the 
success or failure to achieve change. 
3) When the social cleavage and the partisan cleavage aligned: 
c. If proposals for change came from the ‘out’ group, the elites that 
represented that group would have insufficient influence to bring about the 
change. 
d. If proposals for change came from the ‘in’ group, the elites that represented 
the ‘out’ group would resist change and opt instead for the status quo. 
4) When the social and the partisan cleavages are cross-cleavages: 
a. If change is seen to come from a social group it will be resisted as outlined 
in 3. 
b. When proposals for change come from only one side of the partisan 
cleavage, it will only be successful if the group has elite representatives 
from both sides of the social cleavage among its leadership. 
c. For change to occur there needs to be a public debate between the two sides 
of the partisan cleavage surrounding the change. 
5) Successful change will not significantly vary social group representation in the 
overall structure of governance. 
6) For a change to the social group representation to occur, a shift in the social 
cleavage will hsvr preceded the change, with that shift reducing or eliminating the 
perceived need for that group’s representation in the institution in question. 
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IV. Road Ahead 
The results of this dissertation to the importance of looking for two cleavages in a 
polity, one social and one partisan, when trying to identify the impact of societal divisions 
on politics in general and institutional change in particular.  The belief was that if the two 
cleavages were uncoupled, it would allow for greater insight than identifying multiple 
cleavages or a single one.  This clearly is a better approach to the study of institutions. 
With respect to political parties, it suggests that the emergence of political parties in 
Western Europe should be re-examined using this approach.  Clearly the social cleavages in 
the British non-revolutionary provinces did not have their political parties form around the 
social cleavage. 
Karl Marx, and those who followed him, thought that armed rebellion would be 
necessary to achieve the institutional change that benefited the proletariat.  So there seems 
to be an innate understanding that social groups will resist change when advanced be an 
‘out’ social group.  What Marxist did not predict is that ‘out’ social groups would opt for 
the status quo, which would explain why the workers’ revolution he predicted would 
change the world never materialized.  As the status quo is easier than change, most 
institutions remain unchanged.  Whether this theory for how institutional change occurs in 
non-revolutionary environments extends to other British derivative countries, to countries 
the British did not found and to different political systems are all deserving of research. 
The standard developmental trajectory of the Westminster-model should also be 
examined in other British non-revolutionary colonies.  The evidence here was that societal 
context is central to when institutional change occurs.  This may mean that in other 
countries, which have substantively different social and partisan cleavages, this model may 
not hold.  Canada offered the benefit of having both ceded/conquered and settler colonies 
and had, in the case of Manitoba, a province that was not a British but rather Canadian 
colony, so there can be some confidence that the model would be applicable to all British 
colonies.  But this is also worthy of exploration. 
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Appendix I: Abbreviations and Terminology 
1st Reading The parliamentary term in most Westminster models of government for the 
introduction of a bill.  A bill, when enacted, becomes law. 
2nd Reading The term, also predominantly but not exclusively used in the Westminster 
model, for the approval in principle of the objectives of a bill.  A chamber 
will sometimes give approval in principle for a bill so that it can be sent to a 
committee of the chamber, the next stage in consideration, without genuinely 
accepting the principle of the legislation.  Strategically there may be any 
number of reasons to support a bill at 2nd reading while apposing its 
adoption. 
3rd Reading The term for a chamber approving the bill in a specific form, and may be 
preceded by amendments proposed by the committee which studied the bill 
in detail or in the chamber through votes on proposed amendments prior to 
the final vote. 
A.B. Alberta 
A.G. Attorney General 
B.C. British Columbia 
BNA British North America Act (now called the Constitution Act with relevant 
year following the name of the Act as there were several enacted by the 
British Parliament over a number of years, many of which are still the 
constitutional authorities for non-revolutionary institutional change in 
Canada). 
Britain Short form for the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and [more recently just 
Northern] Ireland’ which was united in 1801; ‘Great Britain’ was united in 
the person of James I in 1603 and legislatively under the British Parliament 
in 1707, and includes Scotland, England and Wales; and most of Ireland 
(except for the North) was given independence in 1921. 
British An adjective pertaining to the U.K. 
B.M. British Museum 
B.T. Board of Trade Archives 
Can. Canada 
C.O.  Colonial Office 
Debates The record of what was said, now recoded verbatim, in a legislative chamber 
in Canada, the U.K. and other British institutional derivatives.  The term 
Hansard is used more frequently in the U.S. and Debates in Canada, but 
they are interchangeable. 
EC Executive Council (this would come to be known as the Cabinet) 
G.B. Great Britain [Scotland, England and Wales] 
HA House of Assembly 
HoC House of Commons (federal elected lower chamber in Canada, as well as in 
the unitary country of the U.K.) 
JCPC Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
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Hansard Another term for the official record of the legislative debates, which are the 
formal record of what was said, now verbatim, in a legislative chamber in 
Canada, the U.K. and other British institutional derivatives. 
H.B.C. Hudson Bay Company.  It was formally established through letters patent as 
“The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into 
Hudson's Bay” and was given vice regal authority over most of the land 
which is now Canada. 
I Imperator (Emperor) or Imperatrix (Empress) 
Journals The formal record of a legislature.  It does not contain speeches, except for 
the King/governor’s speech from the throne.  It records motions and 
amendments and, when a roll call is requested pursuant to the rules of the 
legislative chamber, the actual votes cast at each stage of consideration of a 
bill. 
LA Legislative Assembly (the elected lower chamber) 
LC Legislative Council (the upper chamber, usually appointed) 
M.B. Manitoba 
M.H.A, Member of the House of Assembly 
M.L.A. Member of the Legislative Assembly 
M.N.A. Member of the National Assembly 
M.P. Member of Parliament 
N.A.C. National Archives and National Library of Canada 
N.B. New Brunswick 
N.F. Newfoundland and Labrador 
N.S. Nova Scotia 
O.C. Order-in-Council 
P.C. Privy Council 
P.E.I. Prince Edward Island 
Qc Quebec 
R Rex (King) or Regina (Queen) 
Royal Assent Having received majority voters at each ‘reading’, a bill becomes law in 
Canada when it had passed all three readings in both chambers and then 
received Royal assent.  Historically the King (or governor) could withhold 
assent.  There is believed to be a constitutional convention in both the U.K. 
and its former colonies, like Canada, who have retained the monarchy as 
head of state, that assent cannot be withheld. 
S.C.C. Supreme Court of Canada 
Sol.Gen. Solicitor General 
S.K. Saskatchewan 
U.K. United Kingdom of Great Britain and [Northern] Ireland (Ireland, except for 
the North, was separated and given independence as the Irish Republic or 
Eire in 1921) 
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Appendix II: Bibliography 
NB: Commissions of appointment, instructions and despatches, references to legislative debates and 
newspaper articles appear in the text and are not repeated in this bibliography.  Documents available through 
reproduction in sessional papers are noted in footnotes at the outset of each section.  
Canadian Constitutional Acts and Documents 
(in chronological order) 
Édits, ordonnances royaux, déclarations et arrêts du Conseil d'État du roi concernant le 
Canada. 1854. Quebec: De la presse à vapeur de E.R. Fréchette. 
The Royal Proclamation, October 7, 1763 (RSC 1985, Appendices, No. 1) 
The Quebec Act 1774, more formally known as An Act for making more effectual Provision 
for the Government of the Province of Quebec in North America, 14 George III, 
c.83 (U.K.) 
The Constitutional Act 1791, more formally known as An Act to repeal certain Parts of an 
Act, passed in the fourteenth Year of his Majesty's Reign, intitulated, An Act for 
making more effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec, in 
North America; and to make further Provision for the Government of the said 
Province, 31 George III, c.31 (U.K.) 
Newfoundland Fisheries, Judicature and Marriage Acts: 
(i) An Act to Repeal Several Laws relating to the Fisheries Carried on upon the Banks 
and Shores of Newfoundland, and to make Provision for the Better Conduct of the 
said Fisheries for Five Years, 5 George IV c.51 (U.K.) 
(ii) The Newfoundland Act 1824, enacted as An Act for the Better Administration of 
Justice in Newfoundland, and for other purposes, 5 George IV c. 67 (U.K.) 
(iii) An Act to repeal an Act passed in the Fifty-seventh Year of the reign of His late 
Majesty King George the Third, entitled, ‘An Act to regulate the Celebration of 
Marriages in Newfoundland’ and to make further Provision for the Celebration of 
Marriages in the said Colony and its Dependencies, 5 George IV 68 (U.K.) 
An Act to make temporary provision for the Government of Lower Canada, 1840, 1 & 2 
Victoria, c.9 (U.K.) 
The Union Act, 1840, more formally known as An Act to re-unite the Provinces of Upper 
and Lower Canada, and for the Government of Canada, 3-4 Victoria, c.35 (U.K. 
Vancouver’s Island Act, 1849, more formally known as An Act to Provide for the 
Administration of Justice in Vancouver's Island, 12 & 13 Victoria c.48 (U.K.) 
An Act to empower the Legislature of Canada to alter the Constitution of the Legislative 
Council for that Province, and for other purposes, 1854, 17 & 18 Victoria, c.118 
(U.K.) 
An Act to change the Constitution of the Legislative Council by rendering the same 
Elective, 1856, 18 & 19 Victoria, c.140 (Canada) 
British Columbia Act, 1858, more formally known as An Act to Provide for the Government 
of British Columbia, 21 & 22 Victoria, c.99 (U.K.) 
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British Columbia Act, 1866, more formally known as An Act for the Union of the Colony of 
Vancouver Island with the Colony of British Columbia, 29 & 30 Victoria, c.67 
(U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1867 (now Constitution Act, 1867), more formally known as An 
Act for the Union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the 
Government thereof; and for Purposes connected therewith, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 
(U.K.), 31-32 Victoria c. 105 (U.K.) 
Rupert’s Land Act, 1868, more formally known as An Act for enabling Her Majesty to 
accept a surrender upon Terms of the Lands, Privileges, and Rights of “The 
Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson’s Bay,” 
and for admitting the same into the Dominion of Canada, 31-32 Victoria, c.105 
(U.K.)  
Temporary Government of Rupert’s Land Act, 1869, more formally known as An Act for 
the temporary Government of Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory when 
united with Canada, 32-33 Victoria, c.3 (U.K.) 
Manitoba Act, 1870, more formally known as An Act to amend and continue the Act 32 and 
33 Victoria, chapter 3; and to establish and provide for the Government of the 
Province of Manitoba, 33 Victoria, c.3 (Canada) 
Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory Order, more formally known as the Order of 
Her Majesty in Council admitting Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territories 
into the Union, June 23, 1870 (RSC 1985, Appendices, No. 9) 
British Columbia Terms of Union, 1871, more formally known as the Order of Her Majesty 
in Council admitting British Columbia into the Union, May 16, 1871 (RCS 1985, 
Appendices, No. 10) 
British North America Act, 1871 (now Constitution Act, 1871), 34-35 Victoria, c.28 (U.K.) 
The Numbered Indian Treaties (1871-1922) 
Prince Edward Island Terms of Union, known more formally as the Order of Her Majesty 
in Council admitting Prince Edward Island into the Union, June 26, 1873 (RSC 
1985, Appendices, No. 12) 
Parliament of Canada Act, 1875, more formally known as An Act to remove certain doubts 
with respect to the powers of the Parliament of Canada under section eighteen of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, 38-39 Victoria, c.38 (U.K.) 
Adjacent Territories Order, known more formally as the Order of Her Majesty in Council 
admitting all British Territories and Possessions in North America and Islands 
adjacent thereto into the Union, July 31, 1880 (RSC 1985, Appendices, No. 14) 
British North America Act, 1886 (now Constitution Act, 1886), known more formally as An 
Act respecting the Representation in the Parliament of Canada of Territories which 
for the time being form part of the Dominion of Canada, but are not included in any 
Province, 49-50 Victoria, c.35 (U.K.) 
British Columbia Terms of Union, known more formally as the Order of Her Majesty in 
Council admitting British Columbia into the Union, May 16, 1871 (RSC 1985, 
Appendices, No. 10) 
 
 
 
v
Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889, more formally known as An Act to declare the 
Boundaries of the Province of Ontario in the Dominion of Canada, 52-53 Victoria, 
c.28 (U.K) 
Statute Law Revision Act, 1893, more formally known as An Act for further promoting the 
Revision of the Statute Law by repealing Enactments which have ceased to be of 
force or have become unnecessary, 56-57 Victoria, c.14 (U.K.) 
Canadian Speaker (Appointment of Deputy) Act, 1895, Session 2, more formally known as 
An Act for the removing of doubts by the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada 
respecting the Deputy-Speaker of the Senate, 59 Victoria, c.3 (U.K.) 
The Yukon Territory Act, 1898, more formally known as An Act to provide for the 
Government of the Yukon District, 61 Victoria, c.6 (Canada) 
The Alberta Act, 1905, more formally known as An Act to establish and provide for the 
Government of the Province of Alberta, 4-5 Edward VII, c.3 (Canada) 
The Saskatchewan Act, 1905, more formally known as An Act to establish and provide for 
the Government of the Province of Saskatchewan, 4-5 Edward VII, c.42 (Canada) 
British North America Act, 1907 (now Constitution Act, 1907), more formally know as An 
Act to make further provision with respect to the sums to be paid by Canada to the 
several Provinces of the Dominion, 7 Edward VII, c.11 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1915 (now Constitution Act, 1915), more formally known as An 
Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867, 5-6 George V, c.45 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1916, more formally known as An Act to amend the British 
North America Act, 1867, 6-7 George V, c.19 (U.K.) 
Statute Law Revision Act, 1927, more formally known as An Act for further promoting the 
Revision of the Statute Law by repealing Enactments which have ceased to be in 
force or have become unnecessary, 17-18 George V, c.42 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1930 (now Constitution Act, 1930), more formally known as An 
Act to confirm and give effect to certain agreements entered into between the 
Government of the Dominion of Canada and the Governments of the Provinces of 
Manitoba, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan respectively, 20-21 George 
V, c.26 (U.K.) 
Statute of Westminster,1931, or more formally An Act to give effect to certain resolutions 
passed by Imperial Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930 1931, 22 George 
V, c.4 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1940 (now Constitution Act, 1940), more formally known as An 
Act to include unemployment insurance among the classes of subjects enumerated 
in section ninety-one of the Constitution Act, 1867, 3-4 George VI, c.36 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1943, more formally known as An Act to provide for the 
readjustment of the representation of the provinces in the House of Commons of 
Canada consequent on the decennial census taking in the year one thousand nine 
hundred and forty-one, 6-7 George VI, c.30 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1946, more formally known as An Act to provide for the 
readjustment of representation in the House of Commons of Canada on the basis of 
the population of Canada, 9-10 George VI, c.63 (U.K.) 
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Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada (1947), Canada 
Gazette, Part I, Vol. 81, p.3104 
British North America Act, 1949 (now Newfoundland Act), more formally known as An Act 
to confirm and give effect to Terms of Union agreed between Canada and 
Newfoundland,12-13 George VI, c.22 (U.K.) 
British North America Act (No.2), 1949, more formally known as An Act to amend the 
British North America Act, 1867, as respects the amendment of the Constitution of 
Canada, 13 George VI, c.81 (U.K.) 
Statute Law Revision Act, 1950, more formally known as An Act for further promoting the 
Revision of the Statute Law by repealing Enactments which have ceased to be in 
force or have become unnecessary and for facilitation the publication of Revised 
Editions of the Statute, 14 George VI, c.6 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1951, s, more formally known as An Act to amend the British 
North America Act, 1867, 14-15 George VI, c.32 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1952, more formally known as An Act to amend the British 
North America Acts, 1867 to 1951, with respect to the Readjustment of 
Representation in the House of Commons, 1 Elisabeth II, c.15 (Canada) 
British North America Act, 1960 (now Constitution Act, 1960), more formally known as An 
Act to amend the Constitution of Canada, 1867, 9 Elizabeth II, c.2 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1964 (now Constitution Act, 1964), more formally known as An 
Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867, 12-13 Elizabeth II, c.73 (U.K.) 
British North America Act, 1965 (now Constitution Act, 1965), more formally known as An 
Act to make provision for the retirement of members of the Senate, 14 Elizabeth II, 
c.4 (Canada) 
British North America Act, 1974 (now Constitution Act, 1974), originally entitled British 
North America Act (No. 2), 1974 and enacted as Part I of the Representation Act, 
1974, 23 Elizabeth II, c.13 (Canada) 
British North America Act, 1975 (now Constitution Act (No. 1), 1975), was enacted as Part 
I of the Northwest Territories Representation Act, 23-24 Elizabeth II, c.28 (Canada) 
British North America Act (No.2), 1975 (now Constitution Act (No. 2), 1975), 23-24 
Elizabeth II, c.53 (Canada) 
Miscellaneous Statute Law Amendment Act, 1977, 25-26 Elizabeth II, c.28 (Canada) 
Canada Act 1982 (including the Constitution Act, 1982 as Schedule B, Part I of which is 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), more formally known as An Act to 
give effect to a request by the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, 1982, c.11 
(U.K.) 
Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983 
Constitution Act, 1985 (Representation), 33-34-35 Elizabeth II, c.8 (Canada) 
Constitution Amendment, 1987 (Newfoundland Act) 
Constitution Amendment, 1993 (New Brunswick Act) 
Constitution Amendment, 1994 (Prince Edward Island) 
Constitution Amendment, 1997 (Quebec) 
Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1997 (Newfoundland Act) 
Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1998 (Newfoundland) 
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Constitution Act, 1999 (Nunavut) 
Constitution Amendment, 2001 (Newfoundland and Labrador) 
Acts of the British Isles 
(in chronological order) 
Ecclesiastic Appeals Act 1532, enacted as Act in Restraint of Appeals, 1533, 24 Henry VIII, 
c.12 (England) 
Act of Supremacy 1534, 26 Henry VIII, c.1 (England) 
Act of Succession 1534, enacted as an Act Respecting the Oath to the Succession, 26 Henry 
VIII, c.2 (England) 
Crown of Ireland Act 1541, enacted as An Act that the King of England, his Heirs and 
Successors, be Kings of Ireland, 33 Hen 8 c. 1 (Ireland) 
Act of Supremacy 1559, enacted as An Act restoring to the Crown, the ancient Jurisdiction 
over the State Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, and abolishing all foreign Power 
repugnant to the same, 1 Elizabeth, c. 1 (England) 
Act of Supremacy (Ireland) 1560, enacted as An Act restoring to the Crown, the ancient 
Jurisdiction over the State Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, and abolishing all foreign 
Power repugnant to the same, 2 Elizabeth 1, c. 1 (Ireland) 
Navigation Act 1651, enacted as Goods from Foreign parts by whom to be imported 
(Commonwealth of England) 
Staple Act 1663, enacted as An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the 
Navigation of this Nation (Commonwealth of England) 
Plantation Duty Act 1673 (Commonwealth of England) 
Bill of Rights 1688, enacted as An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and 
Settling the Succession of the Crown, 1 William and Mary 2, c.2 (England) 
King William’s Act 1699, enacted as An Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland, 10 
& 11 William III, c.25 (England) 
Act of Settlement 1700, enacted as An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown and 
better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 1 Elizabeth, c. 1 (England) 
Acts of Union 1707: 
(i) Union with England Act 1707, enacted as an Act Ratifying and Approving the 
Treaty of Union of the Two Kingdoms of SCOTLAND and ENGLAND, 1707, c.7 
(Scotland) 
(ii) Union with Scotland Act 1706, enacted as An Act for an Union of the Two 
Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 6 Anne, c.11 (England) 
Succession to the Crown Act 1707, enacted as An Act for the Security of Her Majesties 
Person and Government and of the Succession to the Crown of Great Britain in the 
Protestant Line, 6 Anne, c.41 (Great Britain) 
Palliser's Act 1775, enacted as An act for the encouragement of the Fisheries carried on, 
from Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions in Europe, and for securing 
the return of the fishermen, sailors, and others employed in the said fisheries, to the 
ports thereof, at the end of the fishing season, 15 George III, c.31 (Great Britain) 
Papist Act 1778, enacted as An Act to enable his Majesty's subjects, of whatever 
persuasion, to testify their allegiance to him, 18 George III c. 60 (U.K.) 
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Roman Catholic Relief Act 1791, enacted as An Act for the Relief of His Majesty’s Popish, 
or Roman Catholic, Subjects, , 31 George III. c. 32 (Ireland)  
The Catholic Relief Act 1793, enacted as An Act for the Relief of His Majesty’s Popish, or 
Roman Catholic, Subjects of Ireland, SI 1310-1800 (1786-1801), vol. xvi, 685-692 
(Ireland) 
Acts of Union 1800, enacted as An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland and 
registered in short title as: 
(i) Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 and 40 George III, c.67 (Great Britain) 
(ii) Act of Union (Ireland) 1800, 40 George III, c.38 (Ireland) 
Slave Trade Act 1807, enacted as An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 47 George III, 
c. 36 (U.K.) 
Importation Act 1815, 55 George III, c. 26 (U.K.) 
Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829, enacted as An Act for the Relief of His Majesty’s Roman 
Catholic Subjects, 10 George IV, c.7 (U.K.) 
Reform Act 1832, also known as the Representation of the People Act 1832, enacted as An 
Act to amend the representation of the people in England and Wales, 2 & 3 William 
IV, c.45 (U.K.) 
Judicial Committee Act 1833, enacted as An Act for the better Administration of Justice in 
His Majesty's Privy Council, 3 & 4 William 4, c.41 (U.K.) 
Slavery Abolition Act 1833, enacted as An Act for the Abolition of Slavery throughout the 
British Colonies; for promoting the Industry of the manumitted Slaves; and for 
compensating the Persons hitherto entitled to the Services of such Slaves, 3 & 4 
William IV, c. 73 (U.K.) 
British Settlements Act 1843, enacted as An Act to enable Her Majesty to provide for the 
Government of Her Possessions acquired by Settlement 
Importation Act 1846, 9 & 10 Victoria, c. 22 (U.K.) 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, enacted as An Act to remove Doubts as to the Validity of 
Colonial Laws, 28 & 29 Victoria, c. 63 (U.K.) 
Parliament Act 1911, enacted as An Act to make provision with respect to the powers of the 
House of Lords in relation to those of the House of Commons, and to limit the 
duration of Parliament, 1 & 2 George V, c. 13 (U.K.) 
Acts, Bill and Motions of the Canadian Parliament and Provincial 
Legislatures 
(in chronological order) 
An Act introducing English Civil Law into Upper Canada, 1792, enacted as An Act to 
repeal certain parts of an Act passed in the fourteenth years f His Majesty’s Reign, 
intituled, ‘An Act for making more effectual Provision for the Government of the 
Province of Quebec, in North America’, and to introduce the English law, as the 
Rule of Decision in all matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil 
Rights, 32 George III, c.1 (Upper Canada) 
An Act Establishing Trial by Jury in Upper Canada, 1792, 32 George 111, c.2 
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Upper Canada Abolition Act, 1793, enacted as An Act to Prevent the further Introduction of 
Slaves and to limit the Term of Contracts for Servitude within this Province (Upper 
Canada) 
An Act  for altering and changing the name of this Island, from Saint John to that of Prince 
Edward Island, 1799, 39 George III, c.1 (PEI) 
Canada Tenures Act, 1825, enacted as An Act to provide for the extinction of feudal and 
seigniorial rights and burthens on lands held a titre de fief and a titre de cens in the 
province of Lower Canada: and for the gradual conversion of those tenures into the 
tenure of free and common soccage, and for other purposes relating to the said 
province, 6 George IV, c.59 (Lower Canada) 
Party Processions Act and the Secret Societies Act, 1843, Disallowed (Canada) 
An Act to provide for the payment of Claims arising out of the Rebellion and Invasion in 
Upper Canada, and to appropriate the duties on Tavern Licences to local purposes, 
8 Victoria, c.72 (Canada) 
Simultaneous Polling Act, 1847, 10 Victoria, c.1 (Nova Scotia) 
Rebellion Losses Act, 1849, enacted as An Act to provide for the Indemnification of Parties 
in Lower Canada whose Property was destroyed during the Rebellion in the years 
1837 and 1838 (Canada) 
An Act to increase the number of Members to serve in the General Assembly and to 
consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Elections, 1856, 19 Victoria, c.21 
(Prince Edward Island) 
An Act to change the Constitution of the Legislative Council, by rendering the same 
Elective, 1862, 25 Victoria, c.18 (Prince Edward Island) 
An Act further securing the independence of Parliament, 1868, 31 Victoria, c.25 (Canada). 
An Act to provide for the appointment of Legislative Councillors in the Province of Nova 
Scotia, 1872, 35 Victoria, c.13 (Nova Scotia). 
An Act to abolish the office of Law Clerk of the Legislative Council, 1879, 42 Victoria, c.35 
(Nova Scotia). 
An Act to make the first day of July a Public Holiday by the name of Dominion Day, RSC 
1886, c.3 (Canada). 
An Act respecting the Representation of the People, 1890, 53 Victoria, c.1 (Prince Edward 
Island) 
An Act respecting the Legislature, 1890, 53 Victoria, c.4 (Prince Edward Island) 
An Act relating to the Legislative Council, 1891, 54 Victoria, c.9 (Nova Scotia). 
An Act respecting the Legislature, 1893, 56 Victoria, c.1 (Prince Edward Island). 
Legislature Act 1917, 8 George V, c. 3 (Newfoundland) 
An Act to amend Chapter 2, Revised Statutes, 1923, “Of the Constitution, Powers and 
Privileges of the Houses”, 1925, 15-16 George V, c.16 (Nova Scotia). 
Diamond Jubilee of Confederation Act, 1927, more formally known as An act to 
incorporate a National Committee for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee of 
Confederation, 17 George V, c.6 (Canada) 
An Act Abolishing the Legislative Council and Amending the Constitution of the Province, 
1928, 18 George V, c.1 (Nova Scotia) 
 
 
 
x
Canadian Bill of Rights, enacted as An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, SC 1960, c.44 (Canada) 
An Act respecting the Legislative Council, 1968, 17 Elizabeth II, c.9 (Quebec) 
Supreme Court Act, enacted as An Act respecting the Supreme Court of Canada, RSC 1985, 
c. S-26 (Canada) 
Ministries and Ministers of State Act, enacted as An Act to provide for the establishment of 
Ministries of State and the appointment of Ministers of State, RSC 1985, c.M-8 
(Canada) 
Constitutional Questions Act, enacted as An Act for Expediting the Decision of 
Constitutional and Other Provincial Questions, RSNS, 1989, c.89 (Nova Scotia) 
An Act respecting Constitutional Amendments (regional veto), SC 1996-1998, c.1 (Canada) 
Senate Tenure Bill, which would have been entitled, if adopted and given Royal assent, as 
An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (Senate tenure). 
1) Introduced in the Senate on May 30, 2006, 1st Session 39th Parliament as Bill S-4; 
2) Introduced in the Commons on November 13, 2007, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament as Bill C-19; 
3) Introduced in the Commons on March 3, 2010, 3rd Session, 40th Parliament as Bill C-10. 
Senate Motion No. 6, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament, 2007: “Motion to Urge Governor-in-
Council to Prepare Referendum on Whether the Senate Should be Abolished”. 
Senate Appointment Consultation Bill, which would have been entitled, if adopted by both 
chambers and given Royal assent, as An Act to provide for consultations with 
electors on their preferences for appointments to the Senate. 
1) Introduced in the Commons on December 13, 2006, 1st Session, 39th Parliament, as Bill C-43; 
2) Introduced into the Commons on November 13, 2007, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament, as Bill C-43; 
Senatorial Selection Bill, which would have been entitled, if adopted by both chambers and 
given Royal assent, as An Act respecting the Selection of Senators. 
1) Introduced into the Senate on March 3, 2010, 3rd Session, 40th Parliament, as Bill S-8 
Senate Reform Bill, which would have been entitled, if adopted by both chambers and 
given Royal assent, as An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the 
Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits. 
1) Introduced into the Commons on June 2, 2011, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, as Bill C-7. 
Judicial Decisions 
(in alphabetical order) 
Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp [1774] 204 (King’s Bench, England) 
Knight v Wedderburn [1778], Dictionary of Decisions, vol.xxxiii, p.14545 (Court of 
Session, Scotland) 
Liquidators of Maritime Bank v. Receiver General [1892], AC 437 (Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council) 
R v Knowles, ex parte Somersett [1772] 20 State Tr 1 (King’s Bench, England) 
Re: Authority of parliament in relation to the Upper House, 1 S.C.R. [1980] 54 (Supreme 
Court of Canada). 
Re: Reference of certain matters respecting the Legislative Council of Nova Scotia [1926] 
(Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, c.no.7565). 
Re: Reference of certain matters respecting the Legislative Council of Nova Scotia [1927] 
AC 41 (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) 
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Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, 1 S.C.R. [1981] 753 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
Re: Objection by Quebec to a resolution to amend the Constitution, 2 S.C.R. [1982] 793 
(Supreme Court of Canada). 
Treaties 
(in chronological order) 
Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, more formally known as The Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
betwwn the most Serene and most Potent Princess Anne, by the grace of God, 
Queen of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, and the most Serene and most Potent 
Prince Lewis, the XIVth, the most Christian King, concluded at Utrecht, the 31st 
day of March and the 11th day of April, 1713. 
Treaty of Paris, 1763, more formally known as The definitive Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between his Britannick Majesty, the Most Christian King, and the King 
of Spain. Concluded at Paris the 10th day of February, 1763. To which the King of 
Portugal acceded on the same day. 
The Paris Peace Treaty, 1783, more formally known as the treaty signed: In the name of 
the most holy and undivided Trinity.  It having pleased the Divine Providence to 
dispose the hearts of the most serene and most potent Prince George the Third, by 
the grace of God, king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, 
duke of Brunswick and Lunebourg, arch- treasurer and prince elector of the Holy 
Roman Empire etc., and of the United States of America, to forget all past 
misunderstandings and differences that have unhappily interrupted the good 
correspondence and friendship which they mutually wish to restore, and to establish 
such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse , between the two countries upon the 
ground of reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience as may promote and 
secure to both perpetual peace and harmony. 
Treaty of Paris, 1814, more formally known as the treaty signed: In the Name of the Most 
Holy and Undivided Trinity, His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, and his Allies on the one part, and His Majesty the King of 
France and Navarre on the other part, animated by an equal desire to terminate the 
long agitations of Europe, and the sufferings of Mankind, by a permanent Peace, 
founded upon a just repartition of force between its States, and containing in its 
Stipulations the pledge of its durability, and His Britannic Majesty, together with 
his Allies, being unwilling to require of France, now that, replaced under the 
paternal Government of Her Kings, she offers the assurance of security and stability 
to Europe, the conditions and guarantees which they had with regret demanded 
from her former Government, Their said Majesties have named Plenipotentiaries to 
discuss, settle, and sign a Treaty of Peace and Amity. 
Oregon Treaty, 1846, more formally known as the Treaty between Her Majesty and the 
United States of America, for the Settlement of the Oregon Boundary. 
Anglo-French ‘Entente cordiale’ (1904), includes four memoranda of understanding (and is 
not actually a treaty): 
1. A Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco. 
2. A Convention respecting Newfoundland and West and Central Africa. 
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3. An Exchange of Notes agreeing to the Mutual Appointment of Consuls at St. John's, 
Newfoundland, and at St. Pierre. 
4. A Declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. 
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